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THE 25TH AMENDMENT
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1975

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMM ITEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Wa8hington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Birch Bayh (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Bayh (presiding) and Fong.
Also present: J. William Heckman Jr., chief counsel and Marilyn R.
-

-Berning, assistant clerk.
Senator BAYH. We will convene our hearing.

This morning, we are beginning a series of hearings designed to
review and analyze the implementation, for the first time, of section 2
of the 25th amendment to the Constitution and to examine the way
it has operated as well as to examine several proposals that have been

made for its modification and improvement.
I have a few words as an opening statement here, but I know our
lead witness, the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, is carrying many burdens and is anxious to get on about this business. If my
distinguished colleague from Hawaii feels compelled to proceed now,
he certainly may, and I might suggest we permit the Senator from

Rhode Island to proceed.
Senator FONG. Yes. I know the Senator from Rhode Island is very
busy. I had breakfast with him and he had to run away very early. So
I think we can proceed, Mr. Chairman, without our statements at the
present time.

iS. J. RES. 26, 94th Cong.,
first ses.]

JOINT RESOLUTION -Proposing modification of the twenty-fifth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States.
Reaolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House ooncurring therein),
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of several States
within seven years after the date of final passage of this Joint resolution:
"1AagicL&--

"SECTION 1. If an individual takes the office of Vice President under section 2
of the twenty.fifth article of amendment and subsequently becomes President
under section 1 of that article at a time when more than twelve months remain

in the term of the President, then-

"(a) there shall be a special election for the offices of President and Vice
President,
(1)

2
"(b) section 2 of the twenty-fifth article of amendment shall not apply to the
vacancy in the office of the Vice President caused by such individual becoming
President,
"(c) such individual shall serve as President only until a President elected
in such special election takes the oath of office of President,
"(d) the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall in addition to his
duties as Speaker, act as Vice President, and perform the duties of that office,
with one exception that the President pro tempore of the Senate shall serve as
President of the Senate with voting privileges, until a Vice President elected
in such special election takes the oath of office, and
"(e) In the event the Senate shall be equally divided, the Secretary of State
may cast a vote to break the tie.
"SEC. 2. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the appointment of
electors for President and Vice President shall apply in the case of special
elections required by section 1(a). The Congress shall by law prescribe the date
for such elections and such other matters relating to such elections as may be
necessary to effectuate the purpose of this article.
"SEC. 3. The Individuals elected as President and Vice President in a special
election required by section 1(a) shall become President and Vice President
upon taking their respective oaths of office. Nothing contained in this article
shall affect the terms of the President and Vice President as prescribed by
section I [Section 1] of the twentieth article of amendment.".

STATEMENT OF JOHN 0. PASTORE, SENATOR FROM RHODE ISLAND;
ACCOMPANIED BY, MARTIN DONOVAN, LEGISLATIVE ASSISTANT
Senator PASTORE. I want to thank the chairman and also the members of this committee for the opportunity to present my views on the
25th amendment, its operations, and in particular my own proposal to
perfect its provisions.

Now, I want to say at the very outset that what I am proposing to do
has nothing to do with, nor casts any reflection on, the present incumbents of the Office of the President and Vice President. As a matter
of fact, realizing the procedure for the adoption of a proposal to amend
the Constitution, takes years and years, the present incumbents would
not even be affected by my proposal. At this juncture I would also like
to say that what this committee set out to do in proposing the 25th
amendment did meet the need of the moment. Certain events triggered
the first operation of the 25th amendment. At that time we had the

resignation of a Vice President. There was a vacancy in that office.
And realizing, of course, that the Vice President is only a breath away
from the Presidency and there might be a vacancy in the Presidency,
as did occur, we had to have a line of succession that would make some
sense, and-you provided that succession.
But the fundamental question that has bothered me for the longest
time is that our forefathers in adopting our Constitution specifically
provided that the people through electors would elect the President
and that a President, in order to be an effective President, must be
mandated by the people of the country.
The turn of events has been such that the first Vice President appointed under the 25th amendment did in fact become the President
of the United States by virtue of that amendment and under the 25th
amendment he in turn had to appoint a new Vice President, which of
course he did. He appointed Nelson Rockefeller who was confirmed
both by the House and by the Senate.
The purpose of my proposal is to allow the voice of the people to be
expressed through an election should the situation ever arise where
an appointed Vice President succeeds to the Presidency. It may never
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recur, but if it happened once it could well happen again. It strikes
me that fundamentally, this concept of election is the very efficacy of
our democratic system.
Now, I realize that if this situation occurs within 1 sear before a
general election, you would have a problem as to time. So in my proposed amendment I have deliberately and intentionally stated that if
this occurs within the 1 year, then you do not have a special election.
But should a situation occur where you would possibly have an appointed President and an appointed Vice President, if that situation
arises beyond this period of 1 year, then the Congress of the United
States shall call a special election. If the people of this country should
want to elect this appointed President, it is their privilege and their
prerogative, but at least he will have to present his views to the country

as a whole. That to me is very important, because for the very efficacy
of democracy, you have to have a man chosen by the people.
Now, expressed in very simple terms that is all my amendment does.
That is all it does.
I repeat again, what you did was worthwhile. It has worked well. No
one questions that. But the point is that at the time that you were considering the 25th amendment, it was a very remote feeling, I would
assume, on the part of this committee or anyone else that the occasion
would ever arise that an appointed Vice President-would in fact become
the President of the United States.
Now, I repeat again, this is not directed to Gerald Ford. This is not
directed to Nelson Rockefeller. This has nothing to do with the individuals. I am merely discussing a matter of principle. I am discussing
an incident of principle and all I am saying is that in the event that
both the President and the Vice President become appointed officials
rather than elected officials, then if this occurs 1 year before the next
general election, the Congress of the United States shall call a special
election.
Senator FoNe. Those circumstances, Mr. Senator, you would have
to set certain date limits, would you not, because this would-if you
do not set the date limits The President could wait until the %yearand
then try to appoint his Vice President to get away from an election.
Senator PASTORE. No. Under my proposal the election process is
triggered the minute that the appointed Vice President becomes the
President. Under the 25th amendment he shall appoint a Vice President. But, if he refuses to do that it would not make any difference
at all. The minute you have an appointed President then under my
amendment you will have to have a special election process set in
motion.

Senator FoNo. If he takes some time in appointing that Vice
PresidentSenator PASTORE. It would not make any difference.
Senator FONG [continuing]. And the Congress defers in the confirmation, then what happens?
Senator PASTORE.Well, you could-as a matter of fact, if the committee were amenable to my proposal,- they could write right in the
amendment itself that he shall act within a period of 10 days or
what have you. I mean, after all, that is only a detail. I would not
excuse it.
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Senator BAYH. I do not want to interrupt the Senator. Are you
through?
Senator PASTORE. Only one more thing. I ask, Mr. Chairman, that
at this point the text of Senate Joint Resolution 26 be printed in the
record. I also have a statement here that I ask to be placed in the
record as though read and a section by section explanation of the
proposal along with a brief prepared by my assistant and the Library
of Congress. I ask that that also be made a part of the record.
Senator BAYH. Without objection, so ordered.
[The material referred to. follows:]
[S. J. RES. 26, 94th Cong., first sess.]
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing modification of the twenty-fifth amendment of the Constitution of the
United States.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein),
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, which shall be valid to all Intents and purposes as part of the
Constitution if ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years after the date of final passage of this Joint resolution:
"ARTICLE"SECTION 1. If an individual takes the office of Vice President under section 2
of the twenty-fifth article of amendment and subsequently becomes President
under section 1 of that article at a time when more than twelve months remain
In the term of the President, then"(a) there shall be a special election for the offices of President and Vice
President.
"(b) section 2 of the twenty-fifth article of amendment shall not apply to the
vacancy in the office of the Vice President caused by such individual becoming
President.
"(c) such individual shall serve as President only until a President elected In
such special election takes the oath of office of President,
"(d) the Speake..r of the House of Representatives, shall in addition to his
duties as Speake'.', act as Vice President, and perform the duties of that office,
with one exception that the President pro tempore of the Senate shall serve as
President of the Senate with voting privileges, until a Vice President elected in
such special election takes the oath of office, and
"(e) in the event the Senate shall be equally divided, the Secretary of State
may cast a vote to break the tie.
"SEc. 2. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the appointment of
electors for President and Vice President shall apply in the case of special elections required by section 1(a). The Congress shall by law prescribe the date for
such elections and such other matters relating to such elections as may be necessary to effectuate the purpose of this article.
"SEC. 3. The Individuals elected as President and Vice President In a special
election required by section 1 (a) shall become President and Vice President upon
taking their respective oaths- of office. Nothing contained in this article shall
affect the terms of the President and Vice President as prescribed by section 1
of the twentieth article of amendment.".
TESTIMONY BY SENATOR JOHN 0. PASTORLE

Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I would like to thank you for the opportunity
to present my views on the 25th Amendment and its operation and, in particular,
my proposal to perfect those procedures.
As I have said publicly many times before, I have no quarrel with every section
of the 25th Amendment and what it proposes to accomplish. Its provisions to fulfill a vacancy In the office of Vice President are undisputed. It works smoothly, as
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we have already seen. It establishes a badly needed mechanism for transformation of power to the Vice President in the event the President Is
incapacitated.
But the scope of the 25th Amendment must be limited so that an appointed
official should not succeed to the Presidency except on an interim basis. This Is
precisely the reason why I have introduced a Joint resolution to amend the
Constitution to provide for a special election once an appointed Vice President
accedes to the Presidency to Jill a vacancy. My sole purpose is to correct what I
perceive to be an omission, if not a flaw, In the 25th Amendment.
A look at the proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 clearly

demonstrates that our founding fathers intended that the President and Vice
President should be elective officers and that they explicity rejected the notion
that the President should be appointed.
Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution declares without equivocation that the
President and Vice President "be elected."
Therefore, under my proposal there would be a special election for the office
of President and Vice President if an appointed Vice President accedes to the
Presidency with more than twelve months to serve.
The special election would be held on a date to be set by Congress. I want it
distinctly understood that my proposal in no way affects the powers of the
present incumbents In these offices. This Is not the reason for my proposal. As
a matter of fact, the present situation may never rise again; on the other hand,
it could, and that is the reason why I believe that the Constitution should be
perfected in this manner.
I would like, at this time, Mr. Chairman, to include as part of my remarks
a memorandum prepared by my staff and the staff of the Library of Congress
which sets forth the legal and historical background for my proposal and also
contains a section-by-section analysis of S. J. Res. 28.
POPULAR ELECTIONS AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: AN HISTORICAL
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM

An examination of our election machinery and the portions of the United
States Constitution dealing with the office of the President and Vice President
reveals a serious condition which is diametrically opposed to the American
concept of popular elections. Under the Constitution, as it stands today, it is possible that the Office of the
President and the Office of the Vice President be occupied by appointment rather
than by electoral process. Conceivably this situation could continue for almost
four years before a national election was held.
By operation of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, if the office
of the Vice President becomes vacant, the President shall appoint a new Vice
President.
During that term, if the office of President becomes vacant the "appointed"
Vice President will become the President.
Again, by operation of the Twenty.Fifth Amendment, this new President appoints a Vice President. We then have both offices billed by appointed individuals
rather than by elected individuals. How many times this process could reoccur
in the span of the original four-year term is left to conjecture.
The possibility of these events actually coming to pass was either overlooked
by the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or considered too remote to
warrant a separate clause in that Amendment. Perhaps the problem was not
considered serious at that time. Times change.
As Richard P. Longaker, Professor of Political Science and Chairman of
Department, University of California, Los Angeles, concluded in his article
"Presidential Continuity: The Twenty-Fifth Amendment".
"When the twenty-fifth amendment is first applied, flaws now hidden will no
doubt appear. Some of the Inevitable imperfections are already evident, though
their seriousness will depend on factors extrinsic to the wording of the amendment. (See, "Selected Materials on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Oct. 1973,
Committee on the Judiciary, pg. 211, at 286).
Professor Longaker was indeed prophetic in his remarks in February of 1966.
Today we are facing the appearance of one of these flaws, no longer hidden, but
patently obvious. While the idea of repealing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
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need not be considered, some consideration must be given to an amendment
which will improve the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. President Harry S. Truman,
as indicated in the House documents of the 1st session of the 79th Congress
(June 19, 1945 p. 6272) seemed genuinely concerned that it was undemocratic
for a Vice President who had succeeded to the Presidency to be able to appoint
his successor. He said in a letter to the Senate:
"* * * it now lies within my power to nominate the person who would be my

immediate successor in the event of my own death or inability to act.
I do not believe that in a democracy this power should rest with the Chief
Executive.
Insofar as possible, the office of the President should be filled by an elective
officer. There is no officer in one system of government, besides the President and
Vice President, who has been elected by all the voters of the country".
How much more undemocratic would it be for the appointed successor to appoint his successor? This situation should not be tolerated in our democratic
system.
At this juncture, the concept of electing the President, should be analyzed from
historical and legal viewpoints to remove any question as to the intent of the
framers of the Constitution and the courts.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

From the creation of the presidency to the present, that office has been one that
has been dominantly characterized as elected as opposed to appointed. The Constitutional Convention in 1787 had as one of its main objectives the development
of the office of the President. One of the first provisions discussed at that Convention was the manner of electing the chief executive of the States. The first proposal was made by James Wilson, a lawyer, a chief architect of the Supreme
Court and one of Washington's initial appointments as Associate Justice. Wilson's
proposal was that the President be named by direct "election by the people". The
proceedings of the Convention were secret, but according to James Madison's
Journal, at least six delegates, including 'Madison himself and four other lawyers,
endorsed Wilson's suggestion. No less than eight other methods of electing the
President-among them the electoral college system-were proposed. Some of
them were first adopted and then reconsidered and rejected. Not until the final
weeks of the Convention was the electoral college method adopted. Thus, it was
quite clear from the beginning of our constitutional form of government that the
office of the presidency was to be an elected one and not an appointed one.
Moreover, at the Convention of 1787, Edmund Randolph submitted a plan of a
national government in which he proposed "a national executive to be chosen by
the national legislature for the term of

years . . . and to be ineligible a

second time." Charles Pinckney, at the same time, proposed "that the executive
power be vested in a President of the United States of America, which shall be
his style; and his title shall be 'His Excellency.' He shall be elected for
years, and shall be reeligible." The first decision of the Convention was that the
term of the Executive should be seven years. James Wilson proposed that there
should be "certain districts in each State which should appoint electors to elect
outside of their own body." In these three propositions were the essential elements of nearly all the features of the plan ultimately adopted. Again such propositions make it quite clear that the Convention's concept of the President was one
that called for his election rather than appointment.
It should be noted that the Convention first adopted a resolution that the Executive should be chosen by Congress; it also adopted a resolution that the executive
power should be vested in one person. Elbrldge Gerry proposed that the Executive
should be elected by the governors of the several States; this plan was defeated.
Alexander Hamilton presented a draft of a constitution to the Convention according to which the choice of a single executive officer, a President, was to be made by
electors chosen by the people similar to the way they are now actually chosen;
and in case there was no choice by a majority of such electors, then an election
from among the three highest candidates was to be made by a body of second
electors two for each State, to be chosen by the first electors at the time of voting
for a President who were to meet in one place and to be presided over by the
Chief Justice.
The whole focus of the Convention of 1787 was in terms of electing the chief
Executive and not appointing him. It was not until the final weeks of the Convention that the electoral college method of electing the Piresident was adopted. It
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was not an ideal way or even the best way of choosing a President; rather it was
a compromise device. The Convention refused to give the election of the President
to the people; it also rejected amendments to give each State one vote for President; and it defeated a proposition to give a casting vote to the President of the
Senate.
Alexander Hamilton in the Fcderalist No. 68 (March 12, 1788) asserted the
following in emphasizing the need for having the President elected:
"The mode of appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States is almost
the only part of the system, of any consequence, which has escaped without severe
censure, or which has received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to
admit, that the election of the president is pretty well guarded. I venture somewhat further; and hesitate not to affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect,
it is at least excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages; the
union of which was to be desired.
"It was desirable, that the sense of the people should operate in the choice of the
person to whom so important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered
by committing the right of making it, not to any pre-established body, but to men,
chosen by the people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
"All these advantages will be happily combined in the plan devised by the convention; which is, that the people of each state shall choose a number of persons
as electors, equal to the number of senators and representatives of such state in
the national government, who shall assemble within the state and vote for some
fit person as president. Their votes, thus given, are to be transmitted to the seat of
the national government, and the person who may happen to have a majority of
the whole number of votes will be the president. But as a majority of the votes
might not always happen to center on one man and as it might be unsafe to permit
less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided, that in such a contingency,
the house of representatives shall select out of the candidates, who shall have the
five highest numbers of votes, the man who in their opinion may be best qualified
for the office;"
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Article II, Section I of the Constitution explicitly states that the President and
Vice President of the United States "be elected". The immediate source of Article
II was the New York Constitution in which the governor was elected by the people
and thus independent of the legislature. His term was three years and he was
indefinitely eligible. However, the ultimate plan that was adopted by the Convention was not one that was based on the New York way of electing its governor.
The adoption of the electoral college plan came late in the Convention which
had previously adopted on four other occasions provisions for the election of the
Executive by the Congress and had twice defeated proposals for the election by
the people directly. The electoral college, however, probably did not work as any
member of the Convention could have foreseen because the development of political parties and nomination of presidential candidates through them and the designntion of electors by the Iarties soon reduced the concept of the elector as all
independent force to the vanishing point in practice if not in theory. But the college remains despite numerous efforts to adopt another method.
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution provides:
"Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Representative or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the
United States, shall be appointed an Elector."
Although Clause 2 seemingly vests complete discretion in the States, certain
older cases recognized a federal interest in protecting the integrity of the
process. The Supreme Court has upheld the power of Congress to protect the
right of all citizens who are entitled to vote to lend aid and support in any
legal manner to the election of any qualified person as a presidential elector,
Ex Parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884). The Yarbrough Court found that it

is the duty of the Government to see that citizens may exercise the right to vote
freely and to protect them from violence while so doing and that the votes by
which its members of Congress and its President are elected shall be the free
votes of the electors, Id., 662. That Court also found that the right to vote is
based upon the Constitution and not upon State law and that Congress has the
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power to pass laws for the pure, free, and safe exercise of this right, Id 669=104.
Its power to protect the choice of electors from fraud or corruption was sustained in Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
More recently, substantial curbs on state discretion in regulating the selection
of electors have been instituted by both the Supreme Court and Congress. In
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), the Court struck down a complex state
scheme which effectively limited access to the ballot to the electors of the two
major political parties. In the Court's view, the system violated the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it favored some and
disfavored others and burdened both the right of individuals to associate
together to advance political beliefs and the right of qualified voters to cast
ballots for electors of their choice. The Court denied that the language of
Article II, Section I, Clause 2 immunized such state practices from judicial
scrutiny, and the Court rejected the notion that Article II, Section I of the
Constitution gives the States the power to impose burdens on the right to vote
where such burdens are expressly prohibited in other constitutional provisions.
In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), the Court upheld the power of
Congress to reduce the voting age in presidential elections and to set a thirty(lay residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elections; the
rationale was that the Fourteenth Anendment limits state discretion in prescribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in enforcing the
Fourteenth Amendment may override state practices which violate that Amendment and substitute standards of its own.
IV. SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

It seems quite clear, both from a historical analysis and a legal analysis, that
the concept of the presidency was embodied with the understanding that the
office was to be an elected one as opposed to being an appointed one. Moreover,
the right to vote for the President has been upheld and safeguarded as the
above cases have indicated. Congress has the power to protect that right to vote
for the highest office of the land as well as the power to protect the election of
the President and the Vice President from corruption, Burr-ughs and Cannon
v. United States, supra.

It is now time for reflection to see if we have not strayed somewhat from
our basic goal of rule by the people. If we have we must take the necessary steps
to return to our primal goals.
When the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was being considered, arguments were
made as to whether or not we needed to have a Vice President appointed, should
a vacancy in that office occur. Some felt that the Succession Act of 1947 was
adequate assurance of continuity of leadership. However, at least two-thirds of
the Senate, two-thirds of the House, and three-quarters of the States decided
that we should always have a Vice President. It is believed that this office is the
best grooming one can have in case he be called on to succeed to the Presidency.
All this precaution is admirable and, indeed, prudent. The one vital ingredient
missing is the choice of the people. The established machinery is admirable,
but it should apply only to provide a suitable interim president-one who would
serve only until the people choose a new President and Vice President by
election.
In addition, a limit must be placed on the term of a president who neither
faced an election nor received the mandate of the people. He should not be
permitted to appoint his own successor. These choices must be returned to the
people at the earliest practical time. No alternative can suffice if we are to
remain a democracy.
The American people are willing to forego immediate choice in return for the
assurance of capable leadership in a time of crisis accompanying a vacancy in
the presidency.
However, it is doubtful that the American people want to give up this choice
covering an indeterminable number of possible presidents for possibly four
years.
To restore this choice to the American people the Pastore Amendment would
provide for a special election for president and vice president when an individual
who has been appointed Vice President hy operation of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment succeeds to the office of the President.
A section-by-section analysis of the Pastore Amendment follows:
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"Section 1. If an individual takes the office of Vice President under section
2 of the XXVth article of amendment and subsequently becomes President
under section 1 of that article at a time when more than twelve months remain
in the term of the President, then"(a) there shall be a special election for the offices of President and Vice
President,
"(b) section 2 of the XXVth article of amendment shall not apply to the
vacancy in the office of the Vice President caused by such individual's becoming
President,
"(c) such Individual shall serve as President only until a President elected
in such special election takes the oath of office of President,
"(d) the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall in addition to his duties
as Speaker, act as Vice President, and perform the duties of that office, with the
one exception that the President pro tempore of the Senate shall serve as President of the Senate with voting privileges until a Vice President elected in such
special election takes the oath of office, and
"(e) in the event the Senate shall be equally divided, the Secretary of State
may cast a vote to break the tie."
This section is designed to create a special election for the office of President
and Vice President when an appointed Vice President pursuant to section 2 of
article 25 succeeds to the presidency pursuant to section 1 of that amendment.
More than twelve months must remain in the term of the former president in
order for the election process to be implemented. This was done to provide
enough time for proper choice of candidates by all parties wishing to announce a
candidate. Any time less than twelve months was not considered to constitute an
abrogation of the electLrate's constitutional right to choose the president by
election.
The special election process was provided in order to avoid any possible unconstitutionality of a special election grounded on an interpretation of the necessary and proper clause of Article I.
Section 2 of the XXVth article of amendment shall not apply to the vacancy in
the vice presidency because that vacancy will automatically be filled by an acting
Vice President in the person of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This
avoids the necessity for repealing any portion of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
The Speaker of the House of Representatives would assume all duties of the
Vice President but would not give up his duties as Speaker In order that there be
as little change as possible in the status quo during the transition period after a
vacancy. This is also in keeping with the spirit of the current laws of succession.
The one exception to the Speaker assuming all of the vice president's duties is
that the President pro tempore of the Senate became the President of the Senate
assuming this natural function. This was done in order that the leadership of
both legislative bodies remain separate.
The President pro tempore would retain his voting privileges in order that no
state he denrived of its two votes. In the event of a tie In the Senate, the Secretary of State may cast the tie-breaking vote. This was done because the Secretary
of State is the next in line of succession in the Executive Branch behind the
Vice President who would normally have that right under the Constitution.
The appointed vice president who succeeded to the presidency would serve as
president and not as "acting president". His term would end when the newly
elected president (after the special election) took his oath of office. The Speaker
and the President pro tempore would return to their normal functions when
the Vice President elect took his oath of office.
"Section 2. The provisions of this Constitution relating to the appointment of
electors for President and Vice President shall apply in the case of special elections required by section 1 (a). The Congress shall by law prescribe the date for
such elections and such other matters relating to such elections as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this article".
This section is designed to afford the special election the same treatment as a
regular election and to utilize the existing system for elections. The only substantial change would be the date for such elections.
Under the Pastore Amendment Congress is given the flexibility to establish the
date of election as circumstances dictate.
"Section 3. The individuals elected as President and Vice President in a special
election required by Section 1(a) shall become President and Vice President
upon taking their respective oaths of office. Nothing contained in this article shall
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affect the terms of the President and Vice President as prescribed by section 1
of the XXth article of amendment."
The intent of this article is to insure that the individuals elected in a special
election would serve only the remainder of the established term. This also precludes the necessity of repeal of the 20th Amendment.
The Pastore Amendment strives to work within the framework established by
the Constitution from its inception to the present day. It begins and ends with
the proposition that the people should elect their President and Vice President
and to preserve this right this constitutional amendment Is required.

Senator BAYH. Could I ask you to think out-loud on a matterI
Senator PASTORE. Yes.

Senator BAYJI. I have been involved in this matter since its infancy.
I have the mixed feeling of-I guess it goes with some very human
feeling of pride of being involved-but concern over some thin that
are happening now that I wish were not, as a result. This is in refrence
to the decisions of the person chosen and I think we have that liability
regardless of how the individual is chosen.
As best I can recall, the whole purpose for this article 2 was to use
it. It could not be used unless the circumstances which the Senator
from Rhode Island is concerned about took place.
Senator PASTORE. That is right.
Senator BATH. I mean, one can argue that you should have a Vice
President just to function as a Vice President while I am prepared to
accept the fact that the Vice President today has been utilized. Since
President Truman started utilizing Alben Barkley, we had a change.
Instead of the Vice President being, as John Nance Garner described
him, as not worth a pitcher of warm spit and other less flattering
descriptions, we have had the Vice President perform a living role.
But the real reason for this was to provide someone who could fill in
and could provide continuity in a manner that would be acceptable to
the people, and we have gone through very tortuous circumstances
with the Agnew-Nixon double whammy-the likes of which we have
not seen in 200years. I may be wrong, but in my judgment the 25th
amendment made it possible for us to change leaders without going
through an impeachment trial. There are some people that say, we
should have purified ourselves. We should have gone through some sort
of a catharsis which I do iot think would have benefited anybody. An
impeachment would have disrupted the country. torn us ip, I think.
Even though the Judiciary Committee in the House, which is one of the
most salutary things--few salutary things that happened in this tragic
time-did give the people a chance to see men and women of both
parties struggling with their consciences and making an objective appraisal. I just want to say that the only reason the Amendment is there
is in the event it has to be used. The impact of your amendment, which
we are going to give serious consideration to, would suggest there
would be no other purpose for article 2 except for a loss of both the
President and Vice President.
Senator PASTORE. That is right.
Senator BAYHI. And let me ask about one concern.
Senator PASTORE. Before you do, let me say this: what you set out to
do, you did perfectly. You did marvelously well. But I do not think it
entered anybody's m'inds ,tA the time, that we were going to meet with the
situation that confront ott us when Nixon resigned.
Senator BAYH. Not the Agnew-Nixon thing. No, sir.
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Senator PASTORE. You see, I am not saying it is a flaw, although it
could be considered a flaw, but it is an omission that is understandable.
What you started out to do, you did very very well. You filled the Office
of the Vice Presidency, and today in the kind of world in which we
live we need a Vice President to assist the President in his many chores.
Under the Constitution, his only right as you have well said is to preside over the Senate. He does not even have a right to speak unless the
Senate gives him permission to speak. All he has is the power to break
a tie. That is the only time he can vote. We understand all that, but
today in the complexity of our modern world a Vice President is a
very, very important Ambassador for the President. He assumes chores
that have to do with the domestic situation as Nelson Rockefeller is
doing.
I repeat again, this is not aimed at the personalities, this is not
aimed at Gerald Ford as the President. This has nothing to do with
him because it could not affect him in the least. It has nothing to do
with Nelson Rockefeller, but all I am saying is in the annals of our
history, and I hope this Republic lasts for all eternity, the time might
come when this may happen again. What if it does happen soon after
the general, quadrennial election? Let's assume that by some unexplainable or unimaginable situation, we lose a Vice President and then
a President who have been elected by the people within a month after
they qualify for the office. This country will be subjected to being
governed by two individuals who have not been elect edby the people,
for a period of almost 4 years.
Now, it may be a good thing, it may not be a good thing, but after
all, it is inimitable to the very sense of our Constitution which provided that the people through the electoral college shall elect their
President. That is the bulwark of democracy, because if our Founding
Fathers wanted to appoint, they would have provided for it. Moreover, that argument was made during the Constitutional Convention.
That argument was made, and it was finally decided that he had to
be elected, and that is the reason why they wrote it into the Constitution. All I am saying is that the situation that exists today, you
see, is inimicable to that original sense and that concept, that it could
happen again in the future, and that we ought to begin to think about
it.
I realize this is a highly academic situation, but there are those of
us who believe that we have a responsibility to respond in the construction of our Constitution to make it perfect, as perfect as it can
be. We are worried about the present situation and the real possibility
that it could arise again.
Senator BAYH. May I ask if you would just give us your thoughts
about one of the concerns I have about the alternative of an election,
and I am normally an election man. As you know, you have been a
cosponsor of our efforts in which we are continuing to do something
about the electoral college. The people do not elect the President. The
people elect the electors. The reason the electoral college was designed
is not being fullfilled. We would all be passed if the system was individual electors casting individual votes; yet they may. So, the theory
of an election is good.
Now, your proposal would elect both the President and the Vice
President?

12
Senator PASTORE. That is correct.
Senator BAYH. Therefore, you would not have a split between the
Presidency and the Vice Presidency as some proposals which would
just elect the President?
Senator PASTORE. That is right.
Senator BAYR. Nor elect a Vice President to fill the vacancy by an
election?
Senator PASTORE. That is right.
Senator BAYH. The period by which we change national leadersother than the normal quadrennial period, death, assassination, resignation-is a very emotional period. It is a time of instability, instances of doubt, and in this instance, an unfortunate situation that
had not existed in 200 years. I do not think my distinguished colleague from Hawaii, who helped put this together, and I know I did
not, could envision this kind of thing happening. We hope and pray
it does not happen again. But if the situation goes to the very credibility of the previous election, then it is different than the Kennedy
situation or a Roosevelt death. I just ask you to give us your thoughts
about those two particular times because I am certain you can remember the spirit of the country-the concern that people had. The
question was raised, could we get along without an FDR? What about
the Kennedy assassination where the country doubted-they wondered? The fact that there was a Vice President who could move on
in there with a ready transition, sort of like a rock, I mean caused us
all to rally around 'him and to get together and to unite. Both the
men that succeeded were wise enough to say, "OK, let us pull together
and carry on the former leader's mandate."
Now, the only down side I can see about an election-we are all committed to elections, but they are not without significant controversy.
Also, they are not without divisiveness and polarization; and that
kind of experience would be thrust onthe country at a time when we
really need something to pull us together.
Senator PASTORE. Well, that is true, and you are reciting in a very
indirect way what I said at the convention in 1964. At a time when
Lyndon Johnson was up for election. Of course, Lyndon Johnson
was elected as Vice President of the United States. It is not the same
situation of which we are talking about now. He was an elected Vice
President and he would step into the Presidency, and in a case like
that my amendment would not take effect. I said at that convention
in 1964, and I can echo what I said, "In a moment of national tragedy,
the Nation took a measure of that man, and Lyndon Johnson was not
found wanting." However, he was an elected Vice President.
But today the situation we have, neither the President nor the Vice
President is elected by the people. And in the minds of some people,
that raises the question whether democracy should operate in that way.
Now, understand, maybe through the appointment process you might
possibly get a better man than if he were elected President, but that
is not the point. The point is that it should go back to the people.
The appointed Vice President who becomes President shall only be
an interim President. Then if he wants to stand up before the people
and if the people elect him; then he is mandated by the people. I
think that even Gerald Ford would feel more comfortable if he had
been elected as President of the United States.
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Not that I am faulting him that he was not. I mean please do not
misunderstand me, but I would like to feel that I am m the Senate
of the United States because the people sent me here, and not because
the Governor appointed me to come here. It is a comfortable feeling
to know that the people sent you here.
Senator BAYH. Indeed it is. I have just gone through that for the
third time. It is a sense of satisfaction.
Senator PASTORE. I have been through it five times.
Senator BAYH. Well, I know I am still in the minor leagues compared to my distinguished colleague from Rhode Island. But let me
share a thought with you. You might comment or not, about the
similarity between the way the second section of the 25th amendment
is supposed to work and the present electoral process, where the Senator from Rhode Island knows painfully well we elect electors, 535
or so, I guess. We elect two or three more from the District of
Columbia now. Three. So it would be 538 electors.
Senator PASTORE. Well, of course, the Senator from Rhode Island
has always felt we were a government of the people, for the people,
and by the people, and I believe in popular elections, but in this day
and age, and in this point in time, I do not think you would ever
pass it in the Senate of the United States, because that is a unibody.
Senator Fox.o. Coming from a small State, you would look at it
twice, would you not?
Senator PASTORE. No. No. As a matter of fact, I am really for
popular elections. I feel that this is a government of people and that
the people ought to elect their President directly without regard to
the electoral college, but you cannot argue that the electoral college
defeats the purpose of my amendment for the simple reason that even
those electors are elected.
Senator FoNo. But in view of the fact that we have to proclaim a
day in which the delegates would be elected to go to the convention,
then you are going to have to have a convention, and after the convention there will be time for elections. It will probably take about 4 or
5 months before the machinery can be put into action.
Senator PASTORE. That is right, and the presentSenator Foxo. You do not figure that the 1 year you propose is a
little short?
Senator PASTORE. No. As a matter of fact, the 1 year term, you see,
would make my amendment inoperable. In other words, if the election
was to take place, let us say, on November 5, 1976, whatever the date,
and the vacancies occur, you see, on November 10th of 1975, my amendment would not apply, you see. But if it occurred before the 1 yearnow, yoti-could make it 18 months. I do not care how you make it
but the point here is that it has got to be x convenient time in order
for the Congress to stipulate what the procedure shall be. It might
be a regular full-blown convention, it could be a mini-convention, it
could be the executive committee of the parties. It could be almost
anything. But that would be up to the Congress. The Congress would
spell out the procedure and the procedure would have to be consonant

---with what the time element might be.

Senator BAYH. I just want to complete my thought of a moment
ago. This is to suggest that the electoral college would defeat the purpose of the Senator's amendment. But rather, it is to suggest that if
54-563 0 - 75 - 2
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there was a fault in the way we approached the Ford and Rockefeller
nominations in Congress it was that some of our colleagues did not
understand what their role was. Their role was to serve as an electoreven more than the elector that is elected in a Presidential election.
There was no question. Some of our colleagues on the floor debated
this, countrarywise, but they must not have been present when we
were forming this on the floor. The debate is replete time after time
where the Senator from Indiana, the Senator from Illinois, Senator
Dirksen, and several others who were involved in this, the distinguished gentleman from Hawaii. stressed the fact that our role was
to represent the people. This was not an advise and consent process
like an Ambassador or Cabinet official. That is why we brought in
the House, the most populous body. I do not know whether that eases
the concern that the Senator from Rhode Island has. I would feel a
bit easier about this if, indeed, our colleagues had recognized that the
process was more than advise and consent.
Senator PASTOR. 'Well, now, if you look at related situations, under
the Constitution, if you look at the 12th amendment you will find
that the House does make a choice where there is a tie between two
candidates, but you have got to realize the predicate there is that these
two candidates did go before the people. Article 20 of the Constitution has to do with qualifying an elected Vice President to assume the
office of the Presidency until the President qualifies, but there again
he had been elected by the people. So, if under the Constitution, the
requirement is that you must be 35 years of age before you can ascend
to the Presidency of the United States, and by chance, as has happened many times in the Senate, a person who has not yet reached
eligible age has to wait before he can take his oath of office to qualify,
in that particular case the 20th amendment is invoked but there again
they are dealing withindividuals who have been elected by the people.
So, if a young man or a young woman who runs for the Presidency
is elected to that office when they are 33 years old, or 34 years old, the
20th amendment is invoked to say that the Vice President shall be
the acting President during the i~iability of the elected President to
qualify. And then when he becomes 35 years, of age, automatically he
takes the oath of office and the Vice President steps down from the
acting Presidency.
I want to thank the committee for your kindness and your courtesy,
and I hope that we have been somewhat helpful.
Senator BAYI-. We appreciate your concern. Senator Pastore.
Senator BAYH. I have here a statement of Charles A. Wright, who
is the Charles T. McCormick Professor of Law at the University of
Texas, who is one of the distinguished constitutional Lawyers of the
country who was asked to testify. Mr. 'Wright found it impossible to
be here but did send a rather comprehensive statement which I think
will be helpful to us to submit in the record.
[Statement referred to follows:]
STATEMENT OF CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT

I am Charles Alan Wright. I hold the Charles T. McCormick Professorship
of Law at The University of Texas. For many years I have taught Constitutional Law and I have written extensively in that field of the law. Like all of
those who are Interested in the Constitution and the form of government we
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enjoy in this country, I followed closely the process that led to the adoption of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967 and the two very recent occasions in which
the provisions of 1 2 of the Amendment, dealing with a vacancy in the office of
the Vice President, have been used.

In my judgment the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has worked well. It would, I
think, be a mistake to propose any change in it.
In part that conclusion stems from my general attitude that we should proceed very cautiously indeed in amending the Constitution. After the adoption
of the Bill of Rights in 1791, the Constitution was amended only 12 times in
160 years. It is true that we have turned to the amendatory process more
frequently in very recent years, with four amcadments adopted and another
pending for ratification since 1961. Of course we should not refrain from amendments when the need for them is clear. Article V is as vital a part of the Constitution as any other. Nevertheless constitutional amendment should not be undertaken lightly, and should not be attempted until there is a clear national consensus that the Constitution, as it stands, is defective in some particular and
that the proposed change would indeed be an improvement.
I am not persuaded that either of these criteria is satisfied with regard to 12
of Amendment XXV. The objection seems to be that for the first time in our
-history we have a President and a Vice President, neither of whom has been
elected by the people. The events that have led to the present situation are unprecedented in our history, and while the same result could occur under more
routine circumstances-as if, for example, an elected Alice President who were
to succeed to the Presidency on the death of the incumbent were himself to die
or become disabled while in office-the possibility that this circumstance might
occur for brief periods on very rare occasions does not seem the kind of rear
need for which the amendatory process is intended.
More fundamentally, the objection to the present state of affairs seems to me
more verbal than real. It is only in the most formal and technical sense that
our regular Vice Presidents are "elected." It stretches reality to suggest that
the voters of the country really chose to have Calvin Coolidge or Harry Truman
as second in line for the Presidency. I suggest that that is true also of Lyndon
Johnson. Altlmugh he may have helped the 1960 Democratic ticket in the South,
and his presence on the ticket may have tipped the scales in a close election,
it is far from clear that he would have been the winner in a separate election
to be Vice President.
Although President Ford and Vice President Rockefeller have never been
elected to national office, their nominations as Vice President were confirmed
by both Houses of Congress, in which the elected representatives of the nation
do sit. They were each, when nominated, men of national stature with wide
experience in public affairs, who do not suffer from comparison with the great
majority of vice-presidential candidates hastily chosen by one who has been
nominated for the Presidency at the end of a hectic convention and routinely
approved for second place on the ticket by the convention itself. The careful
scrutiny given every aspect of their lives in the confirmation process provides
safeguards wholly unknown in the selection of most of our Vice Presidents.
Thus I think that the procedure introduced in 1967 has functioned well when
it was put to the test-and it seems to me far superior to any alternative I have
heard discussed. Surely it would be unthinkable to go back to the former student
in which the Speaker of the House of Representatives was next In line if there
was a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. History is filled with those who have
served the country well as Speaker who would have been ill-suited, often because
of age, for the Presidency. There is the further difficulty that the Speaker not
infrequently is not of the President's party, and to make him next in line incurs
a substantial risk that the fortuities of death or disability may take the Presidency away from a party that has been given a popular mandate to lead the
country for four years and give that office to the party rejected at the polls.
For similar reasons I reject proposals that there should be a special election
for Vice President if that office becomes vacant or that if one who has become
Vice President should succeed to the Presidency, he should have to stand for
office in a special election shortly thereafter. I think that the party system as
we have known it in the United States, with choice made every four years be.
tween two strong and responsible parties, has contributed greatly to the stability
of American government. I think it would be a distinct step in the wrong direction to move toward a parliamentary form of government or even to edge gingerly
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in that way by providing a machinery that, under some circumstances, would
require election of a national officer other than at the regular four-year periods.
I close as I began. I think 1 2 of the Twenty-FItfth Amendment has worked well
under difficult circumstances and that it should not be changed.

Senator BAYTY. Our next witness is to be the distinguished Junior
Senator from Maine, Senator Hathaway, who will be here in about
5 minutes. He is in another committee.
Pending his arrival, I will read my statement and ask that it be
put in the record at the beginning, and ask unanimous consent that
the Senator from Hawaii be permitted to insert any remarks prior
to putting it in the record.
Many serious students of democracy and the American experience
have suggested that the events of recent months, which led to the elevation to our highest office of a man not directly selected by a vote of
the people, raise fundamental questions about the nature of our democracy. The Senator from Hawaii is one of those.
Several serious proposals, including his, have been put forward to
change the existing Presidential succession mechanism. Because the
subcommittee believed that these concerns merited a full examination, we decided to convene these hearings.
Two things should, I think, be pointed out initially. First. because
our Constitution still contains the anachronistic electoral college system, we do not choose our Presidents by direct popular vote--something which hopefully Congress and the States will consider changing in the near future by constitutional amendment.
Second, since the ratification of the 12th amendment, our Vice Presidents are "elected" to the Nation's second highest office only in the
most technical sense. As one observer has commented, "It stretches
reality to suggest that the voters of the country really chose to
have Calvin Coolidge or Harry Truman as second in line for the
Presidency."
As we look back and see more recently how President Truman performed as President, we may not remember that at the time he succeeded to the Presidency or at the time he was chosen, there was
great question as to the wisdom of that choice, and that it was the
strong personality of the Presidential candidate, President Roosevelt,
that was the subject of the major thrust of that election.
Nevertheless, because of the use for the first time of the provisions
of the 25th amendment, we now have as our President a man who was
actually elected to public office by only that fraction of 1 percent of
the electorate that makes up a congressional district. In addition, Congress, in the second use of the 25th Amendment, has selected as Vice
President a man who actually failed in several attempts to win election to national office. There has been no serious question in the public
mind of President Ford's legitimacy, however. He is President. And
this is perhaps the amendment's strongest point. But we must nevertheless ask ourselves does this departure from the central mechanism of
democracy pose any long-run problems for the basic fabric of our
sstem I And if not, why has it succeeded I If we are concerned about
the imperfections of the 25th amendment, which I think many of us
are now, and many of us were at the time we were considering it several years ago, we must also ask ourselves how do we make it more
perfect. What are the solutions which have less than perfection?
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I introduced the 25th amendment 11 years ago in the 88th Congress
and, with the help of many others, including the distinguished Senator from Hawaii, guided it through the process of congressional
approval and State ratification. We believed it was necessary to provide a mechanism to deal with two problems that were then much on
the public mind. First, because of the tragic death of President Kennedy, we had no Vice President. This was the 16th such vacancy in our
history. Second, the nature of the Kennedy assassination reminded
us of the potential problem of the temporary physical or mental incapacity of a President. This question had arisen during President
Eisenhower's term, and had been a nagging problem of concern to
many since Woodrow Wilson's day.
I see our distinguished colleague from Maine is here, and I think
I will ask unanimous consent to put the remainder of the statement
in the record.
[The statement referred to follows:]
OPENINO STATEMENT BY SENATOR BIRCH BAYK, CHAIRMAN
Today the Subcommittee begins a series of hearings designed to review and
analyze the implementation for the first time of Spetion 2 of the 25th Amendment to the Constitution and to examine various " als that have been made
for Its modification.
Many serious students of democracy and the A:.,. .can experience have sug.
gested that the events of recent months, which led to the elevation to our higheat office of a man not directly selected by a vote of the people, raise fundamental questions about the nature of our democracy. Several serious propo 'als
have been put forward to change the existing Presidential succession mechanism. Because the Subcommittee believed that these concerns merited a full
examination, we decided to convene these hearings.
Two things should, I think, -be pointed out initially. First, because our Constitution still contains the anachronistic electoral college system, we do not
choose our Presidents by direct popular vote-something which hopefully Congress and the States will soon change by Constitutional amendment.
Second, since the ratification of the 12th Amendment, our Vice-Presidents are
"elected" to the nation's second highest office only in the most technical sense.
As one observer has commented, "It stretches reality to suggest that the voters
of the country really chose to have Calvin Coolidge or Harry Truman as second
in line for the Presidency."
Nevertheless, because of the use for the first time of the provisions of the 25th
Amendment, we now have as our President a man who was actually elected to
public office by only that fraction of one percent of the electorate that makes up
a Congressional district. In addition, Congress, in the second use of the 25th
Amendment, has selected as Vice-President a man who actually failed in several
attempts to win election to national office. There has been no serious question in
the public mind of President Ford's legitimacy. He is President. -And this is
perhaps the amendment's strongest point. But we must nevertheless ask ourselves does this departure from the central mechanism of democracy pose any
long-run problems for the basic fabric of our system? And if not, why has it
succeeded? If we are concerned about the imperfections of the 25th Amendment,
how do we perfect it?

I introduced the 25th Amendment eleven years ago in the 88th Congress and,

with the help of many others, guided It through the process of Congressional
approval and state ratification. We believed it was necessary to provide a mechanism to deal with two problems that were then much on the public mind. First,
because of the tragic death of President Kennedy, we had no Vice-President.
This was the 16th such vacancy In our history. Second, the nature of the Kennedy
assassination reminded us of the potential problem of the temporary physical
or mental incapacity of a President. This question had arisen during President
Eisenhower's term and had been a nagging problem of concern to many since
Woodrow Wilson's day.
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I think It is quite safe to say, however, that neither I nor any other member
of Congress specifically foresaw that the provisions we drafted for the filling of a
vacancy In the Vice-Presidency would first be used after the resignation of both
the President and the Vice-President upon disclosure of unlawful acts. Indeed, if
one looks back at the amendment's legislative history, the principal focus of
controversy was on those sections dealing with Presideutial disahiility rather than
those providing for filling a Vice-Presidential vacancy. In almost 200 years, we
had never lost both a President and a Vice-President during one four year term,
though we had experienced the problem of Presidential disability on several
occasions. However, the very fact that the 25th Amendment's first test came
under these bizarre and unforeseen circumstances indicates to me in a very
important way that we (1i(1 not err in amending our governing document.
Some thoughtful men have strongly criticized our wisdom in adopting the
25th Amendment. These critics of the amendment, however, seem to overlook
what may well have been its most significant contribution. Under the most
adverse circumstances, It vastly facilitated the removal of a President vho had
totally lost the respect and confidence of the American people. I say this because,
I do not believe that Richard Nixon would have resigned and turned the Presidency over to Speaker Carl Albert, a Democrat. The Nixon departure could have
come, in the absence of the amendment, only after a difficult and divisive impeachment trial. Even the studious and lelillerate considerations of the House
Judiciary Committee, would, I am sure, have assumed a much more acrimonious
and partisan nature.
It is easy to find fault with the 25th Amendment. It is much more difficult to
envision an alternative solution which does not possess greater imperfections.
What were the alternatives?
Prior to ratification of the 25th Amendment, the question of Presidential and
therefor Vice-Presidential succession, was governed statutorily by the Presidential Succession Law which provides that if both the office of President and
Vice-President are vacant, responsibility will fall on the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, and next to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate. Neither
of these congressional leaders is selected for their positions with ally thought as
to their qualifications for the Presidency. The people of the entire country would
be unprepared for their sudden succession to the Presidency. As President
Truman noted twenty years earlier, there was a clear need that "a plan of
succession be devised so that the office of President would be filled by an officer
who holds his position as a result of the expression of the will of the people."
There were several plans suggested to meet the agreed upon criteria-the ability
to serve as President, acceptability by the American people, and the ability to
work with the President as Vice-President. The suggestions for choosing a new
Vice-President fell into the following categories: (1) the choice should be made
by the Electoral College; (2) by file President ; (3) by the Congress; (4) by the
President and the Congress acting together; (5) by a special election for VicePresident; or (6) that there should be two Vice-Presidents elected at the time
of each general Presidential election.
The Electoral College was rejected on the ground that as a historical curiosity
it would not command the respect and support of the American people. Most of
our citizens have never met or heard the name of a Presidential electrr.
A special election for Vice-President was rejected because of concern about
delay, the departure from our system of quadrennial presidential elections, the
cost involved, the divisive partisan effect it would have on the country at a time
when unity was needed and the possibility that a special election might produce
a Vice-President of a different party who would not be able to work effectively
with the President.
The selection of a new Vice-President by the Congress alone was objected to
on the grounds that if the President and the majority of Congress represented
different lrties. Congress might not select a Vice-President from the President's
party and thus-the new Vice-President would not be able to work closely with
the President.
Presidential appointment was ruled out oi the grounds that the people should
be involved intsuch an important choice, and that no President should be given
the complete authority to appoint the personwho could become his successor.
Finally, the election of two Vice-Presidents was not considered feasible because
it might lead to confusion and divisiveness in the executive branch.
The method finally chosen, that of Presidential nomination and confirmation by
majority vote of both Houses had, we believed, these virtues: first, it would assure
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that the person nominated was a member of the President's own party and thus
of compatible tenlperament and views; second, tire confirmation by both the
Senate and the House would tend to create public confidence in the selectifb.
This Involvement of both Houses of Congress, instead of only the Senate which
has the traditional role of advise and consent, was deemed appropriate for the
selection of the nation's second highest officer since it w( Ad evaluate a VicePresidential selection over other 1're.,idential appointments. This would, we
hoped, more accurately reflect the wishes of the people than either House alone,
and \wuld thus increase public confidence in the final choice. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that the role of the Congress was to be-and is-in this one,
unique instance that of ,urrogate electors. Congress is to represent the people
of the country in a Congressional election of, and not merely acquiescence in, the
choice of a newv Vice-President.
I was deeply concerned that during the debate on the Rockefeller nomination
many of my colleagues in the Senate did not recognize their independent role
as surrogate electors for over 210 million American people. Congress Is to represent the people in electing a new Vice-President. This responsibility is quantitatively different than any other.
The 25th Amendment's first off-spring, President Ford, in his first address to
the Congress very aptly summed l up his responsibility and that of the Congress
when lie said, "Frequently, along the tortuous road of recent months, from
this chamber to tie President's-house, I protested that I was my own man. Now
I realize that I was wrong. I (1m your man, for it was your carefully weighed
confirmation that changed niy occupation. I am the l)eople's man, for you acted
In their name, and I accepted and began a new solemn trust with a promise to
serve all the people."
Most of us pray that we should never again experience any of those circumstances which in this instance, or in others, might require the use of the 25th
Amendment. Unfortunately, history has shown us we pray in vain. Prudence
requires that we lie prepared for those eventualities of death, disability or disasters which iany overtake a national leader. In ny view, the 25th Amendment,
with all of its implications, leaves us better prepared to meet the uncertainties
of the future in an Imperfect world ruled by imperfect men.

Senator Btyji. It is an honor to have with us one of our distinguished
colleagues who has contributed greatly to our deliberations oil many
issues over the past months and years, and has expressed a deep concern
over this matter which is before us. 'We appreciate the fact that you
have taken the time from a busy schedule, Senator Hathaway, to be
here. Why do you not proceed please, sir? •

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM D. HATHAWAY, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF MAINE
Senator HATIAW.tY. Thank you very much.

1 suppose I could say the same thing you said about putting my statement ini the record. iAnybody who has trouble sleeping nights could
read this ill the record, but at the risk of boring you
1 w-0
ith something
that I hav'e already talked about at the time President Ford was nominated by former President Nixon for Vice President, let me proceed.
I really appreciate the opportunity to come before this subcommittee
,MIr. Chairman, Senator Fong, to discuss our recent experience with the
25th amendment. I should begin by congratulating the chairman for
his foresight and his perseverance ill the development and enactment
of this amendment. I voted for it when I was in the House of Representatives. I am firmly convinced that its very existence was a critical
factor in the avoidance of a major constitutional crisis last summer.
W1
ithout the l)rocedures it provided, the transfer of power which became necessary would have been significantly more difficult.
I really do not come before this subcommittee this morning to criticize the provisions of the 25th amendment. It seems to me to be a well-
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balanced and reasonable method of handling a complex and a difficult
problem.
I know Senator Pastore, who I believe has already testified, has submitted a bill providing for a special election of an appointed Vice
President if he should suceed to the Presidency, and although I think
that this resolution has considerable merit, I have sonie reservations
about it which I will be glad to go into in detail if the committee wants
me to, at the end of my statement.
My real interest today is to call attention to a )articular facet of the
question of Presidential succession which the 25ti amendment does not
deal with and to suggest a possible solution to that problemm which
would not require tampering with the amendment itself. I refer to the
question of succession in the case of a double vacancy-the death or incapacity of both the President and the Vice President. Of course, the
chances of this occurring have been greatly diminished by the adoption
of section 2 of the amendment, providing for Presidential appointment to fill a vacancy in the Office of Vice President.
But, as we have learned, the mechanics of this process still allow
some substantial period between the occurrence of the vacancy and the
confirmation of a new Vice President. In this regard, I would point out
that we have been without a Vice President for 6 of the last 16 months,
even with the terms of the 25th amendment fully operational. The
significance of a Vice Presidential appointment-and the importance
of its confirmation-does not allow for a hurry-up process. nor should
-,ewant it to. Because of the uniqueness of providing for the appointment of such an official, a reasonable amount of time must be allowed
for maximum consideration and citizen input into the decision. For this
reason, the question of succession should something happen to the
President during one of these periods, is one which deserves serious
consideration.
A second reason the present succession arrangement deserves
scrutiny is its relationship to the confirmation process itself under the
25th amlendment.. It is my concern that the present succession act can
create a pressure on the Congress to act hastily or imprudently in the
confirmation of a Vice Presidential nominee.
As an example, consider a situation similar to the one which faced
us in the fall of 1973: A vacancy in the Vice Presidency with the President under the threat of impeachment by a, Congress controlled by the
opposition party. The Congress is faced with several difficult alternatives; (1) move ahead with impeachment. even though this would place
one of its own-the Speaker of the House-in the Presidency or (2)
confirm the Vice Presidential nominee (in order to clear the way for
impeachment) even though his patron may turn out to be a wrongloer.
A preferable alternative might have been to await the outcome of the
impeachment proceedings and complete the confirmation when and if
the President was exonerated.
A similar situation could arise where it vacancy occurs and the President has a fatal illness; again, the pressure is on Congress to confirm in
order to avoid the appearance of foot dragging to promote the Speaker
of the House. In both cases-or in others I am sure could be dreamt
up-a pressure to confirm is placed on the Congress which might well
conflict with our best judgment as to the proper length of the confirmation process, or even what its final outcome should be. My basic point,
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Mr. Chairman, is that the Speaker's present place in the line of succession creates an inherent conflict of interest, a conflict so obvious that
our efforts to avoid the appearance of improper motives can actually
impair our performance of other constitutional tasks.
Senator BAYII. Would the Senator yield just a moment?
Senator HATHAWAY. Certainly.
Senator BAYI. Are you saying either directly or by inference that
you have a dual problem? On one hand, if you have the wrong kind of
man there who is selfish and power hungry, there would be foot dragging in the House so that he might succeed. On the other hand, the
situation which we have just gone through, where the Speaker could
not in any way have been accused of that. We might not take as long
and be as prudent as otherwise would be the case, to avoid the appearance of laying politics.
Senator HATHAWAY. Yes. That is correct. As the law stands now, our
safety net-that is, the present succession act-is not very satisfactory,
especially when the Speaker of the House belongs to a party different
from that of the President. My suggestion is to alter the succession act
in such a way so as to remove this pressure from the Congress and provide a more palatable succession mechanism, should its use become
necessary.
My proposal would provide that in the case of a vacancy occurring
in the offices of both the President and the Vice President, there will
be a special Presidential election with the highest ranking officer of the
House of Representatives of the same party as the outgoing President
serving as acting President until such election is held. This approach
is identical in principle to the Succession Act of 1792 which was enacted in the Second Congress by some of the same individuals who
drafted the Constitution. and which remained in force and effect as
law of this land for 94 years. I should also point out that it is substantially the same as the succession act proposal submitted to the Congress
by President truman in 1945. The original act was altered in 1886 and
again in 1916, with the result that under present law the Speaker of
the House succeeds when a double vacancy occurs.
Under the bill I am proposing, the term of the specially elected
President would be limited to the time that is remaining in the outgoing President's unexpired term. In this way, the traditional rhythm
of our quadrennial Presidential elections, falling as they do every leap
year, would remain undisturbed. As to the procedure'to be followed
in nominating and selecting candidates, the bill would leave this to
State law, as is currently required by our Constitution. I would assume
that should this measure be enacted, the State would move expeditiously to enact appropriate legislation with regard to a possible special election so that the 90-day time table in the bill could be met.
There seems to be little question of the constitutionality of the special election approach to the resolution of a double vacancy problem.
The Constitution expressly provides that succession, in the case of a
double vacancy, is a matter to be determined by statute and, as noted
earlier, the first statute passed in this area did provide for such an
election. For the benefit of the chairman and any other committee members interested in this question, I have submitted with my remarks an
excellent memorandum on the question done by the Congressional Research Service as well as a letter from three eminent constitutional
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scholars, Paul A. Freund, Raoul Berger, and Abram Chayes, attesting
that-"In our view, the constitutional text, the debates at Philadelphia
and the practice under the Constitution leave no doubt that the Congress has the power to provide by statute for a special Presidential election in the event the offices of President and Vice President both
become vacant."
By Mr. Hathaway:
S. 2678. A bill to provide for a special election for the Offices of President and
Vice President when the Offices of President and Vice President are both vacant.
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.
Mr. HATHAWAY. Mr. President, I am today introducing legislation which
would provide for a special Presidential election should the Offices of President
and Vice President both be vacant at the same time.
In candor, I must admit that this bill is intended to deal specifically with the
potential situation confronting the Congress should the present President resign
or be removed from Office before the confirmation of his Vice-Presidential designee. But while the present situation may have engendered consideration of
this approach to Presidential succession, the principle it establishes is a sound one
of general applicability to circumstances of a similar nature.
In essence, the bill provides that in the case of a vacancy occurring in the Offices
of both the President and Vice President, there will be a special Presidential election, with the highest ranking officer of the House of Representatives of the same
party as the outgoing President serving as acting President until such election is
held. This approach is identical in principle to the Succession Act of 1792 which
was enacted in the 2d Congress by some of the same individuals who drafted the
Constitution and which remained in force for 94 years. This act was altered
in 1886 and again in 1947 with the result that under present law the Speaker of
the House succeeds when a double vacancy occurs. I have attempted in the bill
to deal with one of the major ambiguities of the 1792 act, which is whether the
term of the new President would be 4 years or for the remainder of the unexpired term of his predecessor.
Under the bill I am proposing, the term of the specially elected President
would be limited to the time remaining in the outgoing President's unexpired
term. In this way, the traditional rhythm of our quadrennial Presidential elections, falling as they do every leap year, would remain undisturbed. As to the proleave
cedure to be followed in nominating and selecting candidates, the bill wouldassume
this to State law, as is currently required by the Constitution. I would
that should this measure be enacted the States would move expeditiously to enact
legislation with regard to a possible special election so that the 90-day time table
in the bill could be met.
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apply-Mr. FORD has never sought the Presidency nor stood before the national
electorate. Further, there is something troubling about a President who is under
threat of impeachment or forced resignation having the power to name his
successor.
In either case-the succession of Mr. FORD or Mr. ALBERT-the country would
have a President not elected by the people. This result I find incompatible with
the basic principles upon which the Nation was founded and upon which the
legitimacy of our form of government rests.
It will be charged, I suppose, that what I am proposing constitutes a political
attempt to nullify the mandate of the voters in the last election. I should say
first that in making these remarks I Indicate no prejudgment of the outcome
of the current controversy surrounding the President. My remarks and my proposal are directed solely to what happens if a vacancy occurs, not whether such a
vacaL'cy ought to occur. When put In this context, such charges have little merit.
The mandate of last November's election belongs to Richard Nixon and Spiro
Agnew, not their political party. While winning the White House, Republicans
actually lost strength in the Senate and among the Nation's Governors. Given
this fact, who is to say with any assurance what the mandate of 1972 was?
Second, I cannot accept the charge of "power grab" or "coup" when the question is actually being returned to the people, the ultimate arbiters of power
within our system.
If the President leaves office, the mandate of last year is negated; it seems logical to me to allow the people themselves to decide who shall then receive what
only they can rightfully give.
Finally, and this is one of the differences between my bill and the original
1792 Succession Act, my proposal would provide that the "interim" Presidentwho would serve between the occurrence of the vacancy and the special electionwould in fact be a member of the political party of the outgoing President. In this
way whatever party mandate which does attach at the preceding Presidential
election would be maintained until the people render their new judgment. In the
present case, the highest ranking officer of the House who is of the same party as
the previous President, and who would under my proposal, become Acting President, is GERALD FORD of Michigan.
Before concluding my remarks, I should acknowledge a debt of gratitude to
several individuals whose wisdom have made this proposal possible. I refer of
course to Professors Freund, Berger, and Chayes, who have provided advice on
the constitutionality of the special election, although they have not considered
the specific provisions of this bill, and also especially to Mayor Kevin White of
Boston who first discovered the possibilities of this procedure and brought it to
the attention of the Nation.
These are troubled and difficult times for all of us. The measure I propose will
not settle events finally or immediately. But it will insure that control of our basic
decisions and, indeed, our very future will remain directly in the hands of the
people.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed in the Record the two
documents I have mentioned in the course of my ,remarks, the letter from the law
professors and the Library of Congress report on this matter; and I further ask
unanimous consent that the bill be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the Record,
as follows:
LAW SCHOOL OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY,

Cambridge,Mass., November 1, 1973.

Hon. KEVIN H.

WHITE,

Mayor of Boston,
Boston, Mass.
DEAR MAYOR WHITE: You have asked if, under the Constitution, Congress has

the power to provide by statute for a special election to fill the office of President
in the event that both the offices of President and V'ice President become vacant.
In our opinion, Congress has such power.
Article 2, section 1, clause 6 of the Constitution provides:
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and Vice
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President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall
act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."
The matter was expressly considered in the Constitutional Convention and the
debates show conclusively that the Framers intended to empower the Congress to
call a special election in those circumstances.
On September 7, 1787, it was moved in the Convention that the Legislature
should designate by law which officer of the United States would act as President
in the event of vacancies in the offices of both Pxesident and Vice President and
that "such officer shall arrive." James Madison objected to this language on the
ground that it would prevent the vacancy in the' Presidency from being filled by
a special election. He therefore moved to change the language to read that the officer who was designated to "act as President" do so "until such Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected." Madison's amendment was carried and
with minor stylistic changes was incorporated In the final text of the Constitution.
The Second Congress, of which Madison himself was a member, exercised this
very power when it enacted the Succession Act of March 1, 1792, providing for a
special election in the event of a simultaneous vacancy in both Presidential and
Vice Presidential offices. 1 Stat. 239. Actions of the First and Second Congresses
are traditionally given great weight on questions of Constitutional Interpretation.
Myer. v. U.S. 272 U.S. 52. 175 (1926).
The text of the relevant sections of the Act of 1792 is attached to this letter.
You will note that the Act provided for the special election to be omitted If the
double vacancy occurred within six months of the expiration of the Presidential
term. It also stipulated that the president pro tempore of the Senate (and if
there was none the Speaker of the House) should act in the interim until the
special election; and that the person elected should serve for a term of four
years from the next inauguration day following the special election. These
features are remarked here not to suggest that they are Constitutionally required, but to indicate the flexibility that is available to the Congress in dealing
with the practical questions !nvolved in a special election.
The Act of 1792 remained law for almost a century. Then the mechanism of
Presidential succession was changed to provide that in the event of the vacancy
of both the offices of President and Vice President, one or another member of
the Cabinet in the order therein provided should "act as President." But the
statute went on to provide that Congress should assemble within twenty days,
presumably to consider what further action to take.
The 1886 statute was in turn replaced in 1947 with the present law providing
that in the event of the vacancy of both the offices of President and Vice President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives would act as President to be
followed by the President pro tempore of the Senate to be followed by ranked
Cabinet officers for the remainder of the then Presidential term. 8 U.S.C. 10.
These subsequent enactments are further evidence of the broad and flexible
authority available to Congress in fulfilling its Constitutional mandate to provide for continuity in the office of President in case of "removal, death, resigna.
tion or inability of both the President and Vice President."
In our view, the Constitutional text, the debates at Philadelphia and the practice under the Constitution leave no doubt that the Congress has the power to
provide by statute for a special Presidential election in the event the offices of
President and Vice President both become vacant.
Yours very truly,
-

PAUL A. FREUND.

ABPAu CHAYES.
RAOUL BERGER.

ATTACHMENT
(Second Congress. Session. 1. Ch. 8. 1792, 1 Stat. 289.)
SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That in case of removal, death, resignation
or inability both of the President and Vice President of the United States, the
President of the Senate pro tempore, and In case there shall be no President of
the Senate, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, for the time
being shall act as President of the United States until the disability be removed
or a President shall be elected.
SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of President and
Vice President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith
cause a notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, and shall
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also cause the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers printed in
each state, specifying that electors of the President of the United States shall be
appointed or chosen in the several states within thirty-four days preceding the
first Wednesday in December then next ensuing: Provided, There shall be the
space of two months between the date of such notification and the said first
Wednesday in December, but if there shall not be the space of two months between the date of such notification and the first Wednesday In December; and
if the term for which the President and Vice President last in office were elected
shall not expire on the third day of March next ensuing, then the Secretary of
State shall specify in the notification that the electors shall be appointed or
chosen within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in December in
the year next ensuing, within which time the electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shall meet and give their votes on the said
first Wednesday in December, and the proceedings and duties of the said electors
and others shall be pursuant to the directions prescribed in this act.
Szo. 12. And be it further enacted, That the term of four years for which a
President and Vice President shall be elected shall in all cases commence on the
fourth day of March next succeeding the day on which the votes of the electors
shall have been given.
Approved, March 1, 1792.
CoNo1EsxorAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
Washington, D.C.
From: American Law Division.
Subject: Provision for Special Election in Event of Vacancies In Offices of President and Vice President.
This is in response to your request for consideration of the constitutional
validity of a provision for special elections to fill the offices of President and
Vice President when both become vacant. It appears that the language of the
Constitution does not preclude provision for such an election and may be read
to support that alternative; when the debates in the Constitutional Convention
are review, such support becomes much clearer and stronger. It therefore may
be concluded that the proposal under consideration is consistent with the
Constitution.
Although the Constitution has been amended twice now in some respects of
presidential succession I the pertinent language remains that of Art. II, 1 1, el. 6.
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected."
The final clause "or a President shall be elected" is, of course, consistent with
the view that the designated officer should serve until the next regular presidential election or with the view that Congress could provide for a special election.
In any event, the language does not preclude the calling of such an election.
But the Convention materials amply demonstrate that authority for Congress
to call a special election in the event of a vacancy in both offices was intended.
The report of the Committee on Detail, which had considered and blended many
of the details of various plans offered to the Convention, contained the following
language with regard to succession. It will be noted that no provision for a
Vice President had yet been made. "In case of his removal as aforesaid, death,
resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
President of the Senate shall exercise those powers and duties, until another
President of the United Stateq be chosen, or until the disability of the President
be removed." 2 M. Farrand (ed.), The Records of the Federal ConventitO ol.g,787
(New llnven rev. ed. 1937), 186. Madison reported no debate on this lahage
when the sections on the Presidency were considered on August 24, 25 and 27. It
is noted that consideration of the entire clause was postponed because some
members were concerned about the ambiguousness of the word "disability",
Id., 427, and on August 81 all postponed sections were referred to the Committee
of Eleven for consideration. Id., 478. The above quoted language thus went to
the Committee as reported.
1 20th

Amendment if 3, 4 ; 25th Amendment.
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In the report of the Committee of Eleven, the above quoted language was retained with the exception of the substitution of the Vice President for the
President of the Senate. Id., 499. No provision for succession beyond the Vice
President was included. Farrand's report of the notes of McHenry, one of the
Members of the Committee of Eleven contains the following: "No provision in
the above for a new election in case of the death or removal of the President."
This would appear to negate the inference that the language "until another
President of the United States be chosen" would have allowed Congress to
provide for one.
When the section was considered on September 7, Randolph of Virginia moved
to add the following: "The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President in case of the death, resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President; and such officer shall act accordingly until the time of electing a President shall arrive."
However, Farrand continues, "Mr. Madison observed that this, as worded,
would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election of the President, and moved to substitute-'until such disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected-'." The motion was then adopted. Further, reports Farrand :
"It seemed to be an objection to the provision with some, that according to
the process established for choosing the Executive, there would be difficulty in
effecting it at other than the fixed periods; with others, that the Legislature was
restrained in the temporary appointment to 'officers' of the U.S.: (They wished
it to be at liberty to appoint others than such.)"
"On the motion of Mr. Randolph, as amended, it passed in the affirmative."
Id., 535.

It seems evident, therefore, that the Convention consciously chose to substitute
language which gave Congress the option to provide for a special election if
both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency became vacant. But the Committee
on Style in reporting what is in essence the clause as it now appears in the
Constitution rendered the final passage to read "until the disability be removed,
or the period for choosing another President arrive." Id., 599. Without recorded
debate, the Convention when it reached this section changed it back to "or a
President shall be elected." Id., 626. The decision of September 7 to leave Congress with the power to provide for a special election was thus confirmed.
Apparently, the only reference to the question in the ratifying conventions in
the States occurred in Virginia, where George Mason, a delegate who had refused to sign the Constitution, objected that the clause did not require a speedy
election of another President in case of vacancy in both the Presidency and the
Vice Presidency. Madison responded: "When the President and Vice President
die, the election of another President will immediately take place; and suppose
it would not,-all that Congress could do would be to make an appointment
between the expiration of the four years and the last election, and continue
only to such expiration. This can rarely happen." 3 J. Elliot, Debate8 on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (New York: 1888), 487-488. Obviously,

Madison was saying that Congress could l)rovide for a special election but was
not required to do so; it could provide for the devolution of the powers and
duties of the office upon some other officer until the next regularly scheduled
election.
It therefore appears that the Convention consciously chose to recognize power
in Congress to provide for a special election in the event of a vacancy in both
offices. Nothing has been found in the debates of the Convention or of the ratifying conventions to negate the conclusion, nor does the Twenty-fifth Amendment
which made significant changes in this area touch upon this question so as to
require a different conclusion.
When in the Act of March 1, 1792, Congress established a policy on succession,
it included 1 10, 1 Stat. 240, which provided for a special election in the event
of a vacancy in both offices. The section read:
"SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That whenever the offices of the President
and Vice President shall both become vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause a notification thereof to be made to the executive of every state, and
shall also cause the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers
printed in each state, specifying that electors of the President of the United
States shall be appointed or chosen in the several states within thirty-four days
preceding the first Wednesday in December then next ensuing:
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Provided: There shall be the space of two months between the date of such
notification and the said first Wednesday in December, but if there shall not be
the space of two months between~the date of such notification and the first
Wednesday in December; and if the term for which the President and Vice
---- President-last in office were elected shall not expire on the third day of March
next ensuing, then the Secretary of State shall specify in the notification that
the electors shall be appointed or chosen within thirty-four days preceding the
first Wednesday in December in the year next ensuing, within which time the
electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen and the electors shall meet and
give their votes on the said first Wednesday in December, and the proceedings
and duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the directions
prescribed in this act."
The significance of this enactment for purposes of constitutional interpretation
may well be gleaned from the comment of Chief Justice Taft who observed, when
the protective tariff was challenged, that the first such law was enacted in the
First Congress. "In this first Congress sat many members of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787. This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of
our government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in
public affairs, long acquiesced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions."
Hampton d Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 412 (1928). See also Myers v.
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175 (1926).
When President Truman recommended in 1945 changes in the law of presidential succession, he included a special election of the President and Vice President when both offices became vacant. H. Doc. No. 246, 79th Cong., 1st seas.
(1945) ; 91 Cong. Rec. 6272 (1945). A bill was reported to the House embodying
this recommendation, H.R. 3587, 79th Cong., lst sess. (1945), 3(f), but it was
struck on tlhe House floor, primarily because the schedule set out could possibly
cause great instability in the country and because the States would be required
to legislate a number of changes in their election laws. 91 Cong. Rec. 7024-7025
(1945). The House then passed the bill but it was not considered by the Senate;
in 1947, however, a bill identical to the House-passed bill, thus omitting the
special election provision, was passed by the Senate and accepted by the House.
In conclusion, then, it seems clear that the language of Art. II, 11, cl 6, especially when considered in light of the events leading to its adoption by the
Constitutional Convention, provides adequate support for the proposed bill.
JOHNNY H. KILLIAN,

Legislative Attorney.

S. 2678
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled, That section 19 of title 3, United States Code,
is amended to read as follows:
"Section 19. Vacancy in the offices of both President and Vice President.
"(a) (1) If, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is neither a President or Vice President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President prior to the 20th day of January In
the fourth year of the current Presidential term, and"(A) if the Speaker of the House of Representatives is a member of the same
political party as the President regularly elected for that term, then the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as a
Representative in Congress, act as President until the Inability is removed or
until a President and Vice President take office for the remainder of the term in
which the vacancy occurs; or
"(B) if the Speaker of the House of Representatives is not a member of the
same political party as the President regularly elected for that term and the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives is a member of the same
political party as the President, then the Minority Leader shall, upon his resignation as Minority Leader and as Representative in Congress, act as President until
the inability is removed or until a President and Vice President take office for
the remainder of the term in which a vacancy occurs.
"(2) If by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or
failure to qualify, there is neither a President or Vice President to discharge the
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powers and duties of the Office of President, on or after the 20th day of January
of the fourth year of the current Presidential term, and"(A) if the Speaker of the House of Representatives is a member of the same
political party as the President regularly elected for that term, then the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall, upon his resignation as Speaker and as
Representative in Congress, act as President until the inability is removed or
the end of the term In which the vacancy occurs; or
"(B) if the Speaker of the House of Representatives Is not a member of the
same political party as the President regularly elected for that term and the
Minority Leader of the House of Representatives is a member of the same
political party as the President, then the Minority Leader shall, upon his resignation as Minority Leader and as Representative in Congress, act as President until
the inability Is removed or the end of the term in which the vacancy occurs.
"(b) (1) (A) If under subsection (a) the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives fails to qualify
as acting President, and if, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office,
or inability, there is no acting President to discharge the powers and duties of the
office of President prior to the 20th day of January in the fourth year of the
current Presidential term, then the officer of the United States who is highest on
the following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and
duties of the office of President shall act as President until the disability Is
removed or until a President and Vice President take office for the remainder
of the term in which the vacancy occurs: Secretary of State, Secretary of the
Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of the Interior,
Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor, Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, Secretary of Transportation.
"(B) If under subsection (a) the Speaker of the House of Representatives or
the Minority Leader of the House of Representatives fails to qualify as acting
President, and if, by reason of death, resignation, removal from office, or inability,
there is no acting President to discharge the powers and duties of the office of
President on or after the 20th day of January in the fourth year of the current
Presidential term, then the officer of the United States who is highest on the
following list, and who is not under disability to discharge the powers and duties
of the office of President shall act as President until the disability Is removed
or until the end of the term in which the vacancy occurs: Secretary of State,
Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of Defense, Attorney General, Secretary of
the Interior, Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Secretary of Labor,
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, Secretary of Transportation.
"(2) An individual acting as President under this subsection shall continue so
to do as specified in paragraph (1) of this subsection, but not after a qualified
and prior-entitled individual Is able to act, except that the removal of the disability of an individual higher on the list contained in paragraph (1) of this
subsection or the ability to qualify on the part of an individual higher on such
list shall not terminate his service.
"(8) The taking of the oath of office by an individual specified in the list in
paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be held to constitute his resignation from
the office by virtue of the hnlding of which he qusllfies to act as President.
"(c) (1) If there is neither a President nor a Vice President to discharge the
powers and duties of the office of President because of death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to quaily, occurring prior to the 20th day
of January In the fourth year of the current Presidential term, then on the
90th day (excepting holidays) after the date on which the acting President under
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) or under paragraph (1) (A) of subsection (b)
takes the oath of office of the Presidency, there shall be appointed electors of
the President and Vice President in the manner such electors are provided for
in a regular election for the offices of President and Vice President.
"(2) Electors appointed on such 90th day shall meet and give their votes on
the 7th day following the date of their appointment.
"(d) Subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall apply only to such officers
as are eligible to the office of President under the Constitulion. Subsection (b)
of this section shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from
office, inability, or failure to qualify, of the Speaker or the Minority Leader of
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the House of Representatives, and only to officers not under impeachment by
the House of Representatives at the time the powers and duties of the office
of President devolve upon them.
"(e) During the period that any individual acts as President under this
section, his compensation shall be at the rate then provided by law in the cae
of the President."
Sac. 2. (a) Section 101 of title 8, United States Code, is amended by-(1) striking out "The term" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "(a)
Except as provided in subsection (b), the term"; and
(2) adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(b) A President and Vice President elected under section 19(c) shall commence their term of office on the second day after the date on which the result
of the electoral vote is announced by the President of the Senate and such
term shall end at noon on the twentieth day of January next following the next
regular election of a President and Vice President."
(b) Item 19 of the table of sections of chapter 1 of title 8, United States Code,
to read as follows:
is amended
"19. Vacancy
in the offices of both President and Vice President."
Senator HATHAWAY. I should note that one of the differences be-

tween my bill and the original 1792 Succession Act is that my proposal
would provide that the "Interim" President--who would serve between the occurrence ofthe vacancy and the special election-would
in fact be a member of the political party of the outgoing President.
In this way, whatever party mandate which attaches at the proceeding
Presidential election would be maintained until the people render
their new judgement.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that this alternative is much preferable to the present situation. It would enable Congress to move
deliberately and with confidence in the consideration of-a Vice Presidential nominee, secure in the knowledge that should something happen to the President in the meantime, the question of succession would
return to thepeople.
In a double vacancy situation-or in a situation where there is a
cloud over the Vice Presidential appointment--a major consideration
must be to maintain the legitimacy of the Government. And in our
system, Mr. Chairman, legitimacy comes only from the people. While
agreeing with the thrust of the 25th amendment, there are situations-- such as those I have alluded to-where it does not offer sufflicient protection to this principle. I urge the chairman to give serious
consideration to my proposal as an alternative to changing the amendment; although it is pending before another committee, the Rules
Committee, any interest expressed in this proposal by this subcommittee would be a significant spur to the adoption of this bill as
legislation.
thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to appear
before the committee. I should add that Congresswoman PastyMink
has introduced a similar bill in the House of Representatives. I introduced this bill at the time President Ford was being considered for
Vice President.
Thank you.
Senator BAYI. I appreciate your taking the time to let us have
your thoughts. Do you have a bit more time that we could explore
some other new avenues of this I
Senator HATHAWAY. Yes.
Senator BAYR. The way I understand your proposal, Senator Hathaway, is that you feel we should continue to implement the provisions
54-563 0 - 75 - 3
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of the 25th amendment, in the event there is either a double tragedy
at one time, as one could envision an airplane accident involving both
the President and Vice President, or some crazy catastrophe of violence. In that instance, the measure that you propose would be implemented in which you -would have a temporary President for 90 days
during which the Nation would choose a President of their own true
election, and a Vice President.
Senator HATHAWAY. That is correct.
Senator BAYH. I think that proposal has considerable merit to it.
In thinking about the 25th amendment when we were going through
the process, we had to draw the line as to what we felt had traditionally been constitutionally established and what we felt could indeed
be enacted by statute. I think your assessment is right, that not only
does the Congress have the authority to enact such legislation short
of a constitutional amendment, but because it traditionally certainly
has been handled that way. This was one of the weaknesses that one
could perceive in the 25th amendment; that perhaps it did not go far
enough.
Another factor we considered which probably would have to be
dealt with by constitutional amendment, particularly since we have
dealt with this area for the first time by constitutional amendment, is
disability. There was some line of thought that that should be handled by statute prior to taking action. Nothing had been done prior
to the 25th amendment. I think once the 25th amendment was enacted we, by precedent, established this constitutional domain. One of
the weaknesses that still exists in the 25th amendment that we were
painfully aware of was what do we do if the Vice President becomes
disabled I We have a situation under the 25th amendment, the other
section, not being questioned here, so far not being implemented fortunately, but if a President becomes disabled we have in the past through
the 25th amendment to make the Vice President acting President and
to then test that, as you know.
What we do if the Vice President becomes disabled, we do not
have that. That is a weakness.
The decision that we had to make which resulted in the continued
existence of the shortcoming you pointed out, as well as the one I just
pointed out, was that we though one constitutional amendment could
carry on this great a load. You get beyond a certain point and then
you begin to pick up all of those that are shooting at the imperfections.
It does not take long until you get more than one-third of any one
body and then you are through.

Senator HATHAWAY.1tight.

Senator BAYH. Now, you suggested that you had some reservations
about Senator Pastore's provision. Could you share those thoughts
with us, please ?
Senator HATHAWAY. Well, with regard to Senator Pastore's amendment, I think there is a need to allow the people in every possible case
that we can to elect their own President and certainly his principle is
right, that when an appointed Vice President succeeds to the P residency he really has not een elected by the people even though he has
been approved by the Congress. It would seem to be almost a natural
followup to Senator Pastore's recommendation that we abolish the
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Office of Vice President althogether, and when a President is out of
office for one reason or another during his term, we simply have a
special election.
I know Dr. Schlesinger has spoken at great length with regard to
his proposal and I think Dr. Schlesinger s point of view has a great
deal of merit. The Vice President, of course, has of recent datebeen
used by the President in various capacities and he has turned out to
be sort of an additional Cabinet member who has proved to be useful
to at least the last two or three Presidents, but I think it is probably
an office that we could get along without. We have gotten along without it for many years in our history when, through some misfortune,
there has not been any person in that office for a period of time.
Senator BAYir. May I explore that idea with youI
Senator HATHAWAY. If we are going to elect a President when there
is an appointed Vice President, you know, it seems to me to follow
naturally why have the office at all? If he is going to be appointed to
take care of the contingency of the President leaving office before
his term is up, so that he can take over, and yet we are going to elect
one in that situation, why not just leave it vacant and when the President does leave office, have some appointment procedure analogous to
the one I outlined in my statute such as the ranking Member of the
House of Representatives of the party of the President take over
during the 90-day period when we have the special election.
Senator BAYn. The major concern I have about the Schlesinger
proposal, is that, although the Vice President has been ridiculed as
part of our governmental institutions, it seems to me the one role the
Vice President does play is to have an unquestioned continuity of
authority whenever a President is taken from us. Let's ignore the past
experience--the unfortunate experience-we have only had one, in
200 years and hopefully it will be at least. 200 more before we have
another one like this. But the more traditional loss of a leader,. the
Kennedy and the Roosevelt experience that I mentioned to Senator
Pastore, is a real shock to the country. I mean, it really is like an amputation of a leg. The Nation is sort of unstable and it needs something to lean on. The fact that there is a person who can succeed and
put a firm hand on the steering wheel to grasp the reins of leadership
is something that sort of shores up the country in an hour of real need
for that kind of thing.
Now, if during that period we had to go to Mfr. X or Mr. Y whb
could conceivnbly be the minority leader of the House. it would seem
to me that this would be a disabling kind of thing. Your proposal
makes good sense to me-if you can provide an alternative. I want
you to analyze what I am saying and critique it in your way. I know
you can. For about 30 days after the succession of Gerald Ford it was
a honeymoon period with no one questioning him. Everybody said
the 25th amendment really gave us continuitv but the criticism
started arising when President Ford granted immunity to President
Nixon, then wanted to raise taxes and started performing Presidential
functions. This would be the same kind of criticism that would be
directed at any President chosen by any means. W11e did have continuity; the authority was passed "and nobody questioned the fact
that Gerald Ford had the authority.
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I wonder if that is not perhaps the most important role the Vice
President can play under normal circumstances.
Senator HATHAWAY. Well, it seems to me that although you can
say since President Ford was confirmed by the House and the Senate,
at least he had some kind of a mandate in that respect. that thepeople
would probably grant a honeymoon period and retain confidence in
the minority leader of the House in about the same way. If you go
back to the days when Franklin Roosevelt passed away, for example,
and Harry Truman, because of strength and power of Franklin Roosevelt, played a very minor role as his Vice President, I think the
people at that time, exteidel to him a honeymoon period and it was
not much different than if he had been minority leader of the House
because he was certainly not known very well: People did not have
ally opportunity to make any juIdguent of him liwhein lie was Vice
President and nevertheless, we weathered that storm without any
difficulty; quite fortunately Harry Triunan turned out to be an excellent President. And I think with an interim one, especially whenlie
is going to serve for a 90-day period and people know they are going
to have an opportunity to choose their own person in 90 days I do
not think that the peol)le of the country would lose confidence In the
country going on for that period of time uider the leadership of either
the Speaker of the House or, if the House was constituted the way it
is now, or the minority leader of the House. Those two officers are
important in themselves and I think people. recognize that the people
elected to those offices in the Houise of Representatives are normally
outstanding people and probably of the same caliber and ability as
the person who is designated by the President to serve as Vice
President.
Senator BAYJI. There was this grandiose annointment sermon down
at the East Room of the White House in which the Nation got a
glimpse of Jerry Ford, almost for the first time. We did hold these
hearings and he was the Vice President. President Truman was the
Vice President and Vice Presidents had traditionally moved on up in
the election procession. That is one thing that was considered, although
I am not saying that I do not think you have a good point there. As I
mentioned in my opening statement I do not think a lot of people
expected Truman to be President Xf the United States when they
voted for F.D.R.
Let me ask you about another question. One of the things that we
weighed in considering the 25th amendment was the problems that
had existed in the past with the various succession statutes and
whether we should incorporate those by constitutional amendment.
We then decided not to do so. This is one of the problems that would
be presented by your statute that we could address ourselves to, or
maybe you do not share the beliefs of this problem. We can only
have one president. We found some Ipretty good quotes that either
you are President or you are not Presdent. When you are Iresident
you are not anything else, and if we ke the Speaker of the House
and elevate him even for 90 days as President, what happens to him
after his 90 days? You see what I mean ? I mean, you are comingling
Legislative anl Executive authority. And, once a person is taken
out of a role, then ]low does he reassume itI
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Senator HATHIWAY. Your point is that the bill does not provide for
what happens to him afterwards. I presume he would go back to
being Speaker of the House or the minority leader, whatever the
case might be. A much inflated one, I would say, but neverthelessSenator B.%YIt. He mi ght never be the same.
Senator HATIIWAY. He might never be the same personality-wise.
Senator BAYJI. I have no problem with your succession as far as
permanent presidency is concerned. I know when I study it I have
a problem. I can anticipate that there may be a significant constitutional question where somebody is made temporary President and then
reinserted in their earlier role. This was one of the major reasons for
the ,feeling that we needed the other section of the 25th amendment.
I think there was good constitutional authority to interpret what the
Constitution said prior to the 25th amendment-that the Vice President could indeed move in and take over as President if the President
were disabled. However, with disability, you have a different question
than you have with death. When the President is dead, the Vice President moves in and is President. The circumstances do not arise that
a dead President is going to reassert himself. Once a person becomes
President can he ever be anything else? I do not ask you to have an
immediate solution but that is a question that I think we had better
look at.
Senator HATIAWAY. Right. I am gratified you called it to my
attention. I assumed in the bill based on the existing constitutional
language that either the Speaker or the minority leader, would be
interim or acting President and lie would be so labeled and go back
to where he camie from. That does not preclude him from running
himself as a candidate for President.
Senator BAYJI.
To keep from having a direct breach or division
of power, would lie have to resign as Speaker? Could one continue
to be Speaker and Acting President at the same time?
Senator HATHAWAY. I would suppose that lie could not because of
the separation of the branches of Government.
Senator BYH. I would like for us to resolve this. I think your
idea makes good sense and we might think about that.
Senator HATHAWAY. But I do nIot see anything offhand that would
be difficult about a leave of absence type of situation where he can be
reinstated in his role as Sp)eaker of the House or minority leader. He
has been elected in normal circumstances. Although the Speaker does
not have to be an elected official, under normal circumstances lie is
elected for a 2-year term, so there is no violation of that by going back
to the office to which he was elected.
Senator B.\ -i. Well, I would like to think about that further with
you. This is a contingency that we have not provided for. Are you at
all concerned about one other aspect of the general election under
those circumstances? Given the time of crisis that would follow the
loss of two leaders, either at the same time or during a short period
of time, and the divisive characteristic of an election, have you considered the instability that would follow? I mean, you know, we could
have a Donnybrook. And this is not the kind of thing that really
pulls the country together despite what people say.

34
Senator HATHAWAY. That is true. But many other countries operating under the parliamentary form of government do this and it has
proven to be not that divisive or not that unstablizing for those
countries. I am sure that this country is stable enough to withstand
a special elecion without having any divisiveness.
Senator BAYH. I think our responsibility, as I am sure you recognize,
is to look at all eventualities and normally think this country can
withstand almost anything. It has. The most extreme situations occur
during a war and weave had election during wars.
Well, unless you have further commentsSenator HATHAWAY. No. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Senator BAYH. I look forward to discussing this further with you
and I appreciate your insight in bringing this to our attention.

Senator

HATHAWAY.

Thank you.

Senator BAYH. You are certainly welcome.
Our next witness is Chairman Peter Rodino of the House Judiciary
Committee. We just received word that they have had a vote over
there and he will be here within the next 4 or 5 minutes if he is not
here earlier.
[A short recess was taken.]
enator BAYH. We will reconvene if you please.
We are priviledged this morning to have with us the chairman of the
House Judiciary Committee, the Honorable Peter Rodino, a man that
I have had the good fortune to work with over the years, and who has
exhibited a great deal of leadership in this important area of the
Judiciary.
I say to you, Mr. Chairman, not as a colleague in the Congress but
as a citizen of this country, that we are all in your debt for the exceptionally difficult job that you carried with great valor in trying times
through the months of 1974. We are glad to have you with us here and
we are looking forward to your comments on our efforts to examine the
25th amendment.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER W. RODINO, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE 10TH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF N1EW JERSEY
Mr. RoDrINo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator, in view of the fact that we did go through a very trying
period where the 25th amendment came into practice, feel that whatever experience we can offer might be helpful during your consideration of this matter.
I have a prepared statement which I would like to read.
Senator BAYH. Please.
Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, in the 10 short years since its recommendation by the Congress. and in the 8 short years since its ratification
by the States, the 25th amendment has already played a vital role in the
course of our history.

I think it is unquestionable that without section 2 of the 25th amendment, this Nation might not have endured nearly so well the ordeal of
its recent constitutional crisis.
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This subcommittee and you, Mr. Chairman, of course, took the lead
10 years ago in drafting the 25th amendment, and the smoothness with
which power has shifted under extraordinary circumstances is strong
evidence of the amendment's usefulness and of your own foresight and
wisdom. The Nation owes a debt of gratitude to your leadership.
No one could have foreseen the totally unprecedented situation where
serious criminal conduct and abuse of power could produce not one,
but two vacancies in the office of Vice President within the short span
of 10 months.
With that predicament now behind us however, this seems a particularly useful time to consider some of the issues the implementation
of the amendment may have raised.
First, it is apparent that if there are weaknesses in the 25th amendment, they are not weaknesses of workability. The amendment works
and in my judgment works well. The mechanics of nomination and
confirmation are sound- the President retains the right to choose an
individual with whom he is compatible; and, the people are assured
of an individual whose integrity is measured by exhaustive scrutiny of
their elected representatives.
Some, however, have been genuinely troubled by the fact that presently neither the President nor the Vice President of our country is
an elected official.
Moreover, our current President was himself elevated by an individual, who, shortly thereafter, was forced to resign to avoid certain
impeachment; subsequently, our Vice President was chosen by the
unelected President.
Although these are serious and legitimate concerns, we must recognize that they were clearly not created by the 25th amendment; if
anything, these problems would have been made unimaginably worse
without section 2 of the 25th amendment.
Had there been no amendment, not only would the Nixon and Agnew
resignations still have left the Nation without a nationally elected
executive, but the uncertainty and partisan divisions which would have
been inherent in the operation of the succession statutes might have
threatened the very constitutional process which ultimately preserved
our institutions. Or, barring that, they might have rendered any "new
administration" wholly unable to govern.
The 25th amendment permitted the constitutional process to proceed
in such a way that the American people could have confidence that no
one sought partisan advantage. A Republican President, if removed
from office, would be replaced by another Republican President. And
if the Nation were to undergo the trauma of an impeachment, it could
at least be assured that a reasonable constitutional mechanism for continuity was available.
Any process which seeks to provide for succession in the event of constitutional crisis must elevate, at least temporarily, those who have not
been elected to national office. At least the 25th amendment achieves
this without injecting partisan imues, while assuring close congressional scrutiny of the new national officers.
The problems of unelected Presidents and Vice Presidents are nonetheless very real, and perhaps we should consider whether under
certain circumstances mechanisms beyond the 25th amendment ought
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to be made available. I know that Senator Pastore has proposed that
whenever a 25th amendment Vice President assumes the presidency,
Congress make arrangements for a special election if more than I year
remains of an unexpired term. The Judiciary Committee in the House
may wish to take a look at similar suggestions. At the present time I
think that it bears scrutiny.
This morning, however, I would like to take a minute to address the
operation of the 25th amendment itself as it has been implemented by
the President and by the Congress.
At the time of the consideration of the Rockefeller nomination, in
remarks before the Sigma Delta Chi Society of Professional Journalists, President Ford suggested that definite time restrictions be written
into the amendment. The President urged that new language in section
2 be added to impose a stated deadline for the Congress to confirm a
Vice President. If that, period were to pass without affirmative action,
the Congress would then be required promptly to begin hearings on
another nominee.
Mr. Chairman, I strongly oppose the President's recommendation.
A time deadline in my judgment, is inconsistent with the responsibility
the Constitution imposes. At the very heart of the 25th Amendment
is the notion that this is not an ordinary advise and consent proceeding.
Under the Constitution this appointment alone is subject to the
scrutiny of both Houses.
Because the people are not afforded the opportunity to cast their
own vote, it would be unthinkable to place on their representatives the
burden of reaching a rushed judgment. There has been no evidence
that the Congress has taken its responsibility under this amendment
lightly; it has not been dilatory, it has not been obstructive. If it has
taken special care, and perhaps a week or a month longer than the
President. might have wished, it has done so because of the special
responsibility we have felt, to insure and restore confidence in our
Government's integrity.
Senator Cannon's committee and the House Judiciary Committee
would have done the nation a great disservice if they had failed to
make the most exhaustive inquiry into all relevant aspects of the
nominee's qualifications and fitness to hold this high office.
But the very extensiveness and exhaustiveness of the committee's
investigations 'has raised some questions that I know trouble members
of the Judiciary Committee in the House.
In the case of the Ford nomination our committee had investigators
and lawyers in Grand Rapids, Mich. within 24 hours of the President's
selection. Every agency of the Federal Government was contacted and
A request went out for all files in their possession relating to the
nominee.
The Judiciary Committee staff, working closely with the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, conducted an independent audit
of Mr. Ford's tax returns, reviewed his personal financial records
and interviewed hundreds of individuals as part of the investigation.
In addition, all members of the committee had access to, or were
briefed on, the information generated by the FBI in its own full
field investigation. Thirty-three officers and more than 350 special
agents interviewed more than 1,000 people in all parts of the country,
resulting in more than 1,700 pages of reports.
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The Rockefeller investigation, because of the complex questions
of family wealth, was even more extensive, as it should have been.
All aspects of the nominee's private and public life were probed and
scrutinized intensely over a period of more than 4 months.
The very intensity of these two inquiries, however, has raised
serious Questions within our committee regarding the reasonable limits
of a 25th amendment investigation. On the one hand, the inquiry must
commensurate with the responsihe wholly thorough and complete.
bility the Constitution imposes. On the other hand, very great care
must be taken not to obscure the genuine larger issues, to preserve
the nominee's civil liberties and to protect his reasonable right to
privacy regarding matters that do not bear on his fitness to govern.
In tle case of the Rockefeller nomination particularly, many times
it became extremely difficult to draw the line between relevitnt matters relating to the nomination and matters intrusive upon the rights
of other members of the Rockefeller family.
Perhaps the reason these issues have caused such difficulty is that
no clear enunciation has ever been made as to precisely what standard
it is that marks the criterion for our judgment. The lengthy and very
scholarly hearings held on the amendment in 1964 and 1965 did not
address this question in any real depth. We all agreed that Congress
was to have a major role and that we should be expected to subject any
nominee to a wide range of questioning on public policy issues. But
just what it was that we were to examine about each nominee's life
and fitness was not as fully considered.
Perhaps that would not have presented a significant problem had
not the first implementation of the amendment taken place in an
atergate and on the occasion of the resignaatmosphere clouded by W1
tion of a Vice President charged with serious criminal conduct. Suddenly we in the Congress were faced with a new responsibility: an
obligation to insure a moans integrity as well as to judge his philosophy
and compeLence.
I believe that the Senate Rules Committee, the House Judiciary
Committee and the Congress as a whole fully met that responsibility.
Congress conducted fair, thorough and very useful investigations. But
I hope that this subcommittee, under your chairmanship, will explore the whole larger issue of what it is that the 25th amendment
requires of a committee investigation.
In doing so, I know the subcommittee will be applying very sensitive balancing tests: the need to quickly fill a vacancy versus the need
to be thorough, the need to probe a man's integrity versus the need to
protect his civil rights, the need to make an individual judgment versus the need to reflect the views of one's constituency.
Finally, if I may, I would like to make two short additional observations. One is that, no matter how attractive a proposition it may
seem, the American Bar Association's proposal for joint confirmation
hearings by the House and Senate is probably an unwise idea. Each
House has its own responsibility, and only by holding separate hearings
can each House be fully accountable and responsible for its separate
judgment. It is no accident that the Constitution subjects this appointment alone to the scrutiny of both Houses.
Second, I would hope that in the future the Department of Justice
will follow the example of its conduct during the Rockefeller investi-
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cation, when it made the FBI field reports fully available to all members of the committee. In the case of the Ford nomination, access to
these reports was much too narrowly limited, and I, as chairman of
the House Committee, strongly objected to a proposal to limit access to
only the chairman and ranking minority member. Only reluctantly did
I agree to a compromise proposal whereby a
had full
access to the FBI reports in order to brief the other members of the
full committee. In something as important as the selection of a Vice
President, there can be no justification for denying to Members of
Congress all materials necessary to making the most informed possible
Pidgment. The situation that prevailed during the Rockefeller hearings was much healthier, and ?trust the Department will follow that
course in the future. Congressional committees have the capacity and
the maturity to prevent leaks of confidential material, and it is essential that they proceed only on the basis of the most complete information.
Mr. Chairman, I very much appreciate having had the opportunity
to discuss some of these important issues with you this morning, and
these narrow aspects of the 25th amendment. A gain I think it is worth
noting once more that the Nation owes to your leadership a very genuine measure of gratitude.
Thank you.
Senator BAYH. Thank you very much, Chairman Rodino, for your
thoughtful reference to the junior Senator fr om Indiana, as well as taking your time from a busy schedule to let us have the benefit of your
particular insight.
Do you have a few moments for us to explore this furtherI
Mr. RODINO. Yes.

Senator BAYH. You were absolutely right when you said it was no
accident that the Constitution, through the 25th amendment, subjects
the nomination and election of a new Vice President under the terms
of the 25th amendment to both Houses. This was designed to emphasize the unique characteristic of this particular choice compared to
other choices in which Congress has a role. and to emphasize the additional responsibility that those of us in Congress have in this choice.
Let me just explore a- few thoughts with you. You are in a unique
position to lend expert testimony in several areas that relate to how the
25th amendment works. Do you feel that if the 25th amendment had
not been in the Constitution that it is reasonable to have expected that
President Nixon would have resigned?
Mr. RODINO. I hardly believe so, Senator. I think that when you
view what the possible succession might have been, the pressures that
might have been to the contrary. President Nixon himself might under
those circumstances not have resigned. I believe that while the impeachment process worked.as it did. with the overwhelming evidence that
we brought forth, the resignation was a consequence that was almost
inevitable. But we have (rot to consider, too, that in all of us. partisan
considerations do arise. Had there been a question as to whether the
succession might have gone without a Vice President to the Speaker
of the House, who is a Democrat. and whether this would not have
aroused those in the Republican Party who have felt strongly, and of
course considering. too. that the people and the people's will had been
expressed some time previously, there might have been serious ques-
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tions. For that reason I believe that because of the 25th amendment,
the transition became a lot easier and less difficult.
Senator BAY1. Well, the events surrounding and comprising Watergate had dealt a damaging blow to the political processes of our country. I think the confidence of the American people in their political
leaders at all levels is at an all-time low by almost any yardstick.
One of the few salutary eveiiis that occurred during the Watergate
experience, if one may describe it as that, at least in my judgment was
the manner in which'your committee pursued its responsibility under
the Constitution. There literally live and in full color before the
American people was the legislative process, the constitutional process
exposed for their examination. They could look into the hearts and
minds of your colleagues on the judiciary. They could follow your
efforts successfully I think to be an objective presiding officer.
Now, if this is not a fair question, then we will just strike it from
the record, or if it is a question that might for obvious reasons be best
not answered, then the same will follow.
It is awfully difficult to be in a position of weighing motives and
once we weigh other's motives, then I think we are subjecting ourselves to the same test.
As a member of the other body and as a citizen, I got the impression
that you and your colleagues were going through a great deal of soulsearching, that there was perhaps as nonpartisan an approach to a
problem that had severe parts and overtones as we have ever had in
our country. Certainly much more so than was the case when we had
the last impeachment situation with Andrew Johnson. That is not a
chapter of our history we can be too proud of.
Here is where the question comes. If your colleagues had known
that this impeachment. would have led to the elevation of the Speaker
of the House, a Democrat, a colleague, would this have made that
process of objectivity more difficult?
Mr. RoDIx o. I think, Senator, that there is no question it would have
made it more difficult. I have attributed courage to the members of my
committee who did search their conscience and search their souls and
then ultimately came to a decision. However, I think that a great deal
of their abilit& to arrive at the judgment that they did was the awareness, that there was a 25th amendment, awareness, that there was a
Vice President who would be the nominee of the President, and compatible with the President and of that party. On the one hand it is
difficult to say whether it would have created more difficulties on top
of the fact that impeachment was calling into judgment a President
of the United States who could ultimately be removed. In itself this
is difficult enough, but members of a certain party. knowing that the
success might go to another party, would, of course, have found it
even more difficult. While I think that that is not quite an answer,
nonetheless it does demonstrate that the 25th amendment, having
worked the way it did, made it possible for those at least who did rise
to the occasion to do so. With the recognition that there was this constitutional process which would safeguard at least what they considered and what many might have considered to be the mandate of
the people in the previous election.
Senator BAYJI. I would like to explore the full ramifications of
that possible influence on objectivity. I think the first inference that
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one has in thinking about the possibility of turning over of the Presidency to a partisan of the other party is that members of the President s party might have reservations because of the political repercussions they would face at home. On the other hand, is it not possible
that the converse would be true, that those who were of the party of
the new officer would lean over backward to be objective? Thus, that
party would not be as perceptive and as determined as they otherwise
should be to do what was absolutely right based on the issue before
them.
Mr. RODINe. I think you are absolutely right. There is no question,
Senator, that the thought did arise in the minds of many Democrats
at the time when there was a vacancy, that if the vacancy were not
filled in accordance with the 25th amendment, succession might go to
the Speaker of the House who is a Democrat, and there was this talk.
I mean one cannot deny that. And some may have felt strongly so and
with justification at least in their own minds, that perhaps the then
President and the then administration should not be governing any
more and that that might have been an opportunity to do it without
the benefit of the 25th amendment. And these were I think discussions
that were had.
I know that I myself made my views known the first time that the
25th amendment was implemented, when the question was raised,
again genuinely, that there was a cloud over the head of the then
President Nixon, a cloud because resolutions of impeachment had been
introduced into the House. Some questioned whether, even with the
25th amendment, the then President should have had the right to
nominate and then have someone confirmed whom he nominated, because they felt that because of the cloud there, was a question as to
whether or not impeachment mi ght result in ultimate conviction.
Those people felt justified in possibly taking what might have been a
shorter route of removing a President and then, of course, we would
have been confronted with the question of having to turn over the
Presidency to a member of another party. That certainly in my judgment would have not been in keeping with what the constitutional
amendment intended and with what I felt was a wise amendment and
a timely amendment.
Senator BAY11. May I ask you to give us your judgment as to the role
of the Congress under the 25th amendment and whether this was fully
exercised. It seems to me that we made it rather clear that Congress
was to play a very deep role of representing 210 million people in the
electoral process. That was-the only way we could in good conscience
deny the people a right to exercise their franchise. I think both committees pursued their responsibilities in a very forthright manner.
In the debate on the floor of the Senate, I must say, I became concerned over those who, at least in what they said, felt that there was
important responsibility to go along rather than to exercise an independent judgment served by the electors. By the time you gentlemen
and ladies of the House got. through I sensedthere was more a feeling
of an election than had been the case in the Senate. Maybe that is being
unduly harsh of my colleagues. It is not intended in any way to be
critical of individuals. But, that is just the sense I felt, when I was
over there and participating to a very limited extent in the debate.
Would you give us'your thoughts on that role?

41
Mr. RODINO. Yes, Senator. As you recall, we were clear when we
adopted the 25th amendment, and the report was clear, as to the question of nominating one who was compatible. I think there was no question that we all construed that this should be a member of the President's party and a person whose views would be compatible , in the sense
of political philosophy as such.
However, again I do not believe, at least I as'a member of that committee during the course of the hearings and during the course, of
debate did not construe it to be a simple advise and consent procedure
where the nomination is made and the Senate normally finds certain
qualities of fitness and competence and that is it.
I think that, while the President has a right to nominate an individual with whom he is compatible, on the other hand, I think that
giving to the two Houses for the first time the ability to express themselves renders it different. I think the phrase used was that by giving
the broadest possible acceptance, the electorate almost might have had
an opportunity to express itself. The nearest way that this possibly
could have been expressed, I believe, or carried oui in a manifesto, was
to assure that the House would be made part of this confirmation proceeding. And so for that reason you and others suggested this and I
think It was wise.

I think, therefore, that it becomes incumbent upon us in trying to
interpret the amendment to insure that we ought to examine not only
a man's view but also his integrity, his commitment to human Values
and human freedoms, and I think that the Congress should confirm
only those individuals who have demonstrated and acted upon a deepseated belief in those values. I think therefore the Congress in a sense
acts as well, and using your own word again, as surrogates of the
people in the only way that I think it is possible for a representative
body to speak for the people. And this is the reason why I believe that
it is so tremendously important, too, that we set no time limitations on
the investigations and on the inquiry, because I think then we would
be sacrificing what needs to be done in an effort to expedite something
which may not turn out in the best interests of the public.
Senator BAYJI. Despite what the President may have made, you
think it is pretty difficult to put a time limit on the search for truth.
Mr. RoiNO. I would oppose that very vigorously. I think, Mr. Chairman, that if I had been imposed upon in that way, I would have expressly stated that I believe that we would be doing a disservice to the
American people. As a matter of fact, when the President did call me
to talk with me about the 25th amendment and merely to inquire how
we were proceeding, I told him that we were doing as we had done in
his case, in the case of President Ford when he was the Vice Presidentdesignate. Despite the fact that he was a member of the House of Representatives, and it had been suggested in the press, that., you know,
because of cronvism we might just go ahead, I thought that we should
conduct a very thorough and yet expeditious kind of inquiry and when
it was complete and when that investigation satisfied the minds of
those who were inquiring so that they could make a judgment which
was responsible, only then should they come to a conclusion. Therefore
T would oppose that. And Tthink it would be unwise.
Senator BAYI. Well. the administration will be represented tomorrow by the Department of Justice. I am anxious to see what they have
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to say now after we have gotten by an election. We do have a Vice
President and the process is functioning.
Mr. RoDiNo. Well, I would like to state, Senator, that you should
remember that there was a Democratic majority in the Congress
during the implementation of the 25th amendment, under serious
circumstances where we could really reasonably have questioned
whether the President of the United States, and I am referring to
the former President, when he was under a cloud of impeachment,
where one could have used that as justification and said, well, this is
a President under the cloud of impeachment, he may not be the President at the time, he may be impeached, and confirmation may not yet
then have come. It was asked, "Should we proceed I' And I remember
that these questions came before me and I assured as chairman of the
committee that despite some of the protests, and they are a matter
of record, that we would not interpose what I thought might have been
the kinds of objections that do not really lie under the constitutional
amendment.
Senator BAYH. I would like to share with you one reservation I have
about the 25th amendment as one who was at least partially involved
in its conception.
In our wildest imaginations we could not have anticipated the tragic
sequence of events--dual resignations under a cloud of misconduct of
our two highest officers. We had no precedent. To imagine that I
suppose, would have been subject to ridicule. One of the reasons for
the 25th amendment was the general acceptance over 200 years of
moving forward in quadrennial steps. The people speak. They expect
that certain policy be followed for a 4-year period. Thus, the President
by appointing someone and us electing someone of his own general
philosophy are really following the wil of the people expressed in the
last general election.
In this particular circumstance, the charges which were brought
against the President went to the credibility of the election process
that chose him; went to the tactics that were used to influence the
mandate which was to be perpetuated. If we could look back and say,
"well, this could happen," we might have had cause to at least think
about exempting those provisions from the 25th amendment. I do not
know how in the world you would word it for those exemptions. But.
as someone who is involved in the process, does that concern you at
all? Are we free now to say, well, this is never going to happen again?
What do you think about it?
Mr. RoDINo. No. I do not believe, Mr. Chairman, that we can say
that this is never going to happen again. As you well have stated, Y
doubt that there were anv of us who had a hand in this measure that
ever conceived that this situation would have occurred. This was one
of the reasons why, incidentally, some of those who felt that maybe we
should not go forward with implementation of the 25th amendment at
the time that President. Ford was the Vice-President-designate because
man, thought that the election process might have been questioned
because of the tactics that might have been employed.
How you do this very frankly, while I have been concerned about it,
I as yet have not really been able to get through thp maze of all the
questions that arise. I think, however, that we would have to take a
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look at that aspect of it. I think that hopefully your hearings may
develop something like that and my committee on the House side at
the present time, while we have not yet referred any matter relating
to the 25th amendment to the particular committee for any further
hearings, nonetheless it is something that we have discussed and I think
may require some further consideration.
How you get to it I do not know. If we are going to try to provide for
every foreseeable kind or unforeseeable kind of contingency, I do not
know that we would ever get through, and I believe that human beings,
even Senators and Congressmen, have limitations. So we have a difficult process before us.

-

But I think on the whole again, Mr. Chairman, that this has served
us well and we ought to address ourselves to some of the problems. As
I say, maybe Senator Pastore's version, his proposal for an election if
there is a period of 1 year, maybe that ought to be looked at.
Senator BAY1. One can envision structurally language that would
take into consideration the Watergate circumstances. It seems to me,
however, very unwise to amend the Constitution to deal with something that hids happened once in 200 years if, in the process, you make
it more difficult to handle a situation that occurred 16 times prior to
that. Well. we are going to study that.
One last thought concerns the whole business of standard which you
mentioned in your testimony. Could you help us as someone who has
been involved in this? What standard should we apply? I do not know
how you apply it in terms of days, hours. The disparity in time between the Rockefeller and Ford hearings was based on differences in
the complexity of the men's backgrounds.
And circumstances at the time.
Mr. BAYIJ• Circumstances. The people were much better served
to know these things before we voted-before Governor Rockefeller
particularly became Vice President Rockefeller. What standards
would you impose? We assume that we could trust the judgment of
the respective committees to explore anything that they felt was
reasonable or would have a reasonable impact on the plan to be President of the United States or Vice President.
I think you and Senator Cannon, one of your committee members,
pretty well followed that rule. How, is there another standard ? Help
us as we look further.
Mr. RoDI.o. Well, again, "Mr. Chairman, I think it comes down
ultimately not to writing standards but I think to the individual judgment of the member, whether Senate or House, who is going to vote,
bearing in mind that there is a question of integrity that we seriously
had to consider rather exhaustively because of Watergate and because
it imposed upon us a greater responsibility. Again this was dictated by
the circumstances that prevailed prior to the nomination of now Vice
President Rockefeller, and the circumstances in his own case of his
vast wealth. There were those who felt that vast wealth of itself
should have almost precluded his becoming the Vice President because
he could ultimately become the President and would there be a conflict. I remember ihat I then stated rather emphatically, if we were
to proceed on that basis, we would almost be saying that a man of great
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wealth--and this county understands the system and encourages individuals to explore their talents and those talents could bring them
great wealth-was precluded from becoming the President of the
United States or the Vice President under and through the 25th
amendment. And I could not see that.
On the other hand, in that case it became a question that needed to
be looked at rather exhaustively, together with the regular standards
that one would expect of a public servant who is going to be considered
for a position a heartbeat from being President. We would expect the
highest standards and by the highest standards we mean not only the
standards where he is a man of integrity, a man of honesty, a man of
complete dedication. But also in my judgment, and this is why I talked
about a feeling that individual Members make their own judgment
here. We would have to ask how he feels about the public and the
public interest and public trust as a whole. Does he serve the party's
interest more than he does the public's interests I Does he serve in a way
that would insure that if he were to become President, he would be
discharging a responsibility to all the people?
I think tere-are, then, questions that would arise at that time. I
doubt that you could write specific standards. I doubt that seriously.
Senator BAYM. Is there anything we could do about a concern I
know you and I have had in a number of other areas relative to information that is leaked I I think your insistence that individual Members
be given all the information necessary to make the choice is the only
decision you can make. Frankly I think the public has a right to know
all of the facts upon which we make our decisions. There is that information, in some of these FBI files, that is not facts-that is heresay.
I am sure the average citizen does not realize that. Is there anything
that we need to do there or can do without muzzling the Members?
Mr. RODINO. Well, I for that reason emphasized in my prepared
statement to the chairman, I believe the Members have got to be given
full access to those files since they are the ones who in the first instance
are going to be making this important judgment.
Now, again, we know that it is difficult to keep some people from
leaking, and this does occur. However, in the main, if you look at what
did take place, the material that we talked about that was leaked was
material that was almost public, that had been made public, and
frankly I think that the public does have a right to know, especially
in instances where an individual is being judged who may
in a
position to become President of the United States.
I think maybe if a lot more individuals had known a lot more about
some of the people who had been elected to public offices, maybe those
people would not have been elected to public offices.
Senator BAYn. No, I think you are right. We certainly do not want
to get in the position of muzzling. As I say, I think the people have
a right to all the facts. It is the quasi-facts, the rumors and hearsay
that are a problem. The matters that were made public action in
particular instances, I know people had a right to know.
Well, you have been very kind and I know you are busy. I appreciate your help with our hearings. We will call on you again as we go
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ahead in the next year or two with some of the joint ventures that we
are working on.
Mr. ROD!.%o. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I
know you have some in mind and we will be glad to cooperate and
discuss those matters with you.
Senator BAYJI. Thank you for coming as well as for exercising your
responsible role in a very exemplary manner over the last year.
Mr. RODI.-o. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BAYii. Tomorrow we will hold our second day's session in
room 6202 of the Dirksen Building. We will have Assistant Attorney
General Scalia and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and James MacGregor
Burns.
We will recess until tomorrow.
(Whereupon the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 10:10 a.m.,
February 26, 1975.1
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THE 25TH AMENDMENT
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1975

U.S. SENAT E,

SUw(O.MITTurEE o" C.X'TITu'rI()NA, A MF.NxDMENT8
OF TIlE ('o01[I='EE ON TIlE JUDICIARY,

lVashimgton. D.C.

The subcommittee met. )urisuant to notice, at 10:10 na.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Birch Baylh (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present : Senator.s Bayh and Fong.
Also pirsent : J. William I-Ieckman, .Jr.. chief counsel and Marilyn
Bearing, assistant clerk.
Senator B.\ii. We have three dist inguished witnesses this morning.

I would like to start out with the representation from the administration, the Honorable Antonin Scalia, A.sistant Attorney General, Departillent of ,Justice.
Mr. Scalia. we aplvlriate your being with us this morning to get
us started with this second day of hearings. If you will just proceed
in the manner you see fit. please.
Mr. ScALIA. I will essentially be following the printed statement
that I believe 'ot have before'you. There are a couple of technical

corrections ill it which I will give to the reporter. I will read it as
corrected.
STATEMENT OF ANTONIN SCALIA, ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL, OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
f.. ('inirman, I am hpnpy to respond to yotu' invitaMr. Sc. 1 Mr.
tion to testify on S..I. Miles. 26. 1lis proposal would amend the 25th
amendment to provide that where a A ice President who has come into

that office under the 25th aiendinent succeeds to the Presidency with
more thanl a veal remaining il the Presidential term, a special election
shall be called to select both a President and a Vice President.
I understand the intent of the proposal to be that the term of the
persons so elected will extend only to the end of the unexpired Presidential term. although its language does not use the clearest formulation. it seems to te. to achieve that end.
Under the proposal, the Vice President who has succeeded to the
Presidency will serve as President only until the winner of the special
election is swoln in: and during that period the Speaker of the House
will serve as Vice President. except that the President pro tempore
of the Senate will perform the Vice Presidential finetion of presiding
over the Senate and the Secretary of State will have the power to cast
a tie-breaking vote in the Senate.
(47)

48
The Congress would be given authority to fix the date for the special
election and, presumably, the (late of the swearing in.
Mr. Chairman, the Department of Justice opposes Senate Joint
Resolution 26. We take this occasion, however, to urge this subcom-

inittee to recommend clarification of certain aspects of the 25th amendinent which may create doubt and confusion at a time when complete
certainty is particularly important.
Let me discuss first the proposed joint resolution. I start first from
the premise. which I trust all of the members of the subcommittee
will share, that the Constitution is not lightly to be amended. To propose a change in the existing provision on vacancies, less than a decade
after its last revision, is to contribute to an appearance of impermanence that is inconsistent with the very concept and purpose of a
constitution. Of course, a change must be made if it is needed, but the
reasons should be weighty and clear.
I am unable to find that condition met in the present case. Our Presidency has recently come through a period of political turmoil unmatched in the nearly 200 years of its existence. We have survived that

ordeal without suffering any vacancy in the office, without resort to a
temporary caretaker Chief Executive. and without sacrificing the
legitimacy and moral authority of the Presidency. On that evidence,
I am not predisposed to support short-order constitutional revision

in order to abandon a system which, when put to what must be the
supreme test. has worked.

T turn. however, to an examination of the theoretical advantages

which appear to be the object. of the proposed revision. They really
come to just one: The assurance of an elected Chief Executive in the
unlikely event-the event never occurred until 1974-that lth the
elected President and the elected Vice President should no longer be in

office. Even then. the assurance would only be accorded if the double
vacancy should occur before the last quarter of the Presidential term.

An evaluation of the proposed amendment must assess its success in
achieving this objective, and the attendant disadvantages.
The proposal will assure an election in the limited circumstances
in which it applies; but it is in my view doubtful that the process of
that election or its result will bear much resemblance to our normal
Presidential selection. As our Presidential election process. has
evolved, the contest for the party nomination is as important as
the election itself, in a sense more important, because it is at that stage
that the range ef choice available to the voters, is narrowed from
numerous possibilities to a very few serious candidates. The process
of seeking the party nomination begins some 9 months before the
election itself with State primaries beginning in March, leading up
to the party conventions in July and August. There follows a 3-month
period of intensive camnaigning by the chosen candidates, which,
given the size and diversity of our country and the complexity of the
issues that confront it. is none too long to place the candidates' personalities and pregrams before the voters.

Now, it should be apparent. that this "normal" election process

cannot possibly e indulged in the circumstances which would call for
application of the proposed amendment-while a President who has

been sworn in as a caretaker, with no more authority than that status
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confers, seeks merely to hold things together for his successor. Both
the n omination and the campaign periods will have to be drastically
shortened. I invite you to consider how the outcome of the last few
Presidential elections would have been affected if both the nomination

and election campaigns had terminated, let us say, one-third through.
It seems to me very likely that the party nomination process will be
radically altered, and perhaps driven back into whatever, in these
health-copiscious days is the equivalent of the smoke-filled room. Given
the shortness of time in which to smooth out differences and draw
diverse elements within the party together, the likelihood of substantial splinter parties is clearly increased, and hence the risk of having
the election decided in the House of Representatives under the 12th
ainendlment to the Constitution.
In short, unless tie Government is to be left in the hands of a powerless caretaker over an intolerably long period, it does not seeim to mc
that the press which the proi)osed amendment established would
produce tlie peol)les choice in anything like the normal sense. Let me
turn now to some disadvantages which the pursuit of this goal clearly
entails.
First there are disadvantages of what I might call a practical
nature. One of the purposes of having a Vice President is to assure
the existence of someone who is prepared to assume the highest office
at a moment's notice, familiar with the personalities and problems of
the administration, educated in the functioning of the Presidential
office, ready with the staff and the resources to take over the job at
once.
The proposed amendment, when it applies, will disregard those
considerations, and to the extent it produces a result different from

the. present provision must create a transition period in which the
executive branch and the Government are enfeebled. Of course this
effect can bp eliminated or at least reduced. by the Congress' providing for a lengthy period between the election of the new President
and his swearing in. But that of course merely prolongs the effects
of the second practical difficulty with the scheme, which is the
undesirability of a "caretaker" reg ime.
Last year. during the period when there was considerable doubt
about the ability of President Nixon to survive the Watergate scandal,
it was conunonly felt that the uncertainty of the administration's
tenure was having a substantial and harmful effect upon the conduct
of our domestic and foreign affairs. Imagine how much more enfeebling it could be when there is no uncertainty at. all when it is
absolutely sure that the incumbent who has just arrived, will depart
within a few months. Such certainty can be avoided, I Suppose,
and the effectiveness of the entering President elevated to that of a
possible long-term President if he chooses to rimn in the special election,
which is, I suppose, a likely prospect. But that likelihood raises yet
another practical difficulty. The burdens of entering upon the office
of the Presidency are surely enough without adding to them the need
to conduct a full-scale and probably highly compressed election
campaign.
I shall next allude briefly to what I consider a major theoretical
difficulty with the present proposal. While seeking, in my view vainly,
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to give effect, even in emergency situations, to the modern constitutional principle of direct election of the President, it sacrifices another
principle that is much more achievable and no less
constitutional
important.
It is the presumption of our system that major changes of direction
in the executive branch of Government are to be made no more
frequently than every 4 years. In modern practice this is assured
even when the elected President does not complete his term, since tile
Vice President is invariably his running mate on the same party
ticket.
This principle has given our Presidency a strength and our national
policy a stability that have not been achieved by those parliamentary
democracies which operate on the general basis that a Chief Executive
should be replaced whenever a majority of the electorate disagree
with a fundamental policy he is pursuing.
The 25th amendment as now written assures the continuation of
our constitutional principle of stability even in what might be termed
a double emergency, when both the elected President and his running
mate have left office. For the nomination of a successor will have been
made by one of these individuals and hence will presumably reflect
the same political and governmental philosophy. The proposed
amendment, on the other hand, would permit a epbin an is
tration to be replaced by a Democratic one, or vice-versa, within 1
year after its election.
Finally, in the area of theoretical difficulties with this proposal, I
cannot avoid commenting upon the peculiarity and undesirability of
having a voting presiding officer of the Senate and of having tie votes
in that elective body broken by the Secretary of State, who is an
unelected official from another branch of the Government. Why not
the Chief Justice, one might ask?
It seems to me, Mfr. Chairman, that the adoption of the 25th amendment in time for use in our recent constitutional crisis was extremely
fortunate. Its use had been accepted and it has worked well. In these
difficult times in which he has come to office. President Ford has been
compelled to make some difficult decisions which were bound to arouse
strong opposition from one direction or another.
The fact that some of his actions have provoked criticism is not
remarkable. What is remarkable and important for our present purposes is the fact that the new President found he had the legitimacy
and the moral authority necessary to exercise firm leadership.
To return to my first point. I am reluctant to discard so soon a
newly adopted constitutional amendment which has worked so well.
I am all the more reluctant because I believe the theoretical justification for the new proposal is unsound, and its practical application
framsht with difficulty.
With your indulgence. I would like to devote the remainder of my
comments to some clarifications in the meaning of the present 25th
amendment which this subcommittee could profitably achieve.
First there is the problem of the relationship between the 25th
amendment and the Presidential Succession Act. As you are aware,
the latter act was passed pursuant to the constitutional provision that:
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The Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death, resignation,
or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer
shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The statutory implementation of this constitutional provision establishes an order of succession which consists of the Speaker of the
House, the President pro tempore of the Senate and then Cabinet officers beginning with the Secretary of State.
The first question posed by the intersection of this provision with
the 25th amendment is whether the amendment can be invoked by a
person who is an Acting President under the statute.
That is, assuming that both the President and Vice President are
killed in a single catastrophe. can the Speaker of the House who takes
over under the Presidential Succession Act nominate a person to
become Vice President? The scant legislative history on this point
appears to indicate that the answer is "No." This seems to me the most
satisfactory conclusion, since one of the essential features of the 25th
amendment is eliminated when the nominating President cannot trace
his tenure to a political mandate f rom the entire electorate.
Another series of questions is posed when, after the 25th amendment machinery has already been set in motion, the incumbent President dies without a Vice President in office. This would have been the

case had President Ford died before the congressional approval of then

Governor Rockefeller. That is. once a President has forwarded a nomination under the 25th amendment to fill a vacancy in the Vice Presidency, will the Speaker of the House become the Acting President if
the President dies before congressional action on the nomination? The
legislative history of the mendient is again scant on the point, but
the answer appears to be "Yes."
The issue then raised assuming that the Speaker has become Acting
President while nomination for President is still pending, is what is

his relationship to that already initiated 25th amendhvient process?
Need lie, or indeed can lie, withdraw the nomination? If the nomination subsists and is approved, will the Vice President thereby created
displace the Speaker and become President?
There is no clear answer to these questions in the legislative history
of the amendment, but the portions referred to with respect to the
earlier questions seem to dis)lay an assumption that once the nominating President dies the entire 25th amendment process is terminated
and thereafter only the Presidential Succession Act controls. I am of
the view that this is the preferable disposition. The reason I am of that
view is that anjy theory that would allow the nomination to subsist
should also logically lead to the conclusion that the nominee, if approved, not only becomes Vice President but thereupon immediate y
supnlants the Speaker as President. Otherwise there would be created
a Vice President who has more apparent entitlement than the Acting
President to the post of Chief Executive.
Senator Fo.-o. The Speaker becomes President, then he has the right
to nominate the Vice President.
Mr. SCALTA. Well, as I am pointing out, that is not at all clear. I
would say not.
Senator BAyii. He is not Acting President, he is the President.
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* Mr. SCALIA. No; he is Acting President under the present provisions of the law. The question is, as Actiug President, what functions
of the President can he performI
Senator Foxo. He succeeds to the presidency, doesn't he?
Mr. SCALIA. He succeeds to the presidency the way the provision
reads, that he shall act as President.
Senator BAYJI. Well. I was going to wait for you to finish your
statement but I would like for you to examine article II, section 1,
which is the most basic document of the vice presidential transition
and find the language that says the Vice President shall become
President.
You don't need to look because it isn't there. And the Tyler precedent, as you recall, was what established that. There was a strong body
of thought at that time that-Tyler, the first Vice President to succeed
to the Presidency, was just Acting President. It was thought there
should be a mechanism for choosing a new President other than
Tyler's full assumption of the power-that he really didn't perform
the full powers and duties of the office over everything, full salary and
all the powers and duties. Since that time we have assumed, I think
quite rightly so, that the Vice President does serve as President.
We take that forgranted now, but at the time we were implementing the language of article II, section 1, it certainly was not, am I
wrong in that?
Mr. SCALIA. No, sir, you are not wrong. But the current Succession
Act makes very clear the congressional intention that the Speaker
shall act as President. It does not say "be" President, which could have
been set forth with perfect clarity. He has generally been referred to as
Acting President.
Senator BAYUr. Does it prescribe any way to diminish his powers or
to choosV a successor other than he?
Mr. SCALIA. No, sir.
Senator BAYIf. Don't you suppose that the directors of that statute
if it were their intention to choose the Speaker as the next in line of
succession, they would have also chosen a way to remove him and
put someone in there permanently?
Mr. SCALIA. Perhaps, butSenator BAYTI Perha ps-why not?
Mr. SCALTA. They well may have intended the somewhat mild language. "shall act as President," to mean that there are certain powers
of the Presidency which this individual cannot perform. I wouldthialk
the first one on the list would be nomination under the 25th amendment.
I am not trying to establish that. what I say is necessarily the case;
it is simply my best judgment on the matter.'If I were.certain that it
was correct, indeed I would not raise the issue. I am raising it precisely
because I agree with you that it is very much debatable.
Mr. B.Y!. I appreciate your bringing it up because I don't think
it is crystal clear and we must study this. I'll be glad to get the opinion
of our next two experts who are hiistorians of the first degree in this
and other matters.
You stated that you feel the legislative history, would suggest that
the Speaker does not have the full powers of the Presidency. Now, I
would like to know what. that legislative history is. Certainly it cannot
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be found in the words of the Succession Statute other than, shall act.
If one predisposes that one shall act as President, first I think you
assume le has all the powers and duties of the President.
Second, if you suppose that he shall act for only so long and be
replaced, it would be reasonable to suggest that the drafters of the
statute would determine how this choice is made; what the vehicle for
the replacement is, couldn't they ?
Mr. SCALIA. They might have intended to leave it open for the
Congress, where the situation demanded, to provide for an election by
statute. That certainly is one possibility.
The legislative history on the point, Senator, as I say, is scant and
you made some of it, so, if you didn't have that in mind then the
legislative historyMr. BAYI. I was there when it was passed-the 25th amendment.
I can tell you a little bit about what was at least in one Senator's
mind when that was happening. I am not too sure that is relevant as
far as the Succession Act.
Mr. Sc.ALIA. I think maybe we are getting sidetracked into another
problem. I am reallyMr. BAYn. I (on't think so. This is very much on target and I
compliment you for bringing it to our attention. I just want to make
sure that we fully explore each other's minds here.
Mr. SCALIA. My point is that I am really not concerned right now
about whether the Speaker is acting President or full President under
the present Succession Act. The point I am concerned about is whatever you call him, was it contemplated that lie would have the power
to put the 25th amendment into operation? I say, it seems to me unlikely because. one of the l)reliises of the 25th amendment was that the
nominating President would himself be a choice of the people, or trace
his succession back to a choice by the electorate. That was indeed the
whole premise of the thing. That premise is eliminated when the
Speaker takes over-who may well be of another political party.
Senator BAY11. Let me go back into previous legislative history
which was available to those who wrote the present Succession Act
and was available when we vere writing the 25th amendment. The
first Succession Act did provide for a temporary succession to the Office
of the President and specified or inferred there was to be an election
to fill the vacancy, if there was a double vacancy.
Now, if the drafters of the present Succession Act had intended that
follow, what you infer, and having had that kind of legislative history
don't you think they vould have written what the predecessor did,
indeed, what the constitutional fathers did at the very moment they
were, the ink was hardly dry oni the Constitution and the ratification
and everything?
Mr. ScArLIA,. Senator, had they adverted to the matter that closely,
that is very likely, but as you may recall, disability was more the focus
of the entire debate on the 25th amendment.
Senator BAYI. We are talking about the Succession Statute.
MAir. SCA IA. I understand that. What I am saying is the legislative
history on the portion of the 25th amendment dealing with succession
is not as expansive as one would want it to be. The real focus and interest of the Congress in 1965 was on Presidential disability; that
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portion of the amendment received much more of the congressional
attention.
I am by no means certain that the conclusion I set forth here is the
one the Supreme Court would arrive at. As I say. if I were I wouldn't
have raised the matter. The whole point is it is'not clear and this is a
matter that ought to be absolutely beyond question.
Senator B, 1 1,i. We will study it in some detail and I compliment you
on bringing it to us. I would like to suggest that a number of people
emphasized that we gave more attention to the disability part of the
25th amendment than we (lid to the Vice-Presidential vacancy part.
This is true basically because in looking at history we had had disabilities but we had had no dual deaths in a 4-year period. It is not true
that we did not seriously consider that. particular section nor that we
were not prepared to accept the eventuality of its implementation.
In fact, there would have been absolutely no reason to put it in there
if we hadn't feared that we would have to use it. That was one of the
things I remember particularly, although we had not experienced it.
We had gone for long periods of time-almost the whole term short of
1 month. In Truman's case we had gone a very few months. We knew
we. were flirting with danger. We put it in there feeling that we might
use it..
Thus, the fact that the Speaker would assume the full powers and
duties of the Office and that this could indeed change an administration 1800 after a very short period of time from an election, was
considered.
If we hadn't expected the Speaker to have the full powers and the
duties of the presidency, I don't think we would have been that concerned. I don't know how a man can be President and just be partPresident. If you look at the debate, that was one of the concerns we
had about disability.
From Henr" Clay to Harry Truman. we had ample. precedent that
the Vice President could move in under the Constitution and exercise
the powers and duties of the office in the event of disability. That is
there. The question was. a living. disabled President who we hope and
pray to God removes this disability and becomes well again. how does
he reassert himself.
Most, historians and students ofthe Constitution were of the opinion
that once that. Vice President moved in and assumed the powers and
duties under the disability provision of the Constitution the other
President was out.
Now, if that were the case under disabilitv-and I remember discussion on it-if that, were true under the Vice President's assumption
under the powers and duties of the disability provision. wouldn't it.
also be true if the Speaker moved in?
Are we questioning whether he. would have the powers to declare
war or ask the Coneress to declare war?
Mr. SCALTA. The nroblem is you have to decide the present question
by looking at. the 25th amendment. which is the last portion of the
Constitution on the suibiect. And determining what was intended there.
What I am pointing out is there are some peculiarities, some very profound peculiarities, about having the Speaker exercise that particular
constitutional function.
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For example, a President can submit a nomination under the 25th
amendment. Would the nomination of the decreased President stiibsist
when the Speaker takes over, would it still lie on the floor in the Senate
and the House? If you say yes. the question I will ask then is "Well,
one of the functions of the President is to withdraw nominations: Can
the Speaker who sees himself about, to be forced out of office by the
nomination which the outgoing President submitted, withdraw that
nomination ?"Was that intended by the 25th amendment?
Senator BAY1h. I think the answer to both those questions is, yes, the
nomination persists and the new President has the power of any
President to withdraw it.
Mr. SCALTA. Well, it seems to me that that would clearly--.
Senator FoNGo. When the President dies, I think that automatically
dies.
Senator BAYH. You think it automatically dies?
Mr. SCA ITA. I think it does. too, but-

Senator Fo.xN-. If you appoint an agent and you are deceased, why,
the agency is gone, that is simple law.
Mr. SCALIA. Senators. you complimented me for bringing this before you. As I point out iater in my testimony. I really don't. deserve
the compliment because I didn't think these issues upl. These issues
were foisted upon me: they were what we were worrying about while
Vice President Rockefeller's nomination was pending. The Office of
Legal Counsel. in particular. would have had to provide advice about
what happened if. while that nomination was still pending, President
Ford had died or for some other reason left office.
The questions are real ones.
Senator FoNO. We didn't have any question that if the Speaker assumed the presidency he. would be the President. He would have all
the powers. I don't think there was any question in the minds of our
committee about. that, the thrust of that amendment really was on
disability. We were. looking to see how the President could regain his
power once he was disabled. that was the thrust of that amendment.
Mr. SCALIA. I frankly could find nothing directly in point. The
closest thing to legislative history I could find were some exchanges.
Senator. in which it was asked "Well, what if the remaining President
dies before he can nominate a Vice President. then what happens?"
The response was simply "Then the ordinary Succession Act applies
and the Sneaker takes over." One would have expected a followup to
that: Well, can the Speaker then submit a nomination ?" That followup
never came.
Senator BAY!. Perhaps the followup should have come. I don't
know whether the words iised were: takes over; or shall be President.
One would assume that if the Speaker takes over as President he
would have the powers and duties of the office of the President. I am
sure that is what was in my mind. I may have bepn in error then. but
I am sure that is what we were thinking about. We felt if there were
to have been qualifications on the succession of the Speaker. it would
have been put into the succession statutte as it. had been in succeeding
succession statutes. This was not a new idea. it had been suggested
before and been changed.
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Now, we don't need to pursue this further, but in light of our colloqtly, you might go back and reread it and then let us. have your
thoughts on it.
Mr. SCALIA. I certainly will, sir. I am sure that my thoughts will not
be that the matter is clear.
Senator BAYJI. Plus the other matter that you raised. I am sure
it isn't as clear as we would like to have it. These are very real questions in light of what we have gone through. I imagine what you must
have been going through.
In your statement you suggest that under normal nomination following the death of a President it is true that the customary practice
with respect to the nomination by a deceased President appears to be
that they subsist without the necessity of renewal by their successor.
Mr. SCAIJA. Yes, sir. I did not bring those citations with me but we
have documented instances in which that happened.
Senator BAYII. Your thrust is that the Vice Presid(.ntial nomination
is different because of the continuity in office--the 4 vem- ?
Mr. SCALIA. Yes, it is a different question really. There is no other
nomination that goes to both Houses. It is a nominatirvn in a very
unusual sense.
Senator BAYIT. Oh, it is. Well, excuse me.
Senator Foxo. As a committee member I will say that, the assumption was very clear on this, that if the Speaker took'over he had all the
powers of the President. I think that is the reason why nothing was
said on that. question.
Mr. SCALIA. Let me add just one other reason why it seems to me
that result is not one that I would readily reach. If he has all the
powers. one would think that he ought to proceed under the 25th
amendment. If he can, one would think that he ought to. There would
be a lot of pressure for him to use the 25th instead of just staying in
office.
If he does that, you will not only have the nomination submitted by
somebody who is not in line of succession from an election by the entire people but you will also be creating a caretaker President.'Because,
as soon as he submits that nomination he knows thatSenator BAY!!. No. He submits the nomination for the Vice President not the President.
Mr. SCALT.. And you asume, then, that the Vice President who
comes into office in a manner that I think has a higher dignity than
the manner in which the Speaker came into office, should remain as
Vice President and not succeed to the presidency?
Senator BAY!!. That is right.
Mr. SCAITA. That again seems to me to be an odd feature.
Senator Foxo. If he wishes, he could resign the Presidency and go
back to be Speaker.
Senator BAYH. No, I don't think he could because he couldn't become
President without resigning not only his speakership but his congressional seat. That is why I think your theory lead to all sorts of consequences, many of which we were concerned about. That was one of the
reasons we were concerned about the whole disability and the vice
presidential replacement business. What sort of position would this
put the Speaker in?
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You can't be fish or fowl. You either have to be a legislator or an
executive branch member. I don't know how he could go back to a
speakership.
Senator Fox.o. I could foresee where the Speaker says he doesn't
want to be the President, he wants to be the Speaker. He will tell his
Governor that once I become President I want to resign and want you
to reappoint me to tile House, and the House could make him Speaker.
Senator BAYHI. That could happen.
Senator Fo'Xo. I could foresee a Speaker that doesn't want to be
President.
Mr. SCALIA. Or who wants to be Speaker.
Shall I proceed?
Senator BAYH. Yes; please.
We obviously have a great interest in the points you raise to have
interru ted you like this.
Mr. Sc. IA. Let me skip a few pages, Senator, because my main
point was just to bring the problem to your attention and not necessarily to discuss all of the ramifications of it. I would like to just sum
up on this problem by saying that these matters may seem remote from
the practical world but I assure you that, they are not. Three months
ago they wlere of immediate significance. What I urge upon you is the
importance of solution agreed upon in advance rather than concocted

for the occasion. I don't think it matters terribly much what solution
you choose, but it ought to be clear and agreed upon well in advance.
The second difficulty relating to interpretation of the 25th amendment which I would like to bring to your attention is the problem of
making the determination of Presidential inabilty. This problem has
not yet been raised in a practical context but it concerns the issue of
who may participate in the determination of Presidential inability
under section 4 of the amendment. That section, as you know, covers
situations in which an ailing President is unwilling or unable to declare his own inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Office,
which he can do under section 3. In such event a declaration of such inability can be made to the Congress by the Vice President and. this is
the language of the amendment, "a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress
may by law provide."
Upon such declaration the Vice President assumes the Presidential
functions and retains them until the President transmits to the Congress his written declaration that no inability exists, with provision
-for rejection of such presidential declaration'by the Congress in the
event of an opposing declaration by the Vice President joined by, once
again, "a majority of either the principal officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress by law may provide."
Congress has, in fact, made no provision for such other body, so
the constitutional function of determining Presidential inability now
rests with "a majority of the principal officers of the executive department." The important issue which requires clarification is whether
this phase includes a Cabinet member's acting replacement, his Under
Secretary, Deputy Attorney General, or other designated official, in
the event the Cabinet member himself has died, resigned, or is sick
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or absent. Such substitution is the rule with respect to other functions
of the Cabinet members.
The statute governing tile Justice department . for example, provides that when the office of Attorney General is vacant, "the Deputy
Attorney General may exercise all the duties of that office." But such
statutes cannot be dispositive with respect to constitutionally prescribed functions." There the intent of the Constitution itself must.
govern. With respect to this intent, there is a direct conflict between
the House report on the proposed 25th amendment. which stated that
the acting head of a department would be authorized to participate,
and the Senate floor manager. Senator Bayll. wiho in tle 1 .oor
dhate
expressed his opinion that an acting head could not participate. As a

matter of statutory construction, it is exceedingly difficult to predict
how the Supreme Court would choose between these two highly authoritative indicia of legislative intent.
With respect to tlis particular prol)lem. it is simple for the Congress. by statute. to provide a clear and dispositive solution. Whatever
the )hrase principlel officers of the executive department" may mean,
it is clear under the amendment that the necessary determination can
be made by "such other body as Congress may by law provide." I urge
you to consider recommending adoption of a provision which would
specify that the determination of inability is to be made bv Cabinet
secretaries only. or, if you wish. by Cabinet secretaries or their
replacements.
I tend to favor the former, not just because I'm appearing before
this particular sul)comIImittee. but because of the possibility that a
Cabinet secretary's filst assistant. not to mention a more junior assist-

ant. if he should succeed to the vacancy. vill be overly deferential to
both the President and the other Cabinet secretaries, with the result
that his judgment will not be as bold and independent as it should be.
'Moreover. there is something to be said for the proposition that iv
order to tell when the President is sick. it helps to ha'e known him
well when he was healthy. Those below the Cabinet level may not
possess this qualification.
Senator B.%Y?!. We had a memorandum. prepared by the Library of
Congress. which we put into the record to substantiate our thinking
on this. I don't know whether yout were involved in the situation while
President Nixon was President. but when you weighed the transition
and the possibility of imlpeachment that must have been a terrible time.
I am of the opinion that that would have probably been like Ned
in the third reader compared to a disability problem..Normal disability
where a President is avare of his disability or is in.conscious, can be
handled.
But. in a Woodrow Wilson situation. where the President may be at

least iartiallv impaired but doesn't realize it, you have a problem.
One of the things we were trying to do was to make it possible for
the Cabinet or some other boly to make an objective choice without
the possibility of being fired.
- A case in point is the way Wilson treated Lansing. the Secretary
of State. Lansing was the only one that exercised any initiatives or

realized what was going on. They went for months without a Cabinet
meeting. Lansing tried to keep things going and was dismissed, as I
recall. Historians cannot tell me whether that was right or not.
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If you can give the President the right to fire every Cabinet official
and keel) doing that, you are going to make the replacements to follow
very subservient to tle President.
Ape wanted to make certain that any Cabinet official before he has a
right to exercise the powers and duties under this section of the disability provision of the 25th amendment, should indeed be confirmed
by the Senate. The President should not be permitted one at a time,
to remove those who are deeply concerned about his ability to serve.
That was the basis behind thie Senate's position. I think'without that
provision we really are linking it impossible to effectively remove the
President temporarily for disability.
I don't know whether the Senator from Hawaii recalls that date,
but that was the thinking in the Senate's mind in establishing that
provision. I don't know the legislative history in the House or how it
happened. but this come up one time in the debate.
lnStead of answering it and moving on, we answered it and had s'me
time to think about it. Then we came back and documented the think,
ing. It was not just a quick answer in a debate situation.
Mr. Sc.UA.. The preference that I just expressed, Senator, as to
which way it comes out, is the preference that you share. I must say.
though. thnt it. is a mild preference. I think that it is best to let only
the Cabinet secretaries make the decision. But really, the nature of
the choice is less important than the making of the choice. What is
crucial is that a clear answer be provided before the constitutional
provision must be used. In this case, it can be done dispositively by
statute . There is no question that you can pass a statute which will
conclude the issue.
With respect to the first probleur that I mentioned. and which we
discussed at some length-that is. the relationship of the Presidential
Succession Act to the 25th amendment-that you cannot technically
resolve by a mere statute. it seems to ip. ttowever, for all practical
purm)oses, you can. I think if you pass a statute, concurred in by the
executive branch, which expresses your interpretation of how the
Presidential Succession Act meshes with the 25th amendment. it is
beyond my expectation that. the Supreme Court would-not accept that
determination. In other words. I think you would in effect conclude
the matter by amending the Succession Act to make it clear how
it relates to the 25th amendment.
Mr. Chairman. that concludes my prepared statement. I am grateful
for your attention and will be happy to answer any further questions
the subcommittee may have.
Senator Fo.o. I have no further questions. Thank you for bringing
these matters up.
Senator BAYvi. I wish you would, in light of our discussion, go
back and reexamine the things we both said. look at some of the
precedents. I think a strong case can be made for the fact that our
Founding Fathers may have indeed intended for the Vice President
to have the same authority that you now feel the Speaker would have.
as an acting Vice President.
A lot of those people who wrote the Constitution were sitting there
in the Congress that came up with the first succession statute. In the
succession statute. the succession was to be temporary followed by
an election.
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That should be weighed against how the country has historically
treated the Vice President after the Tyler precedent. At that time,
in the light of history, Tyler probably ignored what our Founding
Fathers thought. And we haven't done anything about it, in that
period of time, over 100 years. There was pretty strong precedent that
the Vice President, indeed contrary to what our Founding Fathers
may have thought, does-have all tle powers and duties of the office.
If the country had wanted to change those conditions. certainly
they would have done so. Our next wit"tness has perhaps feelings to
the contrary, and I am anxious to get his thinking, at least about
where we ought to go from here.
Mr. SCALIA. Senator, I think that is right. That is the reason I
did not allude to the earlier history of the constitutional provisions
in my testimony. They have been applied in a manner so fundamentally different from what was contemplated originally. You can
begin with the function of the electoral college, which iii the Federalist Papers is described as a croiip much different from what it
has worked out to be. That is why I refer. in my testimony. to the
modern principle of direct. election of the President. It has, indeed,
worked out that way. It was not originally intended to work out that
way.

Many of the features of the Presidential and Vice Presidential
election have evolved in a manner which the Founding Fathers did
not contemplate. It is for that reason that I think what the Supreme
Court would place most stress on, if it came to examine the matter,
is the theory and the lecrislativ'e history of th 25th amendment itself.
I think they would place much greater weight on that than on the
earlier history of the Presidency and the Vice Presidency.
Senator B, YH. Here again. I am willing to pursue this. and I
appreciate your bringing it up. but I think you will find, as my distinguished colleague from Hawaii said. perhaps we in our debate coilceded the fact that the Tyler precedent changed the original intention
of our Founding Fathers. It has become a rather strong precedent
and one that we can change, of course. by constitutional amendment.
But I don't believe any of us anticipated that the Speaker would
perform a different role than performing the full powers and duties
of the Presidency. The Succession Act. although it does use the frame,
who shall act as President. does not establish as preeding Succession
Acts have. for a vehicle to enact new election procedures in this kind
of thing.
Let me ask you a couple of other questions if I might and then I
don't want to belnbor this. Are you speaking for the Attorney General I
Mr. SCALIA. For the Justice Department; yes. sir.
Senator BAYR. Is the Justice Department speaking for the
President?
Mr. ScALU.. Yes, sir.
Senator BRA'. In other words, what you say has the approval of
the President?
Mr. SCAI!.A. The testimony has been approved.
Senator B.%rir. I appreciate that fact. but certainly he must have
given a lot of thought on these questions that you have raised.
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Now. he gave some thought to another provision of the 25th amendment or the lack of another provision of tile 25th amendment. It was
rather critical of Congress prior to the election in November. I assume

that was not a product of tile electioneering he was (loing but. was a
prodiict of deep concern that he had.
lie criticized tll. ('onl'e...s for lrIir:ritg its feet: urge(l them to
hurry up. At one time, lie suggested that we should have a time limit
I)lt oil tihe eiactl|lent of tie 25t i a nvieilte)it. lilas le hangeded his
midl(l: is tills just a pIssing tlogilt : or what is lis position on this
rigit now ?
M(r. S|eAL.L.. No. sit'. I (loul1t think the administration's position on
tlat point has changedi, flower. I dont think that position was
relevant to aineiling tit( 25th amendment. or even to clarifying its
provisions.
Senator lR.ii. Well. let tle siggvst that it was a lot more relevant
thalu aN'th ing .voni 1 rolugit to oulr at tetilion. The niatters you
l)ro igltl to our t) ,ti o are l|,aS|ilr'es 1', Si| " tiavtre an' some (1 stionis
al)out. There is no (luest ion about t lie fiact tiat t lie 25ti al|||el|dme|lt not
Winly loes not provide for a time, limit. it is Ut(iluest ional)le that that
lhas been rsolv'e(l in f le eglt i%'e. There is amll (lelate. Both Senator
Ervin and myself talked al)out the- follv of setting a time limit on tile
seallrc for t ruthli.
Congress shouldle
gi ve4i whatever timei, thm felt necessarv and
prudent to make a wise choice. Now. if the President still feels that
we were dragging our feet and still feels that we should put a time
limit. why didn't .onl testify to that extent-if you are speaking for
him ?
Mr.
.
Senator, .ott didn't let me finish.
Senator
Il
\li . You1 Nay
tow have as much time as you mant. There
is no tilne limit oit No1.
_ Mr. '
I stated to say tlhat I (did not mention it in my prepared testimony\' lee' use tile a(lluinistration's position is not relevant
to an amendment, of tie 25th a imtudnvit, or to a clarification of the
l)rovisions of tlie, 25th amennlment. The adni|mistration's position cont inues to be t hat it would spem desirable to estallisli a time limit, but
it shioutld! not be dion, by an amendment of tie 25th amendment. It
should
rat l be
I)e dole vt le ( 'ongress.
I think the preferable way would be for the llouse and Senate
rules to provide whiat inl their view tlhey consider a reasonable period
for action 1l)1o1 these 1ominat ions. Once again, it is important that
it e established mtside of the context of any specific case. outside of
the political controversy yoi get into then. I think it would be desirable-atid ti aldlitis lition feels it would be-for tile House and
the Senate by their rules, to set forth well in advance of this problem's
arising again, how long they ought to take to act on the nominations.
Senator BAY'E. Well, if yon or the Plesident feel that, why didn't
you tell us? Obviously. W(e are talking about succession statutes-

things that are beyond the provine'e that can be done without a constitutional amendment here. You suggested yourself that we passed a
law signed by the President relative to this matter.
If the administration feels we should have a time limit placed on
the succession statute, who didn't you suggest that in your statement?
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What should the time limit be; what does the President think the time
limit should beI
Mr. SC ALA. Sir. I think that is an issue that. the Members of the
Senate and of the House can probably judge better-as to the exact
number of days-than the executive branch can. I would pick a number and say maybe 60 days.
Senator Fo.o. How can you enforce it?
Mr. SCALIA. Well, I think it has a good deal of moral force. Senator.
Senator Fox-o. It may have moral force. but how can you enforce
it if the Senate decides not to proceed, and the House decides to take
its time. and the election is pending and Rockefeller would be too
good a speaker for the Republican party, how can you prevent delay
%
until after the election ?
Mr. SCALIA. Senator, there is no way to force it without setting it in
concrete in a fashion that would be undesirable. That is why it
shouldn't be in the 25th amendment. You can't predict. It may indeed
hnve to take longer than that.
There ought to be some pressure. some incentive to keep within a
certain time period. But ultimately. if the Senate found it couldn't
do it. it could just say "We are not going to observe the rule" or "Wqe
are going to amend the rule in this case." There is nothing that could
prevent that. But. when it (lid that it would have to take the heat that
comes with it. I think it would be less simple for the Senate then to
simply say. "WYell. when the President is saying we should act more
quickly oi this. he is just playing politics." The Senate would then
be violating its own rule which it made outside of the heat of any
political campaign-I think it would be difficult.
Senator BAIT. May I just ask, are you represented by legal counsel
here?
Mr. SCATIA. No, sir.
Senator BAv. Let me suggest that perhaps we ought to go back
on that record and you ought to say. "I don't know"-unless you have
had direct information'from the President that you are speaking for
him now.
During the campaign he suggested that the 25th amendment should
be amended.
Mr. SCAL A.No. sir.
Senator B.%Yji. But that a time limit should be imposed ? It is hardly
incumbent upon you representing the Department of Justice to say
that we establish rules or statute-set up those rules, statutes or time
limits but do not adhere to them. The only sanction would be public
authorization.
Unless you want to pursue me on this; unless you are sure that you
are speaking for the President, I must say, I think you are on rather
thin ice there.
Mr. SCALIA. Senator. I am confident that the President did not say
that the 25th amendment should be revised. I think he said consideration should be given to establishing some pressure for prompt action
by a time limit, either through amendment of the 25th amendment, or
through congressional action.
I think lie referred to congressional action by public law. That
leaves open a much broader category of action than just amending the
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25th amendment. I do not believe that putting it in the 25th amendment
itself is the way to do it. The way to do it is to put it in the Htiouse
and Senate riles.
I am speaking for the administration.
Senator B.ATI. Let me ask you this, are you familiar with the rather
extensive
debate1)espite
we hadthe
on fact
this very
point?people
We were
about
foot-dragging.
that seine
said.concerned
well, Congress
got caught with their pants down because here they had a President
of one party and a Congress of the other and they didn't anticipate
this. However, the debate is replete with concern expressed over the
exact political mixture that we (lid find ourselves in?
One of the concerns we had was that the Congress of the opposite
party would drag its feet not merely concerned about the passage of
the election but just drag its feet period. The Speaker, an officer of
the other party, would become the President in the event anything
happened. Are you familiar with that I
Mr. ScALIA,. senator, I am net as familiar with it as you are. I read

it and I agree with the outcome of that debate. I think it was a sound

judgment not to place any time limit in the 25th amendment.
Senator BLYji. You are aware, then. that the absence of a time limit
was not by accident but was the product-our design.
Mr. SCALIA. Ats I recall the discussion, it was confused. Some speakers at. some points were talking about succession when you were talking about disability. The issue was raised with respect' to both. As I
say, I think
Senator ILyix. The lack of time limit wis the product of conscious
consideration--determination that, we should have no time limit in the

Constitution, right?
Mr. SCALIA. Y es, sir.
Senator B]AYm. Now. since that is what the Constitution says, how
in the world can you pass a statute? How can the Senate come up with
a rule or the House come ip with a rule which is in direct contravention of what the Constitution says, or means?
Mr. ScALI. I don't see how it would be in contravention, Senator.
There are many functions which the Senate has to perforni under the
Constitution which are governed by its rules of procedure. Those rules
of procedure simply state how the Senate shall proceed.
I(o not mean to assert that those rules are in any sense binding upon
the Senate except by its own determinations-so that if, for instance,
they establish a 60-day time limit and on a particular nomination it

turns out that they need more time than that., they can amend their
own rule. I don't see how that is at all inconsistent with the 25th
amendment. The rule is not. binding upon them except by their own
act. Its purpose, Senator, would be simply to establish outside of the
heat of controversy

-

Senator BAYJI. Granted, but I don't see how you can establish outside of the heat of controversy, that is the only way to do it. That is
why we passed the 25th amendment-after we had the vacancy filled
and the Vice Presidency.
But, I don't know how you can establish an precedent nor say the
Senate can establish rules. You mentioned you thought perhaps it
could be done by statute. How can you pass a'law that is directly con-
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trary to a decision that was made by the Congress and 38 State legislators that you should amend the Constitution and have no time lmitI
It wasn't that we didn't consider a time limit. We considered it and
decided we didn't want one. Whereas, in a disability provision we considered that we needed a time limit.
Mr. SCALIA. Senator, it seems to me that what you decided was that
you didn't want a time limit in the Constitution.
Senator BAYJI. No, we decided that it would not be wise. We decided that was not it at all. lWe decided that we wanted no time limit
whatsoever.
Mr. SCALIA. You decided it would not be wise to put one in the Constitution.
Senator BAYji. No, we didn't. We decided that the whole process

should not be limited by time restrictions. That was in the debate. I
remember Senator Ervin, as only he can, looking to the galleries and
saying, "God forbid that we should put a time limit on the search

for truth." There may have been a few amens-at least I thought
aniens.
Mr. SCALIA. Senator, you may have discussed the absolute question
in the context of the constitutional debate, but I submit that all the

constitutional failure to include a time limit establishes, is that it was
thought unwise to have a time limit imposed by the Constitutioni, that

could not be eliminated or extended in any way except by action
through the people. I think that is an entirely different question from
whether a time limit imposed by statute, or as I suggest, by I-ouse
and Senate rule, is desirable.
Senator BAYI[. You may be expressing your opinion and that of the
Administration but let me tell you, you are not expressing the opinion
of the U.S. Senate that passed this Constitution. You go back there
and do as thorough a job reading the record on this as you have on the
others. I salute you for that. However, I think yoi will find out you
are on very shake grounds.
Mr. SCALIA. Senator, I don't want to be misunderstood. I am not
speaking in any way as to what the Members of Congress at that time
may have felt. I am just speaking to what they decided when they
did not include a time limit in the constitutional proposal. They certainly did not decide that no time limit could be imposed by louse cr
Senate rule, that is my only point.
Senator B.'II. Well, you just said a moment ago that you thought
it was very important. I don't suppose you (lid this just as a conpliment in one area relative to the Cabinet officers that could or couldn't
serve. The opinion of the floor leader of the measure. namely, yours
truly. was important. The opinion of the debate, of course, is equally
il
lortant.
1low can you say that that is true about one issue in one area and
it isn't on the other? There is no question about what Congress
wanted. They didn't want any time limit-in any way.
Mr. SCALIA. We are talking about what the amendment intended,
what was the intent of the amendment. I am conceding that the Congress absolutely did not intend that the amendment should include
any time. limit. That is quite a different question, however, from
whether the Congress meant to proscribe any time limit by statute or
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by House or Senate rule. If they intended that, they might have go a-.
to say, in the 25th amendment: "No time limit on this inquiry shall
be imposed by statute."
Senator BAYH. You may sit here right now and tell us genuinely
in your heart what you feel, or try to tell us what the President meant
when lie was giving it to Congress 2 or 3 weeks before election. You
may do that. But, you cannot tell us what Congress meant when they
passed that constitutional amendment.
I suggest to you that we couldn't even have gotten the votes necessary to pass it. Senator Ervin was indispensible in our being able to
put together the necessary three-fourth or two-thirds of the Senate. I
am sure they would never have bought it. He made it very clear; we
couldn't have passed it if we had a time limit.
How could you suggest that we wouldn't want a time limit put in
in this by Constitution but we are prepared to accept it by statute?
Mr. ScALIA. I am sure that is right, Senator, that there was extreme
opposition to it. I would have voted against it myself. But, the question there was whether there should be a time limit imposed by the
Constitution. What we are now discussing is a totally different
questionThat is, whether, assuming that the Congress can take as long as
it likes under the Constitution, the Congress should nevertheless in
the exercise of responsible Government, establish a presumptive
period within which it should act. If that period then expires and
the Congress says, "We have to go further," they can always amend
the rule.
Senator BAYH. You say a 60-day period is what you would choose?
Mr. SCALIA. I say further that you probably know better than I,
but 60 days seems good.
Senator BAYH. I don't think that we should have any limit. That is
what I know, and you are wrong, but I want to know what your
judgment is.
Air. SCALIA. I think 60 days is a reasonable time period.
Senator BAYII. Now, does the Administration suggest what criteria

for the standard of applying that 60 days would be?
Mr. SCALIA. The criteria?
Senator BAYii. How do you arrive at 60 days? What is the criteria
on one side of which it is prudent and on the other side of which is
dilatory?
Mr. SCALIA. Well, I suppose you could look to example. President
Ford's nomination process when he was nominated to Vice President
was disposed of, I believe, in slightly less than that amount of time.
What it comes to is a calculation of how Iong it ought to take the
Congress to investigate the qualifications and hold the necessary hearings and make its decision. Sixty days is a long time for a matter of
that much importance to the Republic. Maybe I feel more strongly
about it than you do because I was worried about what would happen
if the incumbent President were to die while the Rockefeller nomination was pending. It troubled me very much.
I don't think that matter should be left pending any longer than is
absolutely necessary.
Senator BAYH. either do 1.
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Mr. SCALIA. I think anything that could be done to put some moral
pressure on to expedite the proceeding is desirable. What I am suggesting here is not something that cannot be reversed or undone when
it appears necessary. But, it will keep on the desirable pressure to
move expeditiously.
Senator BAYH. You known, I think you and I disagree as to what
it takes to do that. You suggested that the time frame of slighly less
than 60 days for the Ford nomination was not dilatory. I think is what
you said.
Mr. Scm.. What I said was that it was completed in that amount
of time. The time is certainly long enough in a normal case.
Senator BAYH. There is no suggestion that the Congress was dilatory in taking that much time for President Ford?
Mr. SCALIA. I have heard none, no.
Senator BAY.r I haven't either. Now, is it fair to suggest that the
Ford nomination was a much simplier one confronting the committee
that had access to all information than the Rockefeller nomination
was?
Mr. SCALIA. I

am not sure, Senator, that is the case. You are refer-

ring, no doubt, to the financial complications of the Rockefeller
nomination.
Senator BAYH. You don't have to be a genius to suggest that there
are a lot of different factors to be weighed. As for complicated financial backgrounds. financial and enonomic power was there in Vice
President Rockefeller's background that was not in President Ford's,
wasn't there I
Mr. SCALTA. Sir. I really don't want to get into a debate on when
it was dilatory and when it wasn't. I am genuinely interested in trying
to get adopted a provision that will solve what could be a problem in
the future. I don't think it contributes to that to rehash whether there
waos dilatoriness or not dilatoriness in the past. All is well that ends
well. as far as I am concerned, but I was nervous at the time-as
President Ford was. and rightly so.
Senator BAYjr. The debate'is whether it ended well or not. The
majority of Congress and the President thought it ended well. I am
willing to accept that interpretation. I think where I disagree with
you is that if you look again at the debate and the reason we didn't
want any time'limit in the Constitution, Conrress or in the Rules. was
that the"white heat of publicity, the very thing that President Ford
and some of the rest of you were doing and saying, would b a
constant thou.ht. as it should be to keel) a Congress moving.
I must say I think the Congress acted very expeditiously considering everything. They moved qu;eklv the first time. dring President
Ford's nomination. Speaker Albert uicklv laid to rest the few voices
in our party. There were some that said."'wait a minute. don't rush
in there, we've got a Democrat one heartbeat away."
It was that public debate about the time limit that said. well we can
turn our head if the time isn't right. I for one am unwilling to put a
time limit.
Senator Fox-o. I will say that I naree with the witness here that we
could set a time limit if ;e wislied to by statute or by Rules of the
Senate. I don't think that we would like'to. If we really wanted to I
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think we could, even though many believe that. we shouldn't have a
time limit.
Senator BAY11. Well. tlt
is what makes a ball game--two
sides. We appreciate, Mr. Scalia. your taking your time to let us have
your thoughts. If you have any other reflectins after we are through
here, we will be glad to have those for our record or for further testimony as you may see fit.
M. ScMjr.. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Senator BA,1. We will have a brief intermission so that our reporter
can take care of some necessary changes in equipment.
[A brief recess was taken.]
Senator BAY!i. Our next witnesses are two scholars whose special
and practical experience suggest that they. as much as any other two
human beings, could bring insight into the precedent and practice and
wisdom of the constitutional provisions which we are now studying,
Prof. Arthur Schlesinger. Jr. of the City College of New York and
Prof. James McGregor Burns of Willians College.
I don't think it is necessary to further document the academic and
practical experience that these men have had relative to being students
of the Presidency. which in essence. is what this is all about.
After consulting with the witnesses. they concur in a format of letting each make a statement as long as he desires, there is no time limitation prescribed thereon. constitutionally or otherwise. Then, we will
involve ourselves in a dialog between them and me and between
themselves.
Professor Schlesinger. if you will initiate this dialog.
Mr. SCHLSIxFR. Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., CITY COLLEGE OF
NEW YORK
Mr. SCHLESINGER. I am happy to have the opportunity today to offer
this distinguished subcommittee some views on the 25th amendment.
When that amendment was adopted 8 years ago. no one anticipated the
circumstances in which section 2 would be applied. I freely include
myself among those who failed to foresee the curious future of section
2. However, this failure of foresight does not relieve any of us of
responsibility for the mischief that section 2 has caused or of the
obligation to'begin a search for a remedy.
The Congress has now confirmed two Vice Presidents under the 25th
amendment. This experience has plainly demonstrated-or so it seems
to me-that the original theory of section 2 has been abandoned. That
theory. as set forth in the legislative history, was that election by the
Congress was to take the place of election by the voters. As you, Senator Bayh, said in the debate. "If Congress is to choose the man nominated it will * * act as the voice of the people." And, as he subsequently put it in a statement preceding the fir-st congressional application of section 2. "The role of Congress was to be-and is-that of
electors. We are to represent the people of our country in this congres-

sional election of a new Vice President * * *. We are acting as surro-

gate electors for the people."
The theory that Congress was acting in lieu of the electorate was
expressed in the requirement that both Houses-not the Senate alone,
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as in the case of other Presidential appointinents-nmst give their consent to tile election of a mid-terin Nice President. The election of a
Vice President, Senator Bavh assured us. was not "just another traditional nomination to be handled in the traditional way * * *. This is a
nomination unlike any other." And. since Congress was supposed to
act as the representatve of and th, substitute for the voters, there is
no escape, it. seems to inc. from the conclusion that it was commanded to
apply to a person nominated for tile Vice Presidency the same tests
that the voters ap)ly to candidates in a regular election.
I do not, in retrospect. think that this original theory was a good
idea. The Founding Fathers, after each careful consideration, had
rejected the proposal that Congress should choose the Chief Executive.
As Governeur Morris put it in the convention, the President would be
"the mere creature of the Iegislature: if appointed and impeachable
by that body." The Constitution even prohibited 'Members of Congre.s
fr-om serving as presidential electors-article I1, section 1. It brought
Congress into the picture only in case of a tie in tile electoral college.
Te 25th amendment has6greatly enlarged the congressional role.
It gives Congress in relatively routine cases almostt a quarter of the
time since the ratification of the 12th amen(lment) what the Founding
Fathers resolved to deny it, except in the most extreme cases: control
over the choice of a l)otential Piresident. This control was cloaked in
the theory that congressional consideration was tile replacement of
popular election ; anid only this theory saved section 2 from moving
our concept of government measurably towar(l a parlimentarv concept.
For the essence of a parliamentary system,- of course, is legislative
selection of the Chief Executive.
In any case this theory has turned out to be fiction. Congress in
practice'has failed to live ul) to its commitment to serve as surrogate
electors for the people. Tile pioof of this is simple and conclusive. If
Congress had employed tie same criteria voters use in an election, if
it had supplied, as it" was obligated to supply. an authentic equivalent
for tile electoral process. Congressman Ford and Governor Rockefeller
would not have been confirmed by the overwl'helming margins that,
in fact, Members of Congress gave them : for it. seems improbable that
any )ol)ular election would ha'e given them such extraordinary
majoities. MNanv Members voted to confirm the names submitted to
them who would never dream of marking the ballot for them in
a polling booth.
Instead of applying the. standards l)lainly demandedd by section 2.
they al)l)lied the standards routinely used for routine presidential
appointments. They viewed the selection of Vice President as another
traditional nomination to l)e voted up or down by the same criteria
a Senator would apply to the nomination of a memler of the Cabinet.
They failed, in short. to meet what would appear to have been their
obligations under section 2 of the 25th amendment. And. in justice to
them, the theory of section 2 was probably unreal from the start, since
it is hard to Ilave tie equivalent of an election unless the surrorate
electors are offered a serious choice.
Tile New York Times said in a recent editorial. "Ill acting upon a
Vice-Presidential nomination, the Congress cannot l)retend that the
25th amendment conferred upon it the final power that the sovereign
people possess in ail election * * * Congress instead has tle more
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limited resl)ons hility to investigate a nomlinee's probity and to make
certainl that he is not of sticli ch1aractor o tel )eniment as to disqualify
him for tihe l-resi(ley." "I'lhere could laNrdlv be a m1ore egregious
miSrea(lillg of the (lear congressional intent ill section 2 to make Congress the surrogate for the electorate. But also there could hardly be
a clearer statement of wlre section 2 stands after its first two applications. It is for this reason tlat I suggest that the original theory of
section 2 has been abandoned.
If this original theory has been al)atdoned, if Congress has decided
not to serve as surrogate electors for the people. tlen the content of
section 2 Ias been subtly but l)rofoulily tinsmformed. Congress has
now reduced the designation of a mid-term Vice Plresident to a status
Ver-y like that of tle nomination of a Secietary of State or of the
Treasury'. less the nominee. for Vice 1Presilelt lhas the most gross
(lisquali'ficatiois. .Nemlbers of congresss evidently feel tlev must
approve him even if they would never vote for him in a Presidential
election. T'he result, in short, is to give the Iresident tile tactical
successor.
power to appoint llis own
This is surely a situation rel)ugnant to i (lemocracy. I need hardly
remind this committee that 30 years a(o Presidlent T1iruman secured
the repeal of the Presidential Succession Act of 1886 on the precise
g round Id that it enabled himi, as a Vice lPresident wiho had succeeded to
(h Presidency, to name his own successor wlen lie chose a Secretary
of State. "It. now lies Wiithin my power'," he told Congress on June
19, 1945, "to nominate tie person who would be my immediate successor. ** * I do not believe that in a democracy this power should rest
with the Chief Executive." Yet this is squarely the position in which
the 25ti amendment lhas laled our hapless ltel)ublic.
I know it is said that PIresidents lhave this power anyway in the
nominating convention. But I must agree with Senator Mathias who
characterized thlis argument as a "false aii logty" when, as a congressman a decade ago. lie viselv declined to join the stamiwde for the
25th amendment. A Presidential nominee and an incumbent President,
Senator Mathias observed, aree very" different nen, moved by v'ery different motives. 'lel nominee at tle convention is far more res)oisive
to popular sentiment tllan the president in the White ]Iouse. Moreover, there is no lzuwv giving l)residential nominees a five hand in picking their partnerss on the ticket. Thiis has not been always. or indeed,
often true in the. past. I (oubt whether it will be al'a"s true in the
ftre.
Surely Iresident Truman "'as everlastingly right in 1945. Surely
the Presidency of the united States must never be an office within
the power' of one man to hand to allother. Yet this is where we are
today, as a result of the abandonment of tie idea that Congress serves
as the surrogate for tie electorate. And this is only the beginning
of the constitutional absurdity into \hichsection ' ofthe 25th amendmeit lhas pluliged us. The situation becomes even more incompatible
with tie thmeoryN' of the Replublic-aul even more l)rel)osterous-%when
one considers ihat the 25thi amendment empowers a mistrusted and
discredited Presi(lent, a President on the brink of impeachment, to
name his successor. And what is most incompatible with tie theory
of the Replblic-and what is most preposterous of all is that, as a
result of section 2 of the 25th amendment, we now have for the irst
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time in American history both a President and Vice President wvho
have come to power not, like all their prelecessors, through election
but through appointment.
This is an extraordinary predicament for a democratic republic. Up
to now the right of the 'people to elect their own leaders had been
assumed-by definition as the fundamental point of self-government.
The Constitution thus required that the President and Vice President
"be elected" (Art. I. see. 1). The 23th amendment has taken upon
itself to repeal this point so axiomatic to the Founding Fathers. Today
we have the extrnordinarv situation in which no American outside the
5th District of Michigan has ever voted for the President for national
office and no American anywhere has ever voted for the Vice President for national office.
Is this what the drafters of the 25th amendment intended? Obviously not. Let them therefore reassess their handiwork. I do not see
how those who in all good faith and hope conceived section 2 of the
25th amendment can be complacent about the way it has worked out.
The theory on which it was bsed-that Confr'ess should act as the
equivalent* of the electorate-has been rejected. The consequence has
been to introduce into our political process anomalies difficult to reconcile with the Constitution or with any reasonable or responsible theory
of democracy. Under what I believe is an irreversible and probably
inevitable misconstruction of section 2. we have solemly given any
President. in case of a vacancy in the Vice Presidency. no matter how
dishonorable or corrupt that President may be, the l'power to appoint
his successor. It is time, I believe to return to first principles. These
principles. I would submit, are (1) no President. as Mr. Truman so
wisely said, should have such power: and (2) al' Presidents. as the
Constitution so wisely provided, should be elected. These are the principles. I would suggest, that should guide your committee in the task
before you.
Senator Pastore on Felfruary 5 reintroduced a proposed constitutional amendiment-an amendment he had originally, with great
prescience. introduced on November 15, 1973-calling for a special
Presidential election in cases when an appointed Vice President succeeds to the Presidency and when nore than 12 months remain in the
Presidential term. May I say at once that the Pastore amendment
would be an immeasurable inprovenuent over the present section 2 of
the 25th amendment, and I commend it to your consideration.
But I would urge this committee to go imich farther and consider
the case for abolition of the Vice Presidency altogether. I have set forth
that case at length in an article in the fall 1974 issue of the Political
Science Quarterly entitled "On the Presidential Succession." I would
like, if it is appropriate, to submit a copy of this article for inclusion
in the record of these hearings.
Senator BAY11. I would like to ask, that without objection, that that
article appear at the end of our dialog because I think it does exnlore
your views on the relevancv of the Vice Presidency in great detail.
Mr. SCnrLEsiXcrFn. At this point. I will offer oily a brief summary
of some points in the argument.
In the only mention of the Vice Presidency in the Federalist Papers,
Hamilton tinted that the office had been "objected to as superfluous. if
not mischievous."
In my judgment history has more than justified boqh objections. It
has shown the Vice President to be both superfluous and mischievous.
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It is superfluous because the Vice President has no duties except to
preside over tile Senate. I know that Presidents say ritualistically they
are going to give their Vice Presidents soniething'to do, but this never
has aniounted to mucl. Tlire is. first of all, the constitutional problem.

The Vice President. as Mr. Truman in his memoirs wrote, "is not an
officer of the executive branch": or. as General Eisenhower put it in
his meioiis in 1963. the Vice President "is not legally a part of the
executive branch] and is not subject to direction by the President." The

President. moreover, is given by the ('onstitution undivided possession
of the exeelit ive power. "Yol cannot, under the Constitution as President Roosevelt said il 1940. "set ill) i second Prtsident * * *. The
('oustitlitiol states one man is responsible. Now that man can delegate,
surely. lint in the delegation lie does not delegate away any part of the
responsibility from tlei ultimate resl)onsilility tilat, rests on him."
There is, iln addition, tie practical problemii. Presidents will freely
delegate power to mni tley call lire and fire. But they cannot fire
their Vice lresidents. Tisliscourages Presidents from giving them
jobs at whicll tley m1a fail-or may succeed too well. No President
is likely to be ha'ppy if the executive branch begins to fill up with
pJeople whose loyalty'rullns to llis Vice President rather than to himself.
Now it m11ay be tllat 1Presidenlt lord and Vice P resident Rockefeller
aye going to reverse the course of history and demonstrate that the
Vice Presidency. can be more tian a non-job. But this should be regardedias tile filnl exlperilent. as tle last chance for what lhas always
been ll!) to now a melingless and futile office. If this experiment fails,
I would hope that tile country would reacl, what seems to me, the
inevitable Conclusion and aholish tile Vice lPresidency.
The Vice Presidlenvy is not only a superfluous office on the historical
record: it is also a iniscievous one. an office of spectacular and, I believe, incurable frustration. '']e more gifted and ambitious the Vice
President. the )etter (1ualifiedi at tl start for the Presidency, the acute
the frustration. Few Vice Presidents Iave survived the systematic
demoralization inflicted by the odice without serious injury to themselves. Bjill Movers, lhas correctlv called the office "a man-eater. It
destroys individuals." Far fromi being a learning experience, as some
political scientists like to believe, the Vice Presidency has been historically a maiming expe.'ience.
The only serious argument for it is that it provides for the succession. But surelv it. is not beyond our resourceflne1
s to provide for tile
succession without (reatinz' this superfhos and lnischievous office. The
answer lies, I think, in the principle of the Pastore resolution, that is,
succession through a special election.
Tie fix into w-hich the 25th amendment has got the American Republic is drainatized i)y comparison with recent developments in
France. General de Gaulle designed a )owerful Presidency for himSelf, but even that towering leader did not claim for 1Presidents of

France the authority to appoint their successors, the authority granted
American Presidenis in j)articular circumstances when we conceived

and ratified the 25th aniendment during the high noon of the Imperial

Presidency. Instead the. French Constitution provides simply that, in
case of a vacancy in the Presidency. the President of the Senate becomes Actini Pi:esident and a new'election to choose a new President
must be held within 25 days. On April 2. 1974. President Pompidon
(lied. On May 5 the French had an election followed by a run-off on
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MaN 19 and the. inauguration of a new President on Mav 27. In less
than 2 months after the death of one President, Franc1
e had a new
resident. chosen I" tle )eople and equipped by them with a fresh
mandate. Which g(vermitent. is more legitimate: the elected government of France after the death of Pompidol or the ap)ointed gov-

ernment of the United States after the resignatims of Nixon and
Agnew? Which political system, in this respect at, least, is more
democratic ?
Now tle odditv is that tle sN'stem that worked so well last
in
France is aIlilosi ideliticall' tle system originallY\ planned year
'for tie
American (',ostit lit ion. The' early draft of tle (olstitltion thus proposed that in case of a vacantcy il the Presidencv "the President of tile
Senate shall exercise those lowers and duties, lintil another President
of tli I'nited States he chosen." The Vice lPresidenc' came in as an
a fterthourht an(d not primarily to provide for tile' succession. The
point of trie Vice IPresidenc\" of course was rather to insure tile election n
of a Nati onal President tw"requiring each elector to vote for two
persons, onl" one of whlom coilld come from his own State. At a time whenl
local loyalties were stronger than national loyalties, it. was feared
a sinvzle vote Sy'stem would result in eaclh State' s elector.s vastinrvthat
all
its votes for a favorite son. A double vote for President, with one vote.
required to Ibe cast outside tle State would result, it was believed, in
the. Choice of a President commallnding naioal support, tile runner-up
would become Vice Presidelt. 1'lle idea of special ,lections was retained for tle case of a vacancy. ill 1oth offices. That idea was ilio.poriated explicitly in the Presidential Succession Act of 1792 and implicitly in tile Presidential Sucession Act of 1886 and was proposed
again by President Truman ill 1945.
Now, tile Vice Presidency" lost almost immediately tile function for
which it was originally (leigned. It lost that function when the 12th

amendment enled the double vote in 1804 and required separate 'oting for

President and Vice President---'lie fact that the 12th amendment lost its function was perceivedl at the time. and tile logical conclusion was drawn. "The reasons of erecting the office," one Senator
said, "are frustrated by the amendment * * *. It, will be preferable,
therefore. to alxlish the ofAice." Henry Adams tells us in his .,reat.
history of these years that. "had the question risen as a iew one. i)erhaps a' majority, I eight have favored abolition" in' 1804, but the dsculsion.was hampered by instructions from State le,,rislatmires,
and
abolition was defeated oil a iarty vote. The Federalists thereafter,
Adanms wrote, were able to clharce ,Tefferson and his party "for putting
in the office of President. in case of vacancies, men whom no State and
no elector intended for tile post."
It is time for us to repair tile 00rror of 1804. Let us adopt a constitutional aliendnwnt aholishing the Vice Presidency. and then provide for
te succession in the s,,irit of their Fomnding Fathels thrlouh a congressional statute reestablishing the lprincile of special Presidential
elections. In case of a vacancy in the Presidency, let us have an acting
President (lrawn, in order to preserve party," and policy continuity,
from tile Cabinet evolding to tile order laid'down in the President ial
Succession Act of 1886. And. unless the President vanishes in the last
year of his term, let ius choose a new President throull a special
election to h~e liehl(. say. 90 days. This would ouly be all election to fill
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wOUl(1 not require tle elaborate foreplay of the quadrenout a term and N

national coiniuittees, which have become increasingly
rel-'eseltative bodies un1delr the new party riles, could canvass opinion
nial orgy. 'lel

and make nominations. Short. campaigns, federally financed, would
b a ilessing infinitely appreciated by the electorate. Perhaps their
brevity and their economy night have salutary impat on the quadrennial campaignss, which in recent, years have stretched out to intolerable
length and swelled to intole-rable expense.

I realize that this may seem a drastic proposal. But I believe the

exli-riece of. nearly two centillries un1lder the ('onstitution has abiundantly demonst rated the hopelessniess of the Vice Presideney. The 25tlh

a1ienilment. with the best of intentions, has only compounded the
lrobleniI. 1et us do today what Congress and the 'ation should have,

and came near doing ill 1804.
This concludes my remarks. Thank you for the patience with which
you have endured them.
MEMORANDUM ON CANDIDATE SELECTION FOR A SPECIAL
PRESIDENTIAl. ELECTION
Tlre are three ways by which parties could choose presidential candidates
expeditiously if a special election were to be held at some point between the regular (Ituadretinnil elections. Tiley are (1) by the national' committee; (2) by a
national primary ; (3) by a national convention. For tie purposes of tills
memorandum I will assume that the special election must take place within 90
days of the event requiring that it be held.
1. National Committee. Recent reforms, especially in tie Democratic party,
have enlarged the number an1d somewhat increased the representativeness of the
niatiomial colmmittees. Should the parties decide to give the national committees
tie power to name candidates in social presidential elections, tils would doubt-

less be a further stimulus to parly reform. Xpvertheless, the national committees,
am constituted at present, (to not represent the diverse elements in the party as
well as do the delegates to a party convention. Nomination by the national committee would seem to many voters the work of a small coterie of'professional
lxilticians ; it would fall to bring about tle popular particflpatlon III choosing the
canliditte that is so necessary to it successful campaign.
2. NatiowI Iriniary. A national lIrimnary would obviously bring the voters into
the process. Candidates could bue selected in various ways : for example, by petition
(to get oni til' Imilot a contender must present, say, 100,000 signatures from 40
states, with a nilninum of 1000 from each of these states) ; or by the national
committee Ito get on tile ballot, a contender must be nominated by 5 percent
of tile committee's mmleii'rship). One objection to a national primary is that it
might give udue adlvimtage to persons whose names are well known and easily
recognized. A more serious oldection is that it. would require tit(, nation to go
through two national elections In three months. This would be at best an exlimisting experience: and, if tit' vacancy requiring the special election had been

caused by a tragic event like assassination, many people would not be emotionally
prepared for a llational primary so soon after the event.

3. National Conrtctilm. For these and other reasons, a national convention

seeiuis to lite thebest solution. A convention would put the choice inl the hands of
people who have an active concern with politics, thereby reducing the advantages conferred by mere
inme recognition, but would broaden the base of particiiation beyond the party professionals. It would do all this without Inflicting two
elections ill rapid succession on the country.
TlV
xlextuIllestioll is: how would delegates be chosen? There are a number of
lPOssiilith,'S. 0One Would be simply to leave tile choice In the hands of each state
c01MI ittee. coilmiting on local pressure to make sure that ti results would be
representative. Another would be to adopt the proposal made by Woodrow
Vilson i Is alillial inlesage in 1913 and base the convention on the officials
elected by tie party-seuators, representatives, governors, perhaps members of
tie national0111ommittee. with lrovisio1. to fill out the delegations in other ways.
Obviously this problem requires more thought; but, equally obviously, it is not
insoluble.
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On the Presidential Succession

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.
On the eve of the bicentennial of independence, the American experiment in self-government was confronted by a startling development: the President and Vice President who would lead the celebrations
on July 4, 1976, would be persons who had come to office and power, not
through election, like all their predecessors, but through appointment.
Even more disturbing was the thought that the source of this President's
appointment was a former President whose first Vice President had resigned in disgrace as a confessed felon and who himself had resigned in
the face of virtual certainty that he would otherwise have been impeached
and removed because of high crimes and misdemeanors against the United
States.
Nothing like this had ever happened, or could ever have happened, in
the earlier history of the republic. The right of the people to choose their
own leaders had been assumed by definition as a fundamental point of
self-government. A major premise of American politics had always been
-at least up to 1967-that the President was an elected, not an appointed, official. The Constitution (Article II, Section i) expressly provided
that the President and Vice President were to "be elected." The Founding
Fathers believed that no one who had not been elected to the Presidency
should serve as President any longer than necessary to organize a new
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., Schweitzer Professor of the Humanities at the City
University of New York, served as Special Assistant to President Kennedy from 1961
to 1963. His major books include The Age of Jackson; The Crisis of the Old Order, The
Coming of the New Deal, The Politics of UpheaVal (volumes in the Age of Roosevelt);
A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House; and, most recently, The Imperial Presidency.
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presidential election. The Framers would unquestionably have been
astounded and appalled to find as President and Vice President aoo years
after the Declaration of Independence two men, neither of whom had
ever faced a national election and each of whom owed his office to his
direct predecessor.
It was the Twenty-fifth Amendment-ratified in 1967 without, it
must be said, any clear view of the consequences'-that discarded the
wisdom of the Founding Fathers and threatened to introduce so extraordinary an innovation into the American system. Under that amendment President Nixon, after the resignation of Vice President Agnew in
1973, named Gerald Ford as his Vice President. When Nixon himself went
under, Ford, now President, was obliged by the same amendment to name
a Vice President of his personal choice. "For the first time in the history of
this great Nation," John Pastore of Rhode Island cried with pardonable
senatorial grandiloquence, "the President and Vice Presideni will both be
appointed-not elected by the people and not responsive to any mandate2
from the citizens. The Nation will no longer be democratically governed."
I

Nixon's Secretary of State, a former professor of political science, had observed in March 1974, "There have been, very rarely, fully legitimate
governments in any European country since World War IS This was
perhaps an imprudent remark from the representative of a government
whose legitimacy lay at that very moment (and for many moments thereafter) under the most serious question. But what would Dr. Kissinger
make of the legitimacy of an allegedly democratic government headed by
two men receiving their office and power through appointment rather
than through election?
No doubt such a government, though on the face incompatible with
Article II of the Constitution, had become technically constitutional
through the Twenty-fifth Amendment. But it could not be said that those
who drafted that ill-considered amendment desired this particular result. The constitutionality of the appointive Presidency was thus inadvertent, not premeditated. And for anyone concerned with democracy
in a philosophical sense the prospect raised the sternest difficulties. Not
only was the conception of the Presidency as an elected office breached;
but the assignment to a President of the personal power to appoint a
'Certainly not on the part of this writer.
*

Congressional Record, November 15, 1973, S 20429.

New York Times, March z2, 1974.
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Vice President in case of a vacancy added a quasi-dynastic aspect to the
process of presidential succession."
In 1945 President Truman, noting that it lay within his authority to
appoint the person (then the Secretary of State) who would be his successor in the event of his own disability or death, said with customary
directness, "I do not believe that in a democracy this power should rest
with the Chief Executive." 8 The Twenty-fifth Amendment cavalierly
tossed away Truman's old-fashioned scruple and thereby contributed its
mite to the aggrandizement of the Presidency. And, if Truman had supposed that the principle applied to himself, an elected Vice President, how
much more powerfully must it apply to a Chief Executive who was an
appointed Vice President and whose name had never been submitted to a
national electorate. A system that permitted an appointed President
to appoint his own successor was a system that removed the most vital
political choices farther and farther from the people. One doubted whether such a regime could be called, in the phrase with which Professor
Kissinger flunked a half-century of government in Europe, "fully legitimate."
The fix into which the Twenty-fifth Amendment placed American
democracy was emphasized by a striking contrast with events in France
soon after the Secretary of State delivered his .excommunication of
Europe. General de Gaulle had designed a very powerful Presidency
for himself; but even that towering leader had not claimed for Presidents
of France the authority the Twenty-fifth Amendment bestowed, in special
cases, on Presidents of the United States: that is, the power to nominate
his own successor. Instead Article 7 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic said that in case of a vacancy in the Presidency a new presidential
election must be held within thirty-five days. In the meantime, the functions of the President (save for the powers of calling a national referendum and of dissolving the National Assembly) are to be exercised by the
president of the senate. On April 2, 1974, President Pompidou died. On
May 5 the French had their election, followed by a runoff on May 19 and
the inauguration of the new President on May 27. In less than two months,
in short, France had a new President, freely chosen by the people and
equipped by them with a fresh mandate. Which government is the more
legitimate-the elected government of France after the death of Pompidou, or the appointed government of the United States after the resigna'The objection that Presidents name their Vice Presidents anyway at the nominating convention is dealt with in the discussion of the Twenty-fifth Amendment below, section X.
s H. S.Truman, Public Papers... 1945 (Washington, 1961), p. 129.
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tion of Nixon? Which political system is, in this respect at least, the more
democratic?
The signal difference between the French and American systems in
dealing with a vacancy in the Presidency is obvious: the French have
no Vice President. The results surely favor the French on essential tests
of legitimacy and democracy. The contrast therefore calls on Americans to reconsider the utility of the Vice Presidency in their own system.
II

History had shown the American Vice Presidency to be a job of spectacular and, I believe, incurable frustration. Gerald Ford, like his predecessors,
entered into the office with soothing presidential assurances that he, unlike his predecessors, would be given tasks of substance and responsibility. One could be absolutely certain that these shining prospects
would disappear whenever he reached out to grasp them. Nixon, even
in his feeble condition of 1974, was no more disposed to share power

with Ford than he had shared power with Agnew. When James J. Kilpatrick asked Nixon whether he had told his Vice President of 1971 about
the plan for the diplomatic opening to China, Nixon, replying in what
Kilpatrick described as an "incredulous" tone, said, "Agnew? Agnew?
Oh, of course not."' Yet a year later he kept on as his running mate and
successor the Vice President he excluded from his councils. Still President Nixon's tone could hardly have been more incredulous than Eisenhower's when interrogated in 196o about Vice President Nixon's role
in the eight years of the Eisenhower Presidency. To the question "What
major decisions of your Administration has the Vice President participat-

ed in?"
Eisenhower responded, "If you give me a week, I might think of
1
one.0"
Nor was Nixon merely doing unto others what others had done unto
him. He was behaving the way all Presidents have behaved-as they

appear to have no inclination and perhaps little choice but to behavetoward their Vice Presidents. It is a doomed office. No President and Vice

President have fully trusted each other since Jackson and Van Buren.
*Washington Star-News, May 16, 1974. Jeb Stuart Magruder of the Nixon White
House writes of Agnew in 1970: "He'd been frozen out by Nixon, for almost two
years." 1.S.Magruder, An American Life (New York, 1974), P.'a8.
' New York Times, August 25, 196o.
'It should perhaps be added that Polk had amiable personal relations with George
M.Dallas, McKinley with Garret Hobart, and Truman with Alben Barkley, but none of
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Antagonism is inherent in the relationship. "The only business of the
vice-president," wrote the sardonic Thomas R. Marshall, who served for
eight years under Wilson, "is to ring the White House bell every morning and ask what is the state of health of the president."' The only serious thing the Vice President has to do is to wait around for the president to die. This is hardly the basis for cordial and enduring friendships.
"The Vice President," said Lyndon Johnson, who experienced both ends
of the relationship, "is like a raven, hovering around the head of the
President, reminding him of his mortality." 1 Presidents inevitably resent the death's head at the feast; Vice Presidents equally resent the
monarch who stuffs himself at the banquet table while they scramble for
leavings. Elbridge Gerry worried in the Constitutional Convention about
the "close intimacy" that he thought "must subsist between the President & vice-president." Gouverneur Morris responded acidly, "The vice
president then will be the first heir apparent that ever loved his father."11
The single contemporary point of the Vice Presidency is to provide for
the succession in case of the death, disability, resignation, or removal of
the President. Of course there have been repeated attempts to give it
other points. They have all failed. They are all bound to fail. The Constitution does say that the Vice President "shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided." When there
was objection to this in the Constitutional Convention, Roger Sherman
observed that, if the Vice President did not preside over the Senate, "he
would be without employment."'12 Sherman's observation was prophetic, except that the Vice President's constitutional employment soon became a farce. Agnew as Vice President, for example, never went near the
Senate if he could help it. Early Vice Presidents of a philosophical
bent filled their days by meditating attacks on the power of the national
government. Jefferson wrote the Kentucky Resolution as Vice Presi-

dent, Calhoun the South Carolina Exposition. Their successors have
lacked a taste for political philosophy. Richard M. Johnson ran a tavern
as Vice President. Thomas R. Marshall and Alben Barkley made jokes.
But most Vice Presidents, especially in modern times, have lacked a

taste for humor too.
these Vice Presidents played any significant role in the policy decisions of their respective administrations.
0T. R.Marshall, Recollections (Indianapolis, 1925), i. 368.

"As told by President Johnson in retirement to Professor Doris Kearns, with
whose kind permission I am repeating this exceedingly apt aphorism.
u

C. C. Tansill, ed., Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union of the

American States (Washington, 1927), p. 68a.

u ibid.
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III
Why have Presidents not given the Vice President serious work? For a
long time they supposed themselves constitutionally forbidden to do so.
Washington did on occasion ask his Vice President to attend cabinet
meetings; but Jefferson as Vice President was quick to erect a wall of
separation. "I consider my office," he wrote, "as constitutionally confined to legislative functions, and that I could not take any part whatever in executive consultations, even were it proposed.""3 Most Presidents and Vice Presidents have accepted the Jeffersonian doctrine. Thus
Truman wrote in 1955 that the Vice President "is not an officer of the
executive branch" and Eisenhower as late as 1963 that the Vice President
"is not legally a part of the Executive branch and is not subject to direction by the President."'"
The practice of vice presidential participation in cabinet meetings is a
recent development. In 1896 Theodore Roosevelt thought it would be desirable "to increase the pbwer of the Vice-President .... It would be very
well if he were given a seat in the Cabinet."' But when he became President himself after an exasperating interlude as Vice President, he did
not give his own Vice President, Charles W. Fairbanks, a seat in the
cabinet or anywhere else. Vice President Marshall presided at cabinet
meetings when Wilson was at Versailles. But, since he regarded himself as a "member of the legislative branch," he questioned the propriety of doing so and carefully explained to the cabinet that he was acting "in obedience to a request" and "in an unofficial and informal
way."' Harding was the first President to make his Vice President, Calvin Coolidge, a regular at cabinet meetings. Coolidge expected his own
Vice President to follow this example; but Charles G. Dawes rejected any
such entanglement with the executive as a "wrong principle" and in due
course supported farm legislation from his office on Capitol Hill that his
President opposed and eventually vetoed.'" Franklin D. Roosevelt, who
from the time of his own vice presidential candidacy in 192o had cherished the hope of making something of the office,"8 reinstituted vice"J. D. Feerick, From Failing Hands. The Story of Presidential Succession (New York,
19 6 5), p. 70.
"IH. S. Truman, Year of Decisio', (New York, 1955), p. 197; D. D. Eisenhower,

Waging Peace (New York, 1963), p. 6.
'Theodore Roosevelt, "The Three Vice-Presidential Candidates and What They
Represent," Review of Reviews, September 1896. TR also thought that the Vice President should be given a vote on ordinary occasions in the Senate and "perchance on
occasions a voice in the debates."
" 1. G. Williams, The Rise of the Vice Presidency (Washington, 1956), pp.
" Ibid., pp. 134, x8.

'Franklin

1o9-1o.

D. Roosevelt, "Can the Vice President Be Useful?" Saturday Evening
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presidential attendance at cabinet meetings, and it became routine thereafter. Truman got Congress in 1949 to make the Vice President a member of the National Security Council by statute. But Vice Presidents continued to operate out of an office at the Hill. It was not till Kennedy that
a Vice President was given space in the Executive Office Building.
Nor, despite ritualistic pledges at the start of each new term, have
Presidents ever delegated real power to Vice Presidents. FDR did make
Henry Wallace head of the Board of Economic Warfare-the only big
job handed a Vice President in the history of the American Presidencybut this merely proved the embarrassment bound to arise when an
agency chief who happened to be Vice President got into fights with
powerful members of the President's cabinet. Nixon as Vice President appointed himself the political hit man of the Eisenhower administration
and subsequently as President assigned the same delicate responsibility
to. Agnew, thereby making him, as Eugene McCarthy wittily said, "Nixon's Nixon." When Ford succeeded Agnew, Nixon began by trying to insert him into the same slot. This is hardly a promising development. If
there is anything certain to cast the Vice Presidency into permanent disrepute, it is the theory that the Vice President is the appointed outlet for
an administration's partisan rancor.
For the rest the Vice Presidency is make-work. Presidents spend time
that could be put to far better use trying to figure out ways of keeping
their Vice Presidents busy. "They seek to put him," as Tom Marshall
said, "where he can do no harm."'" So Vice Presidents serve meaninglessly as chairmen of interdepartmental committees like the Aeronautics
and Space Council or the Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity.
The suggestion is sometimes made that the Vice President could take
over the ceremonial side of the President's job. But Presidents perform
few ceremonial functions they do not want to perform; and Vice Presidents would be acceptable substitutes only on the most footling occasions. Nor would a purely ceremonial role satisfy any but the most vacuous Vice President. Getting Vice Presidents out of sight through foreign
travel is a solution r-uc1 '. favored by recent Presidents. This is all makebelieve too. Despite the pieties, the Vice Presidency remains "the fifth
Post, October 16, 192o. FDR claimed to regard the Vice Presidency as a major example
of "industrial waste" in Washington. lic did not think that attendance at cabinet
meetings would makc much difference but argued that the Vice President should be
used to overcome the gap between Congress and the executive branch and to help
bring about government reorganization. lie acknowledged that a constitutional
amendment would be recq,,r-J to give the Vice President serious executive authority
but thought that even wit;.:," an amendment there were things d Vice President could
do.
"Marshall, Recollections, p. 16.
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wheel in our government" (Albert J. Beveridge), "the spare tire on the
automobile of government" (John Garner)."0 As Gertrude Stein said of
Oakland, California, there is no there there.
But what of the suggestion, advocated by Roosevelts when they aspired
to be Vice Presidents (and forgotten once they became Presidents), that
the power of the Vice Presidency might be increased? Carl Kaysen, director of the Institute for Advanced Studies, has made the ingenious
proposal, for example, that the Constitution be amended to make the
Vice President an officer of the executive branch. Then let the presidential candidate promise the nominating convention that he will appoint
his Vice President to one of the four great cabinet offices, State, Treasury,
Defense or Justice, and specify which. This would provide a there there.
But it would also create problems if the Vice President turned out to fail
at the job or to disagree with the policy and could not, like other incompetents or dissidents, be easily dismissed.
Moreover this would have to be an informal, and hence unstable, arrangement; for any formal allocation of power to the Vice President would
run up against the clause in the Constitution vesting the undivided "executive power" in the President. And the resistance to any sharing of authority is visceral as well as constitutional. When William 0. Douglas,
who had been chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, suggested to Franklin Roosevelt that he have the heads of the independent
agencies report to his Vice President, Henry Wallace, FDR replied,
"Would you-like to see Henry instead of me? What would Henry know
about all those matters?"21 No President in the nature of things, is going to yield power to a Vice President.
For this reason, Benjamin V. Cohen, that wise veteran of the New
Deal, recommends a different approach. He would frankly recognize that
there is, and can be, no there there and have presidential and vice-presidential candidates separately" voted upon in the general election. This
would have meant in 1968, for example, that Nixon %ould have been
elected President and Muskie Vice President. The fact that Muskie could
not have taken part in a Nixon administration would have made no difference, since the Vice President has nothing to do anyway; and Muskie
would have been an infinitely more attractive heir apparent. But this proposal raises the possibility of a shift in party control of the White House
without the intervention of a new election.,
"A. J. Beveridge, "The Fifth Wheel in Our Government," Century, December t9o9;
Garner quoted in J. MacG. Burns, "A New Look at the Vice Presidency," New York
Times Magazine, October 9, 1955.
' W. 0. Douglas, Go East, Young Man (New York, 1974), pp. 31o-311.
"So too would Endicott Peabody's otherwise attractive proposal that the Twentyfifth Amendment be revised to require the choice of a new Vice President, in case of a
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Neither of these ideas goes to the heart of the matter. Nor certainly do
the reform proposals generated by the Agnew and Eagleton fiascoes.
In 1973 the Democrats appointed a Vice Presidential Selection Committee under the chairmanship of Hubert Humphrey, whose own vice
presidential wounds had hardly healed. Its recommendation was that the
parties slow up the process of nominating the second man by making the
convention longer and even, if necessary, holding the choice over to a
later meeting of the party's National Committee.23 This procedure, it
need hardly be said, would not have saved the Republicans from twiceanointing Agnew, which did not prevent a corresponding committee of
the Republican National Committee from contemplating the same
change. Senator Robert Griffin of Michigan, the Republican whip, in
what he called, presumably as a recommendation, "a small step in the
direction of the parliamentary system," would do away altogether with
party participation in the nomination and have the new President submit his choice to Congress in the manner in which Mr. Nixon chose Mr.
Ford under the Twenty-fifth Amendment. 2 This would be another formula for Agnews.
Fiddlinig with the way vice presidential nominees are chosen is beside
the point. The real question is why have a Vice President at all? "His importance," as Woodrow Wilson said, "consists in the fact that he may
cease to be Vice-President.' 25 The only conceivable argument for keeping
tie office is that it provides an automatic solution to the problem of succession. No doubt it does. But does it provide the best solution?

IV
There is first the mystical argument that the Vice President is the proper
successor when a President vanishes in mid-course because, as Truman
said and many have repeated, "There is no officer in our system of govemnment, besides the President and Vice President, who has been elected
by all the voters of the country."121 Truman's proposition, advanced nine
weeks after Roosevelt's death, was natural enough to a man concerned
with legitimating his own recent succession to the Presidency. But insofar as it implied that the voters in some sense intended him or any other
Vice President (since 1796) for the Presidency, it was a myth. No one
vacancy, through special election rather titan through appointment. See "On the
Threshold of the White House," Atlantic Monthly. July 1974.
" CongressionalRecord, December 21, 1973, S23 7 5 6-S23 7 5 8.
" Ibid., October a, 1973, S1 9 4 4 8-S1 9 45 0o.
" Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Boston, 19oi), p. 240.
" Truman, PublicPapers... 1945, P. 129.

84

484 1 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY
votes for a Vice President per se. He is a part of a package deal, "a sort of
appendage to the Presidency" (Truman's own phrase); not an inde27
pendent choice.
To this hazy theory of an electorally sanctified'connection between
the Vice Presidency and the succession there is added the conventional
wisdom of political science departments (and of Vice Presidents) that
the Vice Presidency is the best school for the Presidency. It is above all,
we are told, a "learning office" where men educate themselves for the
great responsibility that may one day be theirs. Even if the Vice President
has nothing to do, he can-we are assured-watch what others are
doing and prepare himself to take over if calamity strikes. Thus Richard
M. Nixon: "The Vice Presidency ... is the only office which provides
28
complete on-the-job training for the duties of the Presidency.1
This implies, one fears, an unduly romantic view of Presidents. Nixon himself made this perfectly clear as soon as he had a Vice President or
two at his mercy. Presidents, whatever they may say, do not pick their
running mates because they want to raise them up to be their successors.
All Presidents see themselves, if not as immortal, at least as good for a
couple of terms. They pick a running mate not because he is the second
citizen of the republic and splendidly qualified to replace them in the
White House but because of occult and very often mistaken calculations
about the contribution he will make to their own victory at the polls.
"Whether they should or not," Congressman James G. O'Hara of Michigan has realistically observed, "they 'Will not, in the final analysis,
choose their Vice-Presidential candidate to succeed them. They will
2
choose them to help them succeed."' '
These calculations, I say, are very often mistaken. It is an exceedingly
rare case when the vice presidential candidate makes a difference. Very
likely Johnson made a difference in 196o. But much more typical was
the outcome in 1948. Earl Warren was the most popular governor California had had in a generation, but Truman carried California against
the Dewey-Warren ticket. As for the idea, much discui-sed by the sages of
the press, of a "balanced ticket," this is a fraud on the public. It pretends
that the Vice President's views will somehow "balance" the views of the
President when all our history testifies that they have no impact at all on
the President. Should the President die, however, then the difference in
views could have a cataclysmic effect. Theodore Roosevelt, recalling what
"Truman, Year of Decisions, p. 53.
In his testimony in 1964 before the Senate Judiciary Committee, reprinted in
Senate Judiciary Committee, Selected Materials on the Twenty-fifth Amendment, Senate Document93-42, 93 Cong., i Sess. (1973), 95.
"James G. O'Hara, testimony before the Vice Presidential Selection Commission
of the Democratic National Committee, November 7, 1973 (mimeo.), p. io.
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had happened when Tyler succeeded Harrison and what might have
happened had Grover Cleveland died and Vice President Adlai Stevenson taken over, observed, "It is an unhealthy thing to have the VicePresident and the President represented by principles so far apart that the
succession of one to the place of the other means a change as radical as
any possible party overturn." 80
Presidents not only do not choose Vice Presidents to become successors, but, after they make the White House themselves, they do as little
as possible to prepare them to become successors. A Vice President can
learn only as much as a President is willing to have him learn-which,
given .presidential resentment of vice presidential existence, is not ordinarily very much. Truman, recalling how little he had been told as
Vice President, tried harder than most Presidents to clue in his second
man. His conclusion about on-the-job training is not encouraging. "No
Vice-President," he wrote three years after he left the White House, "is
ever properly prepared to take over the presidency because of the nature
of our presidential, or executive, office." In the nature of things, "it is very
difficult for a President to take the Vice-President completely into his
confidence." The President "by necessity" builds his own staff and makes
his own decisions, "and the Vice-President remains an outsider." 31
Moreover, seeing things as an ill-informed, impotent, and often sullen
outsider, the Vice President will very likely "learn" the wrong things.
Lyndon Johnson thought Kennedy too cautious at the time of the Cuban
missile crisis and in Vietnam. What Johnson "learned" as Vice President
led him on to policies of overkill in the Dominican Republic and Indochina. In any case, where does a successor's responsibility lie? "A VicePresident might make a poor President," said Tom Marshall, who had
to reflect on this question in Wilson's season of disability, "but he

would make a much poorer one if he attempted to 3subordinate
his own
2

mind and views to carry out the ideas of a dead man."
A learning office? With Presidents less generous than Truman-and
that in this context is most Presidents, however generous they may be

in other relationships-the Vice Presidency is much less a making than a
maiming experience. The way most Presidents treat their Vice Presi-

dents, far from preparing them for the succession, is more likely to erode
their capacity to succeed. McKinley, wrote Theodore Roosevelt as Vice
President, "does not intend that I shall have any influence of any kind,
sort or description in the administration from the top to the bottom. This

he has made evident again and again ....
8

I have really much less influ-

Roosevelt, "The Three Vice-Presidential Candidates," p. a92.
Year of Decisions, p. 54.

'"Truman,

"Williams, Rise, p. iio.
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ence with the President now that I am Vice-President than I had even
when I was governor.""3 Fortunately, for T. P , he only had to endure six
months of frustration. When he acquired a Vice President of his own, he
could not have been more destructive of poor Charley Fairbanks. He used
to regale Washington with Finley Peter Dunne's crack after the President
remarked he was going down in a submarine: "You really shouldn't
do it-unless you take Fairbanks with you." Tom Marshall, who at
least extracted a good deal of shrewd humor out of his predicament, concluded that the Vice President "is like a man in a cataleptic state: he cannot speak; he cannot move; he suffers no pain; and yet he is perfectly
conscious of everything that is gcing on about him."3 5Lyndon Johnson,
when Vice President, once remarked to Franklin D.Roosevelt, Jr., "Your
daddy never let his Vice Presidents put their heads above water."3 ,
In recent years, as men of larger aspirations and capacities have responded to the actuarial attractions of the office, the damage to Vice Presidents has increased. The more gifted and ambitious the Vice President,
the more acute his frustration-and the less his President is inclined to
do to alleviate it. Everyone knows the humiliation that Eisenhower repeatedly visited on Nixon. Malcolm Moos, the political scientist, after
watching that relationship as an Eisenhower special assistant, concluded
that the office was "a kind of coffin."' 7 Only a man who has the overpowering ego of a Lyndon Johnson and is treated by his President, as
Johnson was, with relative consideration can survive the Vice Presidency;
and even Johnson was a subdued and shrunken man by 1963. "It's like
being naked in the middle of a blizzard with no one to even offer you
a match to keep you warm-that's the vice presidency," said Hubert
Humphrey in 1969, eight months after he had been released from confinement. "You are trapped, vulnerable and alone, and it does not matter who
happens to be President."' Few Vice Presidents can survive the systematic demoralization inflicted by the office without serious injury to
themselves. Bill Moyers, who was with Lyndon Johnson both as Vice
President and President, later remarked that the Vice Presidency "is a
man eater. It destroys individuals. This country was very lucky that
Harry Truman was the vice president for only a year [actually for less
than three months]. When he became President, he still had so much left.
"Theodore Roosevelt, Letters, ed. E. E. Morison, vol. III (Cambridge, 1951), P. 57.
" Williams, Rise, p. 89.
" Alben Barkley, That Reminds Me (New York, 1954), p. 2a2.
" As told by FDR, Jr., to me; Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston,
1965), p. 704.
.Minneapolis Tribune, June a, 1974.
MTime, November 14, 1969.
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If we had gotten Truman three years later, he would have been much

different.""
V
The Vice Presidency does a poor job of preparing politicians to become
Presidents. But it has recently begun to do an excellent job of preparing
politicians to become presidential candidates. For the Vice Presidency is
the only place except the Presidency itself that insures its occupant automatic and comprehensive national exposure. Moreover, a new sense of
the frailty of Presidents-FDR's death in office, the attempted assassination of Truman, Eisenhower's sicknesses, the successful assassination
of Kennedy, the movement to impeach Nixon-has focused unprecedented public attention on the Vice PresidenCy. As a result, the Vice Presidency has returned to somewhat the status it enjoyed in the early republic as the stepping-stone to the Presidency. In the 16o years before 1948
only five Vice Presidents had ever won election to the Presidency on their
own. Of the five Presidents elected since, three were former Vice Presidents. Every man who has served as Vice President sipce 1953 has become a candidate for President, except for Agnew, who was well on his
way to becoming a candidate until the law caught up with him, and for
Ford, whom the office transformed from a little-known congressman into
a national favorite in a few weeks and who, even before he became President, seemed destined to be a presidential candidate in 1976.
The irony is that this process has nothing to do with the presidential
qualifications a Vice President might have and everything to do with the
publicity in which the office bathes him. Whether or not a Vice President
is any good, the office instantly makes him a front-runner in the polls.
At the same time the office makes it impossible to find out whether or
not he is any good. "The Vice President," Donald Graham has written,
"is the one American politician who is not held responsible for what he
says." 0 If he makes a hawk or a zealot or a fool of himself, it is always
supposed that he is doing so at the behest of his President. No doubt he
is, ghich is one reason why, at the very time the office enhances his political availability, it depletes and despoils his substantive value. So
while the Vice Presidency is coming to be the main avenue to the Presidency, it is, alas, an avenue that typically specializes in the delivery of
damaged goods.
There is no escape, it seems to me, from the conclusion that the Vice
" Jimmy Breslin, "Police Riot," New York Magazine, September 16, 1968.
" Donald Graham, "The Vice Presidency: From Cigar Store Indian to Crown
Prince," Washington Monthly, April 1974.
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Presidency is not only a pointless but even a dangerous office. A politician is nominated for Vice President for reasons unconnected with his
presidential qualities and elected-to the Vice Presidency as part of a tiein sale. Once carried to the Vice Presidency not on his own but as second
rider on the presidential horse, where is he? If he is a first-rate man, his
nerve and confidence will be shaken, his talents wasted and soured, even
as his publicity urges him on toward the ultimate office for which,
the longer he serves in the second place, the less ready he may be. If he is
not a first-rate man, he should not be in a position to inherit or claim the
Presidency. Why not therefore abolish this mischievous office and
work out a more sensible mode of succession?

V!
Such a revision of the Constitution would not be an affront to the Founding Fathers. They had no great commitment to the Vice Presidency.
Though they had had considerable experience with lieutenant or deputy governors in the colonies and though most of the thirteen states had
provided for such officers in their own constitutions, the Constitutional
Convention did not resort to the Vice Presidency in order to solve the
problem of succession. Instead the August 6 draft from the all-important
Committee of Detail proposed that, in case of a vacancy in the Presidency, "the President of the.Sanate shall exercise thoe powers and duties,
until another President of the United States be chosen."' This, it might
be noted, wasthe formula adopted a century and three-quarters later by
General de Gaulle for the French Constitution and employed so expeditiously in France in the spring of 1974.
There was some objection to the President of the Senate as acting President of the nation. Gouverneur Morris thought that the Chief Justice
should be "provisional successor." Madison sugre'ted that "the Execu42
tive powers during a vacancy" be administered y a Council of State.
Wherever the line of devolution went, however, all agreed that it was
to prevail only until the voters could choose, de n-vo, a new President by
special election.
Then a fortnight before the Convention adjourned, a new drafting committee went off for a weekend and came back with the Vice Presidency.
The committee did not devise the Vice Presidency primarily as a means
of dealing with the succession. The delegates already had a solution to
that problem. Indeed, as Charles Warren later wrote, they paid surprisingly little attention in considering the Vice Presidency "to the chief
"Tansill, ed., Documents, p. 479. Emphasis added.

"Ibid., p.611.
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part which the Vice-President has, in fact, played in history, that is, to
his succession in case of the death of the President."" The Vice Presi.ency came to the fore for entirely distinct reasons. Hugh Williamson of
North Carolina, a member of the new drafting committee, frankly told
the Convention that "such an office as vice-President was not wanted.
He was introduced only for the sake of a valuable mode of election which
required two to be chosen at the same time.""1
The Vice Presidency entered the Constitution, in short, not to provide
a successor to the President-this could easily have been arranged otherwise-but to ensure the election of a national President. For the United
States had as yet little conviction of national identity. Loyalty ran to
the states rather than to the country as a whole. If presidential electors
voted for one man, local feeling would lead them to vote for the candidate from their own state. The new draft now recommended that they
be required to vote for two persons, "of whom one at least shall not
be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves.: 4 By means of the

double vote, localism could be overcome, and a President with broad
appeal beyond his own state would emerge. "The second best man in
this case," as Madison observed, "would probably be first, in fact"i.e., the favorite second choice would be the person commanding national

confidence.
In addition, the double vote was also intended to defeat cabal and corruption in the selection process. Because each elector must vote for two

persons without indicating a preference, "the precise operation of his
vote," James Wilson observed, "is not known to himself at the time
when he gives it." Conspiracy would therefore be "under the necessity of
acting blindfold at the election" and would be "defeated by the joint
and unforeseen effect of the whole." 7 Hamilton concluded in Federalist
#68 that through the double vote the Constitution had made it a "moral

certainty" that the Presidency would be filled "by characters preeminent
for ability and virtue." Popularity and intrigue might enable a man to
carry his own state; "but it will require other talents, and a different

kind of merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole
Union."

Under the double vote, the person winning most votes became President, the runner-up Vice President. It was not logically essential to the
"Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution tBoston, 1928), p.635.
"Tansill, ed., Documents, p.681. Emphasis added.
"Ibid., p. 679.

ibidd., p. 454.
"James Wilson, Works, ed. R. G. McCloskey, vol. I (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), P.
439.
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operations of the system that the runner-up be anything at all; and no
doubt considerations of the succession played a larger part here than were
reflected in the discussions at the Convention and in subsequent debates
at the state ratifying conventions. For both President and Vice President
would have been voted on for the Presidency, and both presumably would
be well qualified for the office. The primary point of the Vice Presidency,
however, was not as a mode of succession but as an organic part, in Williamson's phrase, of the "valuable mode of election."
VII

Even then the new office was not received with great enthusiasm. Elbridge Gerry told the Convention that he was "ag.8" having any vice
President."'" Gerry was the only member of the Convention ever to
become Vice President. George Clinton, not a delegate, denounced the
office from outside as dangerous and unnecessary. Clinton later served as
Vice President under two Presidents. James Monroe told the Virginia
ratifying convention that he saw no need for rhe office." The Federalist tried to ignore the issue, devoting two quick paragraphs to it in the
entire series of eighty-five papers. Noting that the Vice Presidency had
been "objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous," Hamilton defended it in perfunctory fashion because the Vice President's casting vote
could prevent deadlocks in the Senate and because the Vice President himself could be on occasion a "constitutional substitute" for the President.
Privately he complained to James Wilson, "Every body is aware of that
defect in the constitution which renders it possible that the man intended
for Vice President may in fact turn up President."'5 The First Congress
even wrangled over the question of whether the Vice President should
be paid a salary. Some members thought he should only receive per diem
for those days when he actually presided over the Senate. Finally they
voted him $5ooo a year.
The double vote did produce two remarkable figures, Adams and Jefferson, as the first two Vice Presidents. But as an occupation for a grown
man the Vice Presidency proved a disaster. "Iam Vice-President," Adams
told the Senate. "In this I am nothing, but I may be everything"-a concise statement of the paradox of the office. To his wife Adams complained that the Vice Presidency was "the most insignificant office that
ever the invention of man contrived or his imagination conceived .... I
'

N

Tansill, ed., Documents, p. 682.
Feerick, From FailingHands, pp. 52, 54.

Alexander Hamilton, Papers,ed. H. C.Syrett, vol. V (New York, 96), p. 248.

91
ON THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 1 491

can do neither good nor evil." Jefferson called it "the only office in the
world about which I am unable to decide whether I had rather have it or
not have it."' 1 In the meantime, the rise of the party system, a development unanticipated in 1787, was placing the "valuable mode of election"
under severe strain. In 1796, the Federalists gave their second ballots to

Thomas Pinckney, who was manifestly not the second citizen of the
country. Adams himself, the top Federalist candidate, would have preferred, if he had been defeated, to lose to Jefferson rather than to his fellow-Federalist.6 2 In :E8oo the Republicans gave the same number of electoral votes to Jefferson, their presidential choice, as they gave to Aaron
Burr, a man of undoubted talents who, however, was trusted by no one
in the long course of American history, except for his daughter Theodosia and Gore Vidal. Burr was nearly chosen President, though the voters never intended him for the Presidency. The fear of comparable slipups
in 1804 led to the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment requiring the
electoral college to vote separately for President and Vice President.
With the abolition of the "valuable mode of election," the Vice Presidency lost the function for which it had originally been designed. Separate voting ended any prospect that the Vice President would be the second man in the country. The office would no longer attract men of the
highest quality. It would become, as was immediately noted, a bargaining counter in the presidential contest-"a bait to catch state gudgeons,"
in Gouverneur Morris' scornful phrase."' Samuel White, a senator
from Delaware, summed up with admirable prescience the consequences'
of the Twelfth Amendment: "Character, talents, virtue, and merit will
not be sought after, in the candidate. The question will not be asked, is
he capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his connexions,
by his wealth, by his local situation, by his influence, or his intrigues,
best promote the election of a President?" Roger Griswold of Connecticut said that the Vice Presidency would thereafter be "worse than useless." A number of political leaders, Republicans and Federalists-John
Randolph of Roanoke; former Speaker of the House, now Senator Jonathan Dayton; Griswold; Samuel W. Dana-drew the logical conclusion.
The Vice Presidency was an organic part of a particular mode of election. That mode of election was now about to be terminated. Should not
the Vice Presidency therefore be terminated too? "The reasons of erecting
the office," Dayton correctly said, "are frustrated by the amendment....
It will be preferable, therefore, to abolish the office." Unfortunately for
Feerick, From Failing Hands, pp. 66-67, 63.
"Lucius Wilmerdin8, Jr., The Electoral College (Beacon paperback, 1964), pP. 33-34.

Michael Harwood, In the Shadow of Presidents (Philadelphia, 1966), p. 17.
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the republic the effort failed by

19-12

in the Senate and 85-27 in the

House."
But the dismal predictions were correct. The Twelfth Amendment
sent the Vice Presidency into prompt decline. The first two Vice Presidents had moved on directly to the Presidency. After the amendment the
Vice Presidency became a resting-place for mediocrities. Who can remember Burr's successors-George Clinton, Elbridge Gerry, Daniel 'D.
Tompkins? For a generation the Secretary of State became the steppingstone to the Presidency; thereafter, until very modern -times, Presidents
were elected from anywhere except the Vice Presidency. In the 170 years
since the Twelfth Amendment only one Vice President-Martin Van
Buren-has advanced directly to the Presidency by election. More than
half our Vice Presidents in the nineteenth century were actually older
than their Presidents. William R. King, when nominated as Vice President with Franklin Pierce, was known to have an incurable disease
and died six weeks after inauguration. Clinton, Gerry, Henry Wilson,
Thomas A. Hendricks, and Garret A. Hobart also died in office. Apart
from their families, few cared or even noticed. The Vice Presidency was
nothing. "It is not a stepping stone to anything except oblivion," said
Theodore Roosevelt when Boss Platt conned him into accepting the vice
presidential nomination in 19oo. "I fear my bolt is shot." Asked if he
planned to attend McKinley's second inaugural, Platt replied with relish,
"I am going to Washington to see Theodore take the veil."- 5 Four years
later the Democrats nominated Henry G. Davis, then 81 years old, for
the Vice Presidency (the ticket lost). For thirty-eight years-almost
a quarter of the time that has passed since the ratification of the Twelfth
Amendment-the republic was without any Vice President at all. No
catastrophe resulted.
Vlll
Theodore Roosevelt concluded that the Vice Presidency was "an utterly
anomalous office (one which I think ought to be abolished)."" He was
indisputably right. But what would take its place? How else to deal
with the succession? Here it would not seem unreasonable to go back
for a moment to the Constitutional Convention. The Founding Fathers
were not a pack of fools. While they did not suppose that their descendants would be governed forever by what made sense for an agricultural
Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 73.
* Williams, Rise, p. 81.
Roosevelt, Letters, vol. I1, p. 6o.
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society of four million souls, they had insights into the principles of selfgovernment that later generations did not conspicuously improve.
Their first thought, as we have seen, had been to give the President a
provisional successor-most probably the President pro tern of the Senate
-and then, as soon as possible, elect a new President. When the Convention, for other reasons, moved on to the idea of a Vice Presidency, the
delegates resolved to empower Congvess to designate the next in succession in case of a double vacancy. The early proposal was that the officerthusdesignated by Congress should "act" as President "until the time

of electing a President shall arrive." Madison at once pointed out that
"this, as worded, would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election of the President" and offered language, immediately
accepted by his colleagues, stipulating that the designated officer "shall
then act as President ... until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."" 7 The constitutional scholar Lucius Wilmerding,
Jr., accurately stated the principle of the Founding Fathers in a letter to
Walter Lippmann in 1946: "A man who had not been voted on for the
Presidency ought not to hold the office for longer than it takes to choose
a new President.""
Before the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, Vice Presidents had
been voted on for the Presidency. Indeed, as the young republic began to
develop and assume a national consciousness, people quickly forgot that
the original reason for the double vote was to overcome localism and increasingly supposed that its point was, in the words of Elias Boudinot
of New Jersey, "to obtain the second best character to fill the place of the
first, in case it should be vacated by any unforeseen accident."" If the
Vice President were thus so well qualified to act as President, the instant
problem of succession seemed under control.
So, when the Second Congress passed the Presidential Succession
Act of 1792, the act assumed without specification that, if anything
happened to the President, the Vice President would take over. If both
the Presidency and the Vice Presidency were vacated, Madison's idea of
an "intermediate election" was to prevail. The President pro aempore of
the Senate (or, if there were none, the Speaker of the House) would "act
as President ... until a President be elected," and a special election would
be called for the next November to choose a new President unless the
double vacancy occurred inthe last months of the presidential term.e°
Tausill, ed., Documents, p. 68o. Emphasis added.
Walter Lippmann, "A Letter about Vice Presidents," Washington Post, December 7, 1946.
' Wilmerding, Electoral College, p. 30.
r The text of the 1791 Act can be conveniently found in Edward Stanwood, A
History of the Presidency (Boston, 19o), pp. 36-38.
54-S63 0 - IS - 7
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"'It is unlikely," E. S. Corwin, that mordant annotator of the Constitution, has written, "that Congress ever passed a more ill-considered
law."a6 This is harsh language. Corwin did not live long enough to see
the Twenty-fifth Amendment. Still, the Act of 1792 unquestionably had
its defects. Corwin was particularly upset because he regarded the intrusion of the legislative branch into the line of succession as a violation
of the separation of powers. (Madison had made this point against the
bill in Congress, but Madison was aggrieved because, had Hamilton not
intrigued to shift the succession to Congress, Jefferson as Secretary of
State would have been next in line. If Jefferson had been President pro
tern of the Senate and Hamilton Secretary of State, would Madison have
cared so much about the separation of powers?) In any case, the Madison-Corwin doubt had not impressed the Committee of Detail in the
Constitutional Convention; and it may be considered to have been laid
to rest by the long life of the Act of 1792 and by the reenactment of
the principle of congressional succession in 1947.
There still remained, though, the more substantial objection that the
qualifications for President pro tern and for Speaker are less stringent
than for the White House. The congressional officers, for example, need
not be natural-born citizens; the Speaker may be under 35 (as Henry Clay
demonstrated in 1811); and, peculiarly, neither is required to be a member of the body over which he presides, which makes them less than perfect exemplifications of the elective principle. Still, in practice, the congressional officers have met the presidential qualifications most of the
time. A graver objection was that they might be on occasion members of
the opposite party; in 1792, however, Congress was not thinking in terms
of the party system. A still graver objection was that there might be
times when there would be neither a Vice President nor a President pro
tern nor a Speaker.

The Twelfth Amendment came a dozen years after the Act of 1792. It
was intended to make it impossible for persons who had not-been voted
on for the Presidency to become President. It had precisely the opposite
effect's After 1804 Vice Presidents were not voted on for the Presidency
except in a highly metaphysical sense. But the retention of the office and
the ambiguity of the Constitution enabled Vice Presidents to make themselves President.

IX
The Founding Fathers, so far as we can tell, assumed that, if a President
died, the Vice President would inherit the powers and duties of the
' E. S. Corwin, ed. The Constitution of the United States of America: Analysis and
Interpretation (Washih~gton, 1953), P. 387.
U As Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., pointed out in two penetrating essays on the Vice
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duties of the presidential office, he inherited the office too and became,
not acting President but President in his own right. There were unavailing protests from senators who thought that a man could gain the
Presidency only by election 6? But Tyler won his point, though the point
did not gain explicit constitutional sanction until i z5 years later in the
Twenty-fifth Amendment.
The United States lived under the Succession Act of 1792 for ninetyfour years Since a double vacancy never occurred, the intermediate-election feature, evidently intended by the Founding Fathers as a routine
part of the process, never came into play. In 188i James A. Garfield, shot
by an assassn, died at a time when there was neither a President pro tern
of the Senate nor a Speaker of the House. If anything happened to his
vice presidential successor, Chester A. Arthur, the Presidency would have
been in limbo. This was strangely also the case when Grover Clevetand's Vice President died four years later. Moreover, the Republicans
were in control of the Senate in 1885, which meant that the President pro
teyn of the Senate, when chosen, would be of the opposite party from
Cleveland as well as his statutory successor.
The cry for reform produced the Presidential Succession Act of 1886.
The new law put the line of descent through the cabinet, thereby making succession automatic and preventing the mechanics of succession
from transferring the Presidency from one party to another without an
election. Soome members of Congress opposed this idea-among them
Congressman William McKinley of Ohio--especially on the ground that
it would contravene the elective principle by empowering a President
to name his successor."" The 1886 law did not, however, eliminate the
idea el intermediate elections. It provided that the cabinet successor
should "act as President until the disability of the President or Vice-President is removed, or a President shall be elected." It was "the powers and
duties of the office of President," and apparently not the office itself, that
devolved upon the cabinct successor, and "it shall be the duty of the
person upon whom said powers and duties shall devolve" to convene
Congress within twenty days, presumably in order to provide for a special election.'
463-464. 1. Q. Adams' great-great-grandson, Thomas B. Adams,
now president of the
Massachusetts Historical Society, has speculated that, if a special election had been
held following Harrison's death, Henry Clay would probably have been the choice of
the nation, in which case there might have been no President Polk, no Mexican War,
and a different course of national development. See "On the Threshold of the White
House," Atlantic Monthly, July 1974.
Feerick, From Failing Hands, p. 95.
Ibid., p. 146.
For text, Stanwood, History of the Presidency, pp. 451-452. Emphasis added.
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The republic operated under this law for another sixty years. Again
no occasion arose to call the provision for intermediate elections into
play. Then in 1945 Harry S. Truman, abruptly translated to the Presi-

dency, faced the prospect of serving the balance of Roosevelt's termnearly four years-without a Vice President. The law of i886 put the
Secretary of State next in line. But Truman, as we have noted, thought
it undemocratic for a President to have the power to appoint his successor,
contending that the Vice President should always be an "elective officer"
-i.e., someone who held-public office through election. So he proposed
a reversion to the principle of the Succession Act of 1792, though with
the Speaker of the House first and the President pro tern of the Senate second. There were manifest defects in the scheme. Neither the Speaker nor
the President pro ten, as we have seen, need be elective officers. Both
posts were in part the reward of seniority, which often meant long tenure in a safe and therefore unrepresentative district. James F. Byrnes and
George C. Marshall, Truman's second and third Secretaries of State in
1947-1948 were far better equipped for the Presidency than Joseph
Martin of Massachusetts, who, as Speaker of the House, was heir apparent for the same period under the Truman reform. In general, Secretaries
of State have been more impressive figures than Speakers. Polk is the only
Speaker to have made it to the White House.
Truman, however, saw this part of the scheme as provisional. Reaffirming the conviction of the Founding Fathers, hesaid, "No matter
who succeeds to the Presidency after the death of the elected President
and Vice President, it is my opinion that he should not serve longer than
until the next Congressional election or until a special election called...
to fill the unexpired term of the deceased President and Vice President." 7 °
As Walter Lippmann put it in 1946, the Founding Fathers "thought the
country should never for more than a few months have a President who
had not been elected. They did not believe, as we now assume, that there
could never be a Presidential election except once every four years.'"71
If the country was without an elected President, it should proceed as expeditiously as possible to elect a new one. There was nothing sacrosanct
about the four-year election system.

X
Truman's proposal that the intermediate election fill the unexpired term
has given some trouble to constitutional scholars who read the language
T Truman, Public Papers... 1945, P. 130.

" Walter Lippmann, "Wrong Answer, Right Question," New York Herald Tribune,
November 12, 1946.
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on the Presidency in Article II, Section 1, of the Constitution-"He

shall hold his Office during the term of four Years"-as guaranteeing
every new President four years in the White House. The Succession Act

of 1792 did provide that the term following the special election should
*be for four years. The Act of 1886 was mute on the point, though the

debate assumed a four-year term. It is far from self-evident, however,
that the Constitution forbids elections to fill unexpired terms. We have
such elections every day for senators and representatives, though they,
no less than Presidents, serve for terms specified in the Constitution. The
House Judiciary Committee, under the chairmanship of that rugged old
Texas strict constructionist Hatton W. Sumners, went into this question

at length in 1945 and found no consitutional problem in the case of the
Presidency
The Constitution, the House Judiciary Committee said, "does not provide that the term of each incumbent shall be 4 years, but that the President shall hold his office 'during the term of 4 years.' This language appears to have reference to a fixed quadrennial term, permitting the filling
of an unexpired portion thereof by elections. The tradition of special
elections for unexpired terms of other officers also supports the provision." T2 "During" often means "in the time of"; it does not necessarily
mean "throughout the entire course of." Had the Constitution said "for
a Term of four Years," this would clearly assure a four-year term to every
new President. But the Constitution does not say this.
And if John Tyler was correct in saying that a Vice President became
President, not just acting president, and if it is correct to construe the
Constitution as assuring every President a four-year term, then this reading must surely apply to Presidents who gain the office by inheritance
quite as much as to those who gain it by election. This would mean that,
when a President dies, the Vice President who succeeds him is entitled
to a four-year term of his own. Ben Butler made this point during the impeachment trial of Andrew Johnson. "Whose presidential term is the
respondent now serving out?" he asked. "His own or Mr. Lincoln's? If
his own, he is entitled to four years up to the anniversary of the murder,
because each presidential term is four years by the Constitution." 3 But
no one has ever argued, not even John Tyler, that a Vice President has
any right to do more than serve out his President's unexpired term. On
what principle, when there is no Vice President, should a specially elected "constitutional substitute" be in a more favored position?
The House unwisely deleted Truman's provision for special presiden" The reportis reprinted in the Congressional Record, June 26, 1947, 7854-7855.
" D. M. DeWitt, Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson (New York, 1903),

p. 411.

99
ON THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 1 499

tial elections before passing the Sumners bill in -945, and the Senate
took no action on the proposed change in the line of succession. The
1946 mid-term election gave the Republicans control of Congress. The
Republican leadership, determined to make Joe Martin Truman's absolute and not provisional successor, now favored Truman's bill while
opposing the idea of intermediate elections. As finally enacted, the law
thus departed critically from Truman's original intention. He signed it,
however, in order to shift the succession back to elective officers.
The elimination of intermediate elections was a bad mistake. The mistake was compounded twenty years later by the ratification of the Twen-

ty-fifth Amendment. Section 2 of that amendment, by authorizing a
President, whenever there was a vacancy in the Vice Presidency, to nominate a new Vice President, sanctified the appointive principle at the
highest level of government and created the monstrous possibilitywithin a decade a probability-that an appointed Vice President would
himself become President and appoint his own Vice President.
There was some opposition to this procedure. The Presidency, as
Charles Mathias of Maryland observed in a brilliant dissent from the
House report, would no longer be a purely elective office if the amendment were adopted. The Constitutional Convention "would surely have
rejected an appointed Vice President on grounds of principle alone." The
amendment, Mathias continued, was based not only on a false view of
democracy but on a false view of human nature. It assumed
that a President will always be enlightened and disinterested in naming a
Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 2oth Century's opinion of itsef in contrast to the pragmatic -8th century estimate of human
frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for constitutional law.
Mathias dismissed the argument that Presidents picked their Vice Presidents anyway at the, nominating convention. A candidate for the Presidency, bent on winning the approval of the electorate, was a different
man from an incumbent President safe and secure in the White House.
"The electability of the vice-presidential candidate is a form of accountability for the head of the ticket." Once elected, a President could employ
any, criteria he personally preferred. Since the rest of the proposed amendment gave the Vice President new authority with regard to the declaration of presidential inability, a President might well "hesitate in seeking
a vigorous and aggressive Vice President" and prefer instead a "respectable,, but pallid" appointment. Congressional confirmation would be "a
mere formality in a period of national emotional stress." In addition,
the choice by the presidential candidate of his running mate was merely
the contemporary political custom. It had not always been the custom in
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the past and might not be the custom in the future. Putting it into a constitutional amendment would transform a passing practice into a permanent principle.;"
Nonetheless, Congress, with the support of the establishment press, the
American Bar Association, and, alas, an assortment of scholars, voted
overwhelmingly for the Twenty-fifth Amendment. The error was deepened in 1973 when Congress, cheering through the nomination of Gerald Ford, acquiesced in Nixon's interpretation of the amendment as making a Vi ce President thus nominated not a choice genuinely shared with
Congress (as some in Congress had ingenuously supposed when voting
for the amendment) but a unilateral presidential appointment subject
to congressional confirmation.

XI
This removal of the Presidency from the elective principle is unnecessary, absurd, and incompatible with 'the constitutional traditions of
American democracy. It is also not beyond recall. If the American people
want to restore authentic legitimacy to their government, it is plain
what must be done. We must adopt a constitutional amendment abolishing the Vice Presidency, an office that has become both more superfluous
and more mischievous than Hamilton could have imagined when he
wrote Federalist #68; and then provide for the succession in the spirit of
Founding Fathers through a congressional statute reestablishing the principle of special presidential elections. This principle, announced by Madison in the Constitutional Convention, authorized by the Constitution,
applied by the Second Congress in 1792 to the prospect of a double vacancy, reaffirmed in this context by the Forty-eighth Congress in 1886,
reaffirmed again by Truman in 1945 (and actually again by Eisenhower
Judiciary Committee, Selected Materials on the Twenty-fifth Amendment,
67-68. Oddly Richard M. Nixon at the time took what superficially appeared to be a
similar position, arguing that the selection of the Vice President "should reflect the
elective, rather than the appointive process" so that "whoever held the office of President or Vice President would always be a man selected by the people directly or by
their elected representatives, rather than a man who gained the office by appointment." On closer examination, however, the Nixon proposal was designed t6-trengthen the presidential domination of the process. His objection to placing the power
of confirmation in Congress was thai Congress might be controlled by the opposition
party. Instead he proposed that the President make his recommendation to the reconvened electoral college, which "will always be made up of a membership a majority of
which is the President's own party," and which would presumably serve as a rubber
stamp, as in the quadrennial elections. This seems an emaciated view of an elective
process. Selected Materials,94, 97.
' Senate
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in 1965),"6 would, if the Vice Presidency were abolished; work fully
as well for a single vacancy. More than this: it would rcipair the fatal
errors of the Twelfth and Twenty-fifth Amendments and make it
certain that the republic would never have to suffer, except as a locum
tenens, a Chief Executive who, in the words of John Quincy Adams,
was never thought of for that office by anybody.
The notion is occasionally advanced that intermediate elections would
be unconstitutional. This can be ignored. Madison himself introduced
language into the Constitution specifically to make such elections possible. The Second Congress, which contained men who had served five
years before in the Constitutional Convention, authorized them by stat-

ute. Anything with such patriarchal blessing may be taken as safely consitutibnal.
Most of the objections to intermediate elections seem to spring primarily from a reverence for routine. The quadrennial rhythm, though
not regarded as untouchable by the Founding Fathers, has evidently become sacrosanct for their descendants. Thus Lewis Powell (before, it
must be said, his ascension to the Court, though he was still holding
forth from a respectable eminence as president-elect of the American Bar
Association) rejected the idea of intermediate elections as a "drastic departure from our historic system of quadrennial presidential elections." 1
One must regard such an objection, especially in view of the clear expectation of the Founding Fathers, as frivolous. If the specially elected
President fills out his predecessor's term, the sacred cadence will not be
disturbed. If not, then Congress could consider E. S. Corwin's proposal:
if the vacancy occurs in the first half of the time, the special presidential
election should take place at the time of the mid-term congressional election, thereby preserving the assumption that the terms of the new President, a new House and one-third of the Senate would start together."
"Eisenhower proposed that in case of a double vacancy there should be a return

to the 1886 law, but the cabinet successor would be an "acting President" and "unless
the next regularly scheduled presidential election should occur in less than 18 months,
the Congress should provide for a special election of a President and Vice President
to serve out the presidential term." He seemed to believe this would require a constitutional amendment. See Eisenhower, Waging Peace, p. 648. It is also of interest that,
when the Louis Harris survey put the question in 1973 whether it would be a good
idea to have a special election for President in 2974, its respondents favored such an
election by 50 to 36 percent. Washington Post, January 7, 1974.
' Senate Judiciary Committee, Selected Materials on the Twenty-fifth Amendment,
124.

"Corwin, The President, p. 57. Corwin's proposal was directed to the possibility of

a double vacancy, but it would serve as well for a single vacancy. If the President vanished after the mid-term election, however, it would risk leaving the country in the
hands of a nonelected President for as long as twenty-six months.
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There is also the objection, formulated by (among others) that thoughtful and lamented student of the Presi4pncy, the late Clinton Rossiter, that
"it would be simply too much turmoil and chaos and expense to have a
special nationwide election."78 But one wonders how carefully Professor
Rossiter considered the proposition. This plainly was not the French experience with regard to the Presidency in 1974, nor indeed has it been
the experience in parliamentary states where elections are held at unpredictable intervals. Are we to suppose that the French and Italians, for example, are so much more cool and imperturbable, so much more AngloSaxon, than the Americans?
It could of course be said that special elections in a time of national
disarray might only deepen popular confusions. Would it have been a
good idea to hold such elections after the wartime death of Franklin
Roosevelt, after the murder of John Kennedy, after a successful presidential impeachment? Hubert Humphrey has made the point that special
elections in wartime, for example, might cause dangerous delay and irrelevant bickering at a time when the nation could afford neither."9 No
doubt such elections would test the poise and stamina of American democracy. Yet what is the gain in undue protectiveness? The same argument can be made against holding presidential elections in wartime at
all. The elections of 1864 and 1944 were held in the midst of the two
greatest crises of our history. They caused much irrelevant bickering.
Had Lincoln and Roosevelt lost, there would have been an embarrassing
interlude of lame-duckery and interregnum. But the nation survived
these elections without undue trauma. Democracy is a system for foul
weather as well as for fair. Though a special election in a time of stress
might conceivably demoralize the country, it might equally help it to resolve its confusions and restore its nerve. At the very least it would reaffirm the principle of self-government and place in the White House a
man chosen by the people to be their President rather than, as the present system has done, a man chosen by a President who himself was forced
to resign to avoid the virtual certainty of being then impeached and convicted for high crimes and misdemeanors.

X1'
If the principle be accepted-the principle that, if a President vanishes,
it is better for the people to elect a new President than to endure a Vice
"

Professor Rossiter's reference, however, was to the proposal of a special election

to choose a new Vice President. He might have thought differently if the purpose was
to choose a new President. See Senate Judiciary Committee, Selected Materials, 136.
" "On the Threshold of the White House," Atlantic Monthly, July 1974.
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President who was never voted on for that office, who became Vice President for reasons other than his presidential qualifications, and who may
very well have been badly damaged by his vice presidential experience
-the problem is one of working out the mechanics of the intermediate
election. This is not easy but far from impossible. The great problem is
that there can be no gap, no chink, in the continuity of the Presidency.
"The President under our system, like the king in a monarchy," said
Martin Van Buren, "never dies.""' It would require up to three months
to set up a special election. In the meantime the show must go on. If the
Vice Presidency were abolished, who would act as President until the
people have a chance to speak?
The historical preference, except for 1886-1947, has been for the President pro tern of the Senate (Committee of Detail in the Constitutional
Convention, Succession Act of 1792) or the Speaker of the House (Successi.. A,t of 1947). But given the regularity with which in recent
years - party has controlled Congress and the other the executive
branch, this formula risks an unvoted change in party control of the
White House and in the whole direction of government. Such a change
would be a graver infringement of the democratic principle than the provisional service of an appointed officer as acting President. The confu-

sion would be even greater in the event of temporary presidential disability, in which case the Presidency might shuttle back and forth between
the two parties in a period of a few months.
Fidelity to the results of the last election and to the requirements of
continuity in policy creates, it seems to me, an irresistible argument for
returning the line of provisional descent to the executive branch. A convenient way would be simply to make the Secretary of'State acting President for ninety days. If the Secretary of State is foreign-born or under
thirty-five or has some other disqualifying eccentricity, then the Secretary of the Treasury could be the automatic successor, and so on down the
1886 list of succession."1
Then, as soon as possible, let the people make their choice (unless the
Martin Van Buren, Inquiry into the Origin and Course of Political Parties in the
United States (New York, 1867), p. 290.

' In an earlier version of this argument, in the Atlantic Monthly (May 1974), I
proposed devolution to the Secretary of State only long enough to permit the choice of

an acting President from the cabinet. The reason for this was that the Secretary of State
might not be the member of the cabinet best qualified to serve as acting President. It

then seemed to me that the cabinet itself might well select the acting President, using
the corporate authority already bestowed on it by the Twenty-fifth Amendment, which
gives a majority of the cabinet, plus the Vice President, power to declare the President
non compos mentis. An alternative would have been to permit Congress to select an
acting President from the cabinet-a device that would preserve continuity, spread re-
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President vanishes in his last year in office, in which case it might be
simpler to let the acting President serve out the term). Some have argued that a national election is too hard to organize; therefore Congress
should choose the person to serve the remainder of the term. But this
would give Congress the right, limited as it might be, to elect a President
-a right the Founding Fathers carefully denied Congress and reserved
for the voters. If it be said that ninety days is not time enough to organize an election, let us recall that the French allow themselves only
thirty-five days, and who will say that the French are better organizers
than the Americans? This would only be an election to fill out a term and
thus would not require the elaborate foreplay of the quadrennial orgy.
Candidates can be established with astonishing speed in the electronic
age. Let the national committees,, which have become increasingly representative bodies under the new party rules, canvass opinion and make
the nominations. Short campaigns, federally financed, would be a blessing, infinitely appreciated by the electorate. Perhaps their brevity and
their economy might have a salutary impact on the quadrennial elections, which in recent years have stretched out to intolerable length and
swelled to intolerable expense.
In doing this, we would not be departing from the spirit and intent of
the Founding Fathers. Quite the contrary: we would be reaffirming their
view-and what view could be more sensible for a self-governing democracy?-that the Chief Magistrate of the United States must, except
for the briefest periods, be a person elected to that office by the people.
"We have only to operate the Constitution as the men who wrote it
thought it should operate," Walter Lippmann wrote in arguing for intersponsibility, afford a choice of sorts, and perhaps stimulate Presidents to choose better
cabinets. I agree, however, with Richard Neustadt (in the Atlantic Monthly, July 1974)

that the temporary succession should be automatic within the cabinet.
I still think there is merit in this more complex approach; but on balance I have come
to believe that two acting Presidents in a period of three months before a new President is chosen would be too cumbersome and confusing. I therefore now favor the simpler system outlined in the text. I have also dropped the proposal that the acting Pres-

ident be declared ineligible as a candidate in the special election, this in order to avoid
the advantage created by the inevitable rush of sympathy to the new person in the
White House. Demetrius Sakellarios has reminded me that democracy implies as few
restrictions as possible on a people's right to choose its rulers.
I have not discussed the issue of presidential inability-an issue that may have received attention out of all proportion to its importance. In any caee, the Vice President
is not indispensable to a solution of the inability issue. The majority of the cabinet,
when making its determination of presidential inability as authorized in the Twenty-

fifth Amendment, could simply designate one of their own number to serve as acting
President until the inability is removed.
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mediate elections in 1946. "'If we are the prisoners of a rigid system today, the fault lies not in the Constitution but in our own habits which
have only rather recently become so hard and so fixed."82
" Lippmann, "Wrong Answer, Right Question."
* This article has been adapted from a new appendix prepared for the forthcoming
paperback edition.of The Imperial Presidency.
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Mr. BURNS. Mr. Chairman, I am particularly happy, to be here today, to be associated with Arthur iSchlesinger-in whatever disagreement with him, I may be-partly because I think he has done one of
the best, short studies of the Vice Presidency in this article in the
Political Science Quarterly.
It is also a pleasure to be addressing a subcommittee chairman who
has written the liveliest study of the Vice Presidency, Mr. Chairman,
your book, "One Heartbeat Away," makes you the only American who
has made the Vice Presidency interesting, and that is a feat.
Senator BAYH. If not salable.

Mr. BURNS. There is a curious reversal in roles here today because it
will be my argument that Professor Schlesinger is acting precisely as
the kind of political scientist that he ordinarily frowns on, and I
will be seeking to act as an historian who would remind my fellow historian that history suggests we are in the process of constant change
and that the Vice Presidency should not be evaluated simply on the
basis of what has happened in the past but of what might happen in
the future.
I would associate myself with the remarks of the Assistant Attorney
General, first of all, in that I believe that the system does deserve more
opportunity to prove itself.
Professor Schlesinger would give it one more opportunity. He would
let the future of the 25th amendment depend largely on how effectively
Vice President Rockefeller fills his role. I think the amendment might
deserve somewhat more substantial basis for proof than that one Vice
Presidency can give it.
Our experience thus far with the two nominations we have had indicate that there is a potential in this amendment that perhaps was
not thoroughly understood even by the authors of the amendment,
that is, the possibility that a President under fire-this is the kind of
President that Mr. Schlesinger is particularly concerned -about-would
use the choice of a Vice President as a means to try to correct the defects of the administration that are becoming particularly evident at
that time.

I am thinking, obviously, of the nomination of Mr. Ford which,
whatever one may say about Gerald Ford, obviously was designed in
part to compensate for the serious failures and indeed corruption
in the Nixon administration. This was an effort to "balance the
ticket", as it were, in a very different way.
It seems to me that President Ford shows every indication of living
up to at least that single criterion. By the same token, President Ford's
nomination of Mr. Rockefeller was an obvious effort to bring the kind
of administrative experience and t:he understanding of economic af-

fairs that Governor Rockefeller had shown in New York State-to
bring that kind of experience and background into the administration.
This experience, it seems to me, shows there is a potential in this
amendment in that Presidents, again, can balance their administration in order to compensate for some of the failures that inevitably
will develop in virtually any Presidential administration.
The Vice Presidency has been mercilessly kicked around as an office.
There is a marvelous collection of cracks about it that I won't inflict
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on you, mainly because we have heard them all.. I think something

again should be said for it in terns of the potential in the office.
First. of all, note the recent tendency ill American history for meii,
and I hope soneilay wo-.men, of Presidential talent to accept the Vice
Presidential iomintion-t1his was not true in most of our history.
The fact that men of tie caliber-in the I)enmocratic party--of Hlenry
Wa llace, tHarry Truman, AlIben Bark ley, Lyndon Johnson, and Hubert Iumphrey not only accepted this office but keenly desired it,
attests to the importance that at least the practical politicians attribute
to the office, even if the academics are somewhat more critical.
While tle roster, perhApS, is not quite so illustrious on tile Republican side, we do have the examples of Theodore Roosevelt, of ('alvin
Coolidge--who was at least an experienced politician--of Henry
Cabot Lodge and of others.
Second, there is publicc pressure for abler candidates. The American
people are now interested in the Vice Iresidency. They know it is iml)ortant; they are concerned abeut who is chosen. A l)arty that )icks
a poor, inappropriate Vice Presidential candidate is going to surfer to
some degree at the polls.
I think this will be increasingly the case as time passes. Th enormous interest in the Eagleton episode attests again to the importance
to which the press and the Ame-rican people assign to this office.
Another argument for an office that admittedly is awkward and
sometimes ludicrous, even iml)otent, is one that, is increasingly rele%ant-theflexability of the Vice Presidency, partly because it is unstructured, partly because it is an essentially weak office.
The person in the Vice Presidency, the encumbent Vice 1President,
is available to a President on the basis of his different talents and on
the basis of what the administration may need at that particular mo.ment. If he has a particular executive competence as Vice President
Rockefeller is reputed to have, he can fill that, role. If lie has had
particularly a legislative background, if he is especially adept 1)olitically, as. Vice President Barkley was, he can fill that role for th6
administration.
If he has none of those abilities, lie can always certainly fulfill some
ceremonial role and take senme of the burden off the 'resi(lent in that
area. Much obviously, del)ends on the President's needs and one cannot
be at all dogmatic about this.
Certain trends are quite evident. One is the decline of the balanced
ticket in the old sense. I was speaking earlier of a new type of balanced
ticket. The old kind of balanced ticket, of course, was the kind of ticket
where the man who had just been nominated for President chose a
running mate who would hopefully bring hini votes from an opposite
wing of the party, whether regional or idlealogical or perhaps even in
personality t erms.
So, that if that ticket were elected-of course, both parties indulged
in this practice-there would be a guaranteed source of opposition to
the President virtually inside his administration. Well, because of
fundamental political trends iii this century, we have departed, probably for good, from that old concept of tle balanced ticket.
The Vice Presidency, indeed, has become so visible and the office
in its own way so important-certainly in its negative and obstruc-
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tionist character-that recently nominated President simply could not
afford to cho
someboily from an opposite wing of the party.
Hence, I think
ill see
e increasingly the rj'w of wdnt ] have

called tle first type of balanced ticket, the ticket in which the two
candidates are essentially agrTi on.the main thrust, the main posture

of their partv and policy and idealogy. If that does continue to be
the trend", this will work a significant change in the role of the Vie
President as we know'him today, that is, a t ice Presidency with the
kind of funwtion and role that he preientl exercise&
Now, I expect. that there always would I* some tension& I think
one of the most valuable aspects of Professor Schlesinger's work is
to indicate the extent to which it is a difficult office, it is an tinsafi.,-

factory office for the encumlwnt and an office on which the President
looks with some trepidation and nervousness.
I expect that even with this kind of halanced ticket, there would
still be some tension inevitably between the President and the Vice
President. if only because of 'the psychological implications of the
famous heartbeat.
Inevitably, there will be sonie differences, the running mate will

not have come from exactly the sante party background as the head
of the ticket. 7o my mind, this is all to the good. I would urge (his
particularly to the attention of Prtfessor Schlesinger because he more
effectively than I think anyone else in recent years has drawn our
atteiition" to the problem of presidential power in his book "The
Imperial Presidency." '
I should think he--and I hope lie will comment-I am sure he
will comment on this-I should think he might welcome the prospect
that built. into the ],residency and possibly with increasing potency
as the years aro bY. there will he a constitutional officer who has a
legitimate place in the administration, however anomolous and
awkward, a person who cannot he fired out of hand. a person who
is established there, a person whose views receive some attention from
the press.
If we are really concerned about building around the Presidency
certain restrictions and confinements that would not fundamentally
hamper him in the exercise of Presidential anthoritv, it seems to me
that. a somewhat independent Vice President cold serve that role.

On the question of simple abolition of the Vice Presidency in terms

of how we would resolve the problem of succession. I would again associate myself largely to save time, with the remarks 'of the Assistant
Attorney General. I would not agree with his time schedule. I don't
think we need 9 months to elect a President. I think some concession
could he made in a special election. I don't think we rould telescope it
to te de.,rree thot Professor Sehlesinger has smigrsted.
We do have the Presidential system. 'We do have this lone rather
confused system of ehoosinq-first of nominating and then electingPresidents. Wre (10 feel it is important for a Inai who is goinwr to occupy
that, office to subiect himself to a series of verve dem'nvdii g tests in
States where thaf candidate will be subjected to the close, scrutiny of
the voters in all parts of the country.
I see no way to reduce that time to a period of less than 4 or .-months.
There must be, under the present system--unless we change the system-the long process of choosingidelegates to national conventions,
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Ole Io g pIr('t5s of the 1)1e(I)ilim
lilt 1011 4'll )aglli tlitle ('O1l,'elitiol itself
Ilid I ieit I hv
t i. 't i(0i pro 'c,-s. I h iit w wo( ld hiave to allow for at least
it llonli, if li)l
t
Iw) ' '.
lOi t' ll;tlrai-itolI l
ip' (d after tbe election, that
is. a Il
,d hwfoe IlI(' l'vW ]'iesl(t
'iit ,'iill ieallv take hold.
So, I t l k Is Is 1as(e1niui
failing iI tOle l):osal simply to abolisli I III V11 v i#sili
t([w I -A'c no ea.N solli)111101 to thlis. 11 iofvssoi
S"'lllt'-11i 1i is at ilble it (lie Political S;civnce Quarterly suggested
t]hat
rpehalt) (i e ]m N ty
litinll
urpa
coln liitt, e' con l(l be used to expedite
(1' It '(. iild
illtis
%\'' wvoildl pot )iaVt' to go tlirougl the full-fledged

1

(')il\'ill[ 11111(III11111 [ ing process.
T'le natt ioali ('(lllillitt e of t ile
'llitl( c)lift\ wlien' t Iere. has Iwel

two p)ar-ties is still, even in the Demoextelsiv'e refolm11, it is still not a represent lltivt' l)(Iy., it df s not i'epreseit ti le )eople is fully, say as Congress tlot's.
11'ie Ilany arilca ic alrlngellellts in the choosing of
u lalinaI conilnliitte n eeber's. 'Il're is al elitist aspect to this, and it
will IN-paricili r ly awk waid for a national committee chosen on the
Sta i(i d, political groui-ils suddenly to be confronted 'vith this treintn(lously iiioirt anlt plrobleni of ('lioosing a Plresidential candidate.
Tle suggest ion, however, (desraise interesting p ossibilities. For exa1niple. tite )ossibIility that if tler-e were finrtlher reform in the party
sy'stenl, per /aps thre coul(I be a paity institutions, party agencies,
party coilnItttees, party con fee(ices il being, in ('ontinuous existence,
tillit cold! iaII
aill assignunent its griye as tlis assignment would be,
If, for exan)le. we hal national )arty ('ohferenees, where at the
1Wginning of tie year delegates to a nlat i(nal conference of a size not
much1d) less tlan i nat ional convent ion. were closen, an(1 if they existed
as (ileg ati s recently c'losen by tie people , anii if tHy had been chosen
witli tile 11n(ler'sta nding that t Iey' Iniglit be called oi" to (leal with this
serious pliro)lel, thwn'l ('cll( sAe possibilities of so rearranging our
Imlitieal system tat it S )t't(iier sl)eCial e('ction ('oul(l be conducted, andtlhat woull thiig'ge ni\I" ioleS for tHie kind of (litstic change that Professor SclIflesinger ils suggeste(l.
I mniake t11is point, Mi'. chairmann , in elation to a readerr consideration witIi wlhcli I woull like to conclude. I would like to COm)liment
tIiis sicomnimittee fori hiating lhan(lle( a series of veiy difficult problens over tie past year.,s sucl as tlie onV we are considering today.
11li1a 'l'e'rIus me al)out the way in wvli h this lhas been (one is the
fict t his sluhconllillittee lits lu d to (eal with tliese matters essentially.
inn ll hoc. snmewlat el)iso(dic, somewhat fragnmentary, and certainly
iT('r'eiieital basis. Tllat is, you have considered questions as they have
come pl. wlich is, of course. perfect 1y logical.
Thle rpioblem is that it is impossible to pick li1) any major asect of
tile Anwiia systemi for study and i'eformN without looking at, the rest
of tile sv--stei. Thlis was the genius of the Foun(ling Fathers-that
they had to look on the system il its entirety, and the genius of the
('onstitut ion ii jairt, is the way it (1oes hang together, the way in which
the major plrovisions of tie Cmostitution were (lrawn tip in relation to
ot her l)'ov isions.
The Piresidencv was ae(l( what it was hecauise the framers understood whiat kind 'of a Contyress they were estal)lishing, and so on. This
is true of the kind of prol)lem, it seems to me, that we fite( in considerinir an oflie tlat is as relatively impotent as the Vice Presidency.
We ('annot eonsi(le' the Vice ]iesi(iency, it seems to me, unless we
also look at the role of the Senate. We have had a dramatic example
54 - 6 (I - Z5 - 8
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this week of the potential role of a Vice President in the deliberations
of the Senate. I lave a feeling that as the pressure on Government increases iii future years that the system will become even more poised
anfl balanced within itself.
This question of the Vice Presidency also relates to the question,
what kind of Presidency do we want ? It relates to the question of the
kind of nominating and election system that we have, as I have just
suggested. For example, on lProfessor Schlesinger's suggestion of a
national pres)(iential primary, that would certainly expedite a special
election. I ia)pen to oppose a national Presidential primary but I
would grant t iat that would be a way of expediting the conduct of a
special election.
The question of the. Vice Presidency, as I suggested, relates to what
kind of party system we have. It relates to the question specifically of
whether the Govermnent miglt finance tle party system instead of
simply financing candidates. The great reform we have seen in campaign spending, and campaign regulation has a very.serious side to it
in that it may increase instead of curbing the excessive private enterprise we see in the con(u qt of American electoral politics.
I would submit that that is the kind of consideration that this subcommittee might study as it, lhoks at this question of the Vice Presidency in a broader context. What I am suggesting, Mr. Chairman, is
that there is a question of priority here.
I share many of Professor Schlesinger's concerns. I simply arn not
as concerned as he is about the Vice Presidency. Compared to the other
grave problems facing the UTnited States, tle Vice Presilency, to my
mind, is a very low priority. I am much more concerned, Mr. Chairman,
about the reform of the Senate.
I think the Senate, as long as it. retains *a means of frustrating
majority will, is a grotesque example for this country and for the rest
of the world, an example of a democracy that cannot govern by the
very, basic l)rinciple of majority rule. I would put that problem higher
ul) in my list of priorities than the Vice Presidency.
A s I, suggested, some of these other questions-the kind of Presidency we want, the kind of )arty system we. want, the kind of electoral
system we want-also have higher priority on your attention at. this
time, and emphasizes the need of considering these questions i.'xcontext.
I make a special point of this last set of suggestions because we are
entering not only into a Bicentennial year, we are entering into what
has well been called a bicentennial era in which we will be celebrating
the Declaration of Indepe(,ndence next year and we will be celebrating
the Bicentennial of the drawing uIp of the Constitution in 1987.
A prominent group of Americans very recently has suggested that
we should look at this Bicentennial period as a combination of bicentennials, and indeed, devote the period between 1976 and 1987 to a
consideration of the American system. They propose. that we consider
the renewal of our system.
I would propse something perhaps a bit, more drastic-that we use
that period as a time for reassessment of our whole system in the same
mood and with the same comprehensiveness that the Founding Fathers
(Iemonstrated in their original drawing up of the Constitution.
Because this subcommittee has e4al)lished cuch a notable record indealing with these problems seriatim, I would hope very much that
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this subcommittee could consider a combination of these problems
not, only during that bicentennial era but beginning now. I think the
.hour is late and there is i1great deal of work to be done.
Thank you..
Senator B13ir. Thank you, Professor Burns. I am not certain where
to begin here.
Mr. SCiL.SI.NGER. I would be happy to comment on Jim's statemenit,
if that-would
help.
Senator
BAYxI. Well,
I lrnve no objection to you doing that. But
then, I Suppose, he would be permitted the right to comment on your
comments.
Mr. SciriLEiNGER. Unless you have some questions.
Senator /AYir. Why don't you briefly comment on his statements
and Dr. Buris may Want to rebut the re!)uttal. I am sure you gentlemen
can work thi-s out.
Mr. SCIILFSIN,GER. We are interested in hearing your comments on
what we both said.
Senator BAYI[. I am not too sure that would be as beneficial to the
legislative process as having yours.
Mr. Burxs. When I was originally invited to appear here, my response to counsel was that my idea of a Senate hearing of this sort
consisted not of academics coming down to inflict their views on public
officers but in having a dialogue. I knew both Professor Schlesinger
and I looked on you and other members of the subcommittee as people
who were deeply involved in this. I think we would be interested in
not only the usual kind of exploratory question, but in your own views
on this matter.
I think part of my statement was designed to elicit response very
much from you as well as from Professor Schlesinger.
Senator iBAYH. Why don't we develop that kind of dialogue. I think
that both of you qualify, let me .4ay in the finest use of the word, as
academicians who liav6 shown by your interest and your practical
experience, an ability to breathe a great deal of very practical experience and applicability to your academic views.
I say that not to be over complimentary but I think the record will
show that. I was almost tempted to iuterrulpt both of your statements.
At times we have had rather significant numbers of students here
sitting on the floor, and then they were leaving and going on to the
next commitments on their schedule. which is very understandable.
I don't believe they will find any place in Washington right now,
two men who are better qualified to bring a great deal of perception
to an issue that is very much before us. I for one, appreciate that.
Dr. Burns, your suggestion, perhal)s we ought to discuss and consider some o;f the broader questions of constitutional reform and use
our bicentennial as a vehicle and platform, makes a great deal of
sense. I think 'that is very much in line with what Professor
Schlesinger was suggesting in looking at the Vice Presidency
differently.
I think the assessment that we have tended in the past to react rather
than to act, is an accurate assessment, either to Supreme Court decisions or acts of tragic fate. I must say I think perhaps a comment which
I hope will not be considered as an excuse, but rather a fact of life
that whenever you are charged with the responsibility of a legislative

a
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vehicle which must receive two-thirds support from both Houses,
Congress and three-fourths of the State legislature.
It is quite a burden to carry. Just the normal kind of considered
judgment, is very difficult to promote that kind of support. I should
be but I have been trying and I don't know whether we ought to getinto this or not, but one of the things we have been trying to do positively before the fact is to do something about the electoral college
system, before we are confronted with another cireimstance like the
Presidency being given to one who is not the popular choice of the
people.
We have had that happen a couple of three times. Frankly, I would
like to see that done differently. It is awfully difficult to sustain interest
in that. There was a much greater degree of intensity when. we finally
moved a p)opular-vote measure through the House and came very close
to getting it moved to the Senate, only to have it throttled by the imperfection in our senatorial rules that you brought to our attention.
The interest in 1970 was great because one candidate for the Presidency came within about 71,000 popular votes of having the opportunity to dictate who the Presidency was going to be for the major
party candidates. If there had been tat small a change in three States,
71,000 1 think it was, and Governor Wallace with those 36. 1 think,
electoral votes, he could have deterniiiied the Presidency, which is not,
I don't think, the American people are prepared for that. That is
neither here nor there.
Mr. BtunN-s. lHave you considered the possibility of simultaneously
studying a collection of what I would call housekeeping constitltionl
amendments, which would be designed to (leal with some of these very
tricky, somewhat controversial questions. I am thinking particularly
of the problem you just raised.
If we cannot amend our Constitution to establish direct, popular
election, and I support your stand for that kind of change, would it be
possible to take out this Russian roulette element and at least provide
for a system.where some person or small group of electors cold not
plunge us into a very serious constitutional crisis. Could that be
combined With such other so-called housekeeping amendments as
the timing of elections, the question of a 4-year term for Members
of the House of Representatives. I realize that that is more controversial, but I expect that we have more Governors with 4-year
terms, we wi'ill find more popular acceptance of the 4-year term for
Congressmen. There is also the item-veto question.
W\rould it be possible. without getting now into the merits and demerits of these, would it, be possible to group together at least at a
minimum level, a combination of amendments that might be considered by State legislatures and by Congress at the same time so that
we cold at least deal with some of these messy and tricky parts of
our ConstituItion even dangerous Parts of our constitutional system
today ?
Senator Bviii. I am certainly willing to receive that. I am glad to
have either one of you gentlemen's ideas as to where we should start
on that list. My experience has led me to believe, over a relatively
short period o'f time as chairman of this subcommittee, that in
starting with a collection of different ideas, one tends to pick up the
opponents of the individual ideas more quickly than the support.
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In looking for a two-thirds, we did not deal with some of the obvious
imperfections that have been brought to our attention. The next step,
what do you do when a Vice President is disabled under the disability
provision.
We thought about that. However, we found that whenever we added
another idea, we lost some of the necessary two-third votes. I am one,
who I hope will never live long enough to lose my ideals.
In a legislative body you are forced to also infse a good deal of
pragmatism as to how you move closer t2 your ideals. When talking
about a two-third vote, it is a tough road."The idea of looking at these
and using the Bicentennial as a vehicle, can begin to develop some
popular support for the constitutional document for the next 200 years.
That appeals to me. The idea was proposed by some that we have
a new constitutional convention. That concerns me because I think
there are some very basic and fundamental ingredients in that Constitution, particularly in the Bill of Rights, which are indispensable.
Whether we should subject those to some of the frustrations of the
moment, was one of the battles of the prior amendment. I fear what
would happen with a new constitutional concept; we would end up
with less than the two-thirds votes necessary.
Mr. SCitESINOER. I think it is a terrible idea. The Articles of Confederation had their obvious defects, and there was need for a Constitutional Convention ift 1787; but there are no such comparable
genetics in the Constitution, and there is no such need for a convention.
I am interested in Jim's proposal about the way we should spend
the years, 1976 to 1987. But, the way we are going now in our public
policy, I fear we are more likely to reproduce the chaos of 200 years
ago that led to the Constitution.
Mr. BuRNs. Let me say I was not proposing a new constitutional
convention, nor do I favor it. I do think it is unfortunate that a way
of amending the Constitution that was laid out by the framers is now
considered so risky in terms of current attitudes toward free speech
and the like, that we do not dare hold a constitutional convention.
I think that is a realistic fact that we do not dare do it, and I think
that is highly unfortunate.
Senator BAYJ. It is highly unfortunate. But it also speaks well for
the wisdom of our forefathers, that we should protect some of the
basic and inalienable rights from other generations who may object to
the motion that would cause them not to realize the importance of them.
Mr. BER-, s. If they were really wise, they would not have allowed
this method of constitutional convention at all. They didn't evidently
think of that. We might be able to conduct a future constitutional
convention, and it is too bad that their faith in us is not'at present
vindicated.
Senator BAYT. Perhaps that was a very human feeling or lack of
faith for themselves. They were experimenting here, fearing that
their wisdom might not holly up through the ages.
We had two subject matters that have been brought forward here.
It is relatively easy to find issues, both of which either of you could
write a doctoral thesis on.
One is the wisdom of the 25th amendment, whether it can be ap-

proved or whether it can be abolished. I suppose the more immediate
question is the relevancy of the Vice President and whether that officer
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has a role. Recognizing that. why don't I pose questions and let you
gentlemen answer them in any way you spe fit; cutting my ideas down
to size: perfecting them fnr voN,', own differences of oninion.
What we are really talking about is the broader subject here, aren't
we? Either one of those two components will fit into it, of Presidential power-how it is
? disbursed; who disburses it; and who are the
disbursers and so forth
Traditionally, the electoral process, the choosing of people in the
final sense of the word, has been a matter of constitutional determination by the Congress and the several States.
The nominating process, at least recently, has been a matter of
statute, party, and regulation by State law and has not been put into
the Constitution.
Is that a fair assessment of where we are now in looking at any
changes that might be made. or should we consider that?
Mr. BuRNs. I would say that is a fair assessment. We have a national
politcal system that. is actually regulated by a congeries of States,
localities, local and State patties, as well as by Congress, and by the
national party.
I think one of the questions this country has to face is whether it
wants to develop a national political system governed by national
legislation out of this congeries of regional and local regulations.
Mr. SCHLESINGER. I should perhaps clarify one point. I did not
mean to suggest that action on the 25 amendment should await the
success of the Ford-Rockefeller relationship, and their capacity to
make something out of the Vice Presidency.
I meant to correct this rather that his really had to do with the
Question of the abolition of the Vice Presidency. T (10 believe the section 2 of the 25th amendment is in error. I would be in favor of its
deletion, quite regardless of whether Ford and Rockefeller can make
anything out of the Vice Presidency or not.
As for the question Senator Bavh iust brought up. I would like to
(lisciiss it. in connection with Jim Burns' argument that the Vice
Presidency. however futile an office it may have been in the past, may
in the future become a means of constraint on the Presidencv.
Professor Burns siigrests that an independent Vi'e Presidency
might be a valuable place from which to exercise such restraint. Now I
am extremely dubious that the Vice Presidency is going to become more
effective in the future than it has in the past.
We often hear that the Vice President can "balance" the President-as if the views of the Vice President could in some real sense
balance the views of the President. it we all know Presidents never
pay any attention to the views of the Vice President.
The modern Vice President ouicklv jettisons his own views or
confides them only to the bosom of his wife and does everything he can
to nrove his lnaltv by endorsing the views of the President.
Far from Vice Presidents becoming more independent in recent
years. they have become less independent. Some of the more venerable
in this room amenl Is may
11e1emllie' when Charles Gates Dawes was
Vice President of the U-nited States and so stronfrly disacrreed with
what President Coolidre was doinr on farmi legislation that lie lobbied
against his own administration on the Hill.
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,John Nance Garner so disapproved of aspects of the New Deal that
he left Washington and stayed away for months in Texas and in fact
was hardly in Washington during the last, 2 years of his Vice
Presidency.
In more recent (lays we have seen men who, before they became
Vice Presidents. had shown notable independence of mind as Senators
or Governors. but who, once they )ecame and Vice President, seemed
to interpret their responsibility not at all as that of restraining the
Vice President but as more a setting forth the President's views in an
even more extravagant and uninhibited way than the President himself had done.
I refer, for example, to Vice lresilent Rockefeller's speech in New
,Jersey a couple of weeks ago. It put certain tendencies in the administration's view in a more (iralatic and exaggerated way than the
President had put them himself.
The Vice President, it is true, cannot be fired but, he can be exiled,
and lie almost always is becallse Presidents don't like Vice Presidents.
They don't like Vice Presidents because they know the Viee President
has only one job -to wait for the President to (lie. This is hardly the
basis for long-lasting and enduring friendship. That is why Presidents
like to get Vice Presidents out of the country.
Their views receive no attention from the Presidency in the past and
I doubt very much if that is going to change. I really_, think that the
notion of the Vice President as a constraint on the*Presidency is a
mirage.
I am also )erplexed, Jim, by your reference to the Vice Presidency
as an "important"' office.
Apart from its role in connection with the succession, it seems to me
an office of no importance at all. I might add that in connection with
the idea of the Vice President as a constraint on the Executive, everyone seems to forget the constitutional point which has been clear
within our own time-both Truman and rEisenhower made it in their
memoirs-and that is the Vice President is not a member of the executive branch and is not subject to direction by the President.
Senator B,%Yyi. On that point, (1o either of you gentlemen know of,
in modern history, a Vice Presi(ent who foi: very long has assumed
any initiative on his own, des)ite 'I ruman s and Eisenhower's memoirs,
anld the contrary notwithstanding, from a practical standpoint hasn't
the Vice President either done the bidding of the President publicly,
or again, been exiled to Texas?
Mr. SCHlll.SINOEn. There are two different problems there. I think
what Truman and Eisenhower had in mind was not the Vice President
(lefendina the Presidential programs in public, but the extent to which
he coiildbe given serious executive responsibility within the executive
branch.
I notice Governor Rockefeller has lxen made chairman of the Domestic Council-whatever that may mean. No one seems to have raised
the, question of how that relates to the constitutional responsibilities
of the Vice President.
Franklin Roosevelt made Henry Wallace chairman of the Board of
Economic WVelfare, but that was ani agency that was based on congressional statute and therefore, was in a different category from those
based purely on Executive order, and not based on statute.
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Mr. BURNxs. I think tle One problenil here, Mr. Chairman, is a problem of historical un(lerstandillg. The Vice Presilency is suich an easily
criticized office, such an anonymous otlice. tliat I think one would have
to explore mullch Ilore systematically than we have done how much
influence tile Vice P~residenits actiall have.
Obviously they do not lave a great. deal.
My main position is this is an office still of potential importane or
nt (olltinue
more precisely, that it would be well to let this amenini
for some time to see if tnder the l)ress of crisis ulnler the kinis of pressures brought on tie Presidency, whether it. is an office that can be
made serviceable to tie 1Iresident in view of tlie kinds of basic political
trends that I see developing in this country.
Mr. ScimwLrI-OERi. 1We have had 200 years to mnake something of this
ha(
,avemoments
office and we have not suceeded in doing so. We h
of much greater crisis in our history than we la ye today. I (lonut ske
why you expect-how nanN years are you going to gi 'e them ? A third
century before von are satisfied that clothing can be ilade of it ?
Mr. BURNxs. I think we should keel) in nlind that history is speeding
up, that, things are happening in our system that are hardly expected,
like. the reforms il Congress of last fall. They are happ)lenilg(. There
are tendencies of party realinemnent ; we are now trying to establish
some constraints aron(li tle President. ''lis is a time of ferment. It.
is going to b, a time of change.
To answer your question, yes, it miglt be well to give time counfry
a generation of experience with the 25th amendment. particularly
during this period of reassessment that I trust will be lying before us.
Senator B.yj. Let me ask you one question.
Do we really want to happen what y"ou are slmesting may ha ppen?.
If it doesn't does that. necessarily mean tle Vice President can play
an important role?
You mentioned you thought it was l)ossi)le. I thoucrlht the response
of Mr. Schlesinger was ased on the fact that. y"o still have hope of
development of an independent Vice Presidency.
I haven't given a whole lot of thouga-ht to the- ise of Presidential
power. but it might. be divisive. I recall stltidying the 21iti amendment
thinking what hap)ne( historically. It was not really the finest hour
of American history when we had Presidents an(d vice Presidents who
did come from different branches of the party. We did have a tug of
war troing on in the executive branch.
What. we want is a strong Execuitive in which tile Vice President is
msd )v the President. That is what concerns me about some of tile
ideas that have been' made for filling Vice Presidential vacancies. Sonm
people say let. Conores choose the Vice President. or we will have a
special election for le Vice President.
If von (lo that you increase the chance of somebodY of a different.
pllilosothy nnd a 'different party serving as a Vice President : thus a
President will not use them. Rather than lookinmr at tle role of the
Vice President to develop as an inldepenldent 1)ll)li(c voice. we shod
hone for the development of the relationship between tle President
and the Vice President. The Vice President coild be used as an
Assistant President and with confidence.
Aft. BvurN,. So much denend. on what we mean v depenlence.
Obviously what I was talking about was neither utter dependence-as
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Mr. Schlesinger has correctly said we have seen in the Vice President
all too much of that-or the kind of obstructionism that has resulted in
the kind of situations which vol mentioned earlier.
What we badly need in the Vice Presidency, in my view is a senior
statesman or stateswoiiian, no matter how o!(1. wlo'is not wholly dependent, on the President, whoe]has a national constituency of his or her
own.
One, of the reasons Cabinet menihers in(ividually and collectively
do not exercise the kind of restraint on tle President nany of us would
like then to exercise is that they are obviously representing regions,
special interests, or special kinds of expertss.
Nqhat we so consl)iculoisly lack in our governmental system is something tile British have made very good use of and that is the senior
party leader, often tle Cabinet einl)er without portfolio. That is the
best way I (oll(l l)aint my picture of the ideal Vice President, as a )erson wv'ho does have his or ler own standing in tile party. not rel)resenting a different wing or ideology, but sonliel)oly-ill the Democratic
Party for exainplle-who would represent the kind of irban liberalism
that tile party now (loes represent. hut a man who would still have a
somewhat different 1)ell)ective. a man who coullsels would be welcomed. a man who not only ('o11(1 not be fired constitutionally but a
nai wholm tle President would respect because lie would ]lave some
kind of national constit uen(y. I fe (lil have somuie stanling in his party.
Now all this in turnlelpendls on changes in the party system. which
is why I cannot look on the Vice President out of that context; I
think it would be too, bad for its to experintent with more institutional
change in the Vice Presidency whiile the party system is changing
around us which in turn might have profo nd iil)l ications for the
Vice- Presidency as well as for tle lPresi(lencv.
It. is that kind of office that I think not only is possible but, that
various political pressures and (lemands on our Government system
may well produce.
Tlis would b: a Vice President that the President would respect
because lie woullineed that kind of counsel, and lie would have a standing in the Cabinet because lie did have that kind of relative independent constituency.
Mr. Scm:s,x-;:,. This seems to le an interesting 1rol)osal if I may
comment. Th is would l)e an argument for leaving an elder statesman
as Vice President: someone like Averell Harriman for the Democrats
or John J. McCloy for the Republicans, a wise man with experience
woi does have stanldilng in the country and whm the President could
not ignore as easily as he (could
1 irnor-e others. But this idea seems at
war with the only real function of the Vice Presidency. For people of
that quality and that eminence are going to be men whlo cannot fulfill
tie needs for succession becausee no one wants a man in his seventies or
eighties as Presi(lent of the United States.
I think the need for that kind of senior experience and advice has
to l)e filled by electing Presidents who are prepared to surround themselves vith st wrong men in their Cabiinets.
I think much of tHe lrol)lem of the restraint of the President depends on tle restoration of the Cabinet , and I thinkPresident Ford,
whatever defects one may see in his l)olicies, deservess treat credit for
the high quality of the people lie has chosen to the Cabinet. transform-
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ing it. from the series of faceless clerks which it pretty much was ill the
Nixon years.
Senator BR,\'ir. Ifere again, this is a personal relationship of the
Presidency. I would assume if the President really wante(l to (do the
job right, he would want to surround himself by Cabinet officials. lie
would want a Vice President. lie would want some people on his personal staff who would say: Wait a minute, don't go out and hold a
press conference. hut who would )e continually testing and continually
developingg the kind of friendly adversarial role.
But from vhtat I have read, your book, those you have written, is
tlere. something al)out that ofli'e as well intentioned as a person may
be who goes in there, with President Ford now putting strong people
il there, tlat timely begin to exercise whlat would seem to be a very
interesting role of independence, that the Presidency begins not to
understand that important role? Are we expecting something that
hiistorically has never happened ?
Mr. SCHLYSINGER. No, it has happened. I thinkPresidents until recent vears have recognize(l that they have certain accountability to tie
executive I)ranch of the Government an( to tie political party. I agree
with Jimli hat the decay of the political parties has been olle factor in
bough Inmay
maresilencv-alt
wonder about
the aggralndizement of the
the methods he has proposed to arrest the decay of tile political p)artybut this gets back to the electoral process in general.
One of the great mysteries, I Supl)OSe. is why the American people
twice elected to tile Presidenev a mian vol flinched from face-to-face
con frontat ion with anvI)o(lv except a small group)of praetorian guards
who carefully understood his weAknesses and carefully played upon
them--preyed upon them too. I (o1 think there ma: be structural
restraints on the ov"erweening Presidency-more attention to the
party, more attention to the Ca)inet, and a more discriminating senatorial role in the confirmation of Cabinet meml)ers instead of assuming
that unless the man was a proven enllbezzler tile President should be
granted his choice.
But these are more direct means of getting at the problems than
working through the Vice 1~residencv. The Vice Presidency has never
played that role in the past. I don't see striuturally and politically how
it vouldl be likely to play it in the future.
Senator BmYi. Let me ask a question. If either of you want to
respIond om' pass the observation to the other ouinU
MA, o so. Let me
ask von to comment on tle Johnson and I [umI)hrev Vice Presidency.
Here vo are talking a)out two very strong men who appeared to have
been frustrated in tlose roles but who also appeared at least to lave
been given some responsibility. Tle Vive President's role is nowhere
near like tle President. but (lid they indeed in their roles make a contribution ? I can't think just I)ecause the Vice President is an Indian
that he may not be performing a full service for the country and for
I
the President.
The space agency responsibilities, the civil rights responsibilities,
just to name a couple. what about that ?
Mr. SCHLESINOFER. My impression is that every thing that Vice
Presidents have done is make work. The only Vice President who
has ever been given any operating responsibility was when Roosevelt
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made Wallace tile chairman of the Board of Economic Welfare, and
l)erliaps Johnson's the chairmanship of tie Commission on. Equal
Opportunity 01 tle Space Agency.
When there are foreign travels or make work jobs, it is really because
lPresidents are not only rotndered unlal)lpy )y tle constant reminder
of their own mortalit, but they like to keel) Vice Presidents happy
and foreign t ravel is ani easy way to do it.
Senator B AYH. Make-work, or maybe not. If either one of you
gentlemen were IPresi(lent, I don't t'link" you would send a Vice
President half way around the world unless you thought it was not
going to h1arni lhlml.
AI. SCiHLESINGEJ. M inlpression is that wleni a President sends a
Vice Presilelt on foreign travel, it is not to (o anything the Anibassa(lor or the Secretary of State could not (o just as effectively but for
symbolic ptirI)oSes, when it is necessary to slow the flag in some dramatic way, as when Kennedy sent Johnson to Berlin at the time of
the crisis in 1961.
But that was a matter of ptrblic symobismn rather than a matter of
the Vice President doing something within, the Government.
Mr. BuRNs. May I comment on the present. potential of Government rather than the historical record? One reason that Vice Presidents have been treated as cavalierly as Professor Sehlesinger has
been suggesting is the concept of Presidential strength, the assumption
by the American people that a President should be masterful, he
should be domineering, he should be in charge of the ship of state.
I wrote a book some years ago in which I contended that among
the other potential controls around the President that were disappearing the Vice Presidency was, too. The Vice Presidency had simply
been drawn into the orbit of the Presidency. I think that is what did
happen under recent Presidents. But here I think we should be sensitive to possibilities in the future.
One thing that has happened-there has been a reaction against
Presidential power. I think there has been some reaction against the
simple. manipulative and exploitative use of or for that, matter, the
ignoring of the Vice President.
I think we are entering an era, with the Rockefeller example, and
partly because a President like President Ford is aware of this
l)roblem, when Vice Presidents will be used increasingly as-and ifwe move away from that old ethic of potential power.
Senator B,%Yn. Let me ask you to look at the other aspects of the
Vice Presidency. I guess the most import-ant reason that exists, is to
succeed the President. Apparently, Professor Schlesinger, you do not
believe it. is beneficial to a Vice President to sit in on the Security
Council, Cabinet meetings, and thus become more familiar with the
actual working of the Government than would otherwise be the case.
Mr. SCHLESINOER. I would not say it is injurious or beneficial. If
we were to say that no one should become President unless he sat on
the N.S.C. meetings or whatever, we would never change administration. Obviously every time a new man comes to the White House
he has not had the experience. I think often Vice Presidents mislearn
things because they are half in and half out of the picture and only
see it partially. I think for example, it is known that Vice President
Johnson was out of sympathy with the decision reached at the time
of the missile crisis.
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When he became President himself, he overreacted in face of a
supposed crisis in the Dominican Republic.
Jam not sure what the Vice President learns is all that significant.
Also, they do not know how much they don't learn.
President Truman, who had been a Vice President and therefore
thought a good deal about it, wrote in his memoirs: "No Vice President is ever properly prepared to take over the Presidency because
of the nature of our Presidential or Executive Office." In the nature
of things, Truman said, and he had been both Vice President and
President.
It is very difficult for any President to take the Vice President
completely into his own confidence.
Senator BAY1I. I suppose one could say no one human being could
be fully prepared to be President. What Truman said doesn't mean
that it wasn't beneficial to him. He can at least think about it and be
exposed.
Mr. SCHLESINGER. I don't think the Vice Presidency is a better preparation for the Presidency than being an effective State Governor
or effective Member of the U.S. Congress.
Mr. BURms. We are talking about. the possibility of a special election
during a President's 4-year term which has been truncated. He is
elected to that office. If we are going to make a main point of familiarity with the job I would not exaggerate the familiarity of the Vice
President, and I vojld grant much of your point, but he does know
something about the Cabinet, he is familiar with the main figures, he
is aware of the administration's policies, he does know something
about the political situation, and he does know other situations where
they are rather restricted political and policy scopes, the Vice President is in a better position than any other officer in Government to
take over if he is a man of quality, personal quality.
That, of course, is a great question. It gets us right back into the
question of politics.
Mr. ScuLESI.NOEn. If you have a special election you have a choice
between two people and two parties. Therefore, the fact that a man
is a Vice President gives him a familiarity with only one set of personnel, one set of policies. Now any time there is a change in administration, you come in with a new collection of people, there is no
familiarity with problems, there is no guarantee of wisdom about
them. Often policies have to be changed. If one assumes, whatever the
existing policies are, they are correct policies, then no doubt there may
be an advantage to the country in having someone familiar with those
policies and committed to them. But that is not an assumption sustained by history.
I would much rather have someone in many cases who is not committed to or involved with existing policies and personnel, and that
seems to be one of the advantages of a special election.
On that score,. JimMr. Burns. You are changing the subject?
Mr. SCFILEmsi.NoR. No. I am going , on on the same subject. But I want
to say a few words in relation to the feasibility of special elections. But
you go head.
Mr. BuRNs. Just on the point you have made. T would make a major
distinction between a special election and a regular Presidential election; everything you say relates to a Presidential election where the
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country and the political leadership are confronting the possibility
of change, and we may well need a change. But I am concerned about
what happens within a 4-year term.
With a President who was elected in a regular election With a
mandate to govern for 4 years, we need the experience of those 4 years,
we have to know whether the President's program is viable-usually
you need a period of at least 3 or 4 years to tell whether it is viable.
I would be very concerned whether the freshness and change I
would want to have in a regular Presidential election would be improperly inserted into the 4-year term. While I would not want the
successor to be a slavish follower of the President, and as I have been
insisting he should be to some degree independent of the Presidential
program, I would not want within a 4-year period a violent oscillation
which would mean that, among other things, the 1 or 2 years a President might have had for his programs would simply be lost in limbo
and we would go off into another direction before we had a chance to
evaluate what he was doing.
Mr. SCHLESINGER. If I may comment on that. If it was a good
program it would be a shame; if it was a bad program it would be a
blessing. And that is a judgement that ought to be left to the people
to be made through a special election.
Senator BAYH. You place no value at all in continuity? For a period
of time? I read what you say here that perhaps some of the things
that may not be beneficial to what you have written before. However,
you may have a great opportunity to change almost on the parliamentary system basis where you can recall a President on less than
impeachment grounds and thus go to a very basic change in our
system.
Mr. SCHLESINOER. I am opposed to that. I do think we elect the
President, we don't elect the Vice President. The Vice President is a
free rider. I really disagree with Jim's belief that people are going
to determine their vote on the President as whether they like the Vice
Presidential candidate or not.
I think, if the President goes, that is the time they should have a
chance to choose a new President. But'I would confine it to exactly
that circumstance and not certainly expose the Presidency to
dissolution by branches of the Congress.
Senator BAYH. Let's go back to the special election as an alternative
to succession. At least one ;mportant consideration has to be, the importance of 'continuity. Then if that is not relevant, you don't have
to worry about it.
Let's take a situation like a close Presidential election. Shortly after
the beginning of a term the implementation of policies may be different than the predecessor's, some of which are controversial and some
of which cannot succeed or fail unless they have time to be implemented. If something happens to that President you have a special
election. Close to the beginning it could go the. other way. So you
have a reversal of policy.
Now, has the 4-year bloc of continuity been good or bad?
Mr. SCHESINGER. Continuity is not an absolute value. Continuity of
sensible policies is a good thing. Continuity of wretched policies is a
bad thing.
I think the 4-year term is a good idea. But I don't think there is
anything sacred about it. In alf of these things I suppose there is a
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conflict of principles and one has to make a judgment, it seems to me,
as between the advantages of continuity over a 4-year term on the one
hand, and the right of the people to have an elected President on the
other. On balance, I would prefer the second.
I think the President should be someone elected by the people, and
if that has to take place in special circumstances at the expense of
continuity, I don't think continuity is that valuable.
Mr. BtmRs. There is another aspect of that, Mr. Chairman, that I
don't think has been mentioned-an aspect of the special Presidential
election--Land that is the implications of a Presidential election that
is held without Senatorial and congressional elections, which I presume to be the likely procedure.
We have never had this experience. One can argue that it is a good
experience for a Presidential candidate to have to run with one third
ofthe Senate and all of the Representatives. candidates for Senate and
Representatives, in that there doubtless is some tendency, and I would
not exaggerate this either, there would be some tendency for the
President to act to some degree as leader of a team. He has to some
degree to be concerned about congressional and senatorial races. and
granted that many Presidents have tended to run alone, I don't think
they ever run as completely separately as obviously candidates would
run in a special election.
I think that raises all sorts of speculations, and it would be very
hard to predict what would happen. But if again, one is concerned
about placing the Chief Executive in political restraint to some degree,
as wellas governmental restraint, I think-one should devote some careful prophetic attention to what would be the implication for the man
who does not have to be concerned about the coattails of how people
can tie in with his coattails, about his responsibility for the rest of the
candidates and indeed to the party as a whole.
Mr. SCHLESINGER. But it can't be said that in recent years the fact
that the Presidential candidate has run, in the context. of House and
Senate elections has exercised much restraint on his behavior once he
became President.
Senator BAYH. Is that restraint, to the extent there is any restraint,
on the recognition of the President that he is a eunuch if he can't get
his legislative policies passed through the Congress?
Mr. BURNS. Is the implication of your question that the. man who
bad run in a special election and had become President. may lack a certain credibility with. Congress who were, not elected with him?
Senator BA'YI. No. You are concerned about that feature of the
special election, because you feel the President. might. be too independent from-the Congrezs because they didn't run tosvther. That
might last from the election until he took the oath of office and suddenlv started trying to fifrure out how he got. his proirram implemented.
He would then be confronted with the stark reality that he had to be
close enough to that Congress to get a majority vote in each House.
Mr. BURNs. On this score. I would ask Professor Schlesinier a anestion about the Kennedv administration. I have the impression that
one reason Preqident Kennedy did not have morp success with Contaresq was the feelintz on the part of Senators and Representatives that

he had essentially rn his own political enterprise, that even though
he said some nice things about congressional candidates on the rostrnm
and gave them recognition, that their perception of him-perhaps
f
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somewhat. unfairly-was that he was an independent candidate, that.
he was not closey related to them, that he had his own constituency,
that he had his own standing in the media, that lie had his own kind
of separate. autonomous political role.
I have often contrasted this with President Truman. There again,
the differences between the Congress and the President were quite
acute.
I have the impression thrt Congress, whatever their differences with
President Truman, had a feeling that this was a man who was part of
them and not simply because he had been in in the Senate, for
of course President Kennedy had been in the- enate, too. But my question is to what, degree would you say that. President Kennedy did
suffer, to some. if indeed I am correct abbut that perception, and
whether or not this kind of problem would not be exacerbated by
special Presidential elections without congressional and senatorial
partici nation I
Mr. CYIIFSINOER. I think our chairman could answer that question
more authoritatively than I. I am rather surprised by the premise of
the question, because I did not have the inlpression that the Kennedy
campaian of 1960 was regarded as a lone enterprise. President
Kennedy spoke very often for Senators and candidates in 1960, and
particularly 2 years later. In 1962, he went, into the campaign much
more extensively than I recommended to him at the time on the basis
of the past experience of Presidents speaking in midterm campaigns.
I would be interested in our chairman's reaction to Jim Burns'
thoughts.
Senator Romii. I suppose I was too detached trying to figure out
how to pass the bar examiination to make a reasonable assessment of
what happened.
Mr. SCIILESINOER.

Didn't Kennedy go into Indiatia?

Senator BAY1I. In 1962 I was the beneficiary of one very important
appearance of President Kennedy in a State which had not treated
him kifidly.2 years earlier.
In examining my own thought processes, I was very appreciative
of this. Of course, I really don't know why lie did this. I would
imagine that. the fact that he was conversant. with my views as contrasted to my opponent's probably had something to do with him
coming in. My views were much closer to his, and my opponent's were
almost totally opposed to his.
I am sure it could have had nothing to do with his judgment that
the Indiana political climate had changed nmuch during the 2 years
in which lie had been rather seriously abused at the ballot box. It was
the assessment of myself and others that. lie could be helpful, and lie
accepted that. A new face in the Senate would be he pfual to his
program.
I was not privy to any of his decisionmaking process. I am glad
that there were others whose judgment was used instead of my distinguished colleague. I think the wisdom of the moment would have
been to accept the Schlesinger interpretation of whether lie should
go into Indiana or not.

Mr.

SCHLESINGER.

He was right, and it was his own judgment. He

knew more about politics than I did.
Senator BAYI. We are all wrong if we think we are going to have
a perfect piece of legislation. A constitutional amendnient that can
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meet all of the contingencies that we can't foresee is very difficult.
I certainly would fault the Times' assessment of the role Congress
should play; that is not, what we intended. I would tend to come down
oil the side of making my own interpretation-you are right that
Congress did not play the kind of independent judgment role that they
should have.
We had not a purely surrogate electoral, but we had to balance that
off against, one other provision in the 25th amendment, namely, trying to get someone who could work with the President. It was an irreconcila)le difference between the person that Birch Bayh would vote
for to be, President. and someone who could work with Gerald Ford or
Richard Nixon. This is a situation where you had not as pure representation as the constituent voting individually as would otherwise be
the case now.
Mr. BURN-s. Could I add a word bn that?
Senator 1,\Yi. Yes.
Mr. BUTRNS. I think Professor Schlesinger was a little cavalier in
his treatment of the congressional process. Granted, the typical Congress will accept the Presidential nomination for the reasons you have
suggested, but I think what should be kept in mind is thatgiven again
the enormous attention that, is (levoted to this question, a President
today cannot get away with the kinds of Vice Presidential choices
that many Presidents made for their running mates, back in the 19th
century.
In short., a President makes that nomination knowing that Congross still'has that power, and it is that anticipatory aspect of the
nomination that I think is important to remember.
It is largely a Presidential, but, also to a. significant, degree, i
congressional decision for that reason.
Senator BAy11. If I might take just a brief leave here. I think probably Professor Schlesinger agrees. It is my judgment that, for a number of circumstances, Presidential nominees are making a higher level
decision, or trying to, as far as basic philosophical differences are converned. You didn't find Nixon making a choice of someone totally
differentt from him as a Vice Presidential nomination. You didn't find
McGovern doing it.
I think the public demands that the ]"residential nominee think in
terms of who would make a good President. At least that has to be
considered. It ought to be good politics.
Second, I can't help but think that a more studied determination
is being made by a President, knowing that that nominee must face
a test given by Congress, than he makes midnight on the convention.
Senator B,\yir. At the risk of missing a vote I am going to have to
go. I will come back if there are two bodies or one or none, and I will
call. If you feel you must go, maybe I can send some written interrogatories on this.
I want to thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 1:24 p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.]
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice at 10:15 a.m., in room
2228, I)irksen Senate Office Building, Senator Birch Bayh (chairman
of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators ]3ayh, Fong, and Thurmond.
Also present: J. William Heckman, Jr., chief counsel and Marilyn
Berning, assistant clerk.
Senator BAYI,. We will reconvene our hearings on the oversight of
the 25th amendment.
Our first witness this morning is our distinguished colleague from
Michigan, Senator Robert Griffin.
Senator Griffin, we appreciate .bur joining us this morning and the
thoughts that you can put into this important matter.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. GRIFFIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF MICHIGAN
Senator GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would begin by commending you for having these oversight
hearings and taking the time to focus on the operation of the 25th
amendment, which was 1)posed and adopted nearly a decade ago.
It gives me a chance, as one Senator who has been rather close to the
confirmation proceedings of two Vice Presidential nominees, serving
on the Rules Committee as I do, to give you my observations and
evaluation. Generally speaking, I would say that the amendment has
worked excee(lingly well. I think that. it, has worked even.better than
perhaps the architect himself may have expected.
These hearings give me. a chance not ohly to say that, 'but to focus
attention again on a proposal which in effect, is an expansion of the
25th amendment, although I conceive of it as being another constitutional amendment. I refer to S.H. Res. 166, which I introduced on
October 23, 1973. I introduced that proposal about 2 weeks after Vice
President Agnew resigned his office under unprecedented circumstances. It will be recalled that, a little over a year earlier, the Vice
Presidential nominee selected by the Democratic Party at its national
convention had resigned just as the 1972 campaign was getting
underway.
(125)
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As everyone knows, of course, the circumstances which led to the two
resignations were entirely different. However, the two cases,have underscored the urgent need for some reform of the traditional method
of selecting the Vice President of the United States.
Al essay that appeared in the August 7, 1972, edition of Time magazine included this paragraph:
It is all done in a 3 a.m. atmosphere by men in shirtsleeves, drinking roomservice coffee-elated, frantic politicians running on sleeplessness, Juggling lists,
putting out phonecalls, arguing in the. bathrooms, trying to make their reluctant
minds work wisely as they consider an after-thought: the party's nominee for
Vice President of the United States. It is the worst kind of deadline politics. For
a year or two, or even more, the vast American political machine has been
rumbling and ramshackling along, sifting Presidentlal possibilities. Now a running mate must be chosen, checked out, signed on, and presented to the convention with a triumphant but seldom very credible flourish. "Tom who?" "Spiro
who?"-all in a matter of hours. It is a procedure that invites error. Thus, most
vice presidential candidates are too hastily chosen by'only one man and his
advisors without any real democratic process or sufficient investigation.

That is the end of the excerpt from the "Time" essay. But how accurately it describes the process that takes place at the convention of
both of the major political parties, at least as I have observed it in
my political experience! Surely the American people deserve, and
ought to demand, a better method than that for selecting a person
who stands only a heartbeat away from the Presidency.
In the resolution that I have offered to amend the Constitution.
The effect of it would be that nominees for Vice President would not
be selected at the )arty conventions. After a Presidential election, but
prior to his inauguration, the President-Elect would name his choice
for Vice President, in much the same way as the President nominates
a Vice President under the 25th amendment. In a situation where that
office for one reason or another becomes vacant. Under the proposal,
the nomination would then be subject to confirmation by both Houses
of the new Congress which convenes in January following the election.
In other words, my proposal would make certain that each future
Vice President, not just those who fill it vacancy, would be carefully
selected with Congress as well as the President playing a significant
role in the selection mocess, and following a procedure similar to
the one already available for filling a vacancy under the 25th
amendment.
Mr. Chairman, it is my strong view that almost any of a number
of available alternatives would serve the national interest better than
the traditional method which is now used to select the Vice President.
But, after careful consideration, I conclude that I favor the approach
set forth in this resolution for a number of reasons.
Instead of nominating a Vice President because his selection at the
convention would balance the political ticket or payoff a political debt,
this proposal would emphasize and focus upon t le national need to
select, all outstanding Vice President who would be highly qualified to
step into the shoes o-1 the President of the United States, if necessary.
In contrast to the harried, haphazard way that the Vice President
is now selected as an afterthought at political conventions, this proposal would allow the President-Elect, as well as Congress ample time
for a sober reflection, through investigation and deliberate consideration in choosing the Vice President.
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Speaking through their elected representatives in the Congress, the
people would have a stronger, more effective voice in the selection of
a Vice President,. As a practical matter, the people have little or no
voice in this selection process as it now operates.
Mr. Chairman, when I first introduced this resolution, I noted that
the media reports, such as there were, generally led off by suggesting
that. said Senator Griffin proposal would take away from the people the
right to elect a Vice President.
I want to suggest that, as I think most people experienced with the
political procss would recognize, that unfortunately the people have
little or nothing to do now with the selection of the Vice President;
and it, would be my contention that, under the 25th amendment,
through their elected representatives in both houses of Congress,
the.I)eople have more of a voice than they do in the normal election
process. I say that because the typical nomination process involves the
resident-Elect, , as has already, been indicated, meeting with his
advisers in the early morning hours to designate a Vice Presidential
nominee. There has been no series of primary elections for the Vice
President as there has been for the President. The people have had
nothing to do, really, with the nomination process .
Even the delegates at the party's convention realistically have little
or nothing to do with the nomination of the Vice President. Then as it
works in the normal situation, he is approved by acclamation without
any real opportunity for examination of his qualifications. He is then
put on the ballot, and he is not voted upon separately by the voters. If
there were a separate election-I do not recommend it, of course-then
the people would be voting for or against the Vice President. The way
it is now, I wonder who can really say that people are voting for or
against the Vice President. lie is extra baggage who just rides along
with the Presidential nominees.
I cojild conceive of a situation where the choice of a Vice Presidential
candidate might be so bad that people would actually vote against the
Presidential nominee because of his running mate. But I think it is
unrealistic to say that they really vote for or against the Vice President. The are. almost always in a practical sense, voting for or against
the Presidential nominee. Senator Fo.,o. In that regard, I want to say in the 1960 convention,
after Vice President, Nixon was nominated, the Republican Party
called a group of people together. I was one of them; 16 of us sat in a
room in Chicago, and each one was asked as to the qualifications, and
who would he recommend for Vice President. Finally it came down
to two people, Henry Cabot Lodge and Truston Morton. Somehow the
opinion Cabot Lodge would be the one. and Cabot Lodge was named
by the then-nominee Nixon to be his Vice President.
Then in the convention in Florida, again, after President Nixon
was nominated for the Presidency, he called a group again together,
and I was one of them again. We were asked as to who we wanted
to be Vice President, who we thought would be a good Vice Presidential candidate. Many, many were named. Very few people brought up
the name of Spiro Agnew; but the President kept on asking of us
what we thought of him. Nobody knew.that Spiro Agnew -was in the
running. Afterwards the nominee said that he wanted Spiro Agnew
and Spiro Agnew was nominated.
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Then, after Spiro Agnew was nominated, the President asked us
to go to a party. TIlen he told us why he wanted Spiro Agnew; because
Spiro Agnew was then a Governor, and as a Governor he knew
State affairs. Ile wanted a man who was experienced in State affairs.
So, I agree with you that actually people do not have much say in
nominating their Vice President.
Senator GRIFFIN. Of. course, no one can say for sure. I think that
it is reasonable to suggest that if a period of time had elapsed, and
if there had been a confirmation process in those situations as there is
11nler tle o5th amendment when a vacancy exists. this country might
have been spared the unfortunate experience of having a Vice President resign on account of certain activities that took place before he
was selected. In the case of the President who imust survive the trials
and challeng*.es of a series of long primary elections, and where the
press has looked into every corner of his life, there is little likelihood
of that kind of a situation developing. When we put people on the
Supreme Couirt. the Cabinet. and in many other important Federal
posts. tile confirmation process affords an) opportunity to prevent that
kinl of a situation. It seems that making Vice Presidents subject to tile
confirmation process would he most appropriate. particularly in view
of our experience of having so many of our Vice Presidents actually
stepping into the lPresidency; it seems even more in modern days than
in the past.
But, because this has happened. it focuses more attention than ever,
it seems to me. upon the need for a deliberate process for selecting the
Vice President. one that is a separate process, where lie is not regarded
as just extra baggage, and( where there will be the focus of attention
on tle nomination tiet the Office really now deserves.
So, I would say that not only has the 25th amendment worked , it has
worked extremely well. It has worked so well that I strongly recommend to the committee and to the Congress that we expand the cohicept
an( ise it to fill the Office of tho Vice President in all situations.
I might just say that I recognize that this would be a small step, or
a bow perhaps. to the parliamentary system, although a very small one,
because the Congress in the selection of Vice President -in other sitlations would be playing a very. very significant role. I think that is altogether appropriate. The Vice President's only constitutional duty is
to preside over the Senate. Just as this procedure works under the 25th
amendment for better relations between the Executive and the Congress, I think that it would also serve that purpose in other situations.
I think that this is perhaps a bit outside of what the chairman had
in mind when he sclheduled the oversi,,ht hearings on the 95tlh almendment itself. It is perhaps taking a little liberty to focus attention on a
separate amendment, one that could be, I suppose. offered as an amendment to the 25th amendment, but one which I think, would make more
sense. if it were considered separately.
I thank the chairman for allowing me to make this brief presentation. If there are any questions, of course, I would be glad to try to
answer them.
Senator B4xy-r. We owe you gratitude for taking time out of your
schedule to come here and talk to us. It is not out of the purview at all.
We have been concerned over the last 10 years or more of providing

129
continuity in the executive branch, putting credibility into the executive branch. If we cannot recognize the shortcomings of the present
system for choosing Vice-Presidential nominees, we err.
The question is what to do about it. I want to study your suggestion
very carefully. I am sure the other members of the committee would
want to as well. I would hope we can move together on it because of
your position on the Rules Committee and having seen this delicate
operation of choosing someone who is one heartbeat away from the
Presidency.
Let me ask you a couple other questions. I think you are in a unique
position because of the two hearings to share your views on. First of
all. one proposal that lhas been made is to abolish the Vice Presidency
and to set uI) sort of a caretaker government while a nationwide election is held. Yol have been in the governmental process a good immher of years. both in the House anml in the Senate. You have served
in a lehadershil) role in the Senate. You have also )articipated in two
sets of hearings relative to the implementation of the 25th amendnient, choosing a mccessor Vice President. Could you give us your
jud!,rment please. Senator Griffin, as to the value or lack thereof of a
sit( inug Vice President ?
Senator GJ1IFFI.N. I think it would be a step backward to in effect
repeal that part of the 25th amendment which provides a procedure
for fillin.r a vacancy. We experienced that kind of a situation over a
number of years when there was no procedure. and we had the uncertainty when there was the problem of the tension that is created when
the Speaker of the Hos e is of a different l)olitical party, and that is
sort of the situation, and I think that there is very little'in this world
that is perfect.
I think the 25th amendment is a vast improvement over the situation that we had or we would have if we went the route that some of
the so-called reformers are now advocating. I think that. it would be
unfortunate-Nwould have been unfortunate for the country and for
the world if there had been only a caretaker government following the
assassination. for example, of President Kennedy, and the country
had to then turn to the kind of turmoil and divisiveness that an elect ion is bound to include.
I think that it was a heathily stabilizing situation that there was a
Vice President. the people recognized as being qualified because Lyn(loll ,Johnson, of course, had come out of the Senate and was wellknown, and the fact that he could step into office was a good thing. not
only for our country. but for the world.
I think that is truie also following the resignation of President
Nixon. I am sure that the 25th amnenlment and tle fact that the Congress had to confirm the nomination nust have had an important part
in the selection of Gerald Ford as the Vice President, and how fort unate we were in the country, it seems to me, that a man of his stature
and recognized ability coming out of the Congress was ready to step in.
I do not think that it would be progress to go backward and -set up
an election procedure. I think what we have frankly under the 25th
amendment is much )etter.
Senator BAY 11. May I ask you to give the benefit of your thinking
on another matter that you have had insight iiito. in the days of the
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hearings through the deliberation process, the first Vice-Presidentdesignate Iord and then Vice-President -designate Rockefeller. I think
you yourself feel that the timing of it should have been different.
First of all, the 25th amendment did anticipate the contingency of a
Con tress controlled by one party and the Presikency by another. I
nthat it is fair to say that none of us had dreand. of the circumstances which led to the dual resignation. Perhaps we should have had
a better crystal ball. We could at least look back historically and see
the )ossibility and division and political power in the executive and
the legislative. Some of us argued against it when in this instance it is
the accepted one in the disability matter where you are talking about
a live President and not to protect. ourselves and feeling that somebody had to be President, whereas if youi ar~i having a vice-Presidential
vacancy filled, at. least during that period of time somebody is
President.
We felt the urgency of the time element was not so great. We were
concerned about the normal kind of foot dragging. I recall one of the
top officials of my party suggested early on that, well, let us not rush.
Speaker Albert is a Democrat. Let. us not rush on out here and put a
Republican in. I think it is to Speaker Albert's credit that in 24 hours
he put a stop to that kind of business, and we did proceed, I thought.
on a rather high level.
Now, there were criticisms directed at the time of the Rockefeller
nomination. Could you give us your assessment of whether you felt,
the Ford nomination was handled expeditiously and whether it would
have been assisted by a time limit of shorter durationn than that was
taken? And then give us your same appraisal of the Rockefeller nomination, if you will, please.
Senator ('ir
x. Well, I suppose I could answer Iy saying that I
thought that tile Congress took a longer l)eriod of time with the
Rockefeller nomination than probably would have been justified under
normal circumstances, but let me hastily add, Mr. Chairman, that the
25th amendment could survive, and it has survived in these most tinusual and unique circumstances of having successive nominations of
Vice President and having both the President and Vice President come
out of this process. It is my humble judgment that it could almost survive anything, and not only do you have this succession of nominations and confirmations, but as you have pointed out, you have the
situation of divided government, the President of one pArty, the Congress of the other.
I think that we can only go up from here frankly. While I would
lean in the direction of supporting some kind of a reasonable limit,
probably I would support it, but I am not all that exercised about it,
to tell you the truth. I do think we have to keep in mind in regard-oh,
there. was another factor which I think needs to be mentioned. The
Rockefeller nomination came at a most inappropriate--not inappropriate, but unfortunate time,. because it was mixed in with the elections
of that particular year. and that is a fact of life. If was on the eve of
a national election, and I do not really think that we can expect the
Congress. being a political institution that it is, is not going to be
affected by tnat.
When the elect ion was over, the Congress got dov n to work, and it
was not too long until the nomination was confirmed. I think the
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pressure of public opinion, I think the attitude of the press in a situation like this, is the kind of a force that will generally take care of
the situation, so it is not going to be the end of the world as far as
I am concerned, one way or the other, whether we actually have some
sort of formal time limitations.
Senator BAYi!. I am glad to have your appraisal. I remember Senator Ervin, as only Senator Ervin could, looking into the galleries
and saying, God deliver us from even putting a time limit on the
search for truth. The others more pragmatic saw that the publicity
then would bring a reluctant Congress to fire, .but if we assume as
you apparently (1o that the process of the Ford nomination was
expeditious
Senator GRIFFIN. I think it was reasonably expeditious, yes.
Senator B~v-ii. There were so many circumstances involved. There
were many financial business interests involved in the Rockefeller
nomination. I suppose it should take a bit more time. I am glad to
have your thoughts; and you have been very thoughtful.
,Just one quick question: Do you think joint hearings between the
House and te Senate committees would expedite this?
Senator GRIFFI.N. Probably, it certainly would expedite it. There
could be situations where separate hearings might serve a useful purpose. I do not think that they necessarily did with respect to either
the Ford or the Rockefeller nominations.
In both of those situations I think it would have helped to expedite
the action of the Congress without any loss or disadvantage in the
process.
Senator BAYj. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Fong?
Senator FoNo. One question. Senator Griffin. Supposing that during the time that the Rules Committee was debating the question as
to whether the Vice President nominee was a good man to succeed
into the Vice Presidency, the President somehow had died or the
Presidency was vacant. Would you say that the nomination that had
been made would be dissolved and would be of no effect?
You see, President Ford went to the Orient. There was great doubt
as to whether he should go or not. Many people said he should not
go until his Vice Presidency was settled, and he did go, and if anything had happened to him there in the Orient, what would have
happened to the nomination of Rockefeller?
Senator GRmrN. I have to confess, Senator Fong, that I have not
reflected on that question or done any research. I do not really know

how to respond. I suppose it would be analogous to the appointments
of other officials perhaps. Suppose the President had appointed a
Chief Justice, and he had not been confirmed, and the President died.
There must be an answer to that. but I do not know what it is. I
imagine that the argument would be available that even though the
situation obviously since the nomination Would not have been con-

firmed at that point, the Congress would be in a very crucial situation there, because they can decide whether to make that man the
President if that nomination is still alive.

Senator FoNo. If the Congress went ahead and said, we consider
this nomination still alive, and then confirmed the gentleman, Mr.

132
Rockefeller, say, then would there not be a constitutional question
as to whether the Congress did tie right thing or not?
Senator GRIFFIN. I suspect that there would be.
Senator FoNG. In a case like that, I would think that tha nomination would have to be moot, that it would be dissolved. The principal
is not there.
Senator GRIIN. I would like to be enough of a scholar -to give
oui a worthwhile answer to that, but I must confess that I would
ke to do more research on that kind of a question before I would
want to answer.
Senator FoNo. Suppose he stepped forward and said I am the
President now.
Senator GRIMN. Certainly there would be an attempt to have a
lawsuit in the Supreme Court on that kind of question if it developed.
Senator Fo'O. Thank you.
Senator BAYH. Thank you, sir.

We have three very distinguished witnesses here this morning.
Our three distingu ished witnesses are certainly not strangers to this
committee: George Reed, dean of the journalism department, Marquette University, a man who has shared his thoughts with this comilittee p)reviolnIlv, as well as Qlhared his si Mlitieait talents with the
Government of the country; Prof. Paul Freund of Harvard, one of
the early day consultants and contributors to the 25th amendment, as
well as other matters that have been studied by this committee; Mr.
John Feerick, American Bar Association, a distinguished member
of the Bar of New York, who also is involved with the legislative

draftsmanship offered at, an early stage, who has consulted with this
committee on a number of constitutional questions.
So, gentlemen, I appreciate this, as you are-that you would take

time from your schedules to help lend your expertise in our oversight of the 25th.
Mr. Reedy, we have you listed first. Will you not first give us your

thoughts. and then I will ask Professor Freund and Mr. Feerick if
they would, and then we can kick it around a bit.
[The prepared statement of George E. Reedy follows:]
MEMORANDUM

,MARCH 11, 1975.
Re Twenty-fifth amendment.
To: Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments.
From: George E. Reedy, Dean, College of Journalism, Marquette University,
Milwaukee, Wis.
1. The problem In assessing the impact of any Constitutional amendment is to
determine reasonable standards by which Judgments can be made. In the case
of the 25th amendment, there is a temptation to confuse the standards by Inserting a political Judgment on- President Ford. In preparing for this session, I found
that those who are opposed to him have a tendency to conclude that the amendment has worked very badly and should be changed. Those who support him
have a tendency to conclude that the amendment has worked very well and
should remain intact. My own judgment is that both attitudes are irrelevant
and that- considerations of how well or how badly the President has performed
should be excluded from such deliberations. There Is no machinery which can
produce a perfect President or a universally acceptable President. The best we
can do is to establish machinery which will preserve our democratic institutions.
2. Upon that basis, I would like to suggest the following criteria for your
deliberations:
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(a) Did the amendment permit a swift and oiderly transition during a gove-rnmental crisis?
(b) Did the American people respond to the new President a8 a legitimate
holder of executive authority?
(c) Did the operation of the amendment disturb or threaten in any manner the
return to the electoral process of selecting a President and a Vice President In
1976?
(d) Did the operation of the amendment disrupt the normal governmental
processes beyond the degree of disruption that inevitably accompanies any
transition?
3. The answer to the first question is that the amendment obviously permitted
a swift and orderly transition. It provided a stand-in for the Presidency who had
been scrutinized by the Congress specifically for his qualifications to play that
role. He was a man who had been nominated to that position by the last President to be elected, thus giving a degree of continuity to the public expression in
the election, lie was a man who had been confirmed in that position by Congressthus giving the highest degree of public assent to his accession possible without a
general election. It seems obvious to me that these factors make the methods of
the 25th Amendment far superior to earlier concepts in which the incapacity of
both a President and the Vice President would require that the office be filled by
men who had not been designated In advance as a stand-in but who had entered
government in some other role.
4. The answer to the second question is that the American people obviously
responded to Mr. Ford as a legitimate President. The operations of the machinery
of tihe 25th Amendment had prepared them in advance for the possibility that he
might take over the position. When he did so, *there was not the slightest sign
of disaffection. When he made what many Americanis regarded as mistakes, there
was no demand that he be thrown out on the basis that he did not really belong
in the White House anyway. It would require'an extraordinary stretch of the
imagination to detect any significant feeling of illegitimacy even though he is
generally considered to be a caretaker and even though there is substantial opposition to his policies.
5. The answer to the third question is also obvious. The return to the normal
electoral process in 1976 is not jeopardized in any manner. Both political parties
are preparing for the election and candidates are plentiful. Minor party groups
are talking hopefully of a new era in which they might have a chance. The Presidential hopefuls are out beating the bushes for money, convention delegates and
organizational support. There is not the slightest indication of any change in tile
normal rhythm of American politics.
6. There cannot be a conclusive answer to the final question. But it would be
difficult to trace any of our present difficulties to the transition. It is possible to
speculate that we might be in better shape with a regularly elected President. It
would be pure speculation, however, with no supporting evidence and, oil balance,
it is unlikely that such speculation would be valid. Another President might do a
better Job but that would be due to the fact that he was following a different set
of policies and not because he had been elected. President Ford, as a caretaker,
may not be regarded with the same attitude of awe that surrounded his predecessors. But that does not mean his hand has been weakened. The normal government processes seem to be carried on with little change other than In the character of the Chief Executive.
7. When those points are considered, it does not seem to me that any serious
case can be made that there are major deficiencies in the transition sections of
the 25th Amendment and certainly it is superior to the previous arrangements.
Naturally, such a ju(lgnent would not preclude efforts to improve the machinery.
But it is difficult to devise any significant change other than providing for a genmeral election. This would be a serious step that would raise problems:
(a) What would be the position of the United States under a caretaker during
the period between the loss of one President and the election of a successor? Of
necessity, there would be a period of some weeks while the campaign was being
waged and they would be weeks of uncertainty.
(b) What kind of machinery would be devised for the selection of the candidates? Could the major and minor parties possibly )told nominating conventions
in what would necessarily be a brief period? Would the ballot be open to all comers on a "winner take all" basis, thus allowing for the possibility of a very small
minority dictating the choice of the President? Would there be a run-off in the
event that no candidate received a majority, thus subjecting the Americani people
to two nationwide campaigns In between the regular elections?
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8. On balance, I do not think that there is any need to bring on such headaches
at the present time. Our experience with the 25th Amendment has not disclosed
any major weaknesses. It is unlikely that the circumstances which trigger its
machinery will recur many times in the future. If experience does disclose an important deficiency, it can be dealt with later. For the record, I have reservations
about the Presidential incapacity provisions of the Amendment but I do not propose to argue them at this hearing. It seems to me that unless someone can demonstrate a powerful case to the contrary, it is the course of prudence to leave the
transition sections alone.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE E. REEDY, DEAN, COLLEGE OF
JOURNALISM, MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
Mr. REEDY. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and I will make it brief.
I I'hink there are one or two sections of the 25th amendment that
have worked very well. An important indication of its workability is
that I can find so little popular interest in the subject. When I was preparing for this hearing, I consulted a number of my friends and people
who have studied the matter, and the general conclusion that I came to
is that the workings of the amendment are so well accepted, and the
legitimacy of the present President is so well recognized, that it does
not occur to anyone, except to people who do not like the present President, to challenge the workings of the amendment. Now, to me, that is a
very
important
Whenever
we point.
are thinking in terms of government, and thinking in
terms of the Constitution, there is always the question of what is legitimate, and what wil' the people accept? What will they regard as being
duly constituted authority ? And there is no question whatsoever in my
mind that, however people may feel about the present President, they
do accept him as duly constituted authority. In fact, about the only
people that I have found who were really seeking a change in the
amendment were people who regarded themselves as political opponnents of President Ford, and who seemed to me to be suffering from
some concept that a different method would have produced what they
would regard as a better President.. And usually, when people do have
attitudes on this amendment, for or against, I find that they tend to
confuse standards with their own political predilictions. In other
word-, if the machinery produced a President that was not of their
particular political persui'sion. they reason that, there w'-ould be some
other process that would. That I regard as a totally irrelevant
standard.
What I would like to suggest is that there are really four standards
as to whether something like this works. First, did the amendment
permit a swift and orderly transition? It certainly did. There can
be no question about that. Second, did the American people respond
to their new President as a legitimate holder of Executive authority?
I do i,,, believe that there can be any question about that; they have
responded. There is no feeling that the country is now under an
illegitimate administration. It takes a terrible stretch of the imagination to detect any disaffection in terms of the President's legitimacy.
Third, it seems to me that the standard should be whether the operation of this amendment did disturb or threaten in any way the
normal American political process. This I cannot see. The political
process seems to me to be operating as it always has. Candidates are
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declaring all over the country-sometimes I think more candidates
than people. I do not think anyone has any questi whatsoever that
in 1976, we will have the normal operations of tl e two parties, and
we will once again produce an elected President.
Third, has the operation of the amendment disrupted the normal
governmental processes, beyond the degree of disruption that inevitably accompanies any transition? There cannot be any conclusive answer to that question. One may argue that a government may be better operated under an elected President. I frankly cannot see, in
terms of the operation of the Government, that anything has gone
wrong simply because of the transition. I think it is a pretty good
principle in government that when a thing is working well-and I
believe the first two sections have worked well-that it is a point
of prudence to leave it alone. Part of the strength of our governmental system is that we have become habituated to it. They are
accustomed to this amendment and accept it. And I also think, in a
sense, is is far preferable to the older system, which after having exhausted the President and Vice President, would start going to the
Speaker of the House, the President pro tern, theoretically down the
Cabinet officers in a list of seniority. This way, the President now in
office, to a certain extent, represents the continuity of the last election, since he was nominated by the President. He can come as close
as you can without a general election to getting the approval of the
people, through the approval of the majority vote of Congress. And
I believe, if anything, this amendment has preserved the normal political process, rather than disrupted it.
But the thing that really impels me to feel that it should not be
changed at this moment is that the only significant change that I can
see is one that would take us to some form of a general election. And
when I start contemplating the results of a midterm election, my mind
boggles. I do not know how the candidates would be selected to begin
with. Obviously, there would not be much time for the political parties
to hold nominating conventions. There would be no time for primaries.
There would be no time for campaigning. I presume that they might
provide for the selection of a candidate by the two national committees. I have a feeling that that would be very, very unsatisfactory.
I do not know how the ballot could be set up. Probably it would have
to be some kind of an open ballot, which might have 10, 15, 20 candidates on it; thus raising the very real possibility of a President elected
by an extraordinarily small vote-possibly even 20, 25 percent. I suppose you could have a runoff, that'would subject the people to the
possibility for two elections in the midterm, which would be a very exhausting thing. And I believe that part of that concept that we could
have a general election in between the regular Presidential elections
arises out of some confusion with the British system. It is not a terribly
traumatic thing for the British to have an election at any particular
time. It is difficult, of course, and it causes problems. But their political
parties are set up for that kind of an operation. They are parties who
have a type of cohesion that our parties do not. They are really running for the Parliament, rather than for the office of prime minister.
The elections can be held in 6 weeks, and again, this is because in the
British system, it is the pitty rather *than that candidate that is
running.
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Our system is not like that. Our system depends upon individual
candidates running. They will pick one party or the other, yes, as their
vehicle, and try to work up through that party. But tile American
voter, when he goes to the polls, is really not voting f6r the Democratic
Party or the Republican Party in a Presidential race. He is selecting
between the two men, and under that kind of a system, it is impossible
to have the sort of discipline and the sort of structure that would enable these quick elections called in the middle of the term.
So, overall, my feeling is that the amendment has worked extremely
well. It has produced a legitimate President. It (lid give us a swift
and orderly transition. The only think that I can think to do to
it that would be a significant change is one that I believe would .create
a considerable amount of turmoil. Therefore, I believe it is best kft.
where it is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Reedy, for your thoughts. You are

one who certainly has seen the inner workings of the Presidency, and I
appreciate it very much.

Mr.

REEDY.

Thank you, sir.

Senator BAYX!. Mr. Freund, it is good to have you back with us
again.
STATEMENT OF PAUL A. FREUND, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOL
Mr. FREUND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am a university professor at the Harvard Law School, where I
teach constitutional law. Although I was a member of the American

Bar Association Commission which supported the 25th amendment,

my mind is by no means closed on the subject of Presidential succession. My judgment, however, is that no persuasive case has been made
for repealing or altering section 2 of the amendment. In my brief
statement, I consider two possibilities; (1) whether section 2 should
be repealed, and (2) whether section 2 should be revised to provide
for a special election.
First, should it be repealed? Section 2 serves a cardinal purpose of
the amendment, namely that the Office of Vice President should not
be vacant, thereby minimizing the need to resort to a statutory line of
suc('..esion. Eighteen times in our history, there has been a vice-presideitial vacancy, aggregating more than 37 years. Seven of these have
been occasioned by death, nihe by succession to the Presidency, and two
by resignation.
If the statutory succession fixes on the Speaker, as it has since 1947,
or on the President pro tem of the Senate, as it did from 1792 to 1886,
certain serious risks are presented. There may be in fact no Speaker or
President pro tem, as was true on the deaths of both President Garfield
in 1881 and Vice President Hendricks in 1885. This situation impelled
the change in 1886 to a Cabinet line of succession. Moreover, a Speaker
or President pro tern might be of lhe opposite party from that of the
President, creating the contingency of a political turnover by accident
of fate. In addition, there isisme question whether the Speaker and
President pro tem are-offie~r- of the United States within the meaning
of article II of the Constitution, authorizing Congress to provide for
the succession from this category in case of a double vacancy.
I
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Suppose, then, that the succession statute were revised to fix on
heads of departments, as was done from 1886 to 1947. To saddle the
Secretary of State with the duties of acting President would grievously
dilute both offices. The Secretary might actually be constitutionally
ineligible for the Presidency. Appointment to a Cabinet post does not
focus on Presidential qualities, but on more specialized training and
talents.
For the sake of concreteness, suppose that there had been no 25th
amendment during President Nixon's second term. If Mr. Agnew resigned, as he did, would the Congress have been as energetic as it was
in the investigations leading to Mr. Nixon's resignation, which would
then have left the succession to a reluctant Speaker of the House, of
the opposite party? Indeed, would the prosecution of Mr. Agnew have
eventuated as it (lid if there had been a prospect of a double vacancy
without the provision for a ne"w- Vioe-President ?
To be sure, neither Mr. Ford nor Mi'. Rockefeller was elected by the
people. But given the selection process governing the nomination of
a Vice President at a national convention, can it be said that tie consultation and public scrutiny attending the selection process under the
25th amendment were inferior to those attending the vice-presidential
selection at the convention? The 25th amendment has served us well in
its first extraordinary test.
Should section 2 be revised to provide for a special election? If the
objections to the pre-25th amendment procedures are too forbidding
for repeal, would a special election procedure be. desirable? In the
event of a double vacancy under the present amendment, despite the
minimizing of that, risk-if, for example, Mr. Nixon had resigned before a successor to Mr. Agnew was confirmed-Congiress could now
rovide for a special election, under article II of the Constitution.
1iuch a provision in case of a double vacancy was, in fact, included in
the law from 1792 to 1886. There is, to be sure, some question whether a
special election for President would have to Ix, for a full 4-year term,
under article II. And the problem of an interiln successioi, l)eI.ling
the election, would remain, in all likelihood weakening the office during
the interval.
If there were only a single vacancy, a special election would require,
a constitutional amendment. If the' Vice Presidency were vacant, it,
seems unwise to bring into play the polderous mechanism of the
nominating and election pi'Ocess,'with the risk in the end that a Vice
President of the opposite l)arty might be elected. The nominating
process, particularly, wouhl )e inadequate and might well gravitate
to the hands of the'national committee of each party, hardly a more
democratic method thal the process established umder the 25th amendmeit. If the single vacancy is in the Office of President, why not, allow
the succession of the Vice President to operate as is implicit in the
latter office?
A *few words may be added on the historical side. It has been argued
that the 25th amendIment violates the spirit of the Founders, since the
Presidential electors were expres'sly forbidden to be members of Congress. But this argument overlooks the historical fact that there was
every expectation that after George Washington, the election would
frelqiiemtly he thrown into the House and Senate, for want of a ma-

jority among the electors. There were no parties at the time, and the
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electors were to meet in their respective States without opportunity
for consultation or coalitions. The argument from history is at best
an ambiguous appeal to an antique system.
I may add just a few words about the proposal this morning, made
very interestingly by Senator Griffin; namely, that the provisions for
nomination and confirmation of the Vice President be made the general rule, dispensing with the election of the Vice President. It seems
to me that there are two major objections to this proposal. I may say,
incidentally, it is in a sense flattering to the authors of the 25th amenament that the amendment ought to be extended. But the fact thit I
like string beans does not make it follow necessarily that I should be
a vegetarian.
The first, major objection is that there would be some risk of a ap
in the P:esidential Office itself, pending the selection of the Vice
President. Suppose, for example, the President were disabled, either
temporarily or permanently, early in his term, before, a Vice President was selected. The office would be weakened. There would be all of
the turmoil, discontinuity, and uncertainty that the 25th amendment
has tried to avoid.
Second, it seems to me that without a vice presidential candidate in
the election of the President, the election itself would be adversely
affected. My judgment is that the presence of a Vice Presidential candidate on the ticket, helps to show the capaciousness of a political
party. It helps to avoid tihe splintering of the major political parties.
It hel)s to moderate ideological cleavages. My guess is, if a President
ran alone without a Vice President on the. ticket, we would have
more Presidential candidates, we would have more sharply ideological
cleavages and splinter parties, and at any rate, the edect of the absence of a vice presidential candidate ought to be carefully explored
in its political ramifications before we turn seriously to the change

proposed by Senator Griffin.

In the end, in dealing with so fundamental a structure as succession

to the Presidency, the best guide is the maxim; if there is no need to
change, there is need not to change.
Senator BAYIL. Thank you, Mr. Freund.
Mr. Feerick?
[The prepared statement of John D. Feerick follows:]

STATEMENT OF JoiN D. FEERICK ON BEHALF OF' THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
CONCERNING THE 25TH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITL.ION

My name is John D. Feerick, and I am a practicing attorney in New York.
I am privileged to appear before this Subcommittee today on behalf of the
American Bar Association.
As this Subcommittee knows, the American Bar Association long has had a
deep commitment to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
In January, 1964, the Association convened a special conference of twelve
lawyers to examine the problems of presidential inability and vice-presidential.
vacancy-problems that had defied solution since the beginning of our Republic
despite efforts l)y many Congresses. Including among those lawyers were former

Attorney General of the United States llerbert Brownell, Federal Judge Walter
Craig, then President of the American Bar Association, Professor Paul A. Freund
of the Harvard Law -,hool, James C. Kirby, Jr., a former chief counsel to this
Subcommittee, former Deputy Attorney General Ross L. Malone, and Justice

Lewis F. Powell, Jr., then President-elect nominee of the American Bar Association. That group, of which I had the honor of being a member, made a series of
recommendations that paralleled those of the Chairman and ultimately were re-

flected in the Twenty-Ffth Amendment to the Constitution.
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Between the date of that conference I and February, 1967, the American Bar
Association worked closely with this Subcommittee and the House Judiciary
Committee In securing the passage of the Amendment by overwhelming votes in
both Houses of Congress and Its ratification by forty-seven state legislatures.
In 1973, the American Bar Association established a Special Committee on
Election Reform to study a number of matters, including campaign financing,
electoral college reform, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment process which recently had been implemented in connection with President Ford's selection as
Vice Prebident. The chairman of our Committee is Talbot D'Alemberte, a Florida
lawyer, and the other lawyer-members are, in addition to myself, Daniel L.
Golden of New Jersey, William D. Ruckelshaus and Stephen I. Schlossberg of
the District of Columbia, Earl Sneed of Oklahoma and William P. Trenkle, Jr.,
of Kansas.
In the early part of 1974, our Committee made an extensive review of the
proposals for changing the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. We also studied the
Amendment's implementation In 1973. In June, 1974, we rendered a report which
concluded, and I quote, "that the procedures of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
worked quite well under the extraordinary circumstances surrounding their first
implementation after the resignation of Spiro Agnew. '[he" prompt nomination
of Gerald Ford by the President and the comprehensive and thorough iliquiries
made by Congress into his fitness to occupy the Vice Presidency demonstrated
the capacity of our system to deal in an orderly manner with a situation of potentially great crisis. We believe that both the Executive and Legislative Branches
properly discharged their constitutional responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment."
The only recommendation which our Committee made with respect to the,
Amendment was that Congress should use a single, joint hearing in filling a vicepresidential vacancy instead of separate hearings by each House. In reaching
this conclusion, the Committee stated its view that the use of a joint hearing
could expedite the process while at the same time assuring a thorough Inquiry.
The Commitee further stated: "While each House ultimately would debate and
decide separately, we find no compelling reason for the continuation of the
precedent of separate investigations and hearings but, rather, are persuaded
by the advantages of a single, joint hearing. It should not be necessary to subject
a nominee for the Vice Presidency to dual hearings any more than are nominees
for the United States Supreme Court, the Cabinet, and other positions." Attached
to my statement as Appendix B is a copy of that report.
The Committee's report and recommendation were approved by the American
Bar Association at its Annual Meeting in August, 1974. The Association's action,
Mr. Chairman, makes clear its continuing commitment to the Twenty-fifth
Amendment and the procedures it prescribes for handling cases of presidential
inability and vice-presidential vacancies.
APPENDIX A

(Prior to the National Forum sponsored by the American Bar Association
a Conference was held on Presidential Inability and Succession in Washington,
I).C. The following consensus and analysis resulted from that meeting.)
CONSENSUS
The Conference on Presidential Inability and Succession was convened by the
American Bar Association at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., on January 20 and 21, 1964. The Conferees were Walter E. Craig, President, American
Bar Association; Hebert Brownell, President, Association of the Bar of 'the
City of New York, and a former Attorney General of the United States; John
D. Feerick, Attorney, New York; Paul A. Freund, Professor of Law, Harvard
University; Jonathan C. Gibson, Chairman, Standing Committee on Jurispruprudence and Law Reform, American Bar Association; Richard H. Hansen, Attorney, Lincoln, Nebraska; James C. Kirby, Jr., Associate Professor of Law,
Vanderbilt University, and a former Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments, Senate Judiciary Committee; Ross L. Malone, Past
President of the American Bar Association, and a former Deputy Attorney
General of the United States; Charles B. Nutting, Dean of the National Law
Center; Lewis F. Powell, Jr., President-Elect, American Bar Association;
I The Consensus of the Conference Is Attached as Appendix A.
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Sylvester C. Smith, Jr., Past President, American Bar Association; Martin
Taylor, Chairman, Committee o)n Federal Constitution, New York State Bar
Association anti Edward L. Wright, Chairman, House of Delegates, American
Bar Association.
The members of the Conference reviewed as a group the following statement
at the close of their discussions. Although there was general agreement on the
statement, the members of the Conference were not asked to affix their signatures; and it should not be assumed that every member necessarily subscribes
to every recommendation included in the statement.
The Conference considered the question of action to Ie taken in the event of
inability of the President to perform the duties of his office. It was the consensus
of the Conference that :
Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in line
of succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable permanent solution
of the problem.
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States should lie adopted to
resolve the problems which would arise in the event of the Inability of the President to dliscliarge the powers and duties of his office.
The amendment should provide that in event of the inability of the President
the powers and duties, but not the office, shall provide upon tihe Vice President
or person next in line of succession for the duration of the inability of the President or until expiration of his term of office.
The amendment should provide that the inability of tit, president hay Ie
established by declaration in writing of the President. Iln the event tlat the
President does riot make known his inability, it may be estallished by ac( ion of
the Vice President or person next in -line of succession with the concurrence of
a majority of the ('abinet or by action of such other body as thi, Congress ay
"
by law provide.
The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to resume the
powers and duties of his office shall lie established by his declaration in writing.
In the event that the Vice President and a majority of tte ('alnet or such other
iody as Con-,ress may by law provide shall riot concur in ti( declaration of tite
President, the continuing inability of tile President may then be determined by
the vote of two-thirds of the elected members of each Ilouse of the Congress.
The conference e also considered tit, related quest ion of President ial succession.
It was the consensus that :
The Constitution should be amended to provide that in tihe event of the death,
resignation or removal of tie President, the Vice President or the larsou next
in line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.

It is highly desirable that ti

office of Vice President lie filled at all times. An

amendment to the Constitution should ibe adopted providing that when a vacancy
occurs in the office of Vice President. the President shall nominate it im-rson who.
upon approval by a majority of the elected mnen bers of Congress meeting iln joint
session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired term.
ANALYSIS

Agreements between the President and Vice President or person next in line
of succession provide a partial solution, but not an acceptable lpermanent solution

of the problem.

These agreements, while desirable under the circumstances, (1o not have the
force of law. They are subject to the whims andpersonal reactions of whoever
may be Vice President or President. They can be disregarded at ainy time by
either parties.
An amendment to the ('onstitution of tile I'nited States should be nldopted to
resolve the lroblens which would arise in tile event of the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of his office. The amen(ment should
provide that in ti event of tit, inability of the President the pIwers and duties.
hut no.t the office. shAll devolve.iijmon the Vice President or person next in line
of succession for the duration of the inability of the President or until expiration
of his tern of office.
Scholars (lifter as to whether a ConAtitutilonal amendment is necessary. Some
believe that Congres..s nov lhas the authority to net. Others believe that Congre. s
has no power whatsoever to legislate on the suhiject of Inability and emphasize
that what actually must lie resolved is the Con-titutional question. It must We
clarified that in the case of the President's inability, only tie powers and duties

141
of the office devolve on the Vice President or person next in line of succession.
An examination of the Sixth Clause of Section I of Article 11 of tile Constitution (see inside front cover) will indicate why a Constitutional amendment is
necessary. This provision of the Constitution applies to succession II cases of
both death and inability. John Tyler was tile first Vice President to succeed to
the Presidency uln the death of the President. Ills succession established the
prect(lednt that upon tile death of the President, the successor becomes President,
rather than "Acting" President.
Since the sane Constitutional language applies in the case of tile President's
inability to act, doFs tie successor actually become President for the remainder
of the term, or do !ilerely (lie powers and duties devolve upon 1li1 1until the
President's incapacitation has terminated?
A question of this magnitude should not be resolved on a balancing of opinions.
Concerned here are the very fundamentals of our government, the office of
President anid the exercise and continuity of Executive power. These should Ioe
dealt with by a clearly stated anniednient to the ('onstitution, and nQt merely
y1' a legislative act which wollld be subject to Constitutional challenge at the
very time we could least afford it.
The amendnent should provide that the inability of the President may be
estaldished by declaration in writing of the President. III the event that the
President docs not make knowI his inability, it m1y he- established by action of
the Vice President or ljrson next In line of succession with the concurrence of a
nmjority of the Cabinet or by action of such other body as the Congress may by
law provide. The amendment should provide that the ability of the President to
resume tle powers and (ilties of his office shall le established by his declaration
in writing. In the event that the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet
or such -ther lbody as Congress miay by law provide shall not concur In the
declaration of the lPrsident, the continuing inability of the President may then
be determined by the vote of two-thirds of the elected members of each House
of the Congress.
Should the procedures for determilning the President's inability ani ternilnation of that inability he written into the Constitution? The Constitutional allendprovide for an immediate self-imnplenenting procedure which does
imiit shouldl
not delwnd upon further Congressional or Presidential action. However, a single
method should not Iw frozen into the ('onstitution and the amendment should
be flexible, giving Congress the legislative power to provide an appropriate
body for inability deternimimrions If the need arises. The procedure for determiining inability leaves the responsibility, in the absence of further action by
Congress, in the Executive Branch of the government.' This is compatible with
the separation of ipowers doctrine of the Constitution. It would enable prompt
aclion by the persons closest to the President, and presumaly most familiar with
his condition.
It would also tend to assure continuity and the least disruption of the functioning of tile Executive Branch. When a l'resid~nt's inability ceases to exist,
ie should be able to regain easily the powers and duties of his office. Thus, If
there is disagreement between the President and the Vice President and members
of tile Cabinet, two-thirds of the Members of Congress should be required to
overrule the Presideittlal declaration that lie is able to res'nme the powers and
duties.
The Constitution should be amended to provide that in the event of the
death, resignation or removal of the President, the Vice President or the person
next in line of succession shall succeed to the office for the unexpired term.
This statement merely confirms the past practice established by John Tyler
in 1841. It gives Constitutional status to the precedent that a Vice President succ(eds to the office itself when a vacancy occurs upon any contingency other
thati inability.
It is highly desirable that the office of Vice President be filled at all times.
An amendment to the Constitution should he adopted providing that when a
vacany occurs it tie office of Vice President. the President shall nominate a
jwrson who, upon approval by a majority of tie elected members of Congress
meeting iii joint session, shall then become Vice President for the unexpired
term.
The office of Vice President has become one of the most Important positions
lit the United States. It is no longer a simLle honorary position. For more than
a decade the Vice Presilent has borne sjwiflc and important responsibilities
in the Executive Branch of government. It is essential in this atomic age that
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there always be a Presidential successor fully conversant with domestic and
world affairs and prepared to step in to the higher office on short notice.
It is therefore necessary that the Vice Presidency be filled at all times. In
the proposed amendment, the President would choose the Vice President subject
to Congressional approval.
It is desirable that the President and Vice President enjoy harmonious relations and mutual confidence, and that the President be granted the generally accepted prerogative of choosing his co-worker. On the other hand, the proposed
amendment recognizes the right of the people to have a choice in the Vice President's election through their elected representatives.
It has been suggested that the Electoral College be reconvened to fill the
vacancy, but the Electoral College performs functions which are primarily ministerial. It is unlikely that a decision by the Electoral College would command the
appropriate respect and support of the people. Nor by use of the College is the
country assured a prompt filling of the Vice Presidential vacancy.
The Congress is a numerical counterpart of the Electoral College in which
each state has the same representation through its Congressional delegations as
there are electoral votes. It is deliberate, easily assnibled, and responsible to
the people.
The vital need is for action which will solve these grave problems of Presidential inability and succession. Discussions of these problems have recurred
down through tie years, especially following events in history which dramatized
the need for solutions. But even the interest aroused by the illnesses of President Eisenhower was not sufficient to bring about action. There has been a
resurgence of interest, and indeed deep concern, since the assassination of
President Kennedy, and once more responsible voices throughout America are
calling for appropriate action. There has been little disagreement as to the need.
The difficulty has been in obtaining a consensus as to how best to meet the need.
Many proposals have been made, and many of these have undoubted merit.
But surely the time has come when reasonable men must agree on one
workable method. It is not necessary, as the Washington conferees agreed, that
we find a solution free from all reasonable objection. It is unlikely that su(h a
solution will ever be found, as the problems are inherently complex and difficult.
It is the hope and strong recommendation of the Americafi Bar Association,
which we know is shared by this Subcommittee, that past differences be reconciled and that a solution be initiated by this session of the Congress. We urge
that the solution be in the form of a proposed Constitutional Amendment, although this would not preclude interim legislation pending ratification of the
amendment. We do not say that the amendment must follow the Washington
Consensus.' There are other worthy proposals which merit your thoughtful
consideration. We do think this Consensus, which is now supported by the
American Bar Association and a considerable body of the most knowledgeable
scholars in the field, contains provisions which are sound and reasonable, and
consistent with the basic framework of our government.
We respectfully commend these proposals to this Subcommittee with the
hope that they will assist you and the Congress in initiating at this session an
appropriate Constitutional Amendment.
AMERICAN BAR AsSOCIATION: REPORT TO Tilt HousE OF DELEGATS--THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON ELECTION REFORm RECOMMENDATION

The Special Committee on Election Reform recommends adoption of the
following:
BE IT RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association recommends the use
of joint hearings by both Houses of Congress with respect to the filling of a
vacancy in the Vice Presidency arising under Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that President or his designee is authorized
to present the substance of the foregoing resolution to appropriate committees
of Congress.
I Stated by Lewls P. Powell, President-Elect. American BWr Association to Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments on February 24. 1964.
* It is to be noted that the proposals In the Consensus are not expressed In the definitive
form of a Constitutional Amendment. Rather, they are Intended primarily as statements of
the substance of the principles involved.
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In creating our Committee, the Association authorized and directed us to examine the effectiveness of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in providing for a successor to the Vice Presidency. We since have done so and have concluded that
the procedures of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment worked quite well under the
extraordinary circumstances surrounding their first implementation after the
resignation of Spiro Agnew. The prompt nomination of Gerald Ford by the President and the comprehensive and thorough inquiries made by the Congress into
his fitness to occupy the Vice Presidency demonstrated the capacity of our system
to deal in an orderly manner with a situation of potentially great crisis. We
believe that both the Executive and Legislative Branches properly discharged
their constitutional responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Since the Association played an active part in the formulation of the TwentyFifth Amendment, our Committee undertook a detailed review of all aspects of
the Amendment's first application, including an examination of the hearings
before the House Judiciary committeee and the Senate Committee on Rules and
Administration. We believe that those Committees conducted their inquiries with
thoroughness and dignity. Understandably, the investigations of each drew on
common investigatory aris of government and covered much of the same ground.
Vice-President Gerald Ford gave extensive testinltony before eah and many of
tile same witnesses testified before each Committee. So, too, many of tile same
matters were looked into by each Committee. As a result of these separate inquires, a total of tifty-tive days elapsed from the date (f nomination of Gerald
Ford to the (late of his confirmationi as our Fortieth Vice-President.
Since Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment embodies a principle that It is
desirable to keep the Vice-Presidency filled at all times and that a vacancy
should be filled with reasonable dispatch, we believe a vacancy could be filled
more quickly, without in any way compromising tile thoroughness of the inquiry,
by the use of joint rather than separate hearings. A joint inquiry not only would
eliminate duplication of effort but would tend to increase the effectiveness of the
inquiry, since the resources of both Houses would be combined, coordinated and
utilized to best advantage. We believe that Joint hearings are especially appropriate for the extraordinary event of selecting a Vice-President whenever the
Incumbent succeeds to the Presidency or dies, resigns or is removed. As Senator
lubert Hunphrey stated on October 11, 1973. in recommending the use of such
joint hearings. "this would serve the national interest and place this whole matter of tie nomination of a Vice-President in the projx'r stature and context, lifting it out of normal legislative proeedures, and putting it on a higher plane of
constitutional perogative".' While each House ultimately would debate and de('ie separately. we find no compelling reason for the continuation of the precedent
of separate Investigatiois and hearings but rather are iersuaded by the advantages of a single, joint hearing. It should lint lie necessary to subject a nominee
for the Vice Presidency to dual hearings any more than are nominees for the
United States Supreme Court, the cabinet , and other iositions.
For the foregoing reasons, we recomnimend the use of joint hearings in the
future to fill a vacancy in the Vice Presidency.
Respectfully submitted,
TALoT DALEMBERTE, Chairman,
JoHN D FEERICK
DANIEL L. GOLDEN.
STEPi.HE, I. ScHiossoEfRo
WIlLIAM P. TRENKLE Jr.

STATEMENT OF JOHN D. FEERICK, ESQ., AMERICAN BAR
&SSOCIATION, NEW YORK, N.Y.
Mr. FEERICK. Thank you very milch, Mr. Chairman. My name is

.John Feerick. I am a practicing attorney from New York. I appear
today on behalf of the American ]Han Association.
With the committee's indulgence I would like to ramble a bit, and
hopefully, in the process, indicate the views of the American Bar
Association as well as my own.
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As the committee knows, in the. year 1964 the American Bar Asso-

ciation assembled a group of 12 lawyers to study the problems of
Presidential inability and Vice Presidential vacancy, and that group

came up with a series of recommendations that paralleled the recommendations of the chairman. And those recommendations ultimately
were reflected in the 25th amendment to the Constitution.
Between 1964 and 1967 the American Bar Association worked very
closely with both the Senate and House Judiciary Committees in the
development of the 25th amendment. Notwithstanding, in 1973 the
American Bar Association established a special committee on election
reform to review a number of subjects, including the implementation
of the 25th amendment.
In the year 1974 this committee made an extensive review of all of
the proposals that existed at that time with reference to the 25th
amendment. The committee's conclusion ran along the same lines essentially of the witnesses this morning, namely, that the amendment had
worked quite well in its implementation. The only recommendation
that our special committee made to the American Bar Association,
which was adopted by the American Bar Association, was that it would
be advantageous in future situations of a Vice Presidential vacancy to
use a single joint hearing of both Houses of Congress instead of separate hearings. Such a procedure does not require any change in the
25th amendment. It is something that was discussed at the time of the
Agnew resignation; indeed, the newspapers indicated that the chairman of the Senate Rules Committee expressed sentiment for such an
idea. Senator Mansfield was quoted in the newspapers as supporting
such an idea, as well as Senator Humphrey and a number of other
Members of both Houses of Congress.
It is the view of the American Bar Association, Mr. Chairman, that
a single joivt hearing can do the job expeditiously and thoroughly.
It is my view that had a single joint hearing been in effect at the time
of the Rockefeller nomination, it might have been handled perhaps
with more expedition.
On other subjects, Mr. Chairman, I would like to follow up the
prior speakers and reflect some observations that I put together with
reference to the various proposals. With reference to all of the proposals to abolish the Vice Presidency and to implement some special
type of Presidential election system, they scrap two principles that
have served this Nation very well, the principles of stability and continuity. For 190 years, whenever a President has gone down, at that
point in time, which is usually a great tragedy for the country. the
people have known that we now have a new President. His identity
was known, and there was his acceptance of his status. Under all of
the proposals to go to a special election or to abolish the Vice Presidency, we would be institutionalizing in our system for a period of
time a caretaker. In my view, foreign leaders would not be able to
effectively deal with such a caretaker and as I see it, a caretaker would
not be able to give effective leadership domestically or in the foreign
field during that perirx prior to the election of a new President and
Vice President.
I find unclear with reference to the proposals for a special Presidential election just. what the election period would be. We had great

difficulty at the time of the direct popular election proposal in devel-
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oping a formula that everybody would find satisfactory to count the
votes alone in a period of 6 or 7 weeks, and I would suggest that any
system of a special Presidential election is basically going to turn out
to be the present election system.
And if we are talking about the present election system, what. we are
talking about is a period of almost a year during which time we would
have a caretaker President.
Senator Pastore's proposal, I think as I see it, has a number of
deficiencies. First of all, the proposal says that if more than a year
remains in his term, a special Presidential election takes place. Let us
examine that. Suppose in early January in the fourth year of a President's term there should be a vacancy in the Presidency. That proposal
would trigger a special Presidential election at the very same time
that our regular election cycle has been triggered. So essentially we
would be faced with two 'Presidential elections-one to fill out the
remainder of the term, the other to choose. a President and Vice
President for 4 year-s.
Ali answer to that observation is let us use a 2-year cutoff instead
of a I-year cutoff. Let us look at that. Let us assume that the vacancy
happened early in the third year of the term and took a year to invoke, or a period of 10 month's to invoke a special election p~rocess. By
the time that that process was finished and we had selected a President
anilVice. President, to serve for 12 months, we would have another
Presidential election right away, the regular Presidential election.
All I am suggesting, Mr. Chairman, is that there are very serious
practical problems with such a system. They have to be addressed by

the I)roponents of those propo.als.
The proposal to abolish the Vice-Presidency to me presents other
problems, as Professor Freund pointed out. Neither the Secretary of
State or the Speaker might be constitutionally qualified to be President. Indeed. the present Secretary of State, if I am not incorrect,
would not. be qualified, constitutionally, that is, to serve as President
because he is not a natural born citizen of the United States.
Second, the proposal to abolish the Vice-Presidency leaves open the
whole probleln of Presidential inability. Suppose a President becomes disabled. Who is going to act as President ? The Speaker of the
House of Representatives, who may be of another party? The Secretary of State?

I think there is a serious problem there.
Senator Pastore's proposal further provides that during the period
that the appointed President serves and a special Presidential election
takes place, the Speaker of the House of Representatives acts as Vice
President but does not serve as President of the Senate.

What that says to tie is that the Speaker of the House of Representatives serves in his legislative capacity at the v-cry same time that he is
serving in his executive capacity. I think that is an undesirable blending of executive and legislative roles.

Furthermore, during the period that an appointed President is serving and a special Presidential election is taking place, under Senator
Pastore's proposal, we would really have no machinery to take care
of the case where the appointed President became disabled. If the
Speaker were the acting Vice President it is highly unlikely that an

appointed President of the other party would turn over Presidential
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power under section 3 of the 25th amendment. It also presents a prob-

lem with reference to section 4 because, as the chairman well knows,
the theory of section 4 was that a Vice President of the President's
party and the Cabinet, an executive group, essentially would have the
power to declare a President disabled.
Under Senator Pastore's proposal, where the Speaker of the House
of Representatives becomes the acting Vice President, essentially we
have vested in the Congress the power to declare a President disabled.
I think that clearly is not the design of the 25th amendment. I might
say I agree with Professor Freund's comment regarding Senator
Griffin's proposal. I think it 'also presents problems under the 20th

amendment because the 20th amendment says: If at the time'that a
President is to take office or in that period prior to inauguration day,
a number of contingencies should happen such as the death of the
President -elect, such as the failure to qualify of a President, the Vice
President-elect acts as President or becomes President, depending on
the contingency.
Under Senator Griffin's proposal, we would not have the Vice President and it would seem to me if those remote contingencies occurred,
we would have a constitutional crisis of a great magnitude in this
country:
Second, it also seems to me on January "20, after a Presidential
election, it is time for our national officers to get down to business and
the business is, as I see it, to govern this country. A President at that
point should have his administration intact and he should be effectively
beginning his programs and plans to govern this country for a 4-year
period.
If, on the other hand, we say that at that point in time he must nominate a Vice President, what we have is a period of time during which
there is no Vice President. And Professor Freund mentioned some of

the consequences there. And at the same time the President is diverted
from really moving ahead with the plans and programs of his administration.
Finally, I would like to comment with reference to suggestions that
I understand President Ford has made concerning time limits in the
25th amendment.
I personally, and I am speaking personally at this point, think that
time limits are undesirable. The Congress that proposed the amendment rejected time limits in section 2, and it seems to me that the Congress has the ability, as the voice of the people, to move ahead with
the processes as expeditiously as the qualifications of the particular
nominee and the public opinion at the time suggest that Congress
should.
I think Congress acted quite effectively in handling Gerald Ford's
nomination in 55 (lays, and I think Congress acted equally expeditiously even though over a greater period of time with Vice President
Rockefeller's nomination, which did present serious questions that had
to be investigated and I do not think the people of this country would

have had confidence in the process had that process sped too quickly
and those matters not investigated as carefully as they were.
I apologize for just rambling like this, Mr. Chairman, but I sort
of wanted to get out my thoughts at the outset.
Thank you.
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Senator BAYH. Thank you, Mr. Feerick. I think you rambled rather
quickly to the point. I thank you for your observations.
My colleague from South Carolina has another commitment. I will
yieldso that he can direct questions to our witnesses.
Senator THtURMOND. Professor Freund, as I understand the thrust
of your statement, it is that the 25th amendment has worked; and as
you expressed in your last sentence of your statement, that there is no
need to change, there is need not to change. That is your feeling on
this matter, is it?
Air. FREUND. It is, Senator Thurmond, yes.
Senator TiiURMOND. Professor Reedy, as I understand your position
on this question, the thrust of your statement is that you feel that the
25th amendment is adequate, it has functioned properly when we had
the change recently in the President and Vice President, and therefore
you recommend no change?
fr. REEDY. That is right, sir. I do not think there should be any
change, unless some overwhelming case can be made, and I c
see it.
Senator TIiURMOND. Mr. Feerick from your stateffi
I construe
that the American Bar Association had an active part in the formulation of the 25th amendment; and it is the position of the American
Bar Association, and your personal position too, that it has worked,
and that there is no need to change. Is that correct?
Mr. FEikRICK. Yes, sir.
Senator TIIURMOND. Except in a few cases like the Vice President
in order to save time?
Mr. FEERICK. Yes, sir.
Senator TIURMOND. I thank all of you gentlemen. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Senator BAY!!. Let me direct your attention, if I may, gentlemen,
to some questions that were raised before the committee by Assistant
Attorney General Leon. He was presenting the administration's position that basically followed your individual assessments that there
need not be any major structural change. But he pointed out some
questions that were left unanswered in our discussion, and in the words
of the 25th amendment. In one instarte, indeed, the legislative history
in the House would lead to one conclusion; the legislative history in the
Senate would lead to the opposite conclusion. I would like to get you
gentlemen's o inion as to what you think the appropriate position
is; what you elt you had in mind when you were discussing this.
If you have a double vacancy prior to the implementation of the 25th
amendment, it is generally understood that the Speaker of the House
would then become President under the'succession statute. Would he
then have the authority to exercise the powers of the President under
the 25th amendment? Would he have authority to appoint a Vice
President who would then be in a position to succeed him, if tragedy
should strike again?
Mr. FEEUCK. Maybe, to lead off on that, I certainly do not agree
with the administration o representative that there are a number of
questions unanswered. I just heard recently-I reread all the legislative history, and certainly the thing that stood out in my mind was
how many questions were answered. On that precise situation, I think
that the hearings before your committee, Senator, in 1964-and I cite
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specifically the testimony of James Kirby, a former general counsel of
this conmittee-made it quite clear that should the Speaker become
President in a dual vacancy situation, he would have the power to
nominate a Vice 1President.to fill out that term, in the same manner
that Gerald Ford had the power upon his accession to the Presidency.

Senator

BAY11.

Senator

BAYI.

Mr. Ready?

Mr. REEDY. I would tend to a g ree with that interpretation, because
if you look at the,,language of the Constitution itself, it does not set
clear and definite limitations as to the powers of the acting President
to act. Consequently, my belief is, in that circumstance, the man who
is acting would just act, and thereby would create whatever legal
precedents were necessary. The mere action of the -acting President
would validate the act.

Professor Freund?

Mr. FREUND. Yes, I agree with that. I think the President who suc-

ceeds by virtue of the succession act to the powers and duties, if not to
the office, must be treated as President for purposes of constitutional
duties. and powers. And one of those duties and powers is that under
the 25th amendment. Moreover, the overriding purpose of section 2
was to assure that there not be a vacancy in the Vice Presidency, and
that overriding purpose leads to the same conclusion; that the Speaker,
on becoming acting President, would have the power to fill up the
vacancy with the confirmation of the two Houses.
Mr. REEDY. 'Mr. Chairman, may I add one thing? While Professor
Freund was speaking, however, I looked at article I section 1 of the
Constitution, where it says, whatever officer is designated shall act as
President, until the disability be removed or a President be elected.
The interesting thing to me is, there is no qualification whatsoever put
on the word "act." It says, he shall "act" as President. It does not say,
he sliall act as President except. It seems to me very plain language
and I would think if there had been some idea of limitation there
would
have been a stated limitation. There are none.
Senator
BAYII. That very wording caused a great deal of concern
on the death of President Harrison, as you all know. Suddenly the
Vice President then, by some definitions acting President, assumed the
powers and duties of the office and the office itself. It took him, I think,
less than 24 hours to strike the acting. Since that time, we have had
several generations that the words in the Constitution mean that the
Vice President becomes President. If you are a President, it seems, as
one person involved, that you cannot say you are President except. in
this area. You do not, have the full powers and duties.
Mr. R.rDY. I think, Mr. Chairman, reading from the Federalist
Papers, that the spirit of the thing is that. lie would not necessarily
have the mystical status of a President who has been elected. But in
terms of what he could do, I would doubt if there is any difference.

Mr.

FEERICK.

Mr. Chairmnai, I would like to read in the record, in

view of the administration representative's statement, that the answer
you elicited during your hearings in 1964 from James Kirby-Kirby
says as follows: "If both offices became vacant, then the existing line
of succession established by Congress would give us a President; and
then he would nominate, and Congress would elect a new Vice President to join him. Ile would fill both offices * * *" and he proceeds,
"The obvious disadvantage is that. both could be nonelected officials.
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But we wrestle in an area here where there are no good solutions. The
nature of the problem is such that any solution is going to be partially
undesirable, and one must choose between conflicting considerations,
and accept the fact that any proposal is going to be subject to some
disadvantage and criticism."
I think that quote is significant, Mr. Chairman, because it certainly
was really within the contemplation of the Congress that proposed
the amendment that we could have a situation some day, in the history
of our country, where nonelected officials occupy the two highest
offices.
Senator BAYH. Putting Mr. Kirby's expertise in the proper context-lie had been chief counsel of this subcommittee, and had worked
closely with the bar association study as they formulated it. At that
particular time, I think, he was at Vanderbilt, and spoke with some
significant authority and expertise.
Another question that was raised-if a President should nominate
a Vice President under the 25th amendment, and then for certain
reasons be taken from the scene, voluntarily or involuntarily, the office of the Presidency then would be vacant,, but that that vacancy
wouthl occur before the Vice President nominated would be confirmed.
Would the nomination automatically be made before the Congress?
Could it be withdrawn after the Speaker succeeded to the Presidency?
If the-nomination was subsequently confirmed, would it be for the Vice
'President, or a man who had prior and a stronger position to be President, than the Speaker who had succeeded to the office?
Mr. FEERICK. To kick it off, the first point I would make is again,
the legislative history is clear in this fact, and I would cite your
testimony, Senator, before the House Judiciary Committee in 1965.
It was made quite clear in the record that,, if at a time when a nomination were pending, the President either died, resigned, or was removed-if there was a vacancy in the Presidential Office, and a new
Vice President had not been confirmed; at that point in time, the
Speaker, by virtue of the succession law, would become President of
the United States to fill out the existing term. It seemed to me that,
at that point in time, a vacancy,, a nomination of the Vice President
was pending, that the Speaker could either withdraw that nomination
or he could continue the nomination. If he continued the nomination,
and Congress confirmed the Vice President, then that person would
be. Vice President, and the Speaker would be President, unless the
Speaker of course chose to resign. In which case, by virtue of succession, the Vice President would become the President.
The question that I have not seen any specific comment on was
whether the fact of the Speaker's succession would render moot the
existing nomination that was pending in Congress. It seems to me
that the Speaker could be counted on to indicate wther he wanted
to continue the nomination, because he has the right to nominate a
Vice President or to withdraw the nomination. The reason I think
that he can withdraw the nomination is because the nomination and
confirmation process give both the President and the Congress the
powers that each presently has with reference to advise and consent.
And under the advise and consent process, the President could withdraw a nomination. I see no reason why the Speaker, under those cir-
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cumstances, might not indicate that he wanted a nomination to be
withdrawn.
I'think that there is an argument, certainly, to say that the nomination has become moot at that time. Because the theory of the 25th
Amendment is that the President should be able to nominate someone
of his own party, someone of compatible views and temperament. Obviously, if the Speaker succeeded to the Presidency, and he was of a
different party than his predecessor President, then I can see a rationale for saying that the nomination should be deemed moot. But
it seems to me, as a practical matter, the succeeding Speaker is going
to indicate whether he wants the nomination continued or withdrawn,
and I think he has the right to withdraw it, and obviously he has the
right to continue. And as I would see that situation, his views would
become clear under the advent of succession.
Mr. REEDY. Mr. Chairman, I would like to suggest'that in a situation such as you have outlined, where very obviously it can be argued
any one of a number of ways, that what would happen would be that
people would act sensibly at the time. And I think there would be
quite a few pressures on them to act sensibly. When you are dealing
with the Presidency, there is a certain amount of arbitrariness in
approaching the office beyond which a person cannot go; and I think
that if the political forces of the country were of such a nature that
it were a wise thing to continue the nomination, my belief is that
Congress would just decide that the nomination was still before it
which would be the prudent thing to do. If the political forces of the
country were such to dictate that a nomination should be withdrawn,
I have the feeling that the Congress would probably again be prudent,
and act accordingly.
I do not think that this is an instance where you have the type of
law that ties men's hands so completely that they cannot take a prudent course. The Presidency is such a focal point of our national life,
and there could be such tremehdous disruptions if a really unpopular
course were followed, that I think Congress would just take advantage of that flexibility.
Senator BAYT. I tend to believe that reason would prevail. I said so
at the time we were being continuously fed a line of horror stories. The
key question here, of course, is what if the reasonable heads in the
House and Senate, for reasons that seem good and sufficient to them,
might think that the nomination should continue. However, the President, for similarly well-intentioned reasons, comes to a different conclusion. Does the President have the authority, then, to withdraw the
nomination, although the Congress wants togo aheadI

Mr. REEDY. Mr. Chairman. I believe that this is a situation that
really goes somewhat beyond the so-called legal bounds of-authority. I
think that if an acting President, under those circumstances, took" an
arbitrary action that was unpopular in the country, so much turmoil
would be created that it would take a very, very reasonable man to
pursue it. There is a certain point, when you are dealing with governments, and when you are dealing with the Constitution. where the political forces are .,roing to dictate the action. We are not here dealing
with a series of city ordinances, or a series of laws governing weights
or measures or something of that nature. We are denlinr hero with the
substance of Govenment, and I simply believe that the situation would
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be created, and the possibilities of reaction from the country would be
so great, that the sensible solution, whatever it. would be, would almost,
dictate itself. I do not think that it. is possible to be arbitrary beyond
a certain point.
Mr. FREUND. I agree with what. has been said and I would think that.
that agrees with what Senator Griffin said this morning, that that
would be, analogous to the case where a President died or resigned after
making another nomination which was lodged with the Senate.
In other words, we start with the premise that there is no automatic
withdrawal of the nomination. From that point on it rests. as has been
so well said this morning here, both with the Congress and with the
Speaker as incoming President whether to continue the nomination or
withdraw it, and that. would depend on the circumstances in the countr.y at the time.
Senator BAW1r. Do you feel that the incoming Speaker has the authority to withdraw the nomination that. was made by his predecessor ?
Mr. FREUN"D. I would assume so if that is the case with other noininations. It seems to me that a President can withdraw a nomination
up until the time that, the Commission is issued.
Senator BAYm. That was my assessment, but I would like a reading
from those of you who spend more time studying the Constitution
than I.
Mr. FREUND. Certainly the Supreme Court held that. in the case of a
Federal Power CommissionerSenator BAYit. That would seem to be the situation that exists. Do
you gentlemen concur in that?
Mr. FEERICK.

Absolutely. I think all the way through the debates

on the 25th there is constant reference to the advise and consent process. It is my understanding of the advise and consent proess that the
President can withdraw a noinitat ion, and as Professor Freund stated,
in situations in the past. such as in 1963 when a P'residlent died in office
and a new President succeeded to the office. that pending nominations
remained intact and the new President had an op)portunitv to indicate
whether he wanted them continued or withdrawn. In fact, I think
there probably is some recent precedent upon President Ford's, succession last summer. I believe lie indicated with reference to a number
of pending nominations in the Congress his thoughts and desires in the
sense of continuing those nominations.
So I tend to agree with Professor Freund's observation that the
event would not render the pending nomination of the Vice President
moot. and of no further effect,. On the other hand. I also agree that the
President has the power to withdraw or obviously nominate, to
continue.
Mr. Rm.Finy. May I make a distinction there, Mr. Chairman. I have
no doubt in my own mind that lie has the authority but somet imes
there is such a thing as authority in circumstances where the authority
is moot and where the man may not actually have the power. The reaction again would be too great. I do not think that there can be, much
question that the acting President would have the authority to withdraw, but lie could be in circumstances where the withdrawal would
be a very dangerous thing to do, indeed.
Mfr. FEERICK. One final note, Mr. Chairman.
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I would just like again to refer you back to your statement to tile
llouse fIudiciarv committee in 195 where contingencies of this kind
were very carefully discussed and a great deal of. legislative history
was established. InI fact, not, to complicate the situation. but one interesting example that was given was SUl)pose the lPresident nominated
the Speaker of the House of Representatives. and while that nomination was pending the President died. Would the Speaker who is now
the Vice President designate nevertheless succeed to the Presidency
by virtue of the Succession Law of 1947. and you said quite clearly, and
I think correctly, that ite would.
Senator BAY!. I must say almost all continigencies were presented
ti is with the exception of what hal)l)ens if a Vice President anid a
President resign un(ler the circumstances that we just witnessed in this
country. For some reason or other, the collective foresight of 535
brothers and sisters and distinguishedd menlmbers of the bar who were
advising us, did not foresee that.
The one area where the Assistant Attorney General pointed out some
legislative history which lie said appeared in conference is a matter
that I remember very vivi(lyd-wv the Senate assumed the position
that it (lid. I was not aware that theiHouse took a contrary position.
The question was in a much stickier area of disability, which I think
was more difficult to deal with in that part of the 25th amendment,
which we have just gone through. In the event of the loss of tle President or Vice President. the individual involved is gone. In the event of
disability lie or ste is there living, hopefully in the process of recovcry, and that makes it a much more difficult situation to deal with.
In the discussion of how this should be done, of course we provided
for three levels of decision , (1) the President can make a determination, and could make it. voluntary, (2) the Vice President or tile.
Cabinet could make it if the President was not able to do so, and (3) we
create a third possibility of howv to deal with it in the event tbat there
is a conflict. between the President on one hand who says: "I am live
and well. Send me back in. I am President." However, the Cabinet,
and the Vice President oi the other hand are saying: "Mr. President,
with all respect, you may be alive but you are, not well. We feel that
the best interests of the country would be better served by you having
a little more rest." It does present some very difficult situations.
One of the questions we dealt with was the composition of the
Cabinet to make this decision. The question was in the event that there
is a vacancy. Does the 25th amendment limit the decisionmaking l)rocess? Assuming that the members of the Cabinet were confirmed by
the, Senate or maybe their designated replacements or their deputies,
would they serve in this decisionmaking capacity ? There is precedent
that the deputies do act. in certain other areas. The House apparently
assumed tile position that the deputy could step in and fill the Secretary's role.
I argued rather strenuously in the Senate, as I recall, that this was
not. the judgment that we should have. This is not. the interpretation
that. we should follow basically because of the experience that we had
had at the time of the Wilson disability where the Secretary of State
at that time was the only Cabinet official who exercised any leadership
at all. le (lid call some Cabinet meetings to try to keel) tile Government moving and for that he was summarily dismissed. One cannot
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conceive of the President going down the list and dismissing all those
Cabinet officials who had any question about his capacity to serve. If,
indeed, the deputies are then able to move in and make that decision,
it, is possible that we call thwart the objective decision of the Cabinet
that was anticipated under the 25th amendment.
What assessment do you gentlemen put on that question?
Mr. FE crK. Why do I not creep into it this way, Senator? First
of all, I think the doubt can be removed by Congress exercising its
Ipower under section 4 to make clear the-answer to that question. As
we know,,section 4 gives Congress the power to establish another body
and that power to establish another body can be exercised in a number
of ways, and the legislative history indicates that mne way is to make
clear that if there be a (loubt here. that the Cabinet who has the power
is the Cabinet of people confirmed by the Senate.
Having said that. I would just like to sort of give you some of the
impressions I have, Senator, and I must say this is an area in which
any responsible representative of the blar should defer to you on. After
all, you were the chief sponsor of the 25th amendment and I think in
terms of the legislative history. certainly what you said and on the
floor' of the Congress has got to be extremely important on any question of interpretation.
My iinderstandin"
of the history of this is as follows: As you
pointed
out, in the Senate
(lbates of February 196,. in your colloquy
with Senator Hart it was indicated that the members of the Cabinet
who would have this power with the Vice President would be the
confirmed members of the Cabinet, that an under" secretar' or nn appointee would not be eligible to participate in that role.
The following month in March of 1965. the lhoise Judiciary ComInittee issued its rel)ort andi its report does contain the statement that
should there be a vacancy on the Cabinet. that the In(ler Secretary
w'olld step into the shoes of the Secretary for the pu1fr)ose of exercising
6hat role. In the Senate (le)ates of ,July 1965, Senator Kennedy, Robert
Kenne(ly, and I believe at least one other Member of the Senate, reflected similar views as contained in the House Judiciary Committee
rel)ot.
So that a fail, reading of the legislative history does indicate that
there is a doubt. I think there is a doubt and there may be an apparent
conflict in the record.
It was my impression in the case of the vacancy in the Cabinet that
the Il under Secretary wouldstep l). I must say that I had the imlpression that was reflected in the House Judiciary Committee report because this was an evolving thing. As you recall, Senator, language kept
changing because of the nee(l to deal with a number of situations, so
that by .July, 1965, it certainly seemed to me and the way I understood
it, the Under Secretary would step into that situation'. But I would
like to emphasize that if there be a (ioubt here. it is not an imperfection
in the amendment. It is something that is easily dealt with if the Congress chooses to exercise its power un(ler section 4.
Mr. RF:mny. Senator. I would like to present one point of view that.
really goes to my feelings about tihe rest of the 25th amendment. I am
not (lulite as happy about the sections after section 2 as I am about the
first two.
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I think that when we aro dealing with basic structures of government, that you reach a point where it is a mistake to try to provide in
advance for all contingencies. That is really the prol)lem when something like this is being considered. and a collection of horror stories
are presented of what mi,hit happen under a set of conceivable circunstances. No one can really foresee what some of the. contingencies
are going to be. And I think not only is it a mistake sometimes to try,
provide for every contingency. but that frequently there is a positive
virtile ill not providing for the contingency.
What we are dealingg with here, again. I stress, is not just a city
ordinance. not. just a law that is going to determine how shops are
going to be inspected or what sanitary regulations are. We are dealing
with a structure that goes to the basic sources of power. all legitimate
power in our society, and I think that when we (to reach many of
these contingencies. these imaginary horrors, what will happen is that
men will act accordingly to tile conditions of the times and prudent
and pragmatic reactions will flow almost automatically from the political situation in this country.
Yes, I think it is vagme and ambiguous and I think it would be a
part of wisdom to leave it vague an1d ambiguous because otherwise
you are tying the hands of men in the future who may have to meet
a contingency under a different Set of circumstances than we had
envisioned. They may legally be liable to meet it if too much precision has been pit ill'determi
what
ving they will do.
When we are dealing with a basic sort of power and what is legitimate, I think that we can contingency ourselves into a lot more trouble
than we will ever get into by leaving it alone.
Mr. Fm:uxn. I really have nothing to add, 'Mr. Chairman. to what
has been said. I think Mr. Feerick has made admirably a balanced,
careful presentation and has pointed out a simple. routine clarification through the fortunate provision that Congress made to designate
a body that would reflect a resolution of the problem.
Senator BAY!. 1 (1o not rest quite as comfortable with that safety
Valve as you gentlemen do. The asset of flexibility is. certaintly an
aset tmider some circumstances. This is the most tr'tgic circumstance
in the country where there is a President who is mentally incapacitated but does not realize it. This is a true )r. Strangelove kind of
situation. Cabinet officials are trying to protest this and take advantage of the vehicle to do so. Yet, they are summarily (lismisse(l. The
only way Congress could a)point a body under the '25th amendment
would be to pass some kind of vehicle which would be subject to Presidential veto, I would think.
If the case was apparent enough, I suppose that at least two-thirds
of the Congress and the Senate would be reasonable to override the
veto.
You are concerned about that, 'Mr. Reedy. I can see that.
Mr. RE.m:,. I am deeply concerned. You see, 'Mr. Chairman, what
bothers me about this is that this is a valid al)proach only if there
are objective standards as to when a President has become mentally
or psychologically or neurotically or what have you, incapacitated.
And there is a very pretty little l)roblem here. When we determine
that a man has become mentally incapacitated, what we are really
saying is that he is not acting accordingly to the normal standards of
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our society. But as nearly as I can determine the normal standards
of conduct are frequently the way that the President acts, and as long
as we have the uncertaiiity, the inability to really determine by some
standard upon which all ivasonable men can agree that a man has
lost his marbles, I think that this could open up the possibility of
cabals and plots.
Suppose, for instance, that there was a cabal against the President,
an(l what he NVas doing was simply dismissing tie Cabinet officers
because they were part of the caba l. I think if you start providing for
all of these contingencies rather than meetng them as they come
that you might tie the hands of an awful lot of people.
I (o not think that there is really any sensible way of handling this
question of mental incapacity, andI think that the deeper we get into
it, the more we are going to complicate the process and the more likely
we are to open up potentialities of coups d'etat.
Mental incapacity ! What is it. in terms of a man who is at the pinnacle of power. who is the ultimate source of legitimate authority. and
in a sense, almost determines what is normal conduct ? I think it is a
very dangerous thing, Mr. Chairman.
senator
BAY1. I suppose a case could be made that an ordinary, reasonable man test would not ap)ly if anyone even seeks the Presi(lency.
Mr. REEDi. That, is )rol)ably true. I have discussed this problems
with psychiatrists in al effort to find a concept of normal standards of
behavior. The best definitionn I have ever been able to find boils down
to any form of conduct that enables a person to survive as a functioning member of society. What (to you do with the man who is at the very
top? I' really do not know.
I think we are trying to )rovide something here that cannot be
provided.
Senator B. vi. In a cabal situation. the 25th amendment does not
prohibit, the President from discharging. lie may (1o that. What it
does (1o. the way I see it. is )rohibit himi froiii being able to shop of who
the flial deterininer shall he in the Ilace of tie 1an who he has discharged. The (lduration of the cabal would 1e limIite(1 to 21 days. unless
you could get two-thirds of the Congress. the 1ouse and the Senate,
to eo along with the conspirators.
We set. a higher test really for removal 1inder disability, if it is contested, than we do for impeachment today. This is done for a very obvious reason. the very concern that you expressed.
Mr. REE DY. I do not think that there is any question about. that. Mr.
Chairman.
If this possibility is open. if it is )ossible to launch this kind of cabal,
obviously this requires a certain type of political situation in the country. These things do not just appear on the stage. They only appear
when you have turmoil of one sort or another.
But, if such a cabal could be launched. I think that all the safeguards
that you have down the road woul(l be dealt, with accordingly. Sometimes you can write things into a constitution, and they simly will not
apTNv. They simply will not prevent the horrors from happening.
One of the most democratic constitutions that has ever been written
was the one that. brought. Adolph Hitler to Power. In terms of all the
safeguards of freedom, et cetera, take a look at the Soviet Constitution; it has many more safeguards than we have. The important thing
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is the structure that is set up in a constitution. Ihere I believe that we
are in langer of setting up a structure that in time of turmoil could
lead us into court politics. Let me let it go at. that.
Senator K%1-ii. Ylrofessor Freund and Mr. Feerick, the Bar Association has adopted the positionn that a joint hearing would be better than
a separate individual hearing ulilder the provision of ti 25th
amendment.
Chairman Rodino suggested that to (1o so would sacrifice another
safeguard which now exists, where each unit is free and separate to
go their own way, an1 reach a separate conclusion.
Would you care to comment on that ?
Mr. ".:mCK. I would Merely l)oint out that we (t1 resort to a single
hearing to appoint a Supreme Court Justice ai(I the'single hearing
has worked quite well in seating ien of great ability in that high
position . We (10 depeld ott a single iheaing to till out a)inet i)oSitions, and in so Inane other critical positions of the executive del)artment leatlershiil). So. I tiink from tihe stan(l)oint of safeguard and
security, the congress s has performed its functions spend idly witi a
single hearing in the filling of other positions. I for one speaking on
behalf of the American Bar Association. believe that a single joint
hearing by the Congress would be handled very, very conscientiously
and would avoid at least the repetition and dplication tlat (toes show
up as one reads the record of the Ford and Rockefeller confirmation
hearings. I think the Congress did its job very well in those implementations. I think ili both sets of sel)arate hearings. many of the sale
witnesses testified before each Homse of congress . The same matters
were (iscusse(l again and again. While there is a check and balance
that is certainly very valuable. I (1o not think that we sacrifice
t loroughluess if the congressss chose to have a single joint hearing,
which is used ill connect ion witI all other no motions for high office.
Senator B.\yil. Of course, you recall in this particular instance, we
wanted to get a special standard, a sj)ecial res)onsibilitv to Congress
that was nonexistiing itt other noillinations. "Hut is wlh" we i)tut both
bodies in there.
Mr. FI:EI(CK. I agree wit) what \ou jlst said. We keel) that in tltere
because the hearing is basically to'flusl out the qualifications and the
background of the nominee. Each llouse separately batess and
reflects the will of its Members in teris of its ultimate action oil that
nomination. So. I (o not think that the concept of a sin,,,le joint hearing in any way cltanges the ultimate fact that each louse umst still
separately approve the particular nomi nation.
Senator Rmi.ILet fie ask. if you would gentlemen, to share your
thoughts on one last area. I sultpOse it is not techni('ally related to the
25th amendment oversiglt. bit I think it is certainly a ballpark area
for us-that is tie suggestion tmtade by Senator Griffin relative to using
the 25th anendment to pick Vice President.
All of you have suggested initially your thoughts on that. If you
would care to expand on then. would you please (1o so. If you are
satisfied with the way we now choose our Vice-Presidetttial nominee.
I would be glad to know that.
If you have any other specific suggestions as to how this choice
could be nadt, more pru(lently, short of the Griffin amendment or
beyond it, I would be glad to hiave your thoughts on that too, please.
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Mr. REEDY. I cannot precisely say that I am satisfied with the present method of selecting Vice Presidents. But, on the other hand, I do
not believe that we are really going to come to any better way of doing
it. The selection of the Vice President is really an integral part of the
political process. 1 do not look upon it as being a frantic, last minute
choice that is made at a period of time when men are incapable of making a choice. It may become so uaider some circumstances, depending
upon the personality of the man who has been nominated for the
Presidency.
But I think that to gQ to some other method of selecting him would
distur[the normal political process in this country. I think that it
would have a greater tendency to disintegrate the political parties both
of which right now are in some difficulty trying to find binding cement.
I believe that it would add confusion to have the convention adjourn
and have the decision made later. I just think in this particular
set of
circumstances we are accustomed to it. I really do not think it is working badly. I think we ought to leave it alone.
Senator BAYH1. Why Y Could you give me some thoughts. I share
your assessment there, and the value of the fuselage that may be added
to certain crack )arts of the political process-t he two-party system.
That is one of the things that concerns me a little bit about that that
would be absent or missing.
But, what is the magic of 1 day or 2 days after the choice of the
Presidential nomination? What is the magic of saying that this must
be done before everybody goes home? Is not the compromise necessary
and the strengthening necessary there? The decision could be made
then in a reasonable period of tne, after that and prior to the actual
election campai n
Mr. RE:EDv. No, Mr. Chairman. Of course, I have a theory about the
political convention which is somewhat different from that which is
generally held. I look upon a political convention as being a microcosm
of the entire political process; and the political process is not just a
question of people getting out and making persuasive speeches. In fact,
some of the finest things in a democracy are things that we really do
have a tendency to derrogate, logrolling, horse trading and that sort
of thing. I think that there is a real virtue to having that choice of the
Vice President made within the heated atmosphere of the convention
where men are really concentrating. primarily, upon tile political forces
at play. I think that once they get away from the convention, once they
get away from that microcosm, they are going to make the decision on
the basis of more sterilized procedures.
I just think that the man who has been nominated for the Presidency
should have to confront that problem of who his Vice President is
going to be when all the political leaders are there, when they can put
pressure directly upon him, when he has a method, really, of working
out what is essentially a kind of vector process. I find it similar to the
vector process in physicis where you have forces going in a number
of different direction's and you have to determine the main thrust.
For all of the disadvantages of the system, and they are many, at
least it brings us in accord with political realities at a white-hot point.
I think that is where political decisions are best made.
Senator Bky. How about you other gentlemen?
Professor Freund?
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Mr. FREUND. I will not repeat what I said in my principal testimony
about the objections, both with respect to a possible disability early in
the term before we have a Vice President under the proposal and with
respect to the election process of the Presidency and the possible effect
on the two-party system.
I do think that our experience in recent years in some cases with the
nomination of the Vice J jidntial candidate, will probably make
Presidential candidates orn sensitive to the need for fuller deliberation, consultation and enquiry. I think we ought to avoid being slaves
at the convention to television scheduling, and possibly taking extra
days, if necessary, beyond the scheduled timing. But beyond that, I
would rest simply with the hope and expectation that in view of recent experiences more care wou1d be taken by prospective Presidential
nominees in thinking through their possible Vice-Presidential choices,
and doing the investigatory work that is appropriate for the high
office.
Alr. FEERICK. I would associate myself with the comments of Professor Freund, and maybe semantically point out that Senator Griffin's proposals really are changing the 12th amendment and not the
25th amendment.
Senator BAY1. We are talking about a different part of the Constitution which, I think, he would like to see added. I would like to ask
you gentlemen, after thanking you for making the special effort to
help us here, and you have been very helpful, to give some thought, if
you will, to that matter of a better choice.
There is a logic in what you say, but there is also a sort of a selfcontradiction there on the.one hand in saying that we want to make it
in the white heat of the political process on the one hand, and yet we
want to get a more considered judgment on the other. It is inconceivable, I suppose, that someone wiho has really been involved in the chase
for the Presidency over a period of months has not given some consideration to who his Vice-Presidential nominee might be. But, given
a, convention deadlock where a dark horse nmay end up on the 27th
ballot, as a Presidential nominee, and to expect him to come forward
with a Vice-Presidential nomination who is the product of considered
judgment, is tough.
I think we can see in the past; of course, hindsight is so much better.
Well, give it some thought.
You have been very kind to let us share your expertise. I really do
appreciate that. Thank you.
We will recess pending the call of the Chair.
[Whereupon at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee recessed.]
TESTIMONY OF RUPRZSENTATIVE BELLA S. ABZUO

Mr. Chairman: Today, as we approach the end of our second century of
I)emocratic government under the Constitution, our President and ,'ice President are both appointed officials. Moreover, neither our President nor our Vice
President has ever faced the national electorate, let alone received any mandate
from it. This Ih no way to run a democracy.
The situation In which we find ourselves has come about as a result of Section
2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1967. Section 2
provides that:
"Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice Preaident, the President
shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of both Houses of Congress."
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Those who drafted Section 2 were aware that on sixteen occasions, totalling
thirty-seven years during our history, the nation has been without a Vice Preslant. Indeed, that fact was a major reason for the Inclusion of Section 2 in a
Constitutional Amendment whose primary purpose was to deal with the problem
of presidential disability. The report of the House Judiciary Committee accompnaying the proposed amendment said- in support of Section 2 that filling the
office of Vice President when it is vacant would permit the person next in line to
become familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act as
President and would perhaps increase the extent to which the President would
take his potential successor into his confidence.
Though they did so only a few years ago, those who drafted, passed and ratified
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment could never in their wildest dreams have foreseen the manner and circumstances of its use within the past two years. Vice
President Spiro Agnew, facing indictment for bribery and income tax evasion,
resigned from office In October, 1973. President Richard Nixon, himself facing
a growing likelihood of impeachment, removal from office and criminal prosecution, was permitted to designate his potential successor, Gerald Ford. When
President Nixon resigned in August, 1974, Mr. Ford succeeded him in the Presidency and gave him a "full, free and absolute pardon" only a few weeks later.
Subsequently, President Ford nominated Nelson Rockefeller as the third Vice
President In a period of under fifteen months.
These events demonstrate clearly that Section 2 does not assure anything
resembling an orderly scheme of succession in which the public can have confidence. Nor does Section 2 assure that the party having the support of a majority
of the electorate will hold the Presidency, for it is highly unlikely that, given
the denouement of Messrs. Nixon and Agnew, the voters would have elected any
Republican presidential candidate in the Summer of 1974.
Under the succession system as it existed prior to the ratification of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the Succession Act of 1947 (3 U.S.C. section 19)
placed the Speaker of the House, the President pro tempore had been elected by
the lPople of only a single congressional district or a single state and might in
addition be of a party different from that of the President and Vice President,
and that the Cabinet officers had not been elected to their positions by anyone.
The criticisms addressed to the pre-1967 succession scheme have merit, but so
do the criticisms addressed to Section 2. I proposed in 1973, and now propose
once more, that we reinstitute a succession system which dates back to the birth
of the Republic. Upon the repeal of Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
which would itself require a constitutional amendment, my proposal could be
instituted by statute. The proposal would provide that in a case in which the
elected President and Vice President leave office, whether by death, removal or
resignation, a new President and Vice President would be elected in the normal
quadrennial manner. This method is not only permitted by the Constitution, but
was undeniably envisaged by the Framers.
Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution provides that the President
find Vice President "shall hold . . . office during the Term of four Years," and
Clause 6 provides that
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
same shall be devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law, provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the Presi(lent and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and
such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected."
In its initial form, the provision which ultimately became clause 6 provided
that the Congress
"may declare by law what officer of the U.S. shall act as President in case of
the Death, Resignation, or Disability of the President and Vice President; and
such Officer shall act accordingly until the time of electing a President shall
arise. J. Madison, Notes of Debat Iefrom the Federal Convention of 1787, 594."
However, Madison "observed that this, as worded, would prevent a supply of
the vacancy by an intermediate election of the President, and moved to substitute-'until such disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.' "
Id. Madison's motion was agreed to, and remains in the Constitution to this day.
Early in 1792, the Second Congress passed the first Succession Act. 1 Stat. 239.
Section 9 provided that in case of the removal, etc. of both the President and
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the Vice President, the President pro tcrnporeof the Senate (or, if there were no
such official, tho Speaker of the house) "for the time being shall act as President
of the United States until the disability be removed or a Presilent elected." 1
Stat. 240, Section 9. Section 10 provided
"[t ]hat whenever tile offices of President and Vice President shall both become
vacant, the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause a notification thereof to he
made to the executive of every state, and shall also cause the same to be published in at least one of the newspapers printed in each state. specifying that
electors of the President of the United States shall be appointed or chosen in the
several states within thirty-four days preceding the first Wednesday in Deceniler then next ensuing: Provided. There shall be the spmce of two months between
the date of such notification and the first Wednewlay in )ecenber, but if there
shall not be the space of two months between the (late of such notiflcation and
the first W(ednesday in December: and if the term for which the President and
Vice President last in office were elected shall tiot expire on the third (lay of
March next ensuing, then tile Secretary of State shall slecify in tile notification
that the electors shall be appointed or chosen within thirty-four days preceding
the first Wednesday In December ii tile year next ensuing, within which time
the electors shall accordingly be appointed or chosen, and the electors shill
meet and give their votes on the said first Wednesday in December. and the
proceedings and duties of the said electors and others shall be pursuant to the
directio s prescribed In this act. 1 Stat. 241. Section 10."
The 179'2 provision was repealed in 1W86, 24 Stat. 2, c. 4. Section 3, and there
has never been an Instance prior to 1974 in which both the President and the
Vice President failed to serve out their terms of office. Partly because of doubt
as to whether the Speaker and the President pro tempore were "officers" within
the meaning of clause 6. the 1886 act removed them from the line of succession
and substituted the cabinet officers. 24 Stat. 1. c. 4. Section 1. The act also provided that a cabinet officer could not succeed to the presidency unless (1) he had
been confirmed in his cabinet office by the Senate. (2) he was otherwise eligible
for the presidency, and (3) he was "not under Impeachment by the House of
Representatives of the United States at the time." 24 Stat. 2. c. 4, Section 2.
The Presidential Succession Act of 1947 reinstated the Speaker and the Presi(lent pro ternpore after the Vice IPresident in the line of succession, on the theory
that preference should be given to having an elected official as President. 61
Stat. 380. c. 264; 11. Rep. 817. 80th Cong., 1st Session (1947). Both the committee which reported tile legislation and the Acting Attorney General were of
the opinion that it was constitutional to have the Speaker and the President pro
tempore in the.line of succession. 1I. Rep. 817, 0th ('ong. (1947). The 1947 act
continued in force the prohibitions on succession contained in the 1886 act, Including the disqualification of anyone under impeachment. 61 Stat. 380, c. 264.
Section 1 e). Except for amendment to reflect changes in the composition of the
Cabinet, the 1947 act continues in force, and has been codified as section 19 of
title 3 of the United States Code.
-

To summarize, the Framers contemplate(]. and the Constituti6n permits Con-

gress to provide for an Immediate election of a new President..0ould tile elected
President and Vice President leave office before the conclusion of their terms.
Under the Presidential Succe.slon Act of 1947, the Speaker of the House would
serve as President until the new election was held.
Under my proposal, which was 11.R. 11230 in the 93rd Congress and which I
shall shortly Introduce In the 94th Congres,, upon the death, removal from
office or resignation of both the elected President and Vice President. the person next in line under the Succession Act of 1947 would serve as President only
until the election of a new President to fill out tile then-current term. If less
than sixteen months remained before the next regularly scheduled appointment of electors, tie individual designated under the Suicession Act would remain In office for the remainder of the term and no special election would be
held. If more than sixteen months remained before the next regularly scheduled appointment of electors, a special election would be held on the next annual
Election Day (the first Tuesday after the first Monday In November), and the
new President and Vice President would take office on the following January
20th.
The Constitution and the records of the Convention of 1787 do not make clear
whether a President and Vice President elected at a special election could be
made to serve less than a full four year term. Since the answer to this question
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is at best uncertain I would propose that the constitutional amendment which
repeals Section 2 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment also provide that the President and Vice President elected at a special election would serve only until the
conclusion of the then-current four year term.
It is inexcusable that in a democracy such as ours, the tumult and agony
which has surrounded the Presidency iii the last two years has been permitted to
occur without returning the choice of the Chief Executive to the people. Numerous nations similar to the United States and every bit as stable have systems
which would have afforded the people the opportunity to select successors to
Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew. Indeed, the Franwrs of our Constitution believed the document provided as much for us.
A great American folk ballad tells of the old man who wouldn't fix his leaky
roof when it was raining because he didn't want to get wet and wouldn't fix
it when the sun was shining because it wasn't leaking. Now-when we find ourselves and the Presidency in a relative period of stinshine-is the time to fix
our roof.
The events surrounding the resignation of Richard Nixon and the accession of
Gerald Ford, in addition to pointing out the weaknesses of Section 2 of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, have also shown a potential for the abuse of the
President's liardon power which must be corrected. Since the pardon power
is set forth in the Constitution, a constitutional amendment will be required to
make the correction.
Prior to 1678, there was no limit on the pardoning power of the King of England.
In that. year, the Earl of l)anby, chief minister of Charles 11, was impeached by
the House of Commons. Before the House of Lords could proceed to a trial and
Judgment of 1)anby, the King gave Danby a pardon. A few years later, Charles
himself was forced from office and legw%.,'on was passed barring any royal
pardon in an impeachment case prior to conviction. The Framers of our Constitution, conscious of the Danby case, provided that the presidential pardoning
lower should not include "Cases of '.nleachnient."
The pardon of Richard Nixon by herald Ford is analogous to the Danby case,
in that it too points out a deflclercy in the limitations which the Constitution
places upon the pardon power. Even assuming that the Nixon pardon was an
entirely voluntary and uisolicited. act oil the part of President Ford, we should
not have in our ('onstitution the temptation which the pardon power as now
constituted might offer to one in line for succession to the Presidency.
Accordingly, I shall shortly introdpmce a proposed constitutional amendment as
follows:
"The President shall lack power to grant any reprieve or pardon to any person
who has held the office of President or Vice, President for an offense against the
United States committed in whole or in part while such person held such
office."
This amendment would close the loophole through which Richard Nixon was
able to slip, and will assure that should we ever have another experience like
Watergate, the biggest enchilada will not be able to escape liability for his
crimes.
TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS-SENATE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY BY ENDICOT PEABODY, MARCH 20, 1975

In holding these hearings to review the experience of the 25th Amendment, this
Subcommittee is living ip to its well deserved reputation for protecting the Constitutional safety of the Republic and I appreciate this opportunity to testify.
Iln all that has happened in the last two years, it cannot be over-emphasized
that were it not for Section 2 of the 25th Amendment, this Nation would, have
had a vacancy in both the Presidency and the Vice Presidency at the same time.
Thanks to the foresight and diligence of this Committee this situation was
averted, and when President Nixon resigned we had It Vice President ready and
prepared to take up the responsibilities of the Presidency immediately. Thus
a serious constitutional crisis was averted.
Because Section 2 (d operate, we are now able to evaluate it and we have
an opportunity to devise ways to make it operate better. In the light of'our
experience-particularly in the last 40 years during which four 4f our six Presidents have been former Vice Presidents-We can also appraise the role as well
as the sue, session of the Vice Prceidcnoy.

.4
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Since January 1972, when I entered the New Hampshire Vice-Prestdential primary, I have been campaigning to revise the role and the selection of the Vice
President. Before the 1912 National Convention, I took this campaign to 44 States
to illustrate by being a candidate, the need to give more attention to the selection
of the Vice President. Practice and tradition have always left that decision to the
last-minute, haphazlrd attention of an exhausted Presidential nominee-hardly
an appropriate time to consider such an Important question. But this is the way
It always happens even though the Convetion Rules and nominating procedures
nowhere suggest that hc should assume that responsibility.
Since the Convention I have attempted to have the rules of our National Convention amended to require that the identity of all candidates for the VicePresidency will be known in advance of the Convention-so that some consensus
may develop among the delegates and in the nation, as to the merits and demerits of those who seek the nation's second highest office.
At this very moment I have an amendment to the Preliminary Call of the National Convention that is being considered by the Democratic National Committee
meeting at the Sheraton Park Hotel here in Washington.
What has struck me as deficient in the normal nominating procedure, I find
even more so in filling Vice-Presidential vacancies under the 25th Amendment.
The people are almost completely closed out In determining the identity of the
official who may have life or death control over them, indeed over the world in
future years.
As Professor Arthur Schlesinger has ably testified before this Committee, the
theory that the Congress was to act in lieu of the electorate has not worked out.
Instead of applying the standards of the voter in a polling booth, the Congress
has acted as though this vacancy was just another appointive position in the
Executive Branch to be filled at the whim of the President.
Senator Pastore has urged a special election for the Presidency after an appointive Vice President under the 25th Amendment becomes President. I question why the nation should wait until that situation develops-a situation that
would really create a constitutional crisis. When President Roosevelt died and
when President Kennedy was assassinated the nation needed a replacement with
the full powers and prestige of an on-going President.
I propose a national election for the Vice Presidency to take place within 60
days after a vacancy in the Vice Presidency occus-tunless there is less than
6 months remaining in the term. At lislTl'b,,atlonal Committee of the Democratic Party-now more representative by being over three times its former sizehas the capability and authority to nominate the candidate within 30 days and
the election could take place within another 30 days.
If such a nomination and election took place, it might happen that the Vice
President would be of a different party than that of the President. This raises
the one objection-which to many seems overwhelming-that thi; hreaks up the
"team" concept of the President and Vice President. But this team is needed
only during the election campaign. After that the traditional "well-balanced
team" has no function, no effect, no value in actually governing the nation. It
just doesn't work. Rarely hjas a President, no matter how close he may have
been to the Vice President formerly, delegated any important duties to the Vice
President. Power is jealous of power. More often the Vice Preqident is relegated
by the White House and the White House Staff to the dim extremities of the
Executive Office Building, to be trotted out to perform political chores but little
more.
Wouldn't we be far better off to have someone ready to take over the Presidency who truly represents the present feelings of the people? Wouldn't we be
far better off now to have a President in the White House of the same party
as the Congressional majority?
It is a myth that the Vice President is a Junior Executive. Constitutionally,
he is no more so than the Speaker of the House. His only constitutionally prescribed duties are legislative, limited to presiding over the senate and voting in
the event of a tie.
This situation has caused Vice Presidents from Adams to Agnew, and now
Rockefeller. to fret about their duties and to end' up more frustrated than
productive.
Accordingly, I would liberate the Vice President, first under Section 2 of the
25th Amendment and then under the constitution generally. I subscribe to your
amendment abolishing the Electoral College and providing for a popularly elected
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President. I also recommend a popularly elected Vice President. At the same
time-since he does not share one iota of executive power of the Presidency (and
I agree he should not)-his duties under the Constitution should be enlarged so
that he has a full vote on every issue just as the Speaker of the House does.
Thus he would provide the only vote In either Congress speaking for the entire
electorate. In this manner, he would gain valuable knowledge concerning national
issues--a resource of great importance to him and the nation were he to become
President.
There is no reason that the electorate should be deprived of their right to
elect a Vice President of any party of their choice, when such a vacancy occurs.
The people should not be bound by a decision which they might have made in the
past, which events have made inoperative subsequently.
MONTANA CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,

Helena, Mont.

U.S. SHOULD ADOPT A ONE HOUSE PARLIAMENT

1. 25th Amendment: If we keep the present form of government, the welldrafted 25th Amendment should be retained. Requiring popular confirmation of
presidential and vice-presidential nominees Ignores the 1972 election returns.
THE SILENT MAJORITY
Nixon, 45,600,000; McGovern, 28,400,000; and not voting, 65,600,000.
In 1974 the turn-out was even worse--38%.
Is the ever lower turn-out the fault of the voters? Of the candidates? Or of the
system?
2. The PARLIAMENT of the UNITED STATES: The Congress should propose to the several states a UNICAMERAL PARLIAMENT.
Attached are copies of my speeches to the 1972 Montana Constitutional Convention on (a) the Parliament and (b) abolishing the Veto Power.
Also attached is (c) a brochure prepared for a Seminar on Non-Violent Revolution on the same subject.
If the Committee has no objection, I would be honored if these were placed

in the record.

Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT LEE KELLEHER.

Enclosures.
EXTRACT FROM REcoRDs OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF MONTANA-1972---ON
THE PARLIAMENT

Delegate KELLEHER. Mr' Chairman. I move to substitute for section one, just
given by Mrs. Reichert, sections one, two, three, four and five of the proposal that
I distributed last week and I believe the clerk has a copy. I wonder if the clerk
would be so kind as to read those five sections.
Chairman GRAYBiLL. Yes, the clerk will read this and this is Mr. Kelleher's
parliamentary system, if you can find it on your desks so you can follow. The
clerk will read sections one through five of the substitute motion. Just th
italicized part, Mr. Clerk.
Clerk SMITH. (Reading) Section One: The legislative power of the state is
vested in the Assembly, consisting of one chamber whose members are designated senators. The people reserve to themselves the power of initiative and
referendum.
Section Two: Executive. The leader of the party which has the greatest number of seats in the assembly shall be declared governor. The assistant leader of
that party shall be declared lieutenant governor.
Section Three: Selection of Leaders. The leaders and assistant leader of any
political party shall be chosen by a direct primary election or by convention
or as otherwise provided by law.
Section Four: Cabinet. The governor shall assume the executive authority
and shall provide for the proper administration of the laws of the state. He
shall appoint a cabinet who shall assist him.
Section Five: Dissolution.
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Subsection A: At any time during an assembly session, the governor may call
for the dissolution of the Assembly. Upon a majority vote pursuant to this call,
the legislature shall be dissolved and new elections shall be held according to
law.
Subsection B : At any time during an Assembly session, a ina,)rity of the
members of the Assembly may call for its di.,solution. Ulmn a two-thirds vote
pursuant to this call, the Assembly shall be dissolved and new elections shall
be called according to law.
Chairman GRAYBILL. Mr. Kelleher.
Delegate Kelleher. Mr. Chairman, I move that when this committee does arise
and report after having had under consideration the setions just read by ihe
clerk, that they recommend the same do pass. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman GRAYBILL. Mr. Kelleher.
Delegate KELLEIIFR. On the first section, my fellow delegates, you will note in
the first Minority Report that I used the word Parlia'nient. I've now substituted
the word, Assembly. One of the principle reasons for that was that I had made
so many changes in the original parliamentary system to wit, very frequent
elections. Under the British and Canadian system, they originally had electi-ns
every seven years; now they have then every five years. Under my propiw- fl.
we would have elections every two years. This is nothing novel with me. You'll
note that on page fourteen of the Majority Report, I merely absorbed their
Section three. Senators shall be elected for a term of four years. One-half of
the senators shall he elected every two years. In this way, every two ytars, if
half of the Assembly w'oul( be up for reelection, and if the people of the statte
do not like the way the ship of--did not like the way the direction the ship of
state was moving-they could change it.
The checks and balances, those hellish words from our friend, Mr. Montesquieu, in his Spirit of the Laws of 1749, are now between-instead of being
between the governor and the legislature-they're between the legislature and
the people. Every twvo years, by voting, the people could change their government. If the people like the vay the ship of state is moving, all they do is
reelect the encumbent senators that ar(t up for reelection every two years. If
they (lon't like the way the ship of state is moving, they defeat them and put
the opposition party into office. At that time, the opposition party would assume
the position of the chief executive and the people by their action would change
the chief executive.
This is highly democratic, very responsive democracy. For instance, we recently have laid-have seen here In the ('apitol-disputes between the State' Roard
of Health and the governor on the matter of pollution controls. The State Board
of Health enacted pollutionn controls which were much higher, as you klow, than
those enacted by the Federal Government. The governor disagreed with the State
Board of Health.
Now, as a Delegate. I'm not going to take an official position on this (isil)ute.
All I'm concerned about is the machinery of government, which, of course, is
what we're concerned about in writing this constitution.
If this had )een a parliamentary body or a body as I proposed where the executive is the leader of the majority in this chamber. the governor could Iw
called into this chamber during a question and answer period-he'd have two
or three days notice in writin.z of the questions that would he put to him-together
with his ministers or cabinet heads or department heads. whatever you wish to
call them, that were in any way connected with the matter of pollution controls.
Every member of this chamber-iwe are now, If you will, imagine yourself as
members of the legislature rather than of the CON CON--every member in this
chamber could ask each one of those ministers or department heads and the governor, any questions that they wished. Now, if the governor satisfied all of your
questions and objections. then you would Just let the matter stands it was.
If however, a minister or the governor did not come up with the right
answers-let's take the case of the minister or department head (the minister Is
the department head, you know) if you (1id not like the answers of the department
head-a. majority of you-you could vote to censure him and down he would
come and he would come back into this chamber whence lie caine to head a Job as
a department head. and you would put him back in his seat and then the governor
would have to get himself a new department head.
Then, you would go on to the governor and if the governor (lid not come up with
the right answers. ladles and gentlemen. you could ask for a vote of confidence.
If you wanted to bring him down, you could get yourself a new governor.
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Now, I submit that this is real democracy. This is very responsive democracy.
Tills is, if you will, instant democracy.

Now, before-let's go one step further-before you bring the governor down,

you realize, of course, that lie is the head of your party and you realize that whell
you go back to the people, that the governor does not go alone. That's the name of
this little game ; you go back with him.
So, it etter be something that's very, very serious, something of the utmost
hiniprtance, before you would go that far.
I merely give this as an example to let you know tie power that. would be in

tills body and that is all that we are talking about at this convention is the power
of the lwople.

Yni remember when Larry Margolis was here, tile Executive Secretary of the

citizens ' Conference on State IAgislatures-he said that this body is not represt-itahive of tile leolie lilt that this toody IS the li'ople. Now, think about that for
a inoment. If you accede to that thesis that this body is the people of Montana,
tlit'ii I submit that before you put any control on this body, that you [letter have a
pretty good reason for doing so.
Vhen tamsey 3clonald took office in 1023, he was defining the pI'ogran of his
new inilistry--of his new government-anl lie discussed this matter of lio'on what type 4f nmatter you would vote oil a vote of no confidence.
"I have at lively recollection of all sorts of ingenuities practiced by oplpositions
int order to bring at snap division upon the goverllneit so that it might tie turned
out on i defeat. I have known bathroonis do%%ista irs utilized iot for legitimate
ilrposes-whatever those are-but for the illegitimate piirpose of packing as
niiany niinlivers surreptitiously inside their doors as their physical limitations
would allow. I have kninvii ail adjoining building where there lalpens to be a
purposes. I have seen this house
'onvenitent division bell used for siilar
priactic'ally empty when the bells began to ring ald then turned into a riotous
sort of mnarketlplace by the inrush of nebiters for the purpose of finding the governielit slapping and turning it out upon a stupid issue. I ain not going out 11po
such isslle-ally such issue."
Sol have no, fear that we're going to lie having elections every year. A person
be in any parwho's a inejibMr of this legislature ulder inyl proposal, wopildlit
ticular hurry lesss it wag a latter of great iniport to hillself return to the
voters.
lie Mcl)onlld] said later: "Nowadays, a iieliber of the majority party in tile
house will hesitate long before voting against his larty leaders, lie has 110 desire
to Irnt out his own party and so bring ill the olposition. perhaps thereby losing
his seat andil(he salary attaching thereto. Nor does lit w ish to incur tile expense
and undergo the labor of ai election. Also alt stake are the interests of the twentytwo niemlibrs o~f he .aliila't wilh thirty or iore otlhr party officials dependeit
existence oif tilie ca linet. They have strong
fill statlis alnid salary on the conll i id
motives to exert all the influence they can to stave off dissolution.'
I quote th l-oe sentelces only to show you that dissolution is not something that
c nits onl very suddenly. And lest anybody fear that we would be chlanging go'erillients rather rapidly. I ask you to look to 11r Canadian cousis to the north
iii Allierta. I *iusl found out 1st week that one of tile reasons why the Labor
Party-I incan tile ('onservatlye Party-which just wvon tile elections last fall,
was so alijrehiensive about talking over power was that this is the first time in
thirty-six years that they've been ill power in Allberta. Appa rent ly, the party
thI't was in lower wvas dohig i salfisfaletory JoII for sonle thirty-six years. So. the
fact that yoll tlo have a very reslionsl\'e type of goverlullemlt, responsive to tile
wslies and desires 'If the people, doews not inean that you're going to Ie hangingg
your government every other day.
If youR were governor, wlich would you rather hive? A guaranteed working
majority or tho, veto piiwer'? Think about that. You've got to lake so1e decisioils
during this week and Riext about the power of the governor. The veto power is
like a string that you enii 1,1111 at lint you cannot i1)sh1.
Mrs. Ilelchert pointed out that in thie last seven sessions, there has been a (isp1rtity lietwe, ci tile house and the seilate as to politial afiliatl(i. I believe-.--it
is 1113' liersmal opialoli---that very likely our state is going to becoiie lniiaineral,
ill least from what
il I hear li iniy mwn colity of Yellowstone. What if the neltw. very
powerful hegislittire- I want it to) halve the liti lost power because it is tile
cotlde--is ulilinnieral aml it is of it 11rty ol11(islte the governor's party?
Since we camie into the union. seveity-one percent of the tilie the governor of
alt least one house of the legislature.
thils state has been of a party other tMa
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Looking at it from the governor's standpoint, to take a current example, let's
go to Washington for a moment. There are at least a half dozen United States
senators all of my party and all great and honorable men, who are seeking the
office of the presidency of the United States. During this, an election year, what
are the possibilities or at least, what are the pressures upon these'men to give
President Nixon a program that would be of benefit to the people?
These great senators, first of all you must remember are partisan politicians
and their job as partisan politicians, when the occupant at 1600 Pennsylvania
Avenue is of the opposite political party, Is to first bring hi1 down and then
we'll start worrying about the people's business.
I think it is time that we Americans stop playing this childish game of who is
the leader and begin to take care of the peoples' business, and the best way to do
that is by guaranteeing that the chief executive of the state of Montana will
always have a working majority in this body-in this hall.
David Patrick Moynihan, former assistant to President Nixon, said that the
Federal Government is very expert at collecting revenues and very poor at dis.
persing services.
Charles Schultze was director of the Bureau of the Budget under President
Johnson and said that only the Federal Government could take care of national
defense and put a man on the moon. As far as education, pollution, manpower,
poverty, welfare, health and urban renewal are concerned, only the states can
handle these problems.
I publicly admit that as a liberal Democrat that not all the answers are in
Washington; in fact, as I get older, I realize more and more that very few of the
solutions to our problems are to be found in the nation's capitol.
Someone has -,aid that if we did not have the states as administrative divisions,
we would have to create them.
Our legislature cannot handle a budget of several hundred million dollars a
year with the shackles of the present constitution. My proposal would provide
a modern, streamlined and efficient form of government for Montana.
Because it is different, it has been called by the editor of one daily newspaper,
"a return to Toryism." Another 6ditorlal writer has defined it as an "alien political culture."
This form of government that is so alien to our shores was responsible in 1215
for the Magna Carta. I have here in my hand part one, volume one-all of you
lawyers know what It is. It's the Revised Codes of 'Montana. The first document
in this book is not the Constitution of the United States or even the Declaration
of Independence. Rather the first document in this volume of our laws starts out,
"John, by the grace of God, King of England, Lord of Ireland." And it goes on to
say, "We also have granted to all of the free men of our kingdom, for us and
for our heirs forever, all the underwritten liberties to be had and holden by them
and their heirs, of us and our heirs forever."
The Declaration of Independence is the next document in our laws and the
first three reasons why we went to war with Great Britain almost two centuries
ago was because the king had the veto power over our legislatures.
Each province of our Canadian cousins on our northern border has never used
any other form of government. President W'ilson favored it. Seventy-flve percent
of the presidents of the American Political Science Association since that time
have also favored it. So did the conservative William Howard Taft.
This "return to Toryisn" is exactly the form of government we are using inI
this great hall. This "alien" form of government is the type of government we
are using to write a new constitution for Moutana. 'Moreover, if the colonies
had revolted only some ten years later, we would now have this type of governmient in the Congress of the United States and the president of the United States
would always be of the majority party of the Congress.
Professor Walgren in his article on the legislature, which I'm sure all of you
read, you will recall, said that lobbyists and incumbent senators favored the
present bicameral or two-house legislature.
Elimination of one house will reduce the effectiveness of lobbyists who would
only have two chances to kill a bill rather than one.
However, my proposal would do away-nffnd you-would do away with the
greatest weapon of the lobbyist-the gubernatorial veto.
We have elected our own president and our own leadership and our president
cannot hide out in a governor's palace. Ile is responsive to us; he is part of us.
Imagine for a moment, if after we finished our document, that we would take
it over to that other chamber, across the hall, and they would tear it apart with
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scissors and pastepot, hold hearings and rewrite the whole thing. That is abhorrent to us but, imagine further with me if you will, that not only after we
wrote it, that our president could veto it and we had to pass every provision with
two-thirds majority. The way we've been voting, we'd be here for a long time to
try to get those two-thirds majority.
The eyes of our state are on you now and you are governing yourselves with
the best possible form of government. You are rightfully proud of the job you
are doing. Our CON CON system is the best form of government. I urge you not
to be selfish; share our system with the people of Montana.
To the yeah-buts, those who agree with me and say, "yes, Kelleher, it's a good
system but . . ." To the yeah-buts, I can only say, have confidence in the people
of Montana. Our people come from the best school system In the United States.
Our children are so bright that in national tests our scores go off the top of
the charts.
Our people want a change. In 1908, by a majority of over forty thousand, they
said they did not like the present system; they refused to give the present
bicameral chambers an extension from sixty days to eighty days.
When the legislature went back to the people and said, "All right, people,
do you want to rewrite the whole business and start a whole new ball game," the
people of this state by a two to one majority said, "Yes, we want a whole new
l1ll g mIue."
A one-house legislature is a baby's step in the right direction and I support
it. It will save nioney ; it will give better representation to rural areas; it will
reduce the influence of lolhlyi.4ts ; it will be more accountable and more representative of the will of the iwnple. However, it will not stop the feuding and the
buck-passing between the legislature and the government.
In one year, Mr. Babcock, you will recall, vetoed twenty bills. I'm not going
into the merits of whether he wits right or wrong. That's not my business as a
delegate, but can you imagine the innumerable hours of time in committee, of
research, of government heads of the state of Montana.that came over here
to testify, and all of that time was wasted
Finally, if you give the governor a majority, you will have taken a giant step
and I ask you to take that giant step and, in conclusion, I say that our legislature would be so powerful that we'll be able to annex the state of North
Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. (Laughter and Applause.)
Chairman GRAYBILL. Discussion is on Mr. Kelleher's substitute amendmentsubstitute motion.
EXTRACT FRoMi

RECORDS OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF
ON TIE VETO POWER

MONTANA-1972-

Chairman GRAYBILL. 31[r. Kelleher.
Delegate KELLEIIER. Yes, sir.
('hairnuan Ga.4YBIm.. Mr. Kelleher, you have an amendment. Do you care to
have It read at this time?
l)ele-ate KEi.;IEIi. Yes, sir.
Clerk HANSEN [Reading]. Mr. Chairman. I move to amend section ten, veto
power, by deleting the subsections one, two, three, four and five beginning at
line fourteen through thirty on page eight of the Executive Committee Proposal.
and lines one through eighteen on page nine, and inserting il lieu thereof the
following language: quote, the governor may veto items in the appropriation
bill for his office, end quote. Signed, Kelleher.
Chairman GRAYBILL. The effect of Mr. Kelleher's proposed amendment is to
delete the veto power, except for the governor's right to veto items in the appropriation bill for his office.
Mr. Kelleher.
Delegate KELLFIIFR. Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates. The veto power, in
the early days of our constitutional history in the United States, was given to
the president to be used to veto hills which were unconstitutional. We still have
this power, of course, In the supreme court and we have it in the state supreme
court. The veto power goes way back to the Romans and we got It from Montesquileu. who got It from the British and. as I told you the other day, he was a
great admirer of the monarchial system. Ie did not care for the republican
system-
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Chairman GRAILL. Stay on the subject now, Mr. Kelleher.
Delegate KELLEHER. I'm staying on veto power and I want to get rid of the
veto power, and I want to show what's wrong with the veto power, Mr. Chairman,
and I want to show where the veto power came from.
Chairman GRAYBILL. Okay.
Delegate KELLEHER. And I cannot show what's wrong with the veto power
unless I show where it came from, Mr. Chairman. Montesquieu said, as you
know, that a republican form of government, which is the form of government we
have under Article Four-paragraph four---of the Federal Constitution, is like to
a body without a head. The last time it was used in British was in 1707 by Queen
Anne and it has not been used since 1707 by the British. At the time of our
Revolution, only Massachusetts and New York had the veto power. Massachusetts
had a single veto power and New York had a veto power combining the power
of the governor and a justice of the supreme court. The reason for that was a
document was to be cut down only If it were unconstitutional. Now, then, Thomas
Jefferson never even used the veto power and Thomas Jefferson said it should
only 'be used when a document is unconstitutional. I submit that we do that
through our supireiie court. John Quincy Adams never used the veto power. It
was only with the time of that wild Democrat, Andy Jackson, that they started
to use it for reasons of expediency, rather than when a law was unconstitutional.
North Carolina today, ladies and gentlemen, does not have a veto power and is
one of the most progressive states in the southern part of the United States. I
would like to read, If I may, a very short paragraph from Robert Lewis who was a
former congressmen-he's deceased now-written in 1935--former congressman
from the state of Massachusetts and scholar on state legislatures.
"There can be no doubt that where the governor and a majority of the legislature are of opposite parties, bills are sometimes passed with the deliberate purpose of embarrassment compelling the governor to choose between signing, say
an extravagant appropriation in which lie does not believe, and losing some
measure of popularity. On the other hand, governors unhampered by scruples,
without fine sense of duty, have used the veto with the deliberate purpose of
making political capital by the appeal to popular sympathy. When ono man sets
up his opinion against that of two or three hundred in the legislature, the passes
are almost sure to approve his position because lie is the underdog. The sort of
message that kind of a governor finds it easy to write, gets wide readi'ig and
hasty applause. The arguments of the authors of the bill, who may know a hundred times more about it than the governor knows, and who may be the men of
the soundest judgment and loftiest purpose, are ignored. The legislature is a
sure loser in the unequal contest. The honors go to the virile, aggressive man of
dominating personality who was willing to climb at the expense of fair play in
the public welfare."
The veto power, Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, is a vicious, powerful
weapon. It is the most powerful weapon in the arsenal of the lobbyist. Charles
I lost his head, literally, over the veto power at the time of the Long Parliament.
Now, I'm no Oliver Cromwell, and I'm not suggesting that we do away with the
governor's head; I just want to get rid of his veto power.
Lastly, remember when Larry Margolis was here a-,d spoke to us from that
podium? He said t%#o sentences that I'll never forget. "The legislature is not
representative of the people. The legislature IS the people." And before you put
any limit in this constitution on the authority of the people of this state, you
better have a very, very serious reason for doing so. There's no veto power on us.
It's our own wise judgement. That's the only veto power on us. This body, in my
opinion, is being very conservative, very mature, in its judgment and in its
deliberations. I ask what right does an uncrowned king have to thwart the will
of the people and I ask you to eliminate the veto power of the governor, except
for control over his own appropriations. This may not be necessary, I admit,
because if the money is appropriated for him, he doesn't necessarily have to
spend it. Otherwise, I would urge you most strongly to exclude completely the
veto power of the governor. I would like to have a roll call vote on my motion
when it's voted, and I'd like to have five seconds please. (Seconds rise.)
Chairman GRAYBILL. The question now arises on Mr. Kelleher's motion to
amend section ten.
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VICTORIA

January 15th,

1974.

Mr. Robert L. Kelleher,
Attorney at Law,
2108 Grand Avenue,
Billings, Montana, 59102.
Dear Mr. Kelleher,
Thank you for your letter of December 10th, 1973.
Please excuse the delay in getting off this reply.
I have given a great deal of consideration to
your request and I was sorely tempted to accept it.
Although I recognize that yours is a voice crying in
the wilderness, it is my candid opinion that the Parliamentary system is a far more effective way of having direct
democracy developed. Had the United States adopted the
Parliamentary system, perhaps some of their present problems
Would not exist.
You are aware, obviously, of the fact that the
Parliamentary system de-emphasizes personality and focuses
more on policies and responsibilities of and by political
parties to those policies rather than relying on the whims
and the power of one man or woman as the case may be.
Since I am so strongly committed to the Parliamentary system, and haje some personal experience of
the problems you are having in the United States in regard
to the existing political mechanisms, I was sorely tempted
to accept your offer and present my point of view, if that
in any way could assist you in obtaining your goal. However,
the combination of the limit of my time and the enormity of
the task that you face has caused me to regrettably inform
you that I will be unable to accept your kind invitation.
If ever you visit this part of the Pacific
Northwest please do not, hesitate to drop in and say 'hello'.
Yours very truly,

Premier.
Cv.an- Amrico nsminsr: NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTION MORALITYY
Moan Colle
Petre Hall - Easetorm
24-26 May. 1074 - silliip
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spessS.000 in Montana. That's ridiculous. It's utterly
ridiculous. And I can my it because he's a member of my

party.

Frank Adams
BILLINGS - "My feeling is that If we bad a parliament

amofdthis would have emvcome up."

Ye* that's Bob Keaeber speaking. And It's Watergate e's
alkif about.
Kelleber was the Constitutional convention delegate who

tried Io got a oe-ihoua parliament for Montana. He Is Kill
Why wouldn't we have had a Watergate and the ensuing im-

pechment rivelIf we had a parliament instead of the present

setup?

"Firs of a whoever was president or prime mister "hotevfr name you want to give him - woul have a majority

of the C4ress And he would be the leader of the majority.
You woldr't have a Deimoratic Congreu trying to impeach a
Reptibican presideaL"
IMPEACHMENT NOT NECEMARWY
SW even mroe basic that that, says Kelleher. there is no

imnllchment in a parliament. "The majority could change
their own leadership at will. They'd just say, 'Mr. Prime

Ministef. we want you to step down.' It would be done
ipocdully"after perhaps an afternoon's debate. And the PM
would either call for new elections and turn out the whole party
or return to his seat in parliament and the minister of foreign

affairs would become PM. It's that simple."
CAN'T IUY ELECTIONS

&it the financial pressures that helped created Watergate
would not exist in the first place, under a parliament, says
Kellaher. That's because the prim, minister would only have
own congressional district rather than the whole
to carry
nation. Thus Nixon. if he were prime minister, would have
be elected to parliament from his California congressional
district and then elected PM by his fellow Republicans in
parliament. assuming tot they were the majonty party. "He
doesn't need to go ot vd collect S million bucks or whatever
xn's people tried to collect," says Kelleher.
And amlarly with a state parliament: the governor would
only hove to nm in his home legislative district. "Torn Judge

~4-YEAR L_--

KING

JMS. NOT THE CANOIOATE
VOTE
Another thing about the parliament, especially the Untwsl
syte, mys Kelleher. "They don't have any of this nonsense:
'I vote for the man, not the party.' That's the height of

for the party. I don't care if the
sa idity. InEnlad you vowe
guys ot bke eyes or curty hair or the best TV appearance.
You vote for the platform. It's issues oriented rather than
personsly
oriented. Tbt's the heart of the whole damned
thin'°
KINGDOM OF THE U.S.
I don't you think Americans want a king? "No I don't. I
think they're tvred of a king now. I think they're sophisticated
enough that they know they can govern themselves. And I
think Waterpte is going to turn out to be one *1 the Greatest
blessings that's ever happened on the American political

scene. Watergate isN per cent good and 2 per cent bad."
Xelleher visited the British paliament last year. "We
walked within feet of the PM. One of our fellows said we
couldn't get this close to our president. And a bobb) looks
down and said, 'right-toh.' But we don't shoot our PM's,
eyether."
On the positive aide, says Kelleher, all the ministers in the

parliamentary cabinet have as many votes as the prime
minster. They come from as sid an electoral base as he
does "The PM is nothing but a first among equals. When the
mnister of war says 'damn it. I don't want you putting those
desUoyers in the Mediterranean, you're goig to irritate the
Arabs,' the P4 has to listen to him. But can you imagine the
secretary o defense talking to President Nixon like that? He's
got his resignation inhis hip pocket.
"The mar is downgraded in a parliament. We've got to cutunder Stalin. Isn't that strange?
tsm Ns like the Soviet Unimo
And they call this a denocra cy t"
PARLIAMENT HALF FEMALE
Kelleher says he's finding growing support for a one-house
parliment for Montano, or at least a one-house legislature.
And he's doing hs bit to further the idea through lecture enSagemets. "We should abolish the Senate. but call the new
members senators so the Senate doesn't feeJ that it lost out. I
want in the worst way to turn that Senate into a big hearing
Kelleher's idea about a one-house leltilaiure is to have one
man and one woman come from each of the 0 senatorial distrcts-
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MONTESOUIEU -

Separation

he has developed to reorpnke the
50 state Into 38 would save $4.6
billon in state government spenaes annual.

of

Powers.
Montesquieu, says the Encyclopedia Brittanica, great tly influenced
the drafters of the Declaration of
Independence and Constitution. He
was amonarchist who said "aRepublic is like a body without a head."
He concocted the "Separation of
Powers" theory to partially limit
the absolutism of Louis XV.
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(From the Missoullan, Mar. 6, 1975]
PARLIAMENTARY

SYSTEM

SUGGESTED

FOR AMERICA

(By Steve Shirley)
A switch to parliamentary government and abolition of the open primary election were suggested Wednesday night by a panel of political scientists discussing
executive power and means to improve government.
The forum topic, "The American Presidency: Monarchy Revisited?" was discussed by University of Montana professors Richard Chapman, Ellis Waldron,
Robert Eagle, Thomas Payne, Peter Koehn, Leo Lott and members of the
audience.
Payne suggested that executive power should be strengthened, rather than
weakened, by adopting a parliamentary form of government.
in
"The governmental system under which we now operate was designedd.
a far different kind of world than In which we now live," lie said.
The founding fathers of the nation meant to fragment power, but more power
concentrated in the executive is needed so people can realize their "policy expectations," Payne argued.
He added that the powers given the president "are not commensurate with the
resplonsibilities we expect him to asunme." -Under a parliamentary system, the executive would not only have more power
to deal with problems, Payne said, but leaders would be more thoroughly screened
before they took power and political parties would have more importance.
Koehn agreed that the president must be strong, saying the president has to
have the power to keep control over bureaucracy.
'rime protuleni of presidential power, lie said, has been a "malapplication of
presldent/i{l power rather than too much presidential power."
Koehn suggested two reforms to help the presidency.
First, he would make the presidency a four-year term for the first time in office,
but allow an incumbent to serve only two year ternis as president. The president,
he said, could serve an unlimited number of terms. Koehn said this reform would
eliminate the lame-duck president.
Some of his colleagues challenged the proposal, arguing the president would
campaign continuously for office.
Koehn's other proposal was for a "national executive council" composed of
broad range of political ideologists who would be required to consult with the
president before any important decision. Such a council is needed, he said, because the president presently can shield himself from diversified information.
Talking about congressional supervision of presidential power, Eagle listed a
number of powers legislators have to check the president, such as rejecting his
legislation, refusing his nominees for appointive office, the power of purse strings
and impeachment.
He acknowledged, however, that Congress often is slow to use these powers.
"There is the power there in Congress to check a president if the congressmen
will use it," Eagle said.
Following questions from the audience of more than 100 persons, both Payne
and Waldron argued for presidential nominating conventions rather than primaries and the scrapping of laws regulating campaigns.
"This business of legislating against campaign contributions is like legislating
against sex," Waldron said.
Ie sugf~sted that presidential nominating conventions he held in August, with
campaignlMg limited to two months before the convention, Ile added that the
media should be required to give free advertising to the candidates.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. BARTELL, PUBLIc RELATIONS CONSULTANT,
WVASH INGTON, D.C.
SUBMITTED TO SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
24, 1975
AMENDMENT-FEBRUARY

ON 25T11

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Conmittee: LIBERTY LOBBY appreciates
this opportunity to present the views of its more than 20,000-member Board of
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Policy, and also the approximately quarter million readers of its monthly legislative report, Lib'erty Letter.

LIBERTY LOBBY is an institution of American citizens, often called the
people's lobby, who have Joined together to promote their patriotic and constitutionalist convictions for good government. LIBERTY LOBBY's position is different from those of special interest pressure groups, and approaches these issues
solely for the best interests of all the people in our country.
In addition to our publications, our daily radio program, "This is LIBERTY
LOBBY," reaches a potential audience of millions on more than 200 outlets from
coast to coast.
As a result of this wide, representative contact with citizens across the country, LIBERTY LOBBY Is in a position to transmit the feelings of a large cross
section of the Americqn people who have no vested interests other than the welfare of the Nation as a whole.
The 25th Amendment, with the backing of powerful forces in this country, was
ratified into law In 1967. Since then, to the surprise of many Americans, it has
resulted in our anomalous and unprecedented situation today: a President and
a Vice President not elected by the people.
It is obvious to some, including members of the current legislature, that perhaps a second ,.Ionger look should be taken at this deceptive, misleading and
obtuse amendment.
It appears that the 25th Amendmept directly conflicts with the 12th Amendment, which states that "The Electors shall meet in there respective states and
vote by ballot for. President and Vice President.... ."We did this for 190 years
although the 12th Amendment was not adopted until 1SO4.
The 25th Amendment says, in essence, that if the Vice President feels the
President cannot *serve, the Vice President shall become President. We believe
there is a basic constitutional conflict here that should be resolved.
Art. II of the Constitution states that the Vice President shall become President in case of the removal of the President from office, and in the event both
President and Vice President are removed from office for some reason, Congress
may by law declare what Officer shall then act as President. Why then was the
25th Amendment needed at all?
Perhaps it was because of Sec. 4 of the 25th Amendment. This would allow
the "principal officers of the executive department," and the Vice President
and/or any other such body as the Congress may provide%to remove the President from office. The clause, "as Congress may by law provide," is the only one
that makes sense, and it is spelled out in Art. II without the unnecessary interpolation of the 25th Amendment. What we consider to be particularly dangerous
is the phrase, "principal officers of the executive department."
Does this mean the Cabinet? Does It mean the directors and chairmen of various departments and agencies directly the responsibility of the executive department, such as the Bureau of the Budget, the Office of Emercency Preparedness, etc.? Does it mean the executive chef of the White House kitchen? Does it
mean the principal officers of the various departments under the direction of the
Vice President? We do not expect an answer to this rhetorical question, for it is
our view that the question is not answerable as the 25th Amendment is written.
LIBERTY LOBBY recommends that the 25th Amendment to the Constitution
be repealed. If not repealed, then it should be amended to require that any Executive Orders issued by the Acting President be approved by a record vote of
both houses of Congress. Further, we feel It should be amended to provide that
if the Vice President assumes the office of President under the obtuse terms of
the 25th Amendment, he shall hold this office only until the succession has been
put to the people In the form of a general election, the terms of which apply to
the Electoral Code. Our founding fathers did not intend, in our view, for any
man to hold the highest elective office In the land without being chosen by the
people.

-

In spite of the fact that the 25th Amendment was passed by the necessary
three-fourths of the state legislatures, and by the required two-thirds vote of each
house, it appears that no in-depth study was made of the conflicting constitutional
questions. Vague and contradictory, it provides for an un-elected Chief Executiv,
and an un-elected Vice President, blatantly unconstitutional in its concept.
We therefore recommend that Senator Pastore's bill, S.J. Res. 26, be approved
after the revision indicated in our statement.
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The longer America exists with this dangerous and unclear Amendment, the
greater the peril. As our bicentennial approaches, let us return to the observation
and respect of those great men who passed on to us the torch of liberty, flickering
now, but still redeemable.
Thank you again for this opportunity to present our statement for the record.
A SPECIAL F LICTION TO FILL A PREXIDERTIAL VACANCY

(By Warren Christopher)
Coming across the country to speak to the leaders of this great Association has
challenged me to choose a subject of national, rather than parochial interest. The
topic I have chosen has been brought to mind by the fact that the President of
the United States was selected by his predecessor and was never elected to either
of our two highest national offices. It is a subject upon which lawyers around the
country may have some valuable Input and it is a good time for reflection. President Ford has himself suggested that we reconsider the method of Presidential
succession, and thus he has made it possible for us all to do so with the least possible partisanship.
I

Specifically, I am urging today that the Constitution be amended to provide for
a Special Presidential Election when the President resigns, dies, or is removed
more than a year before the end of his term. Under this proposal, the Vice President would become an Acting President for 90 days until a new President could
be elected.
Although no doubt controversial, this proposal is not entirely novel. I might
say that I have been surprised in my brief review of the history of the Constitutional Convention to find that this proposal closely parallels suggestions by some
of our Founding Fathers. Moreover, the Idea has been advanced by Senator Kennedy and denounced by Scotty Reston. What surer evidence could be found of its
legitimacy! While, as I say, the Idea has been floated by others, I believe it is
now time to consider the proposal in a systematic way, and I hope to give at
least a small impetus to that process today.
Editor'sNote: Mr. Christopher delivered this paper at the House of the Association in November. He is a former Law Clerk to Justice William 0. Douglas; a
former Deputy Attorney General of the United States; and is presently President
of the Los Angeles County Bar Association.
There are several reasons that prompt my proposal. First, it seems to me that
the people are uneasy and concerned that the awesome power of the Presidency
is in the hands of a man whom they did not elect. I make no pretense of being
Gallup or Harris, or even Sindlinger, but my strong sense Is that the people
wish they had been able to choose their President.
Last week's election brought home again the healthy cleasing effect that results
from public debate followed by decision-making in the voting booths. To some
extent I suppose this derives from the fact that we are a nation of sportsmen,
and. the elective process is analogous to the kind of hard battle which causes
participants to put anxieties and animosities behind them for the time being.
Consciously or subconsciously, as a people we need to have the cleansing and
emancipating effect which comes only from a national election when there is
a vacancy in the Presidency.
Scoond, it seems most unlikely, In any given situation, that the Vice President
will be the best man to succeed to the Presidency. Arthur Schlesinger, in his
witty piece in the May Atlantic Monthly, points out that a President chooses his
running mate not because he is the second citizen of the Republic but because
of intricate and generally mistaken calculations about what he or she will contribute at the polls. Congressman Jim O'Hara summarized it well when he observed that the President chooses his running mate not to succeed him, but to
help him succeed. Even so, Schlesinger points out that the "balanced ticket" is a
fraud on the public because the Vice President rarely balances the President and
usually has almost no impact on him at all. And whatever strengths a man or
woman brings to the Vice Presidency, they are probably diluted by the frustration
and isolation of the office.
Third. a Special Presidential Election to solve the vacancy problem would
follow the spirit of the reforms in the election process being undertaken in Con-

A
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gress and the various state 'legislatures. The fundamental premise of the widespread and overdue campaign reform legislation is a recommitment to the democratip process. What better way to reinforce this commitment thab to rely on
the basic democratic process when a Presidential vacancy occurs.
Like Reston, I would not lightly tinker with the mechanism for Presidential
succession embodied In the 25th Amendment. After all, the 25th Amendment was

the recent product of an exceptional American Bar Association Committee, a

conscientious house of delegates, a highly motivated Congress, and ultimately
an almost unanimous majority of the state legislatures. Nevertheless, while the
25th Amendment has seen us through a difficult situation, in the process some
defects have become apparent that were not, and probably could not have been,
foreseen by its draftsmen. In addressing these defects, I am encouraged to advance this proposal because I have found, somewhat to my surprise, that it has
support in the debates surrounding Article II of the Constitution.
.II
In tracing this historical development, we find that little thought was given
to the general subject of Presidential succession until the Founding Fathers met
in Philadelpluia in the spring and summer of 1787. Neither the Virginia nor New
Jersey plans contained any reference to the subject when they were submitted
to the Constitutional Convention. Indeed, succession was first broached by Alexander Hamilton on June 18, 1787 and was incorporated in the report of tile Committee of Detail of August 6, 1787. The draft text provided that upon the death,
resignation or removal of the President, ". .. the President of the Senate shall
exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the United States be
chosen.... ." The language was clear that only temporary service was anticipated.
Later in 1787 the Vice President was substituted as the Presidential successor
but the report did not alter the concept that only temporary service was expected.
Thereafter, James Madison pointed out that one of the intermediate drafts
contained language that would have effectively prevented the filling of a vacancy
by a Special Presidential Election. In response to this perceived defect, Madison
specifically included draft language that provided that the Vice President carry
on the duties of the President "until . . . a President shall be elected." (It will
be recalled, of course, that the Frames originally provided that the candidate
who received the second highest vote for President should become Vice President,
and thi* procedure was followed until the 12th Amendment was adopted in 1804.)
There was opposition to Madison's amendment, but the Convention transmitted
it to the Committee of Style without change. The Committee of Style changed
the wording into the present form of Article II, Section 1, clause 6, which
provides :
"In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such
Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elected."
It is fair to say that the present version of the original draft does not
unequivocally reflect the intent of Madison's revision, which contemplated a
possible Special Presidential Election. Yet Madison's idea was accepted by the
Constitutional Convention and the Committee of Style .was neither authorized
nor instructed to make any substantive change.
I do not mean to suggest that this brief recitation of the historical development
of Article II, Section 1, ejause 6 of our Constitution is complete or completely
convincing. However, it does strike me as significant that more than one mention
was made at the Constitutional Convention of both the limited role of the Vice
President and the benefits of a Special Presidential Election. One comes away
from reading some of the history of the Convention with the strong impression
that the Vice President was not meant to become President, but only Acting
President until the elective process could operate. One eminent Constitutional
historian, the late Professor Charles Warren, has stated the view that ". . . the
delegates probably contemplated that, in such ease [the death of the President],
the Vice President would only perform the duties of the President until a new
election for President should be held: and that he would not ipmo facto become
president." As Senator Kennedy has said, the Founding Fathers knew as usual
what they ,vere doing.
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In view of the apparent intent of the Framers that the Vice President should
only be all Acting President, a question naturally arises: Why have all the
vacancies in the office of President resulted in the automatic succession of the
Vice President to the Presidency for the remainder of the term? The answer to
this question constitutes an interesting although anomalous chapter in history,
and I will sketch it only briefly.
Early legislation passel in 1792 provided for a Special Election, but only in
the event both the Presidency and Vice Presidency were vacant. This situation
has never existed in the history of the country although in recent months we have
been perilously close to it. Thus there was simply no statutory guidance as to
what should happen when the first vacancy in the office of the Presidency
occurred. This came on April 4, 1841 upon the death of William Henry Harrison
less than a month after his inauguration. John Tyler, then Vice President,
assumed duties of the Presidency for the full three years and eleven months that
remained of Harrison's term.
It is not entirely clear why or how this result was obtained. Presidential
papers show that 3.r. Tyler simply began signing documents as the "President
of the United States." However, John Quincy Adams and some newspapers,
notably the New York Po8t, viewed Tyler's exercise of the powers of the Presidency as inconsistent with the intent of the Framers. In short, they argued that
Tyler possessed only temporarily all the powers of the Presidency but that he
did not in fact succeed to the title. Yet no significant attack was mounted upon
the legitimacy of President Tyler's status, and lie finished out the term.
A few years later when President Zachary Taylor died, any disagreement
over the succession issue apparently had subsided. Vice President Fillmore was
advised of the President's death by the cabinet in a letter addressed to the
"President of the United States." A similarly uncontested succession by Andrew
Johnson after the assassination of President Lincoln all but cemented the practice. Thus, the anomalous Tyler acsendency became controlling precedent for
th( seven successive Presidential vacancies.

IV
Federal legislation providing for a Special Presidential Election was discussed
in Congress on numerous occasions but never enacted. As indicated, the 1792
provisions called for a Special Election only when the Presidency and Vice Presidency were vacant. The Presidential Succession Act of 1886 eliminated the Special Election provision and substituted a cabinet member in place of the leaders
of the House and Senate as successors to the President and Vice President. As
we know, the succession was returned to the Hov..c and Senate leaders by the
Presidential Succession Act-of 1947.
There were several arguments that carried the day in 1886 when even the
very limited Special Election provisions of the 1792 law were repealed. My belief
is that these and other arguments against a special election are not compelling
today, and I want to discuss some of them briefly.
7ir8t, it has been argued that a President is required by the Constitution to
be elected to a full four-year term, whenever elected, and that a midterm Special
Election might end the concurrence of Presidential and Congressional elections.
It seems to me, however, that the better argument, based upon the debates surrounding Article II, is that a Special Election for an unexpired term was contemplated by the Framers. In short, a Special Election, as contemplated by the
language of Article II, Section 1, clause 6, would be following, not departing from,
the spirt of the Founding Fathers.
Second, it has been urged that we already have more than enough elections
and that frequency of elections should not be increased. This may be a good
general prnciple, but it seems to me that the importance of having a popularly
elected President should outweigh this general consideration whenever the Presidency Is vacant.
Third, it can be argued that Special Elections are unduly disruptive and create
unnecessary turmoil. Again, the general observation is probably true, but with
all the uncertainty and instability of the past months, I doubt that the alternative
of a Special Election would have been more disruptive. Moreover, I would again
stress that the healthy cleansing effect of an election for the highest office would
outweigh the delay and disruption involved.
Finally, there would no doubt lie a question whether 90 days is long enough
to prepare and hold a national election. For all the complexities, I think that
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a shorter campaign would be a blessing. The National Committe4 of the parties
could produce a nomination within 30 to 45 days. The campaigns themselves,
aided by federal funding, could produce a national consensus within 30 to 45
days. Don't we all recall that every recent campaign has started repeating itself
after the first 30 days, if not sooner.
V
There will, of course, be other arguments advanced against a Special Election
and I don't by any means want to imply that I have addressed them all. I would
for a moment, however, like to discuss the impact of the proposal for a Special
Election on the office of Vice President. I suspect there will be the suggestion
that the Vice Presidency would be reduced substantially in importance and attractiveness. Yet, to my mind, the limitation of the Vice President's role in case
of a vacancy to that of a potential "Acting President" would-be a beneficial
change.
The special election proposal would have the advantage of clearly defining the
function of the Vice President In the event of a vacancy. In such a situation, he
would be an Acting President for 90 days or, if the Presidential vacancy occurred
within one year of a quadrennial election, he would be Actinz President for the
remainder of the term. This would stabilize the nature of the office. It would take
the inherently ghoulish gambler's attractiveness out of it that now exists by
virtue of the possibility that a Vice President may become President by operation
of the 25th Amendment. I do not go so far as to urge abolition of the office of
the Vice President, though some wise m~n have, but I do think it would be desirable to remove him from the demeaning game of American roulette.
If changed and stabilized in this way, the office of the Vice President could be
modified to make it meaningful and attractive on Its own terms. In short, once
the uncertain "all or nothing" aspect of the current Vice Presidency Is removed,
it could be redefined into a more functional office even if It were less attractive
at the national nominating conventions. This, combined with an increased reliance
on the democratic process to solve the succession problem, would In my view
constitute an improvement in the Executive Branch of government.
CONCL~qTON

As I have said, the proposal for a Special Election to fill a Presidential vacancy
Is bound to be controversial. Nevertheless, it would, In my view, correct a serious
flaw in our system. In any event, against the backdrop of current history, It
invites the most critical evaluation by the nation's most constructive critics.
I know that your Association and its distinguished leadership can be counted
on to take the lead in such a process.

Hon. BIRcn BAYH, Jr.,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT OF ARIZONA,
Phoenix, Ariz., March 10, 1975.

Senator from Indiana,
U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.
DEAR BIRCH: Through the Wae8hington Letter of the American Bar Associa.

tion's Governmental Relations Office, I note that hearings are contemplated on
revisions to the Twenty-fifth Amendment to the Constitution.

Within the past few weeks I received a call from your Administrative Assistant
requesting my thoughts on the application of the Twenty-fifth Amelidment to the
events which have transpired over the last year or so.

As a guess I would suggest that none of us who had part In the formulation
of the Twenty-fifth Amendment foresaw a resignation of a Vice President and
a resignation of a President within a year. While we may not have foreseen
these events, nevertheless, it seems to me that the application of the Twenty.
fifth Amendment to the events as they transpired looked exceptionally well.
The only criticism in the application would be in the direction of Congress,
and not in the Amendment, itself. It Is my personal belief that the delay In the
approval or rejection of the appointment of the second vice presidential nominee
was over-long.
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Fortunately no crisis developed as a result of, in my opinion, the inordinate
delay.
Good or bad, that delay could not be attributed to the Amendment, itself, but
rather to the wisdom, or lack of it, of the Congress, and that is, I suppose, how
the system is supposed to work.
I do not approve of Senator Pastore's suggestion with respect to a special
election. Necessarily a special election would require an Inordinate expenditure
of time in 'a period of national emergencies, and this was precisely what the
Twenty-fifth Amendment was designed to avoid. Mr. James Reston's comment
on Senator Pastore's proposal seems altogether appropriate. Reston said, "No
doubt Pastore's proposal would be logical and democratic, but as H. L. Mencken
once remarked, 'for every human problem there is a solution that is simple, neat,
and wrong.'"
If we put politics aside for a moment and look solely to the welfare of the
nation and the continuity of its leadership, I hope we have the overall intelligence to leave the Twventy-fifth Amendment alone, and let it perform its function as it wasdesigned to do, and which time and circumstance has proven it is
capable of doing.
With kind personal regards, and whatever the outcome, good luck in your
endeavors, I am,
Sincerely,
WALTER E. CRAIG.
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
Cambridge, Mass., March 11, 1975.
EDITOR, THE NEw YORK TIMES,

229 West 43d Strect,
New York, N.Y.
DEAR SIR: Your editorial of March 4, after noting that the recently enacted
25th Amendment has operated, when called into play by the forced resignation
of an elected President whose elected Vice-President had earlier been forced to
resign, to give us a President and a Vice-President neither of whom was elected
by the people. It could also operate, within the next two years, to give us another
nonelected President and Vice-President. You raise the question whether this
indicates that the 25th Amendment should be revised. I believe that Section 2
of the 25th Amendment should be repealed and that we should return to the
method of succession originally contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution. They believed that the ultimate selection of a successor in the event of a
double vacancy should be vested in the electorate.
They therefore provided, in Art. II, Sec. 1, cl. 5 of the original Constitution,
that Congress might by law provide for the case where both the office of President and the office of Vice-President were vacant by "declaring what Officer
shall then act as President . . . until . . . a President shall be elected." This
provision was substituted by the Constitutional Convention for an earlier proposal that the officer designated by Congress should act as President "until
the time of electing a President shall arrive"-a proposal to which James
Madison objected because "it would prevent a supply of the vacancy by an intermediate election of the President" (2 Madison' . Journal of the Federal Convention 676-677). The Framers also provided in Section 2 of the same Article
for the selection of Presidential Electors by the States, but added that "no
Senator or Representative, or person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under
the United States, slil be appointed an Elector." In Section 3 they entrusted
to Congress only the determination on the time of choosing the Electors and the
time when they should cast their votes.
Thus, as Hamilton explained in the Federalist No. 68, "It was desirable that
the sense of the people should orxrate in the choice of the person to whom so
important a trust was to be confided. This end will be answered by committing
the right of making it, not to any lre-establi, hed body, but to men chosen by the
People for the special purpose, and at the particular juncture." Thus, "an immediate act of the American people" was to Ie exerted in the choice of Presidential
Electors to select the President and the Constitution "excluded from eligibility to
this trust all those who from situation might be suslcted of to great devotion to
the President in office. No Senator, representative, or other person holding a place
of trust or profit under the United States, can" be of the numbers of the electors."
And, "as the Vice-President may occasionally become a substitute for the Presl-

180
dent, ...
all the reasons which recoipmend the mtode of election prescribed
for the one, apply with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing
the other."
Tile Second Congress, whose number included Madi-on and many other delegates to the Constitutional Convention, exercised the power given it by the Coilstitiltion by enacting the Succession Act of 1792 (1 Stat. 239) . That Act provided
that in the event of a vacancy in the office, of President and Vice-President the
President pro teinpore of the Senate, or if that office was al.-() vacant, the Speaker
of the House should act as Ireident until "a President shall he elected." It provided also for a special election in any instance where the (luble vacancy ccurred more than six months before the exl)iration of the current term. This
Act was replaced by the Succession Act of 1,S6 (24 Stat. 1 ). which provided
a longer list of "alternate.,; to act as lPresident. in the event of a double vacancy.
until "a Presidint .-hall be elected." While it malde no provision for a special
election it did provide that, if Congress was not in session when the designated
successor took office, he
should
convene the Congress, liresiulally so that it could
j)rovide for such in election.
Not until the Succe:sion Act of 1147 (61 Stat. 310) replaced the Act of 1,.6
did Congress resort to the practice, of doubtful wisdom and doubtful constitutionality, of perrscribing a list of alternate.s to) act as President, ill the event of a
double vacancy. "until the expiration of the then current Presidential tern."
An error was made in 1967 when we adopted the 25th Amendment, Section 2
of which authorized the President and a majority of both houses of Congre:s
to fill a vacancy ill the office of Vice-President with a pIerson who may then
succeed to the office of t1w President. Recent events have demonstrated how that
provision call be successfully employed even by a badly discredited Iresident top
appoliit a Vice-President who could never have been elected to the office. Even
more recent events have (lellonst rated how sich a nonlinee call become a successor
President and then employ the 25th Amendment to designate as h is successor
a man who, despite great efforts and re.soirces, was never able to capture eveni a
nomination for the office.
We would be well advised to return to the original system. If tile office of an
elected Vice-President becomes vacant, let it remain vacatit-oll 16 occasions
covering a iwriod of 37 years we have survived a vacancy in that (oMice. Against
the contingency of a double vacancy, let Congress designate aii officer to serve
as acting President tintili a special election can be promljily called to elect a new
President and Vice-President. IPerlla)s it would le wise, as we releal Set'tion 2
of the 25th Anmendment, to ad(q)t another constitutional A iiendilieit making this

procedure explicit.
Sincerely,
VERN

COUNTRYMAN,

Pr ofessor of Law.

TIiE WHITE IIOUE-REMARKS OF TIE PRESIDENT AND QUESTION AND ANSWER
SESSION AT THE SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS, SIGMA I)ELTA CiII,
D.t. WEBB TOWNE HOUSE
The PRESIDENT. There is a second matter I will discuss briefly before this distinguishied society, whose neinibers I know have a strong sense of history in the
ma king as well as an insatiable interest in good government, both of which I apl)lud. That is the vacancy in the office of the Vice President.
I suplosed I can properly claim to be the worli's champion or world's expert
on tie subject of filling tile Vice P1residency under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
Wheni I suldeily found myself iouninated for this position on October 12, 1973, I
did some research om the debate in the House and the Senate on this important
constitutional amendment which was l)roposed by the Congress in 1965 alid
ratified by the legislatures of 47 States in 1967. Frankly, I was curious as to
what I night have said on the subject, particularly Section 2, which deals with
vacancies in the office of the Vice President.
The fact is, I fould I had not said anything in the debate except to vote "aye",
and the main subject of the debate was the matter of dealing with Presidential
successiois in the event 4)f a President's disability or inability to discharge the

duties of his office.
The replacement of a Vice President was incidental to this, but it seems fair
to infer that the Framers, like the Founding Fathers, coiasldee'ed that office to be
essential to the conduct of the Federal Government, and the orderly succession
of Executive power in any emergency.
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It is implicit in the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as part of the
Constitution that a prolonged vacancy in the second office of the land is undesirable as public policy, and that such vacancies should be filled as promptly as
careful consideration by the President -nd the Congress will permit.
In my case, despite one of the most exhaustive investigations ever undertaken
of anybody not on the FBI's Teti Most Wanted List, tie Congress moved expeditiously and confirmed me within eight weeks of my nomination, although I do
have to admit it, it seemed a little longer than that eight weeks to me.
When I suddenly found myself P"Kesident on August 9, 1974, and the Nation
again without a Vice President, I made it my first or highest priority, aside from
-tfie-Cyprus
crisis, which I walked into, to search out and to select the most
capable and qualified person I could find for that high office.
I finished the task in 11 days and sent to the Senate and to the House the name
of Nelson Rockefeller of New York. That was almost three months ago, and
while I recognize the need of the Congress to take the month off for campaigning-I did it 13 times myself-I believe that the time has come for them to fish or
cut bait in this matter.
I have been assured by Speaker Albert and by Senator Mansfield, the Majority
Leader of the Senate, that they will make every effort to bring the nomination
to a final floor vote before the 93rd Congress adjourns sine die probably in late
)ecember.
,
I am delighted to have their cooperation because I believe it is what the Constltutlon mandates and what the American people want from their Representatives. I am as convinced as ever that Governor Rockefeller is the right mal for
the job, and I am anxious to have him as a working partner in our Federal
Government.
For the future, however, I will propose to the next Congress a re-examination
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment which has been tested twice in as many yeirs to
see if the provisions of Section 2 cannot be tightened up, either by constitutional
amendment, or by public law.
There should be, in my judgment, a specific deadline for the President to nolilinate and for the Congress to confirm a Vice President. If this reasonable period
passes without affirmative action, the Congress would then be required to
promptly oegin confirmation hearings on another nominee.
It has Leen suggested to me--and 1 underline suggested-that if, because of a
partisan deadlock between the President and the Congress, the Congress fails to
act within the deadline, the next constitutional successor, presently the Speaker
of the House of Representatives, should be required to actually assume the Office
of the [Vice] President. Although I am not prel)ared to advocate such a step,
I must say there is really no way, despite secret briefings and all that, that anyone can even, partially be prepared to take over the duties of the Presidency on a
moment's notice without all the participation in the Executive process that a
President can extend to his Vice President.
In this dangerous age. as the Twenty-Fifth Amendment attests, we need a
Vice President at all times, and I speak as one wvho ought to know.
STATEMENT TO TIlE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CONSTITUTIONAl° AMENDMENTS
HY LOUIS J. CAPOZI, GRADUATE ASSISTANT,

ST. JoHIN's U.NivEH"ixr

Two yers after they were returned to office with a tremendous popular mandate, the President and \ice-l'resident of the United States had resigned their
offices because of gross misconduct. For the first time In 200 years, the government
of the United States fell and Americans consigned themselves to a perpetuation
of their democracy. The two transitions which occurred in 1973 and 1974 respectively were smoothened by time very effective 25th Amendment to the Constitution.
The Amendment constitutionalizes a precedent established in 1841 by VicePresident John Tyler who succeeded to the office of the presidency upon1 the death
of William Henry Harrison. In case of the removal, death, resignation, or inability of the President, the Founding Fathers expected the Vice-P1resident to be
Acting President succeeding to the lm)%vers and duties of the office rather than to
the office. Once the Vice-President has succeeded to the Presidency, the Amendment also provides that the office of Vice-President not remain vacant for the
extended leri)ds of time as w%-as common prior to 1967. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that tie succession will go beyond the Vice-President and thus reduces the
possibility of a Speaker of the House of Representatives or a President Pro-tein
of the Senate of opposite political philosophy succeeding to the Presidency.
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The last two sections of the Amendment provide for workable machinery in
case of Presidential inability or disability. Woodrow Wilsons stroke, Franklin
Roosevelts deteriorating health, Dwight Eisenhowers and Lyndon Johnsons heart
attacks made it imperative for the orderly transfer of temporary power to the
Vice-President.
The 25th Amendment works, and fortunately for our country it works well. It
is not an infallible piece of constitutional law. In revising the 25th Amendment,
some scholars suggest that the office of Vice-President be abolished. The office is
significant because the Vice-President may be called upon at any moment to
either succeed to the office or temporarily assume its powers and duties. It is
an office that was filled by men of such high caliber as John Adams, Thomas
Jefferson, John C. Calhoun, Martin Van Buren, Theodore Roosevelt, Thomas R.
Marshall, Calvin Coolidge, Charles Gates Dawes, John Nance Garner. Henry A.
Wallace, and Harry S. Truman. I rise in support of the Vice-Presidency with
these words written by Professor Irving 0. Williams, a specialist in the history
and men of the office:
There Is nothing wrong with the vice presidency that honorable, talented men
cannot overcome. The office can no longer be depreciated; more and more the
electorate will demand in the office top-flight individuals who are capable of
growth.'
One glaring flaw on the 25th Amendment occurred on August 9, 1974. For the
first time in American History, the American People have in the White House a
President who never stood for popular election to either of the two highest offices
in the land. Of course the original framers of the Amendment could not foresee
that such an unprecedented situation of a Presidential and Vice-Presidential
resignation coud occur within the same term. In fact, Congressman Aedanus
Burke of South Carolina was told in 1791, that the chance of change in both the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency within the same term would occur once in 840
years. Mr. Ford is our President though not elected. What is the remedy? I would
propose that if a Section 2 Vice-President succeeded to the office of President,
an immediate special election should occur within 90 days after succession. The
Presidential candidates of the opposite parties would be named by the National
Committees within 10 days. Once the new President was popularly elected, he
would proceed to immediately implement Section 2 of the Amendment. In this
way, the great essentials of our representative form of government as envisioned
by our Founding Fathers would be preserved.
THE RIOIIT OF THE PEOPLE

To

ELEcT THEIR PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT MUST

BE AFlIRMED
Mr. HuMPHREY. Mr. President, I have Joined my distinguished colleague, the
Senator from Rhode Island (Mr. PASTORE) in sponsoring Senate Joint Resolution
26, a Joint resolution proposing a modification of the 25th amendment to the U.S.
Constitution.
I believe this legislation-to provide for a special election for the Office of
President and Vice President when an individual who Ias been appointed Vice
President under the 25th amendment succeeds to the Presidency-is a much
needed and timely measure. It warrants bipartisan support. Enactment of this
resolution will correct a serious constitutional flaw, to insure that tb ultimate
goal of our Nation's democratic process-representation of the peopie--will be
met.
It could be said that the 25th amendment to the Constitution as it now stands
is entirely adequate. People who will argue this, point to Mr. Ford and Mr.
Rockefeller and state that it works, that responsible men are brought into
office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congresses, under
the 25th amendment. I do agree, good men are selected.
However, this reasoning does not address the basic requirement of democratic
government. The foundation of American Qovernment is representation of the
people.
Irving 0. Williams, "The American Vice Presidency," Current Hhistory (June, 1974)
274.
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The 25th amendment calls for the President to appoint a Vice President, should
that office become vacant, for confirmation by Congress. If the President cannot
complete his term, the appointed Vice President becomes President. The result is
that neither this President, nor the Vice President whom he subsequently appoints and Congress confirms, is in office as a result of a popular election.
Although this is a workable procedure as demonstrated by recent events, I
believe that it can be improved. 'lhe people must be able to exercise their constitutional right to choose the President and the Vice President, if the incumbents
of these high offices are unable to fulfill their elected term 12 months or more
before the next general election.
Mr. President, this resolution allows the 25th amendment to continue to operate and fits within the present electoral system. I strongly believe this measure
should be acted upon by Congress without delay. The effective exercise of the
franchise by our citizens is of absolutely crucial importance in assuring the
strength of American democracy. The trust and confidence of the people in their
Government begins at the ballot box where they are given a direct voice in the
choice of their national leadership. ,Government by proxy-where the electorate
is dependent upon the judgment of its representatives in the selection of a President and Vice President-is a serious, weak point in our democratic system that
must be corrected with all possible speed.

J
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PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND VACANCIES IN THE.
OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

AuGusT 13, 1964.-Ordered to be printed

Mr. BATE, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted the
following

REPORT
together with

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. J. Res. 1391
The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the resolution (S.J. Res. 139), proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon, with amendments, and recommends
that the resolution, as amended, do pass.
AMENDMENTS

Onadd
page
line 7, following the word "States" strike the colon
and
the Ifollowing:
within- seven years from the date of its submission by the
Congress:
Strike all of SEC. 1, SEC. 2, SEC. 3, SEc. 4, Src. 5, Szc. 6, and Sr. 7
and insert in lieu thereof the following:
Article SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from

office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become Pesident.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majoritxr
vote of both Houses of Congress.
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SEC. 3. If the President declares in writing that be is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
SEC. 4. If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers And duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as
Acting President.
SEC. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the Congress
his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President, with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body
as Congress may by law provide transmits within two days
to the Congress his written declaration that the President
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
Thereupon Congress shaU immediately decide the issue.
If the Congress determines by two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same .as Acting President; otherwise the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENTS

To substitute perfecting language that was acquired by the reception of testimony from expert witnesses in the field of constitutional
law and from discussion of the problem by members of the subcommittee.
PURPOSE

The purpose of the proposed Senate joint resolution is to provide
for continuity in the office of the Chief Executive in the event that the
President becomes unable to'exercise the powers and duties of the
Office, and further, to provide for the filling of vacancies in the Office
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies occur.
STATEMENT

The constitution provisions
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the executive
power at times of death, resighation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5 reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
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for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is 'the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another -President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change the
substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear that
this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately submitted
was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the Committee
had received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain oily one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with the
qqestion of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convmtion
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingen,:ies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice *,esident John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, v.nder this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United Stltes.
While this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recogniized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5. May 31June 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States bv virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
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Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all have become President
in this manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article IT, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the VicePresident becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, or
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919)).
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice-President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These oonsiderations apparently moved persons such as DanieWebster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency. This
interpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, s .n 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides that:
Th Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
Presi
pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President,
or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic supplied.]
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed materially to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be disposed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
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Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler and Prof.
T eodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for news apers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly
included the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it would
be desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This
damage to' President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the Uited States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of forei n policy such as the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The Brtish Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the. President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screening
board on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Boiling Wilson, "My Memoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Hits," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
of the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, '"Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents involving the physical health of the President served to focus
attention on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to
an informal agreement with Vice
reduce the hazards by means of provided:
President Nixon. The ageement
1. In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President,. and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
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2:-In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson as lias President Johnson with Speaker John
McCormack. Such informal agreements cannot be considered an
adequate solution to the problem because: (A) Their operation would
differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of
the offices; (B) a private agreement cannot give the Vice President
clear authority to discharge powers conferred ()n the President by
the Constituti'on, treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for
the situation in which a dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled. Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers
as well as Attorney General Kennedy agree that the only definitive
method to settle the problem is by means of a constitutional
amendment.
THE NEED POR CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article I, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define
inability so that 'the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to
define the period during which the Vice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a--President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought, to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a ninimumn of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is
more important today than ever before.
'he concert which has been
manifested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and -to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisons relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of 'the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
%4-5,3 () - 7
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with the Constituiion the inability clause remains an untested provision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not, support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate.. They
point out that article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution authorized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication,
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the Congress the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is necesbary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Deputy Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition to the American Bar AssQciation and the
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
have agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,

191
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,-Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York;
Passaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Milwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of disability.
Filling of vacancies in the Office of the President
While the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should a
lapse of Executive authority come to pass.
On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
/( elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the office. Although much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office,'little
thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in-case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally'divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention however, was totally frustrated whea
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
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was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
isappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensuing years to mold the Vice Presidency into an office of inferiority and
disparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, a member of the National Security Council, an a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The death of President Kennedy and the accession of President
Johnson has pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Six.
teen times the United States of America has been without a Vice
President, totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice Presiient's office should the President die. They did not,
however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice Presidential vacancy
could b) fdled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation: or require a constitutional
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
The argument that Congress can designate a Vize President by law
is at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states thatthe Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal
Death, Resignation, or Inability both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected;
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
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and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there i.
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the.
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given.
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers,
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the procedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the Office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the person next, in line to become
familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential succession law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the-President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice-Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatever it be.
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive -argument
in favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute
Initimacy was needed.
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ANALYSIS

.Inabity
The proposal now being submitted'is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 139 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical'practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 embrace the procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practiced that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes
clear that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the
office" that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the
status of the Vice President during the period when he is discharging
the powers and duties of a disabled President.
Section 4 is the first step, of two, that embraces the most difficult
problem of inability-the factual determination of whether or not
inability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the President is disabledshall, with the written approval of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the
powers and duties of the Office as Acting President upon the transmission of such declaration to the Congress.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion and
their possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
Presid, nt, both politically and physically, and presumably most
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familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
,were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constituted
group in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidential
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively simple. No need would exist for a special factfinding
body. 'Nor is a fact-finding bodynecessary if the President can and
does declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dispute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example, if a commission of seven voted 4 to 3 that the President was fit and able to perform his Office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his Office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed
in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.
Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the Presidentto resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission
to the Congress of his written declaration that no inability existed.
However, should the Vice President and a majority of the heads of
the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then they
could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties of
the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the
Congress within 2 days. Once the declaration of the President stating
no inability exists and the declaration of the Vice President and a
majority of the heads of the executive departments stating that
inability exists, have been transmitted to the Congress, then the issue
is squarely joined. At this point the proposal recommends that the
Congress shall make the final determination on the existence of
inability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable, then the Vice President continues
as Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner
to cast a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the
oition that the President was unable to perform the powers and
duties of his office, then the President would resume the powers and
duties of the office. The reconiendation for a vote of two-thirds
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause 6 of
the Constitution relating to impeachments.
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This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.
Vacanuie8
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred
in that Office. The nominee would take office as Vice President once
he had been confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the
Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
positions in our country. The days are long past when it was largely
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the executive branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the recent uninterrupted assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is compatible with the President. The importance of. this compatibility
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties
in according the presidential candidate a voice in choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit
the President to choose his Vice President subject to conrssional
approval. In this way the country would be assured of a ice President of the same political party as the President, someone who would
presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the President.
CONCLUSION

This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional problem from the realm of national concern. It concisely clarifies the
ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In so doing,
it recognizes the vast importance of the office involved, and the necessity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United
States.
The Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments approved this
proposal after hearing testimony and receiving written statements
From many distinguished students on the subject. The subcommittee also had the benefit of considerable study reflected in congressional documents previously published on this subject. In the light
of all this material and evidence, the committee believes that a serious
constitutional gap exists with regard to Presidential inability and
vacancies in the office of the Vice President, and that the proposal
which is now presented is the best solution to the problem.
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RECOMMENDATION

The committee, after considering the several proposals now pending
before it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favor.
ably on Senate Joint Resolution 139, with amendments and recommends its submission to the legislatures of the several States of the
United States so that it may become a part of the Constitution of the
United States.
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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. HRUSKA
The problem of Presidential inability and succession has long
been neglected and ignored. It is for this reason that I welcome the
opportunity to consider the joint resolution now presented to the
Senate.
In the opinion of most legal scholars and writers who have given
this problem careful study, the solution lies in a constitutional
amendment. Considering the gravity of this issue and the ramifications of the solution, it is imperative that in any proposal advanced
the paramount consitutional principle in our governmental framework is preserved. That is the doctrine of separation of powers.
One cannot predict the political crisis in which the Presidential
powers may hang in balance. A review of the cases involving a disabled President reveals the anxiety and confusion which can prevail.
It is also helpful to review the one case involving the impeachment
clause of the Constitution. The intrigue and interplay. within the
Congress during the impeachment trial serves as a warning of clear
and present dangers when Congress is called upon to consider where
to place the mantle of the Presidential powers.
For these reasons our examination of proposed solutions should
carefully weigh the wisdom of adopting a method which does not
explicitly adhere to the principle of separation of powers. The exact
procedure prescribed, if clear and direct, is not my concern. Nor anm
I wedded to any particular language. It is only the principle which
pervades the Constitution which I strongly feel should be respected
by any amendment.
With regard to Senate Joint Resolution 139, my preference would
be to leave the matter of providing a method to subsequent legislation,
so long as it is limited to a determination within the executive branch,
and not lock in any specified plan in constitutional terms. It is
therefore of considerable concern to me that Sehate Joint Resolution
139 not only sets forth a particular method in an amendment but
goes further to provide a procedure whereby Congress can be thrust
into a controversy better left Li the domain of the Executive.
RoMAN L. HnusKA.
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. KEATING
I heartily join in reporting favorably, with the amendments
approved by the committee, this proposed constitutional amendment
to the full Senate.
It is a great forward step, in my judgment, toward the final adoption of a workable solution of. these twin problems, the problems
of succession and inability which from the adoption of the Constitution have loomed as the most serious single threat to the stability
and continuity of the American Presidency as an institution.
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Yet much remains to be done. There is the task of shepherding
this measure, or some version of it, through both Houses of the Congress by the required two-thirds vote in each; and then, for ratification by the States, through the required three-fourths of the State
legislatures.
The process of amending the Constitution poses an additional
dimension to the problem. It is not enough that we devise a solution which on its merits appears to be workable. More is required.
The solution which we adopt here in the Senate must also be acceptable elsewhere. It must be acceptable to at least two-thirds of our
colleagues in the House, many of whom have their own deeply held
convictions, as evidenced in various bills and resolutions, as to how
the problem should be handled. It must be acceptable also to as many
members of 50 State legislatures as will make possible its approval
in at least three-fourths of them. At bottom, of course, this means
that the solution must be acceptable to the American people, who
through their understanding of what needs to be done and their
expression of confidence in what is being proposed, will ultimately
decide the day in the Halls of Congress and n the State houses of
the Nation.
It is not enough, therefore, that Senate Joint Resolution 139, as
it is reported to the Senate, is a good solution and one that I myself
can thoroughly and conscientiously support. What is involved, in
addition, is the extent to which it will muster the support of others,
so that these efforts will not be in vain. This is a weighty practical
consideration. As many who have been concerned with these issues
over the years have said, it is ever so much more important to reach
an attainable solution than to strive for perfection at the considerable
risk of bogging down in disagreement as to precise detail.
It is this reason, among others, which impels me to offer certain substitute language to this resolution which, if adopted, would in my
judgment considerably enhance the chances of ultimate success as wel
as providing an equally workable and in some respects, superior
plan.
These changes, which I shall describe and explain below, would
leave unaffected in their entirety sections 1 and 2 of the proposed
constitutional amendment. Both of these sections, one confirming
the so-called Tyler precedent and extending it to cases of resignation
and impeachment as well as death, the other providing for filling a
vacancy in the Office of Vice President by Presidential nomination
with confirmation by majority vote of both Houses of Congress, have
my unqualified and wholehearted endorsement.
Sections 3, 4, and 5, on the other hand, which would enshrine quite
detailed procedures on Presidential inability into the Constitution,
give me serious pause. In my judgment, it would be preferable to
simply provide by constitutional amendment that Congress shall have
the authority to establish inability procedures by ordinary legislation. This would avoid freezing any particular method into the
Constitution itself, make it easier to change the method if unforeseen defects are revealed by the actual operation of an congressionally prescribed plan, and most important, so simplify the amendment
as to make it more readily understood and, hopefully, more likely of
final congressional approval and ratification in the States.
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I therefore intend to offer an amendment to Senate Joint Resolution 139, which would strike present sections 3, 4, and 5, and insert
instead the following new sections 3,4, and 5:
SEC. 3. In case of the inability of the President to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the said
powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President as
Acting President until the inability be removed.
SEC. 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of
removal death, resiLgnation, or inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall then be
President, or in the case of inability, act as President, and
such officer shall be or act as President accordingly, until a
President shall be elected or, in the case of inability, until the
inability shall be earlier removed.
SEC. 5. The Congress may prescribe by law the method
by which the commencement and termination of any inability shall be determined.
These three sections which I am proposing to substitute are identical
to the last three sentences of Senate Joint Resolution 35, sponsored
by the late Senator Kefauver and myself. Senate Joint Resolution
35 had earlier been approved by the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments and at this moment is still pending on the agenda of
the parent Judiciary Committee.
Section 3 as I propose to amend it would make it clear that it is
not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the office" of the
President which devolve on the Vice President in cases of Presidential
inability. By establishing the title of Acting President, the proposal
would further clarify the status of the Vice President during the
period when he is discharging the powers and duties of a disabled
President. In addition, it would make clear that the President may
reassume the powers and duties of his office when his inability has
ended. In all these respects, section 3 as I offer it would be identical
to section 3 of Senate Joint Resolution 139, except that no specific
provision would be made for a Presidential declaration of his own
inability which would temporarily displace him from the exercise of
his powers and duties. Rather, under this proposal, the method by
which the commencement of any period of inability is to be determined would be left for Congress to decide by ordinary legislation,
as explained below.
The section 4 that I propose would clarify the authority of Congress
to legislate on the subject of Presidential succession, both in cases of
removal, death, and resignation, and also in cases of inability. It
would permit Congress to declare "what officer shall be President"
where both the President and Vice President have been eliminated
by removal, death1 or resignation. Then, if neither the President
nor the Vice President is able to discharge the powers and duties
of the Presidency due to their inability, the Congress would also be
_____-enabledto-declare what officer shallact as President * * * until a President shall be elected,
or * * * until the inability shall be removed.
Finally, the section 5 that I will offer would authorize Congress
to prescribe by law "the method by which the commencement and
termination of any inability shall be determined." This provision
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is at the heart of the amendments I propose, and represents my chief
point of- difference with Senate Joint Resolution 139 as reported.
Past efforts to frame a constitutional amendment on inability have
endeavored, like'Senate Joint Resolution 139, to set out in detail the
procedure to determine commencement and termination of a period of
Presidential inability. At one time, I myself favored the inability
commission approach, and even at this late date there are quite a
number of bills and resolutions in Congress to set up a commission.
These proposals have varied greatly in detail as to the membership
of such a commission but most of them provide for either Cabinet,
congressional, judicial, or medical representation, or a combination
of one or more of these. Every such ro osal, however, has become
bogged down in argument as to whether, for example, Cabinet
members who presumptively owe their primary loyalty to the President would overcome reluctance to take action adverse to him; or
whether the service of legislators or judges on a commission would
violate the spirit of the separation of powers doctrine; or whether
doctors can be expected to participate wisely in the formulation of
what is, at bottom, a political decision.
At long last, and after much debate, Senator Kefauver and I,
simply as two Senators who had long sought a practical solution to
this problem, agreed that if anything was going to be done, all of
the detailed procedures which had been productive of delay and controversy had best be scrapped for the time being in favor of merely
authorizing Congress in a constitutional amendment to deal with
particular methods by ordinary legislation. This, we agreed. would
later allow Congress to pick and choose the best form among all
the proposals without suffering the handicap of having to rally a
two-thirds majority in each House to do it. Senate Joint Resolution
35 was introduced to carry out the consensus we had reached.
The language of Senate Joint Resolution 35 stemmed initially from
the New York Bar Association, aid presently has the support of its
committee on constitutional law. Its basic provisions were also favorably recommended by the American Bar Association's Committee
on Jurisprudence and Law Reform in 1960, and in 1962 the American
Bar Association reaffirmed its endorsement of what is now Senate
Joint Resolution 35. At that time, the Association of the Bar of the
-it" 6- e'wYrl en-do-rseditioo. As recently as June of 1963, the
then president-elet nominee of the American Bar Association testified in behalf of the association before the Constitutional Amendments Subcommittee in support of Senate Joint Resolution 85.
Finally, the Deputy Attorney General, speaking for the Department
of Justice, who testified in 1963 and who has reaffirmed his earlier
testimony this year as still reflecting the Department's views, is in
favor of the approach of Senate Joint Resolution 35. In short, at
one time or another, Senate Joint Resolution 35 has had the approval
of all of the bar associations which had devoted years of careful study
and consideration to this problem. And while neither President Kennedy nor President Johnson chose to take a personal stand on any
particular proposal, it may be fairly said that the Justice Department's continued endorsement of Senate Joint Resolution 35 is closely
tantamount to an administration position.
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As I understand it, the principal objection to the approach taken by
Senate
35 of
haspresidential
been that itinability,
would give
"blank Joint
check" Resolution
in the area
and Congress
that Statea
legislators especially would balk at a "blank check" constitutional
amendment. A part from the fact that the Constitution in major
part is full of "blank check" provisions-the enumerated powers of
Congress under article I provide the most noteworthy example-and that, moreover, the States have previously ratified "blank check"
amendments such as, for example, the income tax amendment, and the
prohibition amendment which left all enforcement details to Congress, the short answer is that Congress here would not be left free
to do whatever it wishes. Here is what the Deputy Attorney General,
speaking for the Justice Department, had to say on that point:
One objection may be that this provision is a blank check
which, if abused, could upset the balance of power between
the legislative and executive branches, and place the President at the mercy of a hostile Congress. I think this danger
is quite remote, and at, all events not great enough to outweigh the advantages of conferring this auth'brity upon the
Congress which represents the national electorate over more
complex constitutional provisions. If the methods adopted
by Congress for dealing with the problem do not meet the
standards of the separation of powers or otherwise satisfy
the President, he may veto the bill, and his veto could be
overridden only by two-thirds of each House. Moreover, if
Congress enacts a measure which is approved bv the President, and thereafter attempts to amend or repeal it, its action
will also be subject to approval or veto by the President.
It seems unlikely, therefore, that any bill would ever be
enacted into law which was not acceptable to the President,
and which did not-afford adequate protection to the people
and to the office of President (1964 hearings, p. 201).
It should be added to this, of course, that the President's approval
is not required for a proposed constitutional amendment to go to the
States for ratification. In my judgment, it is very important, both as
a matter of substance and symbolically, that the Presidency as an
institution place its imprimatur upon whatever concrete procedures
on presidential inability are ultimately decided upon. Establishing
inability procedures by ordinary statute, as would be authorized by
my proposed section 5, would permit the President, in behalf of himself and the office he occupies, to participate in the process of setting
up proper inability procedures.
I cannot too enthusiastically join in the fine analysis of the Deputy
Attorney General as to the other overriding advantages of the flexible
approach embodied in Senate Joint Resolution 35. The Deputy
Attorney General has stated:
* * * The wisdom of loading the Constitution down b.

writing detailed procedural and substantive provisions into it
has been questioned by many scholars and statesmen. The
framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of using broad
and expanding concepts and principles that could be adjusted
to keep pace with current needs. The chances are that sup-
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plemental legislation would be required in any event. In
addition, crucial and urgent new situations may arise in the
changing future * * * where it may be of importance that
Congress, with the President's approval, should be able to
act promptly without being required to resort to still another amendment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution 35 makes this possible.
Since it is difficult. to foresee all of the possible circumstances in which the Presidential inability problem could
arise, we are opposed to any constitutionalamendment which
attempts to solve all these question8 by a series of complex
procedures. We think that the best solution to the basic
problems that remain would be a simple constitutional
amendment, such as Senate Joint Resolution 35, * * *. Such

an amendment would supply the flexibility which we think
is indispensable and, at the same time, put to rest what legal
problems may exist under the present provisions of the
Constitution as supplemented by practice and understanding.
[Emphasis supplied.] (1964 hearings, p. 203.)
And finally, I repeat that the simpler amendment, so capable of
ing readily understood by the people and by their representatives
in the State legislatures, is intheltraditionof, onst tuion-making.
The States have ratified a whole series of amendments giving Con$ress the power to enforce them "by appropriate legislation," including the 13th amendment prohibiting slavery; the 14th amendment's
due process equal protection and other civil rights clauses; the 15th
amendments voting guarantees; the 16th amendment's broad grant
of income-taxing authority; the 18th or prohibition amendment; the
19th or womens suffrage amendment- and the 23d or District of
Columbia vote amendment. .There is absolutely no reason why State
legislators should not wish to grant similar broad powers to Congress
here where, unlike as in many previous amendments, no fundamental clash is involved between the respective powers of the
Federal and State governments and the matter merely goes to the
mechanics, although very important mechanics to be sure, of coping
with potential emergencies in the office of Chief Executive of the
Federal Government.
So that there may be no basis for misunderstanding, I intend to
-offer my proposed amendments not out of intransigent opposition to
Senate Joint Resolution 139 but out of a firm belief that the Senate
should be afforded an opportunity to exercise its best political judgment in choosing between two reasonable alternatives. Most if not
all of us are wefi enough acquainted with our respective State legislatures to form a rough "guesstimate" as to which alternative will
fare better in the process of submitting an amendment to the States
for ratification. And all of us, I am sure, have our firm notions as to
the nature of constitution-makin-g and hwbest toframe
a provision
which the American people may have to live with for a long time.
If the amendments I intend to offer are approved by a majority of
the Senate, other members of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, we have agreed, will be prepared to endorse the now
sections and work for their approval in the States. On the other
-hand, if my amendments are not approved here, I shall fully and
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unreservedly vote for Senate Joint Resolution 139 as it presently
stands and do all within my power to finally bring about its adoption
as a solution to this most important and fundamental problem of
American Government.
KztNETH B. KzATINO.
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the following

REPORT
together with
INDIVIDUAL VIEWS
[To accompany S. J. Res. 11

The Committee on the Judiciary, to which was referred the resolution (S.J. Res. 1), proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the
same, reports favorably thereon with amendments and recommends
that the resolutionamamended be agreed to.
AMENDMENTS

On page 2, in line 14, strike "If the President declares in writing"
and insert in lieu thereof: "Whenever the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration".
On page 2, strike the entire text of section 4, and insert in lieu
thereof the following:
Whenever the Vice President, and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments or such other body
as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
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On page 3, in lines 1 and 2, strike the word "Con- gress" and insert
in lieu thereof the following:
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives
On page 3, in line 5, strike the word "heads" and insert in lieu
thereof the following: "principal officers".
On page 3, in line 9, strike the words "will immediately" and insert
in lieu thereof "shall immediately proceed to".
PURPOSE OF AMENDMENTS

The text of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, requires, under
certain contingencies, for a written declaration to be made by the
President, under section 3, and by the Vice President and principal
officers of the executive departments under sectionof4,the
and
by the
executive
President, the Vice President and principal officers
departments under section 5. It is the intention of the committee
that for the best interests of the country to be served, notice by all
parties should be public notice. The committee feels that notice by
transmittal to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives guarantees notice to the entire country.
The committee is concerned about the possibility that such written
declaration might be transmitted during a period in which Congress
was not in session. In this event the committee feels that transmittal
of such written declaration to the presiding officers of both Houses,
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, would be sufficient transmittal under the terms of this
amendment.
It is the opinion of the committee that, under the language of
section 5, Congress is empowered to reconvene in special session to
consider any disability question arising under this section. Furthermore, under the language of this section, the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives would be required
to call a special session of the Congress to consider the question of
presidential inability whenever the President's abiit to perform the
powers and duties of his office are questioned under the terms of
section 5. However, nothing contained in this proposed amendment
should be construed to limit the power of the President from exercising
his existing constitutional authority to call for a special session of
the Congress.
It is further understood by the committee that should the President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives not be
found in their offices at the time the declaration was transmitted that
transmittal to the office of such presiding officers would suffice for
sufficient notice under the terms of this amendment.
It is the judgment of the committee that the language "principal
officers of the executive departments" more adequately conveys the
intended meaning of sections 4 and 5, that only those members of the
President's official Cabinet were to participate in any decision of
disability referred to under these sections. This language finds
precedent under article II, section 2, clause 1, of the Constitution.
The pertinent language there reads as follows:
he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal
Officer in each of the executive Departments,
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In its discussion of the ramifications of section 5, the committee
considered it important to add additional stress to the interpretation
of two questions which might arise:
(1) Who has the powers and duties of the office of the President
while the provisions of section 5 are being implemented?
(2) Under what sense of urgency is Congress required to act in
carrying out provisions of this section?
Under the terms of section 3 a President who voluntarily transfers
his powers and duties to the Vice President may resume these powers
and duties by making a written declaration of his ability to perform
the powers and duties of his office and transmitting such declaration
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. This will reduce the reluctance of the President to utilize
the provisions of this section in the event he fears it would be difficult
for him to regain his powers and duties once he has voluntarily
relinquished them.
However, the intent of section 5 is that the Vice President is to
continue to exercise the powers and duties of the office of Acting President until a determination on the President's inability is made by
Congress. It is also the intention of the committee that the Congress should act swiftly in making this determination, but with sufficient opportunity to gather whatever evidence it determined necessary
to make such a final determination. The language, as amended, reads
as follows:
Thereupon Congress shall immediately proceed to decide the
issue.
It was the opinion of the committee that the words "Thereupon",
"shall", and "immediately" were sufficiently strong to indicate the
necessity for prompt action.
Precedence for the use of the word "immediately" and the interpretation thereof may be found in the use of this same word, "immediately" in the 12th amendment to the Constitution. In the 12th
amendment, in the event no candidate for President receives a
majority of the electoral votes, the House of Representatives "shall
choose Immediately,". The committee was of the opinion that the
same sense of urgency attendant to the use of the word "immediately"
in the 12th amendment when Congress was in fact deciding who
would be the President of the United States should be attendant in
proceedings in which the Congress was deciding whether the President
of the United States should be removed from his office because of
his inability to perform the powers and duties thereof.
The committee is concerned that congressional action under the
terms of section 5 should be taken under the greatest sense of urgency.
However, because of the complexities involved in determining different
types of disability, it is felt unwise to prescribe any specific time
limitation to congressional deliberation thereupon. Indeed, the
committee feels that Congress should be permitted to collect all
necessary evidence and to participate in the debate needed to make
a considered judgment.
The discussion of the committee made it abundantly clear that the
proceedings in the Congress prescribed in section 5 would be pursued
under rules prescribed, or to be prescribed, by the Congress itself.
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PURPOSE OF THE RESOLUTION AS AMENDED

The purpose of Senate Joint Resolution 1, as amended is to provide
for continuity in the office of the Chief Executive [in the event that
the President becomes unable to exercise the powers and duties of the
office] and further, to provide for the filling of vacancies in the office
of the Vice President whenever such vacancies may occur.
STATEMENT

The constitutionalprovision8
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the executive
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the Office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5 reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
O cer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers or duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change the
substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear that
this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately submitted
was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the Committee
had received.
The inbility clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a matter of fact., the records of the Convention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with the
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question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention

-disc-ls-e.

It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
while this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Congressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 31June 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5 that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation removal from office, or
inability. In all four contingencies, the constitutionn states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the President.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
The Tyler precedent, therefore, has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Yale University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
that the Constitution, while causing either -the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President-'until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
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office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency. This
interpretation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5 of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chus6 their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President,
or
when he
shallsupplied.]
exercise the office of President of the United
States.
[fta/ic
The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the United States it has contributed materially to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department at that time which required the attention of a,
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be disposed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision,
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contAin
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly
included the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's- Cabinet were of the view that it would
be desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919 that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
sigature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, _pp. 232-235). The President's
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wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screening
board on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Boiling Wilson, "My Memoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White House," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
of the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary
of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). -Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tum Uty, "Woodrow
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents
involving the physical health of the President served to focus attention
on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability, and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the
office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of- the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. he President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson as did President Johnson with Speaker John
McCormack and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Such informal
agreements cannot be considered an adequate solution to the problem
because: (A) Their operation would differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of the offices; (B) a private
agreement cannot give the Vice President clear authority to discharge powers conerred on the President by the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for the situation in
which a dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well as Attorney
General Kennedy agree that the only definitive method to settle the
problem is by means of a constitutional amendment.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the diffictiltir which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is lm-,iear, its; application uncertain. The
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clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define
inability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
otoriods. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to
define the period during which the ice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be preventedfrom
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive authority is
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been
mainfested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested provision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutionally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
point out that article II, section 1, clause 5 of the Constitution authorized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
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situation which concerns only a disabled President, with the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The Constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the Congress the authority to
make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment isnecessary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition to the American Bar Association and the
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
have agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New YorkPassaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Milwaukee, Wis.
The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this subject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office. Under
these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of disability.

Filling of vacancies in the Office of the President
While the records of the Consititutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should a
lapse of Executive authority come to pass;
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On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the office. Although much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President: (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the' powers and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
disappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in ensuing years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority and
disparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities, a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for the President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
muc4 of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The death of President Kennedy and the accession of President
Johnson in 1963 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
times the United States of America has been without a Vice President,
totaling 37 years during our history.
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As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,
however, provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
The argument that Congress can designate a Vice President by law
is at best a weak one. The power of Congress in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6 which states thatthe Conress may by law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death Resignation, or Inability, both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what officer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the'
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer to that question is "Yes." The Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who. is to perform it in his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4,
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5_provides that, the Senate shall choose its other officers
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than by the procedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22 can be, the President of the
Senate.
. One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the person next in line to become
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familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policy-making decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says noting about such duties and there is
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential succession law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice-Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatever it be.
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive arument
in favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Congress-to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it would seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute
legitimacy was needed.

Inablit

ANALYSIS

The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have-been outlined
earlier.
Article II, section 1, clause'5 of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolv6- upop the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, wheli it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. It separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3, 4, and 5 embrace the procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
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By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes
clear that it is not the "'office" but the "powers and duties of the
office" that devolve on.;the Vice President and further clarifies the
status of the Vice President during the period when he is discharging
the powers and duties of a disabled President.
Section 4 is the first step, of two, that embraces the most difficult
problem of inability-the factual determination of whether or not
inability exists. Under this section, if a President does not declare
that an inability exists, the Vice President, if satisfied that the President is disabledshall, with the written approval of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the
powers and duties of the Office as ActinglPresident upon the transmission of such-declaration to the Congress.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if ome assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.
There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constituted
group in the nature of a factfindinfg body to determine presidential
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many dilemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
declare his own inability the factual determination of inability would
be relatively sim le. No need would exist for a special factflnding
body. Nor is a ]actfinding body necessary if the President can and
does declare his own inabilty. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwilling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dispute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example, if a commission of seven voted 4 to 3 that the President was fit and able to perform his Office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his Office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed
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in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemeddesirable in light of subsequent experience.
Section 5 of the proposed amendment would permit the President
to resume the powers and duties of the office upon his transmission
to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives of his written declaration that no inability existed. 1fowever, should the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments feel that the President is unable, then
they could prevent the President from resuming the powers and duties
of the office by transmitting their written declaration so stating to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 days. Once the declaration of the President stating
no inability exists has been transmitted to the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, then the issue is
squarely joined. At this point the proposal recommends that the
Congress shall make the final determination on the existence of
inability. If the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable, then the Vice President continues
as Acting President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner to cast a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the
position that the President was unable to perform the powers and
duties of his office, then the President would resume the powers and
duties of the office. The recommendation for a vote of two-thirds
is in conformity with the provision of article I, section 3, clause 6, of
the Constitution relating to impeachments.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.

Vacanrci
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person who meets the existing constitutional qualifications
to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once he had been
confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal; it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
ositions in our country. The days are long past when it. was largely
honorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
For more than a decade the Vice President, has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the executive branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy, there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
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It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is compatible with the President. The importance of this compatibility
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties
in according the presidential candidate a voice in choosing his running
mate subject to convention approval. This proposal would permit
the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional
approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice President of the same political party as the President, someone who would
presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the President.
CONCLUSION

This amendment seeks to remove a vexatious constitutional problem from the realm of national concern. It seeks to concisely clarify
the ambiguities of the present provision in the Constitution. In so
doing, it recognizes the vast importance of the office involved, and the
necessity to maintain continuity of the Executive power of the United
States.
The committee approved this proposal after its subcommittee heard
testimony and received written statements from many distinguished
students on the subject. Last year the subcommittee also had the
benefit of considerable study reflected in congressional documents
previously published on this subject. In the light of all this material
and evidence, and for the fact that 76 Senators have sponsored Senate
Joint Resolution 1, the committee believes that a serious constitutional
gap exists with regard to Presidential inability and vacancies in the
office of the Vice President, and that the proposal which is now
presented is the best solution to the problem.
RECOMMENDATION

The committee, after considering the several proposals now pending
before it relating to the matter of Presidential inability, reports favorably on Senate Joint Resolution 1 and recommends its submission to
the legislatures of the several States of the United States so that it
may become a part of the Constitution of the United States.
COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER AND RETAINED WORDING

The committee amendments to the Senate joint resolution are shown
as follows: Provisions of the resolution as introduced which are
omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in italics,
provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
"ArticleSEC. 1. In case of the removal of the President from

office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
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who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
SEC. 3. [If the President declares in writing] Whenever the
President transmits to the Prisident of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration
that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
Office, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the
Vice President as Acting President.
SEC. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the]
Whenever the Vice President [with the written concurrence
of] and a majority of the heads] principal offers of the
executive departments or such other body as on press may
by law provide, transmit[s] to the [Congress his] President
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatis
their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shell immediately assume the powers and duties of
the office as Acting President.
SEC. 5. Whenever the President transmits to the [Congress] President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that no inability
exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President, with the written concurrence of a
majority of the [heads] principal officers of the executive
departments or such other body as Congress may by law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his
written declaration that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress
wiIi shall immediately proceed to decide the issue. If the
congress determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to
discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise the
President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF
SENATOR EVERETT McKINLEY DIRKSEN
When the Congress considers amendments to the Constitution, it
deals not with the problems of today , or yesterday, or tomorrow, but
in terms of the grand sweep of our NIation's history and future. The
Constitution is the basic charter of our Government. It is axpropriate to keep its function separate from the various laws we derive
from it, laws that are designed to meet specific problems as they may
arise. The Constitution must meet the test of time. It can do this
only if it provides the means by which the Congress may meet the
needs of the moment, not the solution to specific problems.
The questions of Presidential succession and Presidential inability
are not new to the Senate. It has been wrestling with them for many
years. Time and again it has tried its hand at contriving an amendment to the Constitution to deal with the problems. But each time
when the Senate almost reaches a conclusion as to language for the
amendment it becomes aware that its labors have been so narrowly
directed to the problems arising out of particular events that it has
failed to think and write in the broad fundamental concepts which are
necessary to a constitutional amendment. And then, because it
realizes the dangers of a job half done, it does nothing at all.
Congress cannot go along that way any further. It must deal with
the problems of Presidential succession and Presidential inability by a
constitutional amendment. It is necessary that the pertinent provision of the Constitution dealing with vacancy or inability, article
II, section 1, that reads as follows: *
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers
and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the
Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of
the President and the Vice President, declaring what Officer
shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordinglb, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall
be elTected.
be amended to clarify whether the devolution is of the Office of the
President or only -of his powers and duties. Presumably it is the
former in the case of death or resignation and the latter in case of
inability. Be that as it may, it has been the uncertainty of construction of this language that in the past has prevented Vice Presidents from assuming authority during the periods of disability of
various Presidents. Next, it is essential that the Constitution provide
a means of dealing with the other matters encompassed in Senate
Joint Resolution 1. But the amendment should not deal with details.
They can be handled by statute and rightly should be.
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This solution was well laid out before this committee last year and 2
years ago by the then Deputy Attorney General of the United States,
Mr. Katzenbach. His entire statement in the 1963 hearings, incorporated again in the 1964 hearings, should be read by everyone who
is considering this problem. Let me only emphasize his concluding
thoughts:
Apart from the wisdom of loading the Constitution down
by writing detailed procedural and substantive provisions
into it has been questioned by many scholars and statesmen.
The framers of the Constitution saw the wisdom of using
broad and expanding concepts and principles that could be
adjusted to keep pace with current needs. The changes are
that supplementallegislation would be required in any event.
In addition, crucial and urgent new situations may arise
in the changing future-not covered by Senate Joint Resolution 28 '-where it may be of importance that Congress,
with the President's approval, shouldbe able to act promptly
without being required to resort to still another amendment to the Constitution. Senate Joint Resolution 35-1
makes this possible- Senate Joint Resolution 28 1 does not.

Since it is difficult to foresee all of the possible circumstances in which the Presidential inability problem could
arise, we are opposed to any constitutional amendment
which attempts to solve all these questions by a series of
complex procedures. We think that the best solution to
the basic problems that remain would be a simple constitutional amendment, such as Senate Joint Resolution 35,1

which treats the contingency of inability differently from
situations such as death, removal, or resignation, which
states that the Vice President in case of Presidential inability succeeds only to the powers and duties of the Office
as Acting President and not to the Office itself, and which
declares that the commencement and termination of any
inability may be determined by such methods as Congress
by law shall provide. Such an amendment would supply
the flexibility which we think is indispensable and, at the
same time, put to rest what legal problems may exist under
the present provisions of the Constitution as supplemented
by practice and understanding.
Senate Joint Resolution 35, referred to by Mr. Katzenbach, now
the Attorney General, and modified in accordance with his suggestions
reads as follows:
ArticleIn case of the removal of the President from office or of
his death or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the
Vice President, in case of the inability of the President to
discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the said
powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President as
Acting President until the inability be removed. The Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation or inability, both of the President and Vice
188th Cong.
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President, declaring what officer shall then be President,
or in case of inability, act as President, and such officer
shall be or act as President accordingly, until a President
shall be elected or, in case of inability, until the inability
shall be earlier removed. The commencement and termination of any inability may be determined by such method as
Congress shall by law provide.
I, therefore, propose that we adopt as a constitutional amendment
this proposal which not only bears the imprimatur of the two distinguished men who were then Members of the Senate, Senator Kefauver
and Senator Keating, but which was so persuasively supported by the
Attorney General. He has confirmed to me that he still holds those
views. And in his testimony this year he said only that he would
notBut
insist
preference he
had expressed
past.
suchona the
constitutional
amendment
wouldinbetheonly
the beginning.
We must then prepare specific legislation to establish the mechanics
and the details of Presidential succession and inability. It could be
in much the same language as that proposed by the Senator from
Indiana for a constitutional amendment.
This course of action has one advantage above all others. It
removes the fear that we may embed in the Constitution procedures
which may not turn out to be workable. If they are in a statute we
can change them. If they become a part of the Constitution, it
would take another constitutional amendment to change them.
Indeed the events of the past few days have created a presumption
and perhaps a conclusive presumptioxi that a constitutional amendment in the form reported will be ill advised. In testimony before
the Committee on the Judiciary of the other body, the Attorney
General has given further indication of doubts he holds about the
adequacy of the language of Senate Joint Resolution 1. Is section 3
permitting the President to declare his inability if he transmits a
declaration in writing to the Senate and the House to be used when
the President is having a tooth pulled? Is it to be used when he is
out of the country on a visit to Mexico or to a NATO meeting, or
perhaps when he is in the air at any time? If so, then we have
imposed in the Constitution a very cumbersome procedure for him
to take- back his powers and duties. We have provided the same
mechanics for an inability of a few minutes, or a few hours, as we
have for long periods of illness.
Then, too, as has been suggested by those who have studied Senate
Joint Resolution 1 in the form reported by the committee, there are
many things which are not covered by the detailed language of this
amendment which perhaps should be covered if we are going into such
detail instead of adopting broad constitutional language which can be
applied by statute to situations as they may arise. If one of the purposes of the amendment is to provide to the greatest extent possible
for the filling of the Office of Vice President, have we done so? What
happens if the President, is disabled for many months and the Vice
President assumes his powers and duties as Acting President? Can
he apoint a Vice President, or must that Office remain empty?
Surely there is as much chance that some ill may befall the mortal
who is Acting President due to the disability of the President as there
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would be if he succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the
President. By moving into this area with a constitutional amendment containing such specifics dealing with the one case we may have
foreclosed ourselves from dealing by statute with other parts of the
problem. On the other hand the broader language of Senate Joint
Resolution 35, 88th Congress, would permit us to deal with this whole
problem by statute.
And, let us never forget, that it is often argued that because situations of great variety and complexity may arise at any time in the
conduct of our foreign relations and in the administration of the laws
which we pass, we should not too tightly or too rigidly control the
exercise of discretion by those who must deal with the problems. But
by writing such specifics into the Constitution as are proposed by
Senate Joint Resolution 1 as reported, we are even more tightly and
more rigidly binding ourselves in dealing with the details of problems
of Presidential succession and inability.
We should certainly heed the wisdom of the Attorney General when
he testified on the merits of the various proposals last year and the year
before. And we should give thought to the implications of all the
assumptions the Attorney General felt constrained to make when he
testified this year. Let us see what he said:
First, I assume that in using the phrase "majority vote of
both Houses of Congress" in section 2, and "two-thirds vote
of both Houses" in section 5, what is meant is a majority and
two-thirds vote, respectively, of those Members in each House
present and voting, a quorum being present. This interpretation would be consistent with longstanding precedent (see,
e.g., Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919)).
Second, I assume that the procedure established by section
5 for restoring the President to the powers and duties of his
office is applicable only to instances where the President has
been declared disabled without his consent, as provided in
section 4; and that, where the President has voluntarily
declared himself unable to act, in accordance with the procedure established by section 3, he could restore himself immediately to the powers and duties of his office by declaring in
writing that his inability has ended. The subcommittee may
wish to consider whether language to insure this interpretation should be added to section 3.
Third, I assume that even where disability was established
originally pursuant to section 4, the President could resume
the powers and duties of his Office immediately with the
concurrence of the Acting President, and would not be
obliged to await the expiration of the 2-day period
mentioned in section 5.
Fourth, I assume that transmission to the Congress of the
written declarations referred to in section 5 would, if Congress
were not then in session, operate to convene the Congress in
special session so that the matter could be immediately
resolved. In this regard, section 5 might be construed as
impliedly requiring the Acting President to convene a special
session in order to raise an issue as to the President's inability
pursuant to section 5.
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Further in this connection I assume that the language used
in section 5 to the effect that Congress "will immediately
decide" the issue means that if a decision were not reached
by the Congress immediately, the powers and duties of the
Office would revert to the President. This construction is
sufficiently doubtful, however, and the term "immediately"
is sufficiently vague, that the subcommittee may wish to
consider adding certainty by including more precise language
in section 5 or by taking action looking toward the making
of appropriate provision in the rules of the House and Senate.
In my testimony during the hearings of 1963, I expressed
the view that the specific procedures for determining the
commencement and termination of the President's inability
should not be written into the Constitution, but instead
should be left to Congress so that the Constitution would
not be encumbered by detail.
The fact that we give heed and thought to these suggestions does
not mean that we do nothing about the problem of presidential
succession and disability. Indeed, we must do something. Let us
do it with the sweep of history in our mind and pen rather than the
shackles of specifics.
EVERTT£I MCKINLEY DIRKSEN.
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INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF SENATOR ROMAN L. HRUSKA
Agreements devised by the President and his Vice President in past
administrations to cope with an inability crisis are not satisfactory
solutions. Recent history has also made us very much aware of the
need for filling the Office of Vice President when a vacancy arises.
It is abundantly clear that, rather than continue these informal
agreements, the only sound approach is the adoption of a constitutional amendment.
The hearings, which have been held on this important subject in
recent years and in which this Senator has had the opportunity to
participate, have led me to prefer a different approach than the
present one. As in other legislative matters, the finished product
requires the refinement of individual preferences. In the spirit of
this simple reality,- I shall support the proposed amendment. It is
my earnest hope that the Congress and the State legislatures will
,pprove and ratify it promptly. There is, however, one amendment
which I would urge, as discussed at a later point.
There are two major reasons for my acceptance of the proposed
amendment.
The first is the urgent need for a solution. Differences of opinion
in Congress have deprived us of a solution for far too long. It is
time that these constitutional shortcomings be met.
Secondly, the proposed language approaches the product which
would have resulted under the proposal which I had urged, so that
this amendment is acceptable.
Nevertheless, it is in order to state the bases of my earlier preference and the preference of three Attorneys General.
The proposed amendment would distinguish the inability situation
from the three other contingencies of permanent nature; death, resignation, and removal from office, and would recognize that, in the first
instance, the Vice President becomes Acting President only.
At thispoint, we encounter the first major difference of opinion.
Some would advocate spelling out the procedure for determining
inability within the language of the proposed amendment. 1 disagree with the method of locking into the Constitution those procedures deemed appropriate today but which, in the light of greater
knowledge and experience may be found wanting tomorrow.
The preferred course would be for the amendment to authorize the
Congress to establish an apro rate procedure by law. This practice
parallels the situation of Presidential succession, wherein the power is
delineated by the Constitution but the detail is left for later determination.
I would also add one fundamental limitation to the process.
I refer to the doctrine of separation of powers. The maintenance
of the three distinct branches of Government, coequal in character,
has long been accepted as one of the most important safeguards for

the preservation of the Republic.
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The executive branch should determine the presence of and termination of the inability of the President. It is my view that a method
which would involve neither the judicial nor the legislative branch of
the Government would be the better course.
The determination of Presidential inability and its termination is
obviously a factual matter. No policy is involved. The issue is
simply whether a specific individual with certain physical, mental, or
emotional impairments possesses the ability to continue as the Chief
Executive or whether his infirmity is so serious and severe as to render
him incapable of executing the duties of his Office.
Injecting Congress into the factual question of inability does create
a secondary impeachment procedure, although limited, in which the
conduct of the President would not be the test.
The impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson affords a
clear illustration of the dangers presented when Congress performs a
judicial function. The intrigue and interplay within the Congress
during the impeachment trial serves as a warning of clear and present
dangers which exist when Congress is called upon to consider where to
t
t
place the mantle of the presidential powers.
An additional cornpe ling argument for restricting this authority
to the executive branch is that this determination must be made with
a minimum of delay. Although this objection has been alleviated in
the present language, the executive branch is clearly best equipped to
respond promptly as well as effectively in the face of such a crisis.
Obviously, such a decision must rest on the relevant and reliable
facts regarding the President's physical or mental faculties. It must
be divorced from any thoughts of political advantage, personal
prejudice, or other extraneous factors. Those possessing such firsthand
information about the Chief Executive, or most accessible to it on a
personal basis, are found within the executive branch and not elsewhere.
We must be mindful that the President is chosen by the people
of the entire Nation. It is their wish and their right that he serve
as President for the term for which he was chosen. Every sensible and
sympathetic construction favoring his continued Xerformance of
presidential duties should be accorded him. Indeed, were error to
be committed, it should be in favor of his continuation in office or,
were it interrupted by a disability, by his resumption of the office at
the earliest possible moment upon recovery. The members of the
executive branch are best situated to protect that interest.
What briefly has. been developed is the basis of my view that
Congress should not be injectedlintojthbe decision-making process in
igprcsi
cases of presidential inability-r-recovery.
Considerable reference has been made in the discussion of Senate
Joint Resolution 1 to the 76 cosponsors of the proposed resolution.
Cosponsorship of a proposal does not mean acceptance of detail and
the exact text. I am certain that cosponsors do not consider themselves bound by a proposal as introduced. Cosponsorship does not
indicate a desire to proceed without hearings, deliberation, and amendments in committee as well as on the floor of the Senate. Refinements made by the committee on this measure illustrate that whether
a proposal has a single sponsor or 99 cosponsors, it must be examined
in detail before it is considered by the Senate with a view to change
by amendment or substitution.
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The refinements that have been made on the original language of
Senate Joint Resolution 1 will clarify the detailed procedure to be
followed in a case of disability.
The role of Congress is narrow. It is as an appeal open to the
President from the decision of the Vice President and the members
of the Cabinet. It will be brought into the matter only in those
limited circumstances where the Vice President, with a ma ority of
the principal officers of the executive departments, and the President
disagree on the question of inability. It is important to note that
Congress will not have the power to initiate a challenge of the President's ability.
The procedure by which Congress shall act is properly left to later
determination within rules of each branch thereof. Point of possible
conflict is resolved in the understanding that Congress shall act as
separate bodies and within their respective rules.
he language that "* * * Congress shall immediately proceed to
decide the issue" leaves to Congress the determination of what, in
light of the circumstances then existing, must be examined in deciding
the issue. Thus, the matter will be examined on the evidence available. It is desirable that the matter be examined with a sympathetic
eye toward the President who, after all, is the choice of the electorate.
It is apparent that Senate Joint Resolution 1 does have aspects
which alleviate the dangers attendant to a crisis in presidential
inability. Nevertheless, it is felt by this member of the committee
that caution and restraint will be demanded should this inability
measure be called into application.
A time does arrive, however, when we must fill the vacuum. The
points which I have emphasized and previously insisted upon are
important; but having a solution at this point is more than important,
it is urgent. For this reason, I support Senate Joint Resolution 1
and urge its passage. I hope that it vll be given expeditious approval
by the other body and early ratification by the required number of

States.

PROPOSED AMENDMENT

Section 5 gives the majority of the Cabinet and the Vice President
only 2 days in which to challenge the President's declaration that his
inability has terminated.
This is not enough time considering the gravity of the situation and
the circumstances which might exist.
In the discharge of their duties, members of the Cabinet often travel
widely. There are also long periods of time in which they may not
have ad an opportunity to observe and visit with the President so as
to judge whether he has recovered sufficiently to resume his duties.
Such periods of inaccessibility might even be longer, in the event of the
President's illness.
The 2-day period should be extended to properly allow for these
factors. I urge amendment of this point to provide additional time.
ROMAN

L. HRUSKA.
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Mr. McCULLOCH, from the Committee on the Judiciary, submitted
the following

REPORT
[To accompany H.J. Res. 1]
The Committee on the Judiciary, to whom was referred the joint
resolution (H.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution

of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and

Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to dis-

charge the powers and duties of his office, having considered the same,
report favorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that
the joint resolution do pass.

The amendment is as follows:
Strike all after the enacting clause and insert in lieu thereof the
following:
That the following article Is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several
States within seven years from the date of its submission by the Congress:
"Article "SriCoN 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death
or resignation the Vice President shall become President.
"Sac. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice Prm-ident, the
President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation
by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
"Szc. 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declara.
tion that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until

he transmits a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall

be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
"Sac. 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers
of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress marby law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of

the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
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"Thereafter when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of
the Senate anA the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declara-

tion that no Inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office
unless the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive

departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within
two days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide
the issue, immediately assembling for that purpose if not in session. If the Con-

gs, within ten days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments,
or such other body as Congress may by law provide, determines by two-thirds
vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and

duties of the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as
Acting President; otherwise the President shaU resume the powers and duties
of his office."
PURPOSE OF THE AMENDMENT

The principal purpose of the amendment is to distinguish between
inability voluntarily declared by the President himself and inability
declared without his consent. In the former case, the President can
resume his duties by making a simple declaration that the inability has
ceased; in the latter, the measure provides procedures for promptly
determining the presence or absence of inability when that issue is
present.
The amendment makes no changes in sections 1 and 2 of the constitutional amendment proposed by House Joint Resolution 1 as introduced; it does make changes in sections 3 and 4 and it eliminates
section 5 by merging the substance of that section with that of
section 4.
The changes made by the amendment in section 3 clarify the
procedure and clarify the consequences when the President himself
declares his inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
There are two: First, the amendment indicates the officials to whom
the President's written declaration of inability shall be transmitted,
namely the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives. The committee deemed it desirable
to add this specification which was absent from the joint resolution as
introduced. Second, -the amendment makes clear that, in case of
such voluntary self-disqualification by the President, the President's
subsequent transmittal to the same officials of a written declaration
to the contrary, i.e., a written declaration that no inability exists,
terminates the Vice President's exercise of the Presidential powers
and duties, and that the President shall thereupon resume them.
In short, it is the intent of the committee that voluntary self-disqualification by the President shall be terminated by the President's
own declaration that no inability exists, without further ado. To
permit the Vice President and the Cabinet to challenge such an
assertion of recovery might discourage a President from voluntarily
relinquishing his powers in case of illness. The right of challenge
would be reserved for cases in which the Vice President and Cabinet,
without the President's consent, had found him unable to discharge
hi powers and dutiesSections 4 and 5 of the amendment proposed by House Joint Resolution 1, as introduced, dealt respectively with the devolution upon
the Vice President, as Acting President, of the President's powers and-
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duties pursuant to a declaration of his inability made by the Vice
President and other officials, and with the procedure upon subsequent
declaration by the President that no inability exists.
The amendment places the substance of former section 5 into section
4, in order to emphasize the committee's intent that the procedure
provided by former section 5 relates only to cases in which Presidential
inability has been declared by others than the President. Two identical changes are made in former sections 4 and 5. First, the term
"principal officers of the executive departments" is substituted for the
term "heads of the executive departments" to make it clearer that only
officials of Cabinet rank should participate in the decision as to whether
presidential inability exists. The substituted language follows more
closely article II, section 2, of the Constitution, which provides that
the President may require the opinion in light "of the principal officers
in each of the executive departments * * *."

The intent of the com-

mittee is that the Presidential appointees who direct the 10 executive
departments named in 5 U.S.C. 1, or any executive department established in the future, generally considered to comprise the President's Cabinet, would participate, with the Vice President, in determining inability. In case of the death, resignation, absence, or sickness of the head of any executive department, the acting head of the
department would be authorized to participate in a presidential
inability determination.
The second change made in former sections 4 and 5 is to specify
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives as the congressional officials to whom declaration
concerning Presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in
section 3.
The language of former section 5 of House Joint Resolution 1 is
further amended to make clear that if Congress is not in session at
the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives of a written declaration
by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments contradicting a Presien tial declaration that
no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for the purpose of deciding the issue. Finally, the language of former section 5
is further amended by providing that in such event the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Congress within
10 days after receipt of such declaration of Presidential inability dedetermines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is in
fact unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
The committee deems it essential in the interest of stability of
government to limit to the smallest possible period the time during
which the vital issue of the executive power can remain in doubt.
Under the bill, following a Presidential declaration that the disability
previously declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to such
declaration must be made within 2 days of its receipt by the heads of
the Houses of Congress and must be finally determined within the
following 10 days. Otherwise the President, having declared himself
able, will resume his powers and duties. An unlimited power in
Congress might afford an irresistible temptation to temporize
with respect to restoring the President's powers. In this highly
charged area there is no room for equivocation or delay.
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STATEMENT

For its report herein the committee adopts in substantial measure
the report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany
Senate Joint Resolution 1, namely, Senate Report No. 66, 89th Congress, 1st session:
The constitutional provisions
The Constitution of the United States, in article II, section 1,
clause 5, contains provisions relating to the continuity of the Executive
power at times of death, resignation, inability, or removal of a President. No replacement provision is made in the Constitution where a
vacancy occurs in the office of the Vice President. Article II, section
1, clause 5, reads as follows:
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
at his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the same shall devolve
on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide
for the Case of Reftoval, Death, Resignation, or Inability,
both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act
accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President
shall be elected.
This is the language of the Constitution as it was adopted by the
Constitutional Convention upon recommendation of the Committee
on Style. When this portion of the Constitution was submitted to
that Committee it read as follows:
In case of his (the President's) removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the
powers of duties of his office, the Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until another President be
chosen, or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United. States shall act as President, in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President;
and such officer shall act accordingly, until such disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.
While the Committee on Style was given no authority to change
the substance of prior determinations of the Convention, it is clear
that this portion of the draft which that Committee ultimately
submitted was a considerable alteration of the proposal which the
Committee had received.
The inability clause and the Tyler precedent
The records of the Constitutional Convention do not contain any
explicit interpretation of the provisions as they relate to inability.
As a matter of fact, the records of the Convention contain only one
apparent reference to the aspects of this clause which deal with the
question of disability. It was Mr. John Dickinson, of Delaware, who,
on August 27, 1787, asked:
What is the extent of the term "disability" and who is to be
the judge of it? (Farrand, "Records of the Constitutional
Convention of 1787," vol. 2, p. 427.)
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The question is not answered so far as the records of the Convention
disclose.
It was not until 1841 that this clause of the Constitution was called
into question by the occurrence of one of the listed contingencies.
In that year President William Henry Harrison died, and Vice President John Tyler faced the determination as to whether, under this
provision of the Constitution, he must serve as Acting President or
whether he became the President of the United States. Vice President
Tyler gave answer by taking the oath as President of the United States.
Wile this evoked some protest at the time, noticeably that of Senator
William Allen, of Ohio, the Vice President (Tyler) was later recognized
by both Houses of Congress as President of the United States (Conressional Globe, 27th Cong., 1st sess., vol. 10, pp. 3-5, May 3'.une 1, 1841).
This precedent of John Tyler has since been confirmed on seven
occasions when Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency of
the United States by virtue of the death of the incumbent President.
Vice Presidents Fillmore, Johnson, Arthur, Theodore Roosevelt,
Coolidge, Truman, and Lyndon Johnson all became President in this
manner.
The acts of these Vice Presidents, and the acquiescence in, or
confirmation of, their acts by Congress have served to establish a
precedent that, in one of the contingencies under article II, section 1,
clause 5, that of death, the Vice President becomes President of the
United States.
The clause which provides for succession in case of death also
applies to succession in case of resignation, removal from office, or
inability. In all four contingencies, the Constitution states: "the
same shall devolve on the Vice President."
Thus it is said that whatever devolves upon the Vice President
upon death of the President, likewise devolves upon him by reason of
the resignation, inability, or removal from office of the Presid (nt.
(Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability," North American Rev ew,
vol. 133, p. 442 (1919).)
The Tyler precedent, therefore has served to cause doubt on the
ability of an incapacitated President to resume the functions of his
office upon recovery. Professor Dwight, who later became president
of Ya le University, found further basis for this argument in the fact
thattheConstitution, while causing either the office, or the power and
duties of the office, to "devolve" upon the Vice President, is silent on
the return of the office or its functions to the President upon recovery.
Where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving,
the Constitution grants Congress the power to declare what officer
shall act as President "until the disability is removed."
These considerations apparently moved persons such as Daniel
Webster, who was Secretary of State when Tyler took office as President, to declare that the powers of the office are inseparable from the
office itself and that a recovered President could not displace a Vice
President who had assumed the prerogatives of the Presidency. This
intrp retation gains support by implication from the language of
article I, section 3, clause 5, of the Constitution which provides that:
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the absence of the Vice President,
or
when he shall exercise the office of President of the United
States. [Italic supplied.)
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The doubt engendered by precedent was so strong that on two
occasions in the history of the XUnted States it has contributedrnaterially to the failure of Vice Presidents to assume the office of President at
a time when a President was disabled. The first of these occasions
arose in 1881 when President Garfield fell victim of an assassin's
bullet. President Garfield lingered for some 80 days during which he
performed but one official act, the signing of an extradition paper.
There is little doubt but that there were pressing issues before the
executive department -at that time which required the attention of a
Chief Executive. Commissions were to be issued to officers of the
United States. The foreign relations of this Nation required attention.
There was evidence of mail frauds involving officials of the Federal
Government. Yet only such business as could be disposed of by the
heads of Government departments, without Presidential supervision
was handled. Vice President Arthur did not act. Respected legal
opinion of the day was divided upon the ability of the President to
resume the duties of his office should he recover. (See opinions of
Lyman Trumbull, Judge Thomas Cooley, Benjamin Butler, and Prof.
Theodore Dwight, "Presidential Inability, North American Review,"
vol. 133, pp. 417-446 (-1881).)
The division of legal authority on this question apparently extended
to the Cabinet, for newspapers of that day, notably the New York
Herald, the New York Tribune, and the New York Times contain
accounts stating that the Cabinet considered the question of the
advisability of the Vice President acting during the period of the
President's incapacity. Four of the seven Cabinet members were
said to be of the opinion that there could be no temporary devolution
of Presidential power on the Vice President. This group reportedly
included the then Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Wayne
MacVeagh. All of Garfield's Cabinet were of the view that it would
be desirable for the Vice President to act but since they could not
agree upon the ability of the President to resume his office upon
recovery, and because the President's condition prevented them from
presenting the issue to him directly the matter was dropped.
It was not until President Woodrow Wilson suffered a severe stroke
in 1919. that the matter became one of pressing urgency again. This
damage to President Wilson's health came at a time when the struggle
concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations
was at its height. Major matters of foreign policy such as the Shantung Settlement were unresolved. The British Ambassador spent
4 months in Washington without being received by the President.
Twenty-eight acts of Congress became law without the President's
signature (Lindsay Rogers, "Presidential Inability, the Review,"
May 8, 1920; reprinted in 1958 hearings before Senate Subcommittee
on Constitutional Amendments, pp. 232-235). The President's
wife and a group of White House associates acted as a screening
board on decisions which could be submitted to the President without
impairment of his health. (See Edith Bolling Wilson, "MyMemoirs,"
pp. 288-290; Hoover, "Forty-two Years in the White house," pp.
105-106; Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 437-438.)
As in 1881, the Cabinet considered the advisability of asking the
Vice President to act as President. This time, there was considerable
opposition to the adoption of such procedure on the part of assistants
the President. It has been reported by a Presidential secretary

235
of that day that he reproached the Secretary of State for suggesting
such a possibility (Joseph P. Tumulty, "Woodrow Wilson as I Know
Him," pp. 443-444). Upon the President's ultimate recovery, the
President caused the displacement of the Secretary of State for
reasons of alleged disloyalty to the President (Tumulty, "Woodrow
Wilson as I Know Him," pp. 444-445).
On three occasions during the Eisenhower administration, incidents
involving the physical health of the President served to focus attention
on the inability clause.
President Eisenhower became concerned about the gap in the
Constitution relative to Presidential inability and he attempted to
reduce the hazards by means of an informal agreement with Vice
President Nixon. The agreement provided:
1. In the event of inability the President would, if possible,
so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President would serve
as Acting President, exercising the powers and duties of the

o-

office until the inability had ended.

2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President, the
Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon the devolution of the powers and duties of the office and would serve as
Acting President until the inability had ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when the
inability had ended and at that time would resume the full
exercise of the powers and duties of the office.
President Kennedy entered into a similar agreement with Vice
President Johnson as did President Johnson with Speaker John
McCormack and Vice President Hubert Humphrey. Such informal
agreements cannot be considered an adequate solution to the problem
because: (A) Their operation would differ according to the relationship between the particular holders of the offices; (B) a private
agreement cannot ' ve the Vice President clear authority to disch arge powers confeTed on the President by the Constitution,
treaties, or statutes; (C) no provision is made for the situation in
which a dispute exists over whether or not the President is disabled.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers as well as Attorney
General Kennedy agree that the only definitive method to settle the
problem is by means of a constitutional amendment.
THE NEED FOR CHANGE

The historical review of the interpretation of article II, section 1,
clause 5, suggests the difficulties which it has already presented.
The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain. The
clause couples the contingencies of a permanent nature such as death,
resignation, or removal from office, with inability, a contingency
which may be temporary. It does not clearly commit the determination of inability to any individual or group, nor does it define
inability so that the existence of such a status may be open and
notorious. It leaves uncertain the capacity in which the Vice President acts during a period of inability of the President. It fails to
define the period during which the Vice President serves. It does
not specify that a recovered President may regain the prerogatives
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of his office if he has relinquished them. It fails to provide any
mechanism for determining whether a President has in fact recovered
from his inability, nor does it indicate how a -President, who sought to
recover his prerogatives while still disabled, might be prevented from
doing so.
The resolution of these issues is imperative if continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of turbulence at times
when a President is disabled. Continuity of Execdutive authority is*
more important today than ever before. The concern which has been
manifested on previous occasions when a President was disabled, is
increased when the disability problem is weighed in the light of the
increased importance of the Office of the Presidency to the United
States and to the world.
This increased concern has in turn manifested an intensified examination of the adequacy of the provisions relating to the orderly transfer
of the functions of the Presidency. Such an examination is not
reassuring. The constitutional provision has not been utilized because
its procedures have not been clear. After 175 years of experience
with the Constitution the inability clause remains an untested pro
vision of uncertain application.
METHOD OF CHANGE

In previous instances in history when this question has arisen, one
of the major considerations has been whether Congress could constitutiorally proceed to resolve the problem by statute, or whether
an enabling constitutional amendment would be necessary. As early
as 1920, when the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 66th Congress, 2d session, considered the. problem,
Representatives Madden, Rogers, and McArthur took the position
that the matter of disability could be dealt with by statute without
an amendment to the Constitution, whereas Representative Fess
was of the opinion that Congress was not authorized to act under the
Constitution, and that an amendment would first have to be adopted
(hearings before the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, February 26 and March 1, 1920). Through the years,
this controversy has increased in intensity among Congressmen and
constitutional scholars who have considered the Presidential inability
problem.
Those who feel that Congress does not have the authority to resolve
the matter by statute claim that the Constitution does not support a
reasonable inference that Congress is empowered to legislate. They
point out that article II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution authorized Congress to provide by statute for the case where both the President and Vice President are incapable of serving. By implication
Congress does not have the authority to legislate with regard to the
situation which concerns only a disabled President, wit the Vice
President succeeding to his powers and duties. Apparently this is
the proper construction, because the first statute dealing with Presidential succession under article II, section 1, clause 6, which was
enacted by contemporaries of the framers of the Constitution, did
not purport to establish succession in instances where the President
alone was disabled (act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239).
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Serious doubts have also been raised as to whether the "necessary
and proper" authority of article I, section 8, clause 18 gives the
Congress the power to legislate in this situation. The constitution
does not vest any department or office with the power to determine
inability, or to decide the term during which the Vice President shall
act, or to determine whether and at what time the President may later
regain his prerogatives upon recovery. Thus it is difficult to argue
that article I, section 8, clause 18, gives the Congress the authority
to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying out
such powers.
In recent years, there seems to have been a strong shift of opinion
in favor of the proposition that a constitutional amendment is necessary, and that a mere statute would not be adequate to solve the
problem. The last three Attorneys General who have testified on the
matter, Herbert Brownell, William P. Rogers, and Acting Attorney
General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, have agreed an amendment is
necessary. In addition to the American Bar Association and the
American Association of Law Schools, the following organizations
have agreed an amendment is necessary: the State bar associations
of Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Virginia, Vermont; and the bar associations of Denver, Colo.;
the District of Columbia; Dade County, Fla.; city of New York;
Passaic County, N.J.; Greensboro, N.C.; York County, Pa.; and
Milwaukee, Wis.

-

The most persuasive argument in favor of amending the Constitution
is that so many legal questions have been raised about the authority
of Congress to act on this sub ject without an amendment that any
statute on the subject would be open to criticism and challenge at
the most critical time-that is, either when a President had become
disabled, or when a President sought to recover his office.

Under

these circumstances, there is an urgent need to adopt an amendment
which would distinctly enumerate the proceedings for determination
of the commencement and termination of disability.
Filling of tvcanciea in the office of the Presvident
While the records of the Constitutional Convention disclosed
little insight on the framers' interpretation of the inability provisions
of the Constitution, they do reveal that wide disagreement prevailed
concerning whether or not a Vice President was needed. If he was
needed, what were to be his official duties, if any.
The creation of the office of Vice President came in the closing
days of the Constitutional Convention. Although such a position
was considered very early in the Convention, later proposals envisaged
the President of the Senate, the Chief Justice, and even a council of
advisers, as persons who would direct the executive branch should a
lapse of Executive authority come to pass.
. On September 4, 1787, a Committee of Eleven, selected to deliberate
those portions of the Constitution which had been postponed, recommended that an office of Vice President be created and that he be
elected with the President by an electoral college. On September 7,
1787, the Convention discussed the Vice-Presidency and the duties to
be performed by the occupant of the Office. Though much deliberation ensued regarding the official functions of the office, little
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thought seems to have been given to the succession of the Vice President to the office of President in case of the death of the President.
A committee, designated to revise the style'of and arrange the
articles agreed to by the House, returned to Convention on September
12, 1787, a draft which for all practical purposes was to become the
Constitution of the United States. It contemplated two official
duties for the Vice President; (1) to preside over the Senate, in which
capacity he would vote when the Senate was "equally divided" and
open the certificates listing the votes of the presidential electors, and
(2) to discharge the powers and duties of the President in case of his
death, resignation, removal, or inability.
While the Constitution does not address itself in all cases to specifics
regarding the Vice President as was the case for the President, the
importance of the office in view of the Convention is made apparent
by article II, section 1, clause 3. This clause, the original provision
for the election of the President and the Vice President, made it clear
that it was designed to insure that the Vice President was a person
equal in stature to the President.
The intent of the Convention, however, was totally frustrated when
the electors began to distinguish between the two votes which article
II, section 1, clause 3 had bestowed upon them. This inherent defect
was made painfully apparent in the famous Jefferson-Burr election
contest of 1800, and in 1804 the 12th amendment modified the college
voting to prevent a reoccurrence of similar circumstances.
There is little doubt the 12th amendment removed a serious defect
from the Constitution. However, its passage, coupled with the
growing political practice of nominating Vice Presidents to appease
disappointed factions of the parties, began a decline that was in
ensuing years to mold the Vice-Presidency into an office of inferiority
and disparagement.
Fortunately, this century saw a gradual resurgence of the importance
of the Vice-Presidency. He has become a regular member of the
Cabinet, Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council,
Chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities a member of the National Security Council, and a personal
envoy for tle President. He has in the eyes of Government regained
much of the "equal stature" which the framers of the Constitution
contemplated he should entertain.
THE URGENCY OF AMENDMENT

The death of Piesident Kennedy and the accession of Piesident
Johnson in 1963 pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the
executive branch when there is no incumbent Vice President. Sixteen
times the United States of America has been without a-Vice President,
totaling 37 years during our history.
As has been pointed out, the Constitutional Convention in its
wisdom foresaw the need to have a qualified and able occupant of the
Vice President's office should the President die. They did not,
however,
provide the mechanics whereby a Vice-Presidential vacancy
could be filled.
The considerations which enter into a determination of whether
provisions for filling the office of Vice President when it becomes
vacant should be made by simple legislation or require a constitutional

239
amendment are similar to those which enter into the same kind of
determination about Presidential inability provisions. In both cases,
there is some opinion that Congress has authority to act. However,
the arguments that an amendment is necessary are strong and supported by many individuals. We must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of our Nation's executive branch. When a
President or a Vice President of the United States assumes his office,
the entire Nation and the world must know without doubt that he
does so as a matter of right. Only a constitutional amendment can
supply the necessary air of legitimacy.
The argument that Congress can designate a Vice President by law
is at best a weak one. The power of Con ess in this regard is measured principally by article II, section 1, clause 6, which states thatthe Congress may by law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation, or Inability both of the President and
Vice President, declaring what oAicer shall then act as President, and such officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
This is not in specific terms a power to declare what officer shall be
Vice President. It is a power to declare upon what officer the duties
and powers of the office of President shall devolve when there is
neither President nor Vice President to act.
To stand by ready for the powers and duties of the Presidential
office to devolve upon him at the time of death or inability of the
President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice President.
It is clear that Congress can designate the officer who is to perform
that function when the office of Vice President is vacant. Indeed
it has done so in each of the Presidential Succession Acts. Should
there be any more objection to designating that officer Vice President
than there is to designating as President the Vice President upon
whom devolve the powers and duties of a deceased President, for
which designation there is no specific constitutional authorization?
The answer to thatquestion is "Yes." The Constitution has given
the Vice President another duty and sets forth specific instructions as
to who is to perform it in his absence. Article I, section 2, clause 4,
provides that the Vice President shall be the President of the Senate
and clause 5 provides that the Senate shall choose its other officers
including a "President pro Tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President or when he shall exercise the Office of the President of the United
States." It is very difficult to argue that a person designated Vice
President by Congress, or selected in any way other than b the procedures outlined in amendments 12 and 22, can be the President of the
Senate.
One of the principal reasons for filling the office of Vice President
when it becomes vacant is to permit the person next in line to become
familiar with the problems he will face should he be called upon to act
as President, e.g., to serve on the National Security Council, head the
President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity, participate in Cabinet meetings and take part in other top-level discussions
which lead to national policymaking decisions. Those who consider
a law sufficient to provide for filling a Vice Presidential vacancy point
out that the Constitution says nothing about such duties and there i§
therefore nothing to prevent Congress from assigning these duties to
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the officer it designates as next in line in whatever Presidential successing law it enacts. Regardless of what office he held at the time of
his designation as Vice President, however, he would have a difficult
time carrying out the duties of both offices at the same time.
When, to all these weaknesses, one adds the fact that no matter
what laws Congress may write describing the duties of the officer it
designates to act as Vice President, the extent to which the President
takes him into his confidence or shares with him the deliberations leading to executive decisions is to be determined largely by the President
rather than by statute, practical necessity would seem to require not
only that the procedure for determining who fills the Vice Presidency
when it becomes vacant be established by constitutional amendment
but that the President be given an active role in the procedure whatever it be.
Finally, as in the case of inability, the most persuasive argument in
favor of amending the Constitution is the division of authority concerning the authority of Congress to act on this subject. With this
division in existence it wouid seem that any statute on the subject
would be open to criticism and challenge at a time when absolute
legitimacy was needed.
ANALYSIS

Inability
The proposal now being submitted is cast in the form of a constitutional amendment for the reasons which have been outlined
earlier.
Artiole II, section 1, clause 5, of the Constitution is unclear on two
important points. The first is whether the "office" of the President
or the "powers and duties of the said office" devolve upon the Vice
President in the event of Presidential inability. The second is who
has the authority to determine what inability is, when it commences,
and when it terminates. Senate Joint Resolution 1 resolves both
questions.
The first section would affirm the historical practice by which a
Vice President has become President upon the death of the President,
further extending the practice to the contingencies of resignation or
removal from office. it separates the provisions relating to inability
from those relating to death, resignation, or removal, thereby eliminating any ambiguity in the language of the present provision in
article II, section 1, clause 5.
Sections 3 and 4 embrace the procedures for determining the commencement and termination of Presidential inability.
Section 3 lends constitutional authority to the practice that has
heretofore been carried out by informal agreements between the
President and the person next in the line of succession. It makes clear
that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon
such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President.
By establishing the title of Acting President the proposal makes clear
that it is not the "office" but the "powers and duties of the office"
that devolve on the Vice President and further clarifies the status of
the Vice President during the period when he is discharging *the
powers and duties of a disabled President.
The amendment to section 3 makes certain that in cases in which
a President himself declares his inability, the period of his disability
would be terminated by a simple Presidential notice to both Houses
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of Congress. To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge
such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President from voluntarily relinquishing his powers in case of illness. The right of challenge would be reserved for cases in which the Vice President and
the Cabinet, without the President's consent, had found him unable
to discharge his powers and duties.
Section 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment deals with the
most difficult problem of inability-the factual determination of
whether or not inability exists. It provides that whenever the Vice
President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive
departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempoze of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the office as Acting President.
The final success of any constitutional arrangement to secure
continuity in cases of inability must depend upon public opinion with
a possession of a sense of "constitutional morality." Without such
a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute guarantee against
usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will provide a
complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which most of
the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of constitutional
propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be adopted that
presumes we shall always be dealing with "reasonable men" at the
highest governmental level. The combination of the judgment of the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members appears to
furnish the most feasible formula without upsetting the fundamental
checks and balances between the executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the
President, both politically and physically, and presumably most
familiar with his condition. It is assumed that such decision would
be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who
were intricately familiar with the President's physical and mental
condition.

There are many distinguished advocates for a specially constituted
group in the nature of a factfinding body to determine presidential
inability rather than the Cabinet. However, such a group would face
many"Ylemmas. If the President is so incapacitated that he cannot
would
of inability
factual
his own
inability
declare
exist for a special
factfinding
be relatively
simple.
Nothe
need
woulddetermination
body. Nor is a Iactfinding body necessary if the President can and
does declare his own inability. If, however, the President and those
around him differ as to whether he does suffer from an inability which
he is unwiling to admit, then a critical dispute exists. But this dispute should not be determined by a special commission composed of
persons outside the executive branch. Such a commission runs a good
chance of coming out with a split decision. What would be the effect,
for example, if a commission of seven-voted four to three that the President was fit and able to perform his office? What power could he
exert during the rest of his term when, by common knowledge, a
change of one vote in the commission proceedings could yet deny him
the right to exercise the powers of his office? If the vote were the
other way and the Vice President were installed as Acting President,
54-563 0 - 75 - 17
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what powers could he exert when everyone would know that one vote
the other way could cause his summary removal from the exercise
of Presidential powers? If the man acting as President were placed
in this awkward, completely untenable and impotent position, the
effect on domestic affairs would be bad enough; the effect on the international position of the United States might well be catastrophic.
However, in the interest of providing flexibility for the future, the
amendment would authorize the Congress to designate a different body
if this were deemed desirable in light of subsequent experience.
The second paragraph of section 4 of the proposed amendment
would permit the President to resume the powers and duties of the
office upon his transmission to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of his written declaration
that no inability existed. However, should the Vice President and
a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments feel
that the President is unable, then they could prevent the President
from resuming the powers and duties of the office by transmitting
their written declaration so stating to the President of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives within 2 dayU, Once
the declaration of the President stating no inability exists has been
transmitted to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then the issue is squarely joined. At this
point the proposal recommends that the Congress shall make the
nal determination on the existence of inability. If within 10 days
the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote o both Houses that the
President is unable, then the Vice President continues as Acting
President. However, should the Congress fail in any manner to cast
a vote of two-thirds or more in both Houses supporting the position
that the President was unable to perform the powers and duties of
his office, then the President would resume after the expiration of
10 days the powers and duties of the office. The recommendation
for a vote of two-thirds is in conformity with the provision of article I,
section 3, clause 6, of the Constitution relating to impeachments.
The committee contemplates that votes taken pursuant to the provisions of the proposed constitutional amendment will be conducted
in accordance with the rules of the House and Senate, respectively,
and that record votes may be taken when in conformity with such rules.
This proposal achieves the goal of an immediate original transfer
in Executive authority and the resumption of it in consonance both
with the original intent of the framers of the Constitution and with
the balance of powers among the three branches of our Government
which is the permanent strength of the Constitution.

Vacanies
Section 2 is intended to virtually assure us that the Nation will
always possess a Vice President. It would require a President to
nominate a person who meets the existing constitutional qualifications
to be Vice President whenever a vacancy occurred in that office.
The nominee would take office as Vice President once he has been
confirmed by a majority vote in both Houses of the Congress.
In considering this section of the proposal, it was observed that the
office of the Vice President has become one of the most important
ositions in our country. The days are long past when it was largely
onorary and of little importance, as has been previously pointed out.
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For more than a decade the Vice President has borne specific and
important responsibilities in the executive, branch of Government.
He has come to share and participate in the executive functioning of
our Government, so that in the event of tragedy there would be no
break in the informed exercise of executive authority. Never has
this been more adequately exemplified than by the uninterrupted
assumption of the Presidency by Lyndon B. Johnson.
It is without contest that the procedure for the selection of a Vice
President must contemplate the assurance of a person who is compatible with the President. The importance of this compatability
is recognized in the modern practice of both major political parties
in according the presidential candidate a major voice in choosing his
running mate subject-to convention approval. This proposal would
permit the President to choose his Vice President subject to congressional approval. In this way the country would be assured of a Vice
President of the same political party as the President, someone who
would presumably work in harmony with the basic policies of the
President.
The committee recommends adoption of the joint resolution as
amended.
COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS TO HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 1 SHOWING
OMISSIONS, NEW MATTER, AND RETAINED WORDING

The committee amendments to the House joint resolution are
shown as follows: Provisions of the resolution as introduced which
are omitted are enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed in
italic, provisions in which no change is proposed are shown in roman.
ArticleSECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from
office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
SEC. 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote
of both Houses of Congress.
SEC 3. [If the President declares in writing] Whenever the
President transmits to the PresidentPro Tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office and until he transmits a written declaration
to the contrary, suA powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice President as Acting President.
SEC. 4. [If the President does not so declare, and the Vice
President with the written concurrence of a majority of the
heads of the executive departments or such other body as
Congress may by law provide, transmits to the Congress his]
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal
ofters of the executive departinents, or such other body as
Congress may by law prod, transmit to the President Pro
Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Reresentlaives their written declaration that the President is
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unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and
duties of the office as Acting President.
*CSEc. 5.] Thereafter, when ever the President transmits
the ena and
to the CCongrees President Pro Tempor
the Speaker o the Howse of Representative, his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and
duties of his office unless the Vice President, (with the
written concurrence of a majority of the heads of the executive departments or such other body as Congress ma b law
provide, transmits within two days to the Congress his] and

i offer of the executit e departments,
a majority of the i -iip
or tgi r boidryZConreee may by law prozide, tranemit
within two days to the PretidentPro Tempore of the Senate and
te Speaker of the Houe of Repreentative, their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall
kimediately] decide the issue, immediately assembling for
ta purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within ten
days after the receipt of the written declaration of the Vice

President and a majority of the prine'at officer of the exe-

tive department", or suck other body a Congre.. may by law
pride, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
the office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the
same as Acting President; otherwise the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office.
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ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE
EDWARD HUTCHINSON
House Joint Resolution 1, as reported, would ratify the Tyler
precedent of succession to the office of President by the Vice President
upon the death of the President; it would provide for filling a vacancy
in the office of Vice President; and it would incorporate into the
Constitution a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive power
from the President to the Vice President in times of the President's
inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office.
THE TYLER PRECEDENT

No reasonable question any longer exists about the constitutional
succession to the office of President by the Vice President upon the
death of the President. Vice President Tyler's claim to the office
as well as its powers and duties, upon the death of President W. H.
Harrison in 1841, has without exception been asserted on every
subsequent like occasion. The country would not now accept any
different construction of the constitutional provision, nor would any
different construction be warranted. There is no disagreement over
section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1. It makes clear that whenever
a vacancy in the office of President occurs, whether by removal death
or resiiation, the Vice President will assume the office as well as its
powers and duties.
FILLING A VICE-PRESIDENTIAL VACANCY

Section 2 of House Joint Resolution 1 would empower and direct
the President to nominate a Vice President when that office is vacant,
and the citizen so nominated would take office when confirmed by a
majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
While it is generally assumed each House would act separately,
the language employed requires a majority vote of both Houses, not
each House, to co nfirm. If, sometime in the future, pressure is brought
to bear for congressional confirmation in joint convention, as some
proponents of this measure now advocate, the language of section
ma be construed to require only a majority of both Houses combined, in that way diluting the vote of Senators. In my opinion,
this possibility would be lessened if the language directed, the majority
vote in each House instead of a majority vote of both Houses.
Although the section is silent on the point, it is expected that the
majority vote required, so long a" each House acts separately, is a
majority of the votes cast in each House, a quorum being present.
There is no requirement for a record vote, but one-fifth of those
present could require it. A secret ballot could not be ordered over
their objections.
Procedure for confirmation of nominations by the President by
both Houses is unique in our experience. All other appointments are
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submitted only to the Senate, for advice and consent. A good case
could be made for submission of this nomination to the Senate alone.
After all the sole constitutional duty of the Vice President remains
that of resident of the Senate; and within the purview of the Constitution, the President, by nominating a Vice President, is choosing
their Presiding Officer. Senate approval of his nominee, as in the
ease of other Presidential appointments, certainly would have been
thought sufficient in earlier periods of our history, and may be sufficient
today.
The case for Senate action alone also can be buttressed by an
analog. In those cases where a Vice President is not elected, because
of a flilure of a majority of the electoral vote, the Constitution
directs the Senate to elect one from the candidates who received the
two highest numbers.
Finally, in the case for Senate confirmation alone, it may be observed
that our constitutional processes for the selection of our Presidents
and Vice Presidents are Federal in nature. Presidential electors,
chosen in each State in such manner as the legislature may direct,
meet in their respective States and there cast the votes to which their
State is entitled. The Senate too, is a body Federal in nature. Each
State has an equal vote in tle Senate. The Senate represents the
States in our legislative branch. It would be wholly consistent with
the preservation of the Federal structure if the Senate were vested
with power either to elect a Vice President to fill a vacancy, or to
advise and consent to the nomination of the President for that purpose.
Thus far in our history there has been a vacancy in the office ofVice
President during a part of 16 different terms. One vacancy was
caused by resignation of the Vice President. Seven died in office and
the other eight succeeded to the Presidency upon the death of the
President.
On those occasions when the Vice President's office becomes vacant
through removal, death, or resignation, it is possible that some division
in Congress might occur over confirmation of. a President's nomination
of a successor. But on those occasions when. a vacancy is due to a
Vice President's succession to the Presidency, and the new President,
so recently a Vice President himself, is called upon to nominate
another, the temper of the country and of the Congress is likely to
be such as to make congressional confirmation of the appointment
pro forma. Under such circumstances, how meaningful really is the
function of congressional confirmation? The new President might
as well be empowered to appoint a new Vice President outright.
Consider the terrible pressures that will immediately come to bear
on a newly elevated President to choose a Vice President. No time
is specified within which the nomination must be made, but it would
be a mistake to believe the new President could relieve the pressure
by putting the matter off. As soon as he enters the presidential stage,
the new President will see prospective Vice Presidents and their supporters in the wings. In addition to all of the other cares, duties,
and responsibilities thrust upon him, he will also have to deal with
those who aspire to the second highest office of the land-the largest
plum within his hands.
A better solution to the problem of succession to the office of Vice
President would be to provide that the holder of some other office in
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the administration should automatically succeed to the VicePresidency.
It is hard enough for the country to go through the sad experience
of a change of administration at the time of the death of a President,
when the succession is automatic. That is the situation now and as
it has been. Since 1792 there has always been a known successor. to
the office of President when there was no Vice President. But upon
the ratification of this proposed amendment, there will be an air of
uncertainty, at least for the time during which it takes a new President
to nominate and obtain confirmation of his choice-and this uncertainty will be experienced at a time when the country can least bear it.
PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY

House Joint Resolution I would incorporate into the Constitution
a detailed procedure for the transfer of Executive power from the
President to the Vice President in times of the President's inability to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. Such transfer can occur
with the President's consent or over his protest. The language of the
resolution offers no hint that the determination of inability shall be
based on medical or psychiatric evidence. Instead, the determination
will be a political one; and here lies a danger in the proposal.
Words written into the Constitution in the past are now found to
have vested powers to extents and in ways not intended by their
authors. We should be extremely careful, lest we unwittingly provide tools of power we would ourselves oppose.
Do the provisions of section 4 of this resolution in effect create a
new way in which a President might be removed from office? Might
it be possible for a Vice President, sometime in the future, to form a
cabal with a majority of the President's Cabinet and size power from
him? Are we, by incorporating these words into the Constitution,
providing the machinery by which the stability of the office of President might be undermined? All. it takes, under section 4, is for the
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet to file their written
declaration of the President's inability with the President pro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, and the Vice President
becomes Acting President. Then the President, dislodged by this
maneuver from his awesome powers, is put in the position of having
to win back his position by persuading Coness of his fitness. Here
again the decision will be a political one. There is no suggestion that
medical or psychiatric evidence even be considered. And if an
unpopular President should fail to find support among at least a
third of the Senators and Representatives in Congress, he would
continue in name only, shorn of his powers and duties. He could
apparently make repeated attempt ts to regain the powers of his office
until his term expires. Would these circumstance lend stability to
the country or undermine it?
On the other hand, suppose an unpopular President is upheld by the
Congress with more than one-third, but less than a majority of the
Members sustaining his contention of ability to serve. Is it not
possible the same cabal might try again? The President would
break it up, if possible, by changes in his Cabinet, providing he could
win the advice and consent of the Senate for his new appointees, but
under such circumstances he might not obtain confirmation of his

248
Cabinet changes. Would these circumstances tend to lend stability
to the Government or undermine it?
Other assumptions might be made to illustrate further how the
machinery we now offer the country might sometime be used by men
ambitious for power.
We should .keep in mind, that we are fashioning tools which could
be used to unsettle the stability of our Government while we mean to
promote it.
Section 4 is certainly not intended to provide the tools for power to
evil men. - Its drafters had in mind an altogether different situation.
They suppose an ill President physically unable to give his consent for
the assumption of power by the Vice President.
onder
these circumstances some alternative to his consent must be devised if the Government is to carry on. Thereafter, when the President has recovered
sufficiently to resume his duties, or thinks he has, the drafters wanted
to be sure of machinery whereby he could recover his powers from a
Vice President and Cabinet who might disagree with his own assessment of recovery.
Supporters of this proposal call the power of public opinion to their
defense and say a Vice President and Cabinet would not dare seize
power from a President physically and mentally able, nor withhold
power from him once recovered. But public opinion can be molded,
and some Presidents in our history have been most unpopular in
office, and probably there will be some in the future.
There is no definition of inability or disability in the proposed
amendment, nor is there any provision for the definition of this term.
If there has existed an uncertainty of congressional power to define
it under existing constitutional provisions, it is clear Congress will be
without power to define an inability after House Joint Resolution 1
is incorporated into the Constitution.
The proposal will leave to the President in section 3, and to the
Vice President and Cabinet majority in section 4, complete power to
treat any conditions or circumstance they choose as a disability. It is
even conceivable, though I hope not likely, that some President might
declare himself unable, and state no reason therefor (since no reason is
required by the language) in order to avoid responsibility for some
unpopular act, devolving the powers of his - office upon the Vice
President for the time being to accomplish that purpose. After
ratification of House Joint Resolution 1, the Congress definitely
cannot define by law what constitutes Presidential disability. I think
a good case can be made to vest that power of definition in Congress.
Here would be another check and balance in our system, built in to
guard against. abuse of power.
It, was suggested in the hearings that the President might declare
his inability because of absence from the country. It seems unlikely
that he would do so because he would want to go abroad with full
powers of his office, as Presidents have done in the past. But members
should know that in the minds of some, the language of this proposal
will permit a future President to relieve himself of the burdens of his
office, at will, by a declaration of inability due to absence.
The provisions of House Joint Resolution 1 leave many questions
unresolved. For example, it does not address itself to the problem of
what happens if an Acting President suffers an inability. It overlooks
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the possibility of a Presidential inability at a time when there is no
Vice Presiden't, which might occur soon after a new President succeeded
to office and before he nominated a new Vice President. How could
the machinery of section 4 work then? Under the language of that
section, it would appear essential that there be a Vice President to
trigger the machinery of that section.
In my opinion it would be better to work out the answers to these
problems and others before submitting this proposed amendment for
ratification. There is no real urgency. We now have a Vice President,
and an executive understanding between him and the President on the
matter of Presidential disability. We should not rush this proposal
on its way until it is as perfect as we can make it. These other
problems Will remain unsolved and those who are concerned about a
certainty of succession and ability will continue to press for further
amendments.
It will be tragic if we have unwittingly, deprived Congress of power
to move into any breach in the structure here being fashioned.
Respectfully submitted.
EDWARD HUTCHINSON.
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DISSENTING VIEWS OF REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES McC.
MATHIAS, JR.
I dissent from the views of the majority of the committee with
respect to the grant of power to the President to nominate his heir. I
oppose such power as being in conflict with the basic principles of the
Republic and the philosophy of the Constitution which tends to disperse, rather than to centralize, power.
The Presidency has always been considered an elective office, but it
will not be purely elective if this amendment is adopted.
The Constitutional Convention, as we know it through Madison's
Journal, would surely have rejected an appointed Vice President-on
grounds of principle alone. Modem conditions, while compelling,
do not dictate that we abandon principle when we provide a modem
method of succession.
The Constitution seeks means to interpose legal safeguards between
the weakness, the temptations, and the evil of men and the opportunity
to injure the state. We do the same in private life when we ask an
honest debtor to execute a mortgage or an honorable man to state his
promise or covenant in writing.
By permitting the President to name a Vice President, House Joint
Resolution 1 operates on the opposite principle, assuming that a
President will always be enlightened and disinterested in naming a
Vice President. While this optimism reflects well on the 20th Century's opinion of itself in contrast to the pragmatic 18th century
estimate of human frailty, it may not be a prudent basis for copstitutional law.
Congressional confirmation of a vice-presidential nominee would be
only a mild check and, in my judgment, would be a mere formality
in a period of national emotional stress. Most of us who were here
in the last dark days of November 1963 would confirm that almost
any such request made by President Johnson would have been favorably received by the Congress in our desire to support and stabilize his
administration.
Giving the President exclusive power to nominate a Vice President
has been justified by a false analogy to the broad discretion allowed
modern presidential nominees to express a preference for their running
mates. But a presidential nominee and an incumbent President are
very different men-even if they inhabit the same mortal frame-and
they may be moved by very different motives. A President secure
in the White House will have undergone a metamorphosis from his
earlier self, insecurely and temporarily occupying the presidential
suite at the Blackstone or the Mark Hopkins during the climax of a
national convention.
If the presidential nominee really is allowed a personal choice of
running mates, he will seek a candidate to complement his own candidacy and to strengthen the ticket. He will want an attractive,
vigorous, and patently able associate. The electability of the vice-
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presidential candidate is a form of accountability for the head of the
ticket. B way of example, recall the probable motives of Senator
John F. Kennedy in choosing Lyndon B. Johnson for his running
mate and consider whether the same motives would have been decisive
with President John F. Kennedy.
Furthermore, the, analogy used to justify this amendment would
crystallize contemporarg political custom into organic law. Current
practice at national political conventions and conventions themselves
are the creatures of custom only. Customs can and should change as
social, political and technological changes affect our way of living.
The Constitution cannot and should not be so flexible.
The public today is all too ready to impugn the motives of a
President dealing with his Vice President. It is hinted that a President is constantly tempted to relegate the Vice President to a subordinate role in political life. If such motives are credible in daily
governmental relations, hoW much more would they be present in the
selection of an heir and successor.
Couple this consideration to the provisions of House Joint Resolution 1 with respect to Presidential inability and the considerations
that might move a President to nominate a respectable, but pallid
Vice President. If the heir apparent is to gain certain powers of
deposition as well as natural succession, a President may indeed hesitate in seeking a vigorous and aggressive Vice President. Such a
danger would not have escaped examination by the framers of the
Constitution and should be considered by those who propose to
.amend it.
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, Jr.
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Mr. CELLER,

hrom the committee of conference, submitted the

following

CONFERENCE REPORT
(To accompany 8.1. Res. 11
The committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two

Houses on the amendment of the House to the joint resolution (S.J.
Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency
and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office, having met, after full and free conference,
have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective
Houses as follows:
That the Senate recede from its disagreement to the amendment of
the House and agree to the same with an amendment as follows:
In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the House amendment insert the following:
That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Cnstitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all irtent8 and purposes
aR part of the Constitutionwhen ratified by the leri'latvresof three.fot rts
of the several Stales within seven years f.' m tie date (if ?ts submision
by ,te Confress:
"lARTICLE"e"StcrtoN 1. In case of the ,'emoval of the Presidentfrom office or of his
death or resignation, thi Vice President shall become President.
"Src. R. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President,
the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majorU vote of both Houses of Congress.
'Sec. . whenever the Presiden transmits to the President to tenpre
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the puers and duties of his
office, and until he kansmits to them a written declaration to the contrary,
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suh
powers and duties shall be dischargedby the Vice President as Acting
Presdent.
"Sic. 4. Whenever the Vice Presidentand a majority of either the principal offwcr of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress
may by law provde, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representaties their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties
of the o#Fce as Acting President.
"Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Presidentpro tempore
of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written
declaration that no inability exst., he shall resume the powers and duties
of his office unless the Vice Presidentand a majority of either the principal
officers of the executive department or of such other body as Congress may
y law provide, transmit Uthin four days to the President pro tempore of
the Senae and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
deciwration that the Presidentis unable to discharge the Rowers and duties
of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling
within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. I] the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration,
or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress
is reqired to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses
that the Preaidint is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his
ofte, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties

of his office "

And the House agree to the same.
EMANUEL CELLER,

BYRON G. RooERS,
JAMES C. CORMAN,

WILLIAM M. MCCULLOCH,
RICHARD H. POFF,

Managers on the Partof the House.
BIRCH E. BAYB, Jr.,
JAMES 0. EASTIAND,
SAM J. ERVIN Jr.,

EvEREn M. bIRKszN,

ROMAN L. HRUSKA,

Manageron the Part of the Senate.
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STATEMENT OF THE MANAGERS ON THE
PART OF THE HOUSE
The managers on the part of the House at the conference on the
disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the House
to the bill (S.J. Res. 1) proposing an amendment to the Constitution
of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and
Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, submit the following statement in
explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conferees
and recommended in the accompanying conference report:
The House passed House Joint Resolution 1 and then substituted
the provisions it had adopted by striking out all after the enacting
clause and inserting all of its provisions in Senate joint Resolution 1.
The Senate insisted upon its version and requested a conference; the
-House then agreed to the conference. The conference report recommends that the Senate recede from its disagreement to the House
amendment and agree to the same with an amendment, the amendment being to insert in lieu of the matter inserted by the House
amendment the matter agreed to by the conferees and that the
House agree thereto.
In substance, the conference report contains substantially the
language of the House amendment with a few exceptions.
Sections 1 and 2 of the proposed constitutional amendment were not
in disagreement. However, in sections 3 and 4, the Senate provided
that the transmittal of the notification of a President's inability be to
the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The House version provided that the transmittal be to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives. The conference report provides that the transmittal be to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives.
In section 3, the Senate provided that after receipt of the President's
written declaration of his inability that such powers and duties would
then be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. The
Houseversion provided the same provision except it added the clause
"and until he transmits a written declaration to the contrary". The
conference report adopts the House language with one minor change
for purposes of clarification by adding the phrase "to them", meaning
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House.
The first paragraph of section 4, outside of adopting the language
of the House designating the recipient of the letter of transmittal be
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives, minor change in language was made for purposes
of clarification.
In the Senate version there was a specific section; namely, section 5,
dealing with the procedure that when the President sent to the Congress his written declaration that he was no longer disabled he could
resume the powers and duties of his office unl:3ss the Vice President
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and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments,
or such other body as the Congress might by law provide, transmit
within 7 days to the designated officers of the Congress their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. Thereupon, the Congress would immediately proceed to decide the issue. It further provided that if the Congress
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President would continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President would resume the powers and duties of his office.
The House version combined sections 4 and 5 into one section, now
section 4. Under the House version, the Vice President had 2 days
in which to decide whether or not to send a letter stating that he and
a majority of the officers of the executive de artments, or such other
body as Congress may by law provide, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. The conference report
provides that the period of time for the transmittal of the letter must
be within 4 days.
The Senate provision did not provide for the convening of the Congress to decide this issue if it was not ip session; the House provided
that the Congress must convene for this specific purpose of deciding
the issue within 48 hours after the receipt of the written declaration
that the President is still disabled. The conference report adopts
the language of the House.
The Senate provision placed no timie limitation on the Congress for
determining whether or not the President was still disabled. The
House version provided that determination by the Congress must be
mads within 10 days after the receipt of the written declaration of
the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the
executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law
proviIe. The conference report adopts the principle of limiting the
period of time within which the Congress must determine the issue,
anid while the House original version was 10 days and the Senate
version an unlimited period of time, the report requires a final determuination within 21 days. The 21-day period, if the Congress is in
session, runs from the date of receipt of the letter. It further provides
that if the Congress is not in session the 21-day period runs from the
tine that the Congress convenes.
A vote of less than two-thirds by either House would immediately
authorize the President, to assume the powers and duties of his office.
EMANUEL CELLER,

BYRON

G.

ROGERS,

JAMES C. CORMAN,
WILLIAM

RICHARD

M.

H.

MCCULLOCH,

Po7,

lanagere on the Part of the Hoitue.
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